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ABSTRACT
COMMANDEERING EMPIRES: EGYPT, TRIPOLI, AND TUNIS IN THE AGE
OF REVOLUTION, 1774-1835
Mukaram Hhana
Eve M. Troutt Powell
This dissertation interrogates our conceptualizations of space, our understanding of
the topographical borders of historical regions, and our historiographical depiction of the
margins between imperial administration and local autonomy the Ottoman Maghreb. It
does so by juxtaposing the history of corsairs, Bedouins, desert caravans and empires in
turn-of-the-nineteenth-century North Africa. Further, it examines the horizontal
connections among the North African provinces and their corresponding systems of
governance. The central premise of this dissertation is that one cannot fully understand
the policy and affairs of turn of the nineteenth century Egypt, or the Porte, without a firm
grasp on the historical context of neighboring Ottoman Tripoli and Tunis.
Approaching this project with a regional lens allows this research to challenge the
historiographical perception that North Africa was a periphery of the Ottoman world, and
that its coastlines were the southern periphery of the Mediterranean region. Rather, it
argues that for as incomplete as Mediterranean history is without a thorough examination
of North Africa, North African history in turn cannot be understood without examining
the Sahara and the region’s connections with the Sahel. By reframing the concept of
frontier space in our understanding of empire, this work takes zones of contact that have
been traditionally seen as marginal and situates them at the center of the narrative.
Changing this perspective allows us to better contextualize how Ottoman power
structures ran both vertically between the imperial center, the periphery and beyond, but
also horizontally— across the seas and the sands of North Africa, and across the divides
of the provinces: Egypt, Tripoli, and Tunis. In doing so, this dissertation re-conceptualizes
our understanding of what is ‘marginal’ and blurs the lines between the sea and the sand
of African Mediterranean.
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INTRODUCTION
CHARTING A NEW MAP FOR OTTOMAN NORTH AFRICA
This dissertation interrogates how human networks created the socio-political
geography of turn of the nineteenth century North Africa. By focusing on regional and
imperial connections, it argues that as historians of the Ottoman world, North Africa,
and the Mediterranean we need to incorporate the new frameworks and methods
developed in the field after the 1950s in our analysis of space and territory. The main
objective of this research is to establish a new model for engagement, as well as a new
imagining of space, and to build out the traditional binary model of “center” and
“periphery,” within imperial studies. By tracing these networks across the span of
various Ottoman provinces and ecologies, this work weaves together the social history
of the Ottoman Maghreb and ties the histories of the distinct, yet interconnected,
spaces such as, Istanbul, Tripoli, Tunis, and Cairo, together and interwoven with the
spaces of Ghadames and Bomba and Constantine.
My cross-examination of these diverse spaces offers two important
historiographical revisions. First, this framework stretches our historical imagination
of North Africa beyond the coastlines of Tunis, Tripoli and Alexandria. It includes the
inland connections that tie together the sea to the sands of the Sahel. Secondly, it
establishes a new framework for how to understand the spaces of empire and frontier.
Traditionally, Ottomanists and North Africanists studied the top-down interplay
between an imperial center and a specific province. As a result, historians of Ottoman
Egypt concentrated on the ties between the province and the Sublime Porte. Rather
than pursuing a similar approach, I break down this historiographical paradigm by
showing how social and political networks cut across the rigidity of borders and
topography within the empire itself.
1
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Effectively, this work maps a new bilateral axis for engagement in the region.
It probes the historical viability of the east-west connections that crisscrossed through
the provinces of Egypt, Tunis and Tripoli, and argues that the connections between
the provinces demonstrated a far greater cohesion in the Ottoman Maghreb than is
currently envisioned. Secondly, my research diagrams the north-south ties between
the North African shores and the Sahel region. Typically, historians of the Maghreb
have highlighted either the maritime world of the coastlines and the long-held practice
of Mediterranean corsairing in the region’s relations with Europe or the land-based
networks of trans-Saharan caravans, and the intellectual networks of the desert saints.
I argue that both these vectors served as the infrastructural backbone for the multiple
networks of the slave trade and, later, the transregional colonial resistance movements
that found their roots in Islamic theological networks of North Africa. In doing so,
this dissertation argues that Mediterranean history is incomplete without a thorough
analysis of the North African provinces, Egypt among them, and that, in turn, North
African history remains equally fragmented without a careful analysis of the African
Sahel.
Reflections on the Field
In presenting a history of a region that has had a plethora of different
methodological and conceptual lenses applied to it, I became curious as to why so
many of my secondary sources were, in fact, so old. As I was making my way through
the literature, I found that the cornerstone studies were not the books published in the
1980s, ‘70s or ‘60s, but rather voluminous studies produced in the 1920s and ‘30s.
This realization struck me as surprising, especially when we take into consideration
the massive body of work produced since World War II.
2
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The Anglophone historiography of Egypt, and the Francophone studies of the
Maghreb and the broader Mediterranean, are nothing if not vast and rich.
Contemporary scholars, such as Khaled Fahmy, Virginia Aksan, Asma Moalla, and
Daniel Panzac, as well as their predecessors, have contributed to, and indeed revised
our methods and approaches to the history of Ottoman North Africa and the
Mediterranean. Why then did I find myself going back, time and time again, to the
interwar-period works of Henry Dodwell, Pierre Crabitès, and Georges Douin when
writing this dissertation?
As I moved forward in my research, this sense of surprise increased. For
instance, as I came across the autobiography of a Russian diplomat, who provided a
detailed portrayal of Ibrahim Pasha, I realized that the source remained untapped by
the Anglophone and Arabic historians of Egypt. Despite the author’s extended career
in the Middle East and his service in official capacity both in Egypt and the Qajar
court, I found it exceedingly delightful, if not peculiarly odd, that this account had
never made its way into wider scholarship.1 However, the question remained hanging
in the air until finally, in conversation with my adviser, I pointedly was asked the

1

Aleksander Osipovich Dyugamel', general of infantry, member of State Council, Senator of Imperial
Russia. Born 1801, died 28th May 1880 (Julian year). Son of a Privy Counsellor, he was born in Mitau
(currently Latvia) to a wealthy aristocratic family of German origin and entered the Corps of Pages. He
entered military service in 1820, in 1828-1829 he participated in the war against Ottomans and was
awarded the rank of captain. In 1831 he fought against the November Uprising and also distinguished
himself and received the medal 'for bravery' and the rank of colonel. In 1832 he entered general staff
and in 1833 he was sent for his mission to Egypt. He subsequently became the plenipotentiary minister
of the Qajar court in Tehran. In 1841, he returned to serve in the General Staff. In 1842 he served as a
special envoy to Moldavia and Wallachia, and subsequently he was in the planning committee for the
construction of road and waterways system in Russia. In 1847 he entered tsar Nicholas I's entourage
and in 1849 he became General Lieutenant. Subsequently, he received the medal of St. Vladimir
second-class, and White Eagle Order for excellent performance during his second mission to Moldavia
and Wallachia. In 1851 he became a senator and in 1856 was awarded with the Order of St. Aleksandr
Nevskii. In 1861 he became the general of infantry and the governor-general of Western Siberia, and in
1865 he became the commander of Western Siberian Military District. In 1866, on his own request, he
was relieved of all his duties, but remained a senator and the member of State Council. In 1870, on the
occasion of 50th year of service, he was appointed back to the General Staff. He died in his estates in
May 1880.
3
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same question that had loitered in the back of my mind for so long; and with the
question, an answer began to crystalize.
Trends in the Field
The field of history, like many others, has its own trends and styles that shift
in and out of fashion with the changing ages. The 1950s-‘60s were a time of massive
socio-political, ideological, and economic upheaval in the region of the Middle East
and North Africa. The many manifestations of nationalism, be it qawmiyya and
wataniyya, or the many more within, changed the history of the region, but also the
ways we told the history of the region.
As momentous changes revised the political map of the Maghreb and led to
the casting off the old colonial shrouds, the history of the region faced new demands
from the public, interested in more contemporary models and approaches to the past.
There was an air of newness and excitement in the region. The ‘great man’ narrative
was largely out, reduced to the field of contemporary history about the dynamic
politicos of the age, such as Nasser. As the states of the region gained and established
their independence, the field of historiography turned its attention away from stodgy
questions of empires, sultans, and war. These questions gave way to more
contemporary and pressing issues: new political ideologies and emerging identities,
be they modern Islamism of Qutbist inspiration, pan-Arab aspirations of ba’athist
movement, anti-colonial and pro-independence movements of the FLN and the PLO,
feminist pioneers such as Nawal El Saadawi and Fatima Mernissi, or even the sociopolitical inspirations resonating in the songs of Umm Kulthum or Fairuz. In this novel
and robust intellectual context, the notion of writing a diplomatic history about a time
of war long past became, much like the kings and the colonial influences that the
4

Msdfasd

revolutions had so vehemently tried to uproot, entirely and appropriately outdated.
For the broader field of Middle Eastern and North African history, this was
nothing short of groundbreaking. The change of perspective yielded many brilliant
contributions to the literature of the field. Finally, the narratives of women, peasants,
workers, Bedouins, and other central but nevertheless marginalized people were being
told—or at the very least included—in the bigger picture. In fact, the framework of
this wave of research, as well as the post-colonial, post-structural, post-modernist
approaches that came afterwards, tied together by a general revisionist theme, remains
very much the heart of the arguments presented here.
The questions that I ask in this dissertation and the methodology I employ in
trying to decipher socio-political and economic idioms of the turn-of-the-nineteenthcentury Ottoman Maghreb, in many respects originated and took shape within a
context of great privilege: the high vantage point built by the secondary literature
allowed me to look far enough as to explain the phenomena I have addressed in the
present study. Nonetheless, the type of history that this dissertation tells is in fact,
very different.
A Return to Old Questions
Put simply, the radical shift forward in the field of history from the 1950s
onwards has had massive, broad-sweeping ramifications for our understanding of the
Middle East, both with regard to the topics that were examined and re-interpreted, as
well as the topics that were not. It is the humble contention of this introduction that
the ‘old fashioned’ diplomatic approaches to the region need to be reexamined. That
these bonds of regionalism still permeate and unify the region and can be seen in the
movements as contemporary as the Arab uprisings in 2011. Can we, as Middle
5
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Easternists, truly be surprised that shortly after Tunisians brought down Ben Ali,
Egyptian took to Tahir to do the same to Mubarak? Or, that after the wave of
revolutionary fervor that spurred Yemenis to take down Saleh across the Red Sea,
inspired Qaddafi’s long-silenced dissidents to take to Green Square in Tripoli? Had
not each of these four leaders embedded themselves and their governments in the
discourse of a highly specific form of wataniyya nationalism, and had they not
considered untouchable in the many years before 2011? Why then did they all come
down so fast and more specifically, right after one another?
And in turn, was it not the subsequent power vacuum in post-Qaddafi Libya
that allowed for the radicalization of Cyrenaica and the gradual trickle of PanIslamism over the border of the Western Desert? Did not the ties between of the alHarakat al-Islamiya al-Libiya and al-Qaeda underscore the later radicalization of the
Sinai’s Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis, an organization that pledged its commitments to the
trans-regionally violent Islamic State of Iraq and Syria? Or, more to the point, that this
organization only came into its own and found support in Egypt after the forced
removal of the freely elected Muslim Brotherhood? While it is beyond the scope of
this dissertation to delve into current affairs, I argue that it is simply no longer an
option for my generation of scholars to underplay either the historical or
contemporary effects of regionalism and the importance of cross-national ties among
socio-political movements among the many, and varying spaces of North Africa and
the Middle East.
The Power of Connection
To fulfill these objectives, this dissertation examines the structure of sociopolitical engagement across a wider geography than has typically been considered to
6
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constitute Maghrebi space. By focusing on three specific provinces: Egypt,
Tripolitania and Tunis, this dissertation is able to extrapolate on the specific nature on
the provinces’ ties to one another. Furthermore, it also examined the region’s northern
ties to their Mediterranean neighbors as well as its southern ties to the Central Saharan
Sahel, and the spaces Bornu, Hausaland, and the broader Sudan.
However, imagining this space requires that we change the state of play on
multiple levels. First, it is the contention of this dissertation that we have overly
dissected turn-of-the-nineteenth-century Ottoman imperial space along borders that
were yet to exist. The spaces of Tunis, Tripolitania, and Egypt were by no means as
fragmented as we image them, nor were they insulated from one another by
impermeable boundaries. Rather, this dissertation underscores the inter-provincial
connections across the broader region, and the socio-economic, political and
ideological interlinkages that tied the histories and peoples.
This is a critical point, since – by deconstructing the sharp boundaries within
Ottoman North Africa – we are effectively reintroducing Egypt into the broader
history of both the Maghreb and the Mediterranean. With this critical omission, our
contemporary understanding of what made up “the Maghreb” and “the
Mediterranean” that has long overlooked the maritime connections, as well as the
socio-economic, and political ones that firmly embedded Egypt in the world of its
Arabic speaking Maghrebi neighbors in the Ottoman Empire, has haunted our
understanding of North African history. At the same time, by bringing Egypt back
into Maghrebi space and history challenges our contemporary, post-colonial
perceptions of space, which have led to compartmentalization of the region along
imperial lines. As a result, Algerian and Tunisian history belong largely to the
7
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Francophone literature, Egypt and the Hijaz–to the Anglophone, while Libya remains
the preserve of Italian scholarship. However, these anachronistic divisions meant
nothing to the North Africans of the early nineteenth century.
Secondly, by expanding our concept of the Mediterranean past beyond the
mountains and coastlines described by Braudel, and by underscoring North African
ties to the Sahel, we discover that it was never either the narrative of the sand or the
one of the sea for the provinces of Ottoman North Africa.2 Rather than dissecting the
political and social context, in which North African political actors, corsairs,
Bedouins, slave traders, Islamic theorists, and travelers operated, into two isolated
vectors, this dissertation focuses on the role of Maghrebi provinces as a crucial nexus
in the interwoven networks that linked the world of coastlines and the world of the
interior.
Historiography: Overview
To say that the Mediterranean has been an important focus in modern
historiography would be an understatement. From the works of Braudel and other
scholars before him, the ‘Middle Sea’ has served as the primary locus for generating,
developing, testing and positing several important historical hypotheses.3 In a
collective volume, devoted to the sea from throughout the ages, David Abulafia
applied the very notion to ‘Mediterraneans’ as an interpretive tool for global and
comparative history. In it, he used this label to describe such disparate regions as East
China Sea, as well as Central Asian and African deserts.4 Thus, the idea of the

2

Fernand Braudel, The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II, Vol. 1,
trans. Siân Reynolds, 2nd ed. edition (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996).
3
ibid.
4
David Abulafia, The Great Sea: A Human History of the Mediterranean, Reprint edition (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2013).
8
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Mediterranean, in many respects, could function as a shorthand for entangled
history—as space that linked disparate regions, polities, and communities together
and underscored the intricate ties of one space to another. After all, as Horden and
Purcell argued, regardless of the nature of a particular microclimate, sheer necessity
forced the engagement of various zones of the sea. Dependency demanded
interaction, and required engagement across specific zones of the Mediterranean.5
However, not everyone agreed with this thesis.
In his book, The Forgotten Frontier Hess, an Ottomanist by training, read
Braudel’s two-volume tome, The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the
Age of Philip II, and was wholly unconvinced by the Annales scholar’s notion of a
regional cohesiveness. Braudel’s main premise, that there were historical connections
among northern and southern shores of the Mediterranean by way of shared
geography, terrain, climate and diet that stretched through longue durée and into the
sixteenth century, became the foundation on which Hess built his antithetical
response. For Hess, the sea was split, with the fault line running between Muslim and
Christian domains. To frame his decidedly bifurcated world of socio-political
division, he argued that throughout the sixteenth century, the northern and southern
shores of the Mediterranean had effectively turned their backs to one another along
the divide of the coasts that separated Christian Europe and Muslim North Africa.
Hess argued that “the process of historical change during the sixteenth century
produced a new segregation of Mediterranean life”6 that ultimately allowed the
Hapsburg monarchy of Iberia and the Ottoman deys of Algiers, as well as the sultans

5

Peregrine Horden and Nicholas Purcell, The Corrupting Sea: A Study of Mediterranean History
(Malden: Wiley-Blackwell, 2000).
6
Andrew Hess, The Forgotten Frontier: A History of Sixteenth-Century Ibero-African Frontier
(University of Chicago Press, 2010), 3.
9
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of Morocco, to isolate themselves from one another. Nevertheless, despite his premise
of the historical isolation, Hess’s book remains important in the comparative approach
it used in its analysis of sources from Rabat and in Simancas, even without a profound
reliance on Arabic language materials.
A cursory look at the western historiography of North Africa during the
Ottoman period shows that the representation of Southern Mediterranean has been
largely overlooked within the broader historiographical narratives, of both the
Ottoman world and the Mediterranean history. In regards to the Ottomanist works,
this is especially true for the westernmost regencies of Algiers, Tunis and Tripoli,
which for over three centuries played a crucial role in projecting Sublime Porte’s
naval power in the Mediterranean. However, a few monographs notwithstanding, the
history of these provinces is prominently absent from general accounts of Ottoman
history. Even the works specifically devoted to the Arabic speaking provinces of the
empire have paid little to no attention to the developments in the Ottoman west.7
Instead, the prevalent perception of the three Maghrebi regencies has been one of
isolated, largely independent communities, lacking interest in wider geopolitical
developments and invested solely in revenue from the practice of corso. Meanwhile,
the historiography of the Mediterranean region effectively isolated Egypt to the same
extent that Ottoman work overlooked the North African provinces.
This piecemeal approach to the history of the region has subsequently had a
profound impact on our conceptualization of the region. Scholars working within the
field of Ottoman studies – both Anglophone and Turkophone – have generally
privileged the ‘core’ provinces of the empire and the ‘view of the center’, while
7
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underplaying the role of the Maghreb as a far-away, relatively detached region,
overwhelmingly disinterested in the affairs of the Porte. In turn, for western, mostly
French, scholars of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries the dominant narrative
also emphasized the region’s relative isolation and stagnation. By presenting
Maghrebi rulers and communities as perhaps little more than maritime bandits,
European historical narratives effectively justified and legitimized France’s colonial
expansion and rule over the territories to the south of Mediterranean.
The wave of decolonization in the 1950s and 1960s, followed by the
establishment of independent states of Algiers, Tunisia and Libya, brought a new
wave of scholarship by North African historians, who challenged the dismissive
discourse of North African history and recovered the local perspective as part of the
broader ongoing nation-building efforts. However, while these studies have greatly
contributed to deepening our knowledge of the history of the region, the main tenets
of the ‘nationalist’ paradigm did not encourage a re-evaluation of close ties across the
region or the imperial context of the pre-modern period. Rather, Ottomans became
anachronistically considered as ‘foreign occupiers’ of the Maghreb, which led
scholars either to denounce the Sublime Porte as yet another imperial power, or to
underplay the region’s connection to the imperial center and the broader Ottoman
world altogether. Paradoxically, in their efforts to reclaim North African histories as
their own, North African scholarship indirectly reinforced the perception of the
Maghreb’s isolation.
This trend has changed somewhat in the recent years, with authors such as
Khaled Fahmy, Asma Moalla and Tal Shuval trying to reconnect the history of
Maghrebi regencies into the wider narratives of the Ottoman polity. However, despite
11
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the considerable amount of information that these studies have provided, they also
reinforce the “center-periphery’ binary within the field of Ottoman history. The
engagement between Cairo and Constantinople, Tunis and Constantinople, and
Algiers and Constantinople, are respectively analyzed, but the broader subject of the
provinces’ position in both North Africa and the Ottoman world falls away. Similarly,
the careful analysis of the vertical ties between center and periphery came at the cost
of the horizontal connections that bound the provinces together within the larger
region. Thus, the reintegration of regencies into the Ottoman ‘hub-and-spoke
network’ came at the expense of ignoring the entanglements within the region.
From the vantage point of Ottomanist historiography, most studies have
focused on the models of imperial governance and framed the relationship between
the Porte and the provinces as a binary relationship between the center and
peripheries. This approach took its most salient form in the Empire of Difference by
Karen Barkey, in which she outlined the structure of the Ottoman Empire as a ‘huband-spoke network,’ with the imperial center in Istanbul brokering communication
and political power between otherwise unconnected territories and communities.8
According to the author, the virtuosity of the Ottoman state in managing its periphery
was crucial for the longevity of the imperial enterprise, which began to unravel once
the Tanzimat reformers set out to overhaul the administrative structure along the lines
of the nation-state. In this respect, Barkey taps into the wider paradigm of
historiographies of the empire, with similar lenses adopted by scholars of Qing China,
Russia and European composite monarchies.9 The same point of view made has
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overwhelming been the adopted by Turkophone scholars.
When discussing the naval campaigns and the importance of the maritime
world in the policies of the Sublime Porte, İdris Bostan’s work stands out. His studies,
which mostly focuses on the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, highlights the
importance of the Ottoman navy in the history of the Sublime Porte. Focusing
exclusively on the Ottoman archival records of the tersane, Bostan analyzed the
efforts of the Ottoman Porte to expand the fleet and maintain control of the Adriatic.
While the Turkish author was mostly interested in the Ottoman corso of the ‘Golden
Age,’ his work has also touched on the Ottoman role in the Italo-Turkish War of
1912, which ushered in the wave of Italian colonialism in the province of
Tripolitania.10 Similarly, Orhan Kuloğlu has also addressed the topic of Ottoman
Tripoli in the twentieth century. While the author’s interests lay within the sphere of
political history under Ottoman rule (1832-1912), Kuloğlu also took the pains to
highlight the role of Ottoman-Maghrebi connection. This dissertation builds on the
research of these Turkophone scholars by examining the history of the political ties
before the Ottoman reoccupation in 1835 and highlights the cross-regional ties, rather
than limiting itself to the connection between a province and the imperial center.11
Historiography: The Dominancy of the Center and Periphery
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Recently, scholars of the Ottoman world have increasingly underscored the
point that an overemphasis of the relationship between the center and the periphery
often leads us to overemphasize the perspective of the former, while depriving
peripheral agents of their agency. It is true that early modern empires did not provide
the level of horizontal integration on par with that of the nation-state, nor did they
contribute to the emergence of national identities on a comparable scale. However, to
assume that peripheral actors simply conformed to the ‘hub-and-spoke’ model
imposed top-down by the imperial authorities would be a misrepresentation. Different
arrangements existing between the Sublime Porte and the territories and communities
under its control did not prevent the latter from forming their own, autonomous ties
with other actors in pursuit of their political goals.
On the contrary, in some respects, these horizontal ties constituted an integral,
albeit informal, part of imperial governance systems, facilitating procurement of
resources, communication and defense.12 As Kerry Ward has pointed out in her
analysis of the Dutch East India Company (VOC) and its networks of exile, even
state-mandated networks could produce unintended consequences. Her study showed
that the practice of exiling political and religious figures from Batavia to South Africa
inadvertently contributed to the emergence of ties between the two loci of imperial
power, a consequence that officials of the company did not expect, in effect
establishing Islamic religious ties between South Africa and East India.13 At the same
time, the position of Cape Town as a prisoner colony for the VOC enraged free
12
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settlers and eventually led to the Dutch loss of South Africa to their British rivals.
Thus, even if the imperial center struggled to keep the peripheries isolated, it could
not prevent the emergence of alternative power networks that ran horizontally across
provincial divides.14
This is especially important in the context of the last quarter of the eighteenth
and the beginning of the nineteenth century, when the Ottoman imperial edifice faced
enormous challenges, both foreign and domestic. The tremendous debacle in the
course of Russo-Ottoman war of 1768-1774 had far-reaching effects on the empire’s
position in Eastern Europe, with the loss of suzerainty over the Crimean Khanate
constituting the biggest blow and effectively opening the ‘Eastern Question.’15 Even
more importantly, the scale of the defeat in the eastern realms had grave consequences
for the Porte’s reputation internally. Throughout the eighteenth century Baki Tezcan,
Ariel Salzmann, Bruce McGowen and Karen Barkey have all pointed out that
Ottoman society and institutions underwent a tremendous change where the provincial
elites were increasingly involved in the empire’s system of governance.16 This
transformation coupled with the losses of 1774 and the subsequent crisis of legitimacy
allowed these newly empowered actors came to doubt the Porte’s ability to preserve
the social and political order. Therefore by the last quarter of the eighteenth century
the Sublime Porte had become increasingly dependent on the cooperation of the local
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strongmen, such as Osman Pazvantoğlu Pasha and Ali Tepelenla Pasha, to maintain
authority while the latter grew less responsive to the bidding of the imperial center.17
The crisis of legitimacy and coordination came at a critical point, when
developments in Europe reshaped the geopolitical context of the Mediterranean. The
French Revolution and subsequent continental conflicts that changed balance of
power in Europe swept across the Mediterranean, overturned traditional alliances and
posed new challenges for the Ottoman authorities, central and provincial alike.18 The
increased presence of British and French navies in the Mediterranean, as well as the
emergence of new sea powers (such as the United States and Russia), cut deeply into
the economic and political interests of the Porte, which itself was facing a time of
reform under Selim III and its relationship with the Maghrebi regencies, and would
endure even more change after the Congress of Vienna mandated an abolishment of
the corso in the early decades of the nineteenth century.19
Napoleon’s landing in Alexandria in 1798 foreshadowed yet another, even
more important watershed in the region: the rise of colonial idiom in European
policies towards the North Africa. While the emergence of this new form of
imperialism occurred in a piecemeal fashion, it was also, as Jennifer Pitts, fueled by
the growth of an intellectual climate in favor of permanent occupation of the southern
shores of the Mediterranean.20
Faced with these new challenges, the Ottoman provinces of North Africa were
often left to their own devices and became reliant on one another in their sustained
17
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viability. Their distance from Constantinople and slow communication constituted a
serious obstacle in the period before space-time compression set in around the world,
and while the ties between the regencies and the center remained intact, they were by
no means the only ties present. Tripoli, Tunis, and Egypt faced diplomatic and
military challenges of a different kind than that of the Ottoman imperial center. With
the Porte fighting a losing battle against the Russian Empire in the Balkans and in the
Caucasus, the elites of the North African provinces often found themselves on their
own in dealing with fast-changing political climate—at least while officials in the
center mulled over and implemented their response. Thus, the imperatives of political
survival forced local elites to engage with their counterparts in other provinces and
beyond, creating the web of grassroots diplomacy.
However, this dimension of North African history has been largely ignored by
scholars, who instead focused on binary relations between the center and specific
provinces. This is clearly the case in the studies of Egypt, one the most important of
Ottoman provinces. While the historiography of Ottoman Egypt has recovered from
the nationalist frameworks and recent work has highlighted its provincial ties to the
Ottoman Porte and the Greater Syria region and the Hijaz, the connections with its
western neighbors remain unexplored.
In regards to the remaining Ottoman Maghreb, the dominate paradigm shifts
slightly. The three spaces of Tripoli, Tunis and Algiers have typically been subsumed
under an umbrella category of the Barbary Coast, and the examination of the region
has highlighted the practices of corso to the neglect of the inland histories. However,
despite the trans-provincial classification of ‘Barbary’ a closer examination of the
literature has revealed that studies of the western Ottoman Maghreb have ignored the
17
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connections existing among the provinces, and addressed their developments either in
isolation or, more recently, discuss their individual connections with imperial centers.
Even more importantly, studies addressing the Mediterranean dimension of the
Maghrebi existence and the provinces’ ties to the Porte tend to ignore the connections
that bound Algiers, Tunis, and Tripoli, with their respective hinterlands. As a result,
the Maghrebi provinces emerge from the scholarship as narrow strips of land,
sandwiched between the sea of water and the sea of sands, with no viable connection
between them, with Maghreb being a region in a name only.
One of the most of prominent examples of the tendency to underplay regional
ties in favor of center-periphery relations can be discerned in Asma Moalla’s study of
late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century Tunis. While the author focuses on the
connection between the Porte and the beys of the province, Tunis’ neighbors to the
east and west are sidelined.21 Similarly, the studies on Ottoman Egypt rarely even
mention the existence of Maghrebi provinces, not to mention analyzing their mutual
ties.22 Of course, this does not mean that such a heuristic choice is in any way wrong,
as the robust scholarship on Ottoman provinces has shown.23 However, it comes at a
price of underplaying horizontal networks that straddled the administrative
boundaries, thus creating an impression of a system imposed from top-down and
overwhelmingly dominated by a hub-and-spoke model.
Historiography: Diplomatic Ties
The focus on vertical ties stands in a stark contrast to the evidence of many
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sources, both from the Porte and the provinces, which suggest an interconnectedness
of the provinces and the operation of grassroots diplomacy on multiple levels. This
dynamic was further exacerbated by the development of the field of North African
history. While diplomatic relations constituted the main object of study at the
inception of modern historiography of the region, colonial context and conceptual
limitations precluded the scholars – often without the knowledge of Arabic and
Ottoman Turkish – from presenting a holistic picture of these ties. As a result, the
analysis of the region’s ties with the world beyond the pale was restricted to the
matters of bilateral relations with European powers and the Porte on the government
level. The colonial division between French Maghreb and British-controlled Egypt
only deepened this divergence and discouraged scholars from addressing the historical
ties between the former Ottoman provinces. In turn, as the wave of decolonization
swept through the region, the new generation of historians steered away from the
themes of diplomacy and political history, shifting the focus towards cultural,
economic, and social history.
This interplay between centrality and marginality was also prominent in the
case of the Phanariot community, recently revisited by Christine Philliou. Despite the
fact that the Greek Orthodox identity of this milieu removed its members from most
positions of power, these influential families came to occupy key positions with the
Ottoman system of governance, including those of dragomans of the Porte and the
voievodes of the Danubian principalities. The Phanariot experience, which grew in
scale during the late seventeenth century and continued beyond the Greek revolution
of 1821, eludes traditional categorizations of centrality and peripherality. While
socially marginal to the Muslim Ottoman elite, the Phanariot families constructed an
19
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intricate nexus of political positions, which straddled between the northern fringes of
the empire, the Porte itself, and the Aegean possessions of the sultan.24
The relative abandonment of diplomatic topics in North Africanist scholarship
means that the field was largely bypassed by the developments in the field of
diplomatic and imperial studies that contributed to the expansion of the notion of
diplomacy itself. As scholars have pointed out, the imperial structure of early modern
polities blurred the boundary between the spheres of internal and foreign politics that
we tend to take for granted.25 Thus, it is difficult to even establish, where did the
imperial domains end, and precludes a clear differentiation of the spheres of domestic
policy and diplomacy.26 At the same time, new generation of scholarship has brought
to light a plethora of non-state actors, whose actions and political interests were also
conducive to the expansion of cross-border and trans-regional political networks.
While networks of religious scholars, corsairs, and Bedouins were not diplomatic
actors in the strict sense of the world, their role and impact on the wider political
landscape cannot be ignored anymore. This makes it incumbent for us to revisit the
topics that have been effectively abandoned by mid-twentieth century and re-examine
them in the context of new scholarship.
Historiography: The North Africanists
The emergence of such cross-provincial and cross-regional ties went beyond
the sphere of diplomacy, but also brought a sense of common interests and identity
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throughout the region. This identity was not borne out, or rather – not only out, of
religious solidarities or the sense of being subjects of the sultan or common language.
Instead, the linchpin of this common identity of North Africa as a region stemmed
from the land and the provinces’ peculiar position within the region and the wider net
of political, intellectual and social ties that operated in the Mediterranean, imperial
and African contexts. Thus, in order to understand the region properly, it is necessary
to fix our vantage point in the Maghreb and avoid the center-oriented approach
adopted in most studies.
Within the realm of Arabic-language historiography, it is important to keep in
mind distinctions between North African approaches to region and western
approaches to the region. This is to say, while the nationalist narrative looms large in
the histories of the region, so too do the intellectual, anti-colonial, cultural threads that
bound the regions of the Maghreb together. For example, in his three monographs on
the on the historical relationship between Tripoli and and Egypt, Sāmiḥ Ibrāhīm
ʻAbd-al-Fattāḥ delves into the historical outline of the trade relations between the two
provinces under Ottoman administration, the relationship between the Karamanlı
dynasty and the Mamluks and later Mehmed Ali, as well as the general governorship
of the Ottoman Porte in the North African provinces. Throughout the three works, the
author, much like Zā'idī, Muhammad Rajab in his work on the relationship between Tripoli
and Egypt during the French invasion, highlights the religious commonalities between the
provinces.27
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However, it is in this matter of the factors underpinning the social cohesion between
the provinces that my work differentiates from the broader body of Arabic literature. This is
to say, while common religious identity, and, to a lesser extent, languages are often used to
highlight the cohesion between the North African provinces, this work instead adopt the
approach proposed by Firoozeh Kashani-Sabet in her work on the importance of land and its
representations in the formation of communal ties, be they nationalist or, in this case,
regionalist.28 After all, while the ties between the North African provinces and the Porte were
also reflective of a common religious ideology, the fact remains that the ties among the
provinces themselves oftentimes superseded confessional ties common to the Ottoman, as
well as the Safavid, empires. This approach stands in contrast to a pan-Islamist reading of
Maghrebi history, adopted by Imḥammad Saʻīd Ṭawīl in his monograph, Baḥrīyah alṬarābulusīyah fī ʻahd Yūsuf Bāshā al-Qaramānlī, published in 2000. At the same time, the
interpretive framework also diverges from Tawīl’s nationalist perspective, which often times
conflating the matter of complicated matters by also conflating the spaces of Ottoman
Tripolitania with the contemporary nation of Libya.29
In western scholarship, the work of contemporary North Africanists is quite
extensive, and has developed across the field in an overwhelming province-centric
approach. For example, in the realm of Tunisian historiography, Montana, Oualdi,
Moalla and Kalender’s research on the history of slavery, the political relations of the
Tunisian Mamluks, the relationship between the Bardo and the Porte, and the role of
households in the history of the Tunisian elite, have all contributed vastly to our
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understanding of the socio-political and economic conditions of the province.30 My
work builds on this literature by tying in several of the themes that the abovementioned scholars focus on, and expanding it out into a regional sense. Thus, in this
dissertation, I juxtapose Montana’s study on the history of slavery in Tunis with
Wright’s analysis of parallel phenomenon in Tripolitania in an effort to contrast the
regional trends and put together the printed primary sources that both use in an effort
to better contextualize the regional practices of the slave trade and the trans-Saharan
caravans.31
In many respects, Kola Foyalan’s works stands out in regards to turn-of-thenineteenth-century Tripoli, as well as in his pioneering insights into the relationship
between Tripolitania and Bornu.32 His research, almost exclusively conducted in the
British National Archives, was critical especially for providing a significant survey of
Tripolitan political landscape in the period, as well the policies and consequences of
its ruler, Yusuf Karamanlı. However, while Foyalan’s work is notable for the amount
of primary sources used, the research presented here supplements his conclusions by
introducing both Ottoman and Arabic language sources into the discussion. In a
similar vein, while political science studies by Ahmida and Vandewalle offer
important insights into the political life of the province, their research approaches the
early nineteenth century from the perspective of subsequent colonialism and
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independence, rather than treating the period on its own terms.33 Within the
historiography, Minanwi’s work in The Ottoman Scramble for Africa delved into the
historical connections between Tripolitania and the Sahel, specifically the Lake Chad
Basin, and the Ottoman Porte’s efforts to expand their control into the region in the
second half of the nineteenth century.34 My work expands on his argument by
highlighting the historical ties between Tripoli and the Sahel before the 1835 Ottoman
reoccupation of the province, and argues that regional forces, as well as Ottoman
imperial commutation, were critical for the saliency of the ties between the two spaces
throughout the nineteenth century.
In comparison with the Maghreb, Egypt has an extremely prominent role in the
Anglophone historiography. The works of Hathaway, Baldwin, Fahmy, Mikhail,
Hanna, and Winter, all underscore the connections between the Ottoman Porte and the
province, while contributions by Crecilus brought to light the saliency of ties between
the Egyptian Mamluks and their homeland in the Caucasus.35 In turn, Cole’s analysis
of French mentalités during the 1798 French invasion offered important insight into
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the perspective of Napoleon’s soldiers during the occupation.36 This work builds off
this extensive body of literature by looking to tie together the connections not only
Egypt and the Porte, but also the province’s place in the broader Mediterranean and
Maghrebi worlds. For its diplomatic backbone, this dissertation has turned to the older
histories of Douin, Dodwell, and Crabitès, which despite their age, all used the
Egyptian sources on Mehmed Ali in their attempts to frame the vali’s engagement
with both European imperial powers and the Porte.37 This dissertation builds off this
framework, by incorporating Ottoman sources into the broader narrative, as well as
western diplomatic reports that discuss the role of Egypt in broader imperial plans of
the French state.
Sources and Approach
The arguments presented in this work constitute the product of extensive
research in Ottoman, North African, British, French and American, as well as a
handful of translated Russian, published and unpublished, primary sources. By using a
broad compendium of sources, I was able to triangulate different perspectives of
imperial centers, provincial actors, western diplomats, with those of North African
chroniclers, political narratives and traveler accounts. Contrasting these different
imperial and regional responses allowed me to approach the same historical events
from a variety of standpoints, and gain a more holistic narrative into their political
contexts.
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For example, by turning to Ottoman, Tunisian and Tripolitan sources
concerning the 1798 French occupation of Egypt, this dissertation is able to examine
the power play behind negotiating regional logistics and alliances, the imperial
competition among the British, the French and the Ottomans, as well as the influence
of North African intelligence networks in shaping policies within the far-off imperial
centers.
By using American captivity narratives to examine the Tripolitan experience of
the First Barbary War, we are able to reincorporate the ramifications of the hostilities
on the North African province, and are given insight into how the narrative of a war
that is so top heavy from the American perspective, impacted the province of Tripoli.
It is through American sources that we learn of the deep impact of the food shortages
within the province, the degree of freedom that Americans were accorded in both the
household of the bey, and the governmental milieu of his ministers and advisers. At
the same time, these same sources provide us with an insight into the level of
cooperation between the government of Tripoli and its Egyptian and Tunisian
counterparts in the efforts to circumvent the American blockades.
Finally, by juxtaposing western and eastern European sources, and
complementing them with the evidence provided by the personal correspondence
between Ibrahim, Mehmed Ali Pasha, and the Porte, we are able to analyze the
complex nature and political dynamics of the Egyptian governor’s relationship with
the imperial center. As I will argue, especially after the Battle of Navarino, the
existing tensions between Cairo and Istanbul led to a protracted rupture between
Mehmed Ali Pasha and the government of Mahmud II.
These three examples are just a few of the contextualized vantage point that my
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research in multiple archives offers the literature. Throughout this dissertation, I
attempt to integrate these disparate threads of archival evidence, with particular
attention given to the socio-political contexts of the North African provinces, and to
weave a more holistic narrative of the Ottoman Maghreb during a time of war and
political revolt.
Throughout the study, the objective is to highlight the bilateral axis that I argue
mapped out the on the ground political engagement of, among others, emperors,
sultans, and valis in the region of the Ottoman Maghreb.
Chapter Outline
The first chapter of this dissertation, ‘The Catalyst for Change’ examines the
relationship between the North African provinces and the Porte vis-à-vis the maritime
reforms of the Grand Admiral, Gazi Hasan Pasha, and how, after the massive losses in
the Danube the Porte, attempted to reassert its authority over its remaining provinces.
It is also in this section that I introduce the key actors that emerge, and re-emerge,
throughout this dissertation, such as the authoritative Kapudan Pasha who introduced
the reforms; Yusuf Karamanlı, the young governor of Tripolitania who evicted the
corsair Ali Burghol, that had usurped his father’s post, and Hammuda Pasha, the
governor of Tunis who ushered in an age of reforms.
In the second chapter, “The French Invasion in Context, 1798-1801
Reexamined,” we look at the North African role in the 1798 French invasion of
Egypt. Throughout this section, we see that the dependence of European and Ottoman
imperial powers on networks of the North African corsair navies and the supplies and
resources of the provinces to manage the day-to-day needs of their invading troops.
Lastly, it is in this chapter that we are able, through the records of Egyptian
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chroniclers, to examine the role of North African elites, both within the city of Cairo
and among the ulama within the walls of al-Azhar, in their efforts to better position
themselves in regards to their French invaders.
Chapter Three, Corsairs and Caravans, Internal Struggles for Power, 1801-1814,
examines the ramifications of the First Barbary War on the province of Tripoli. It is
throughout this section that, with the introduction of the new American actors into the
imperial struggles, we examine the close ties between the provinces of Tunis, Tripoli
and Egypt. In this section, we also explore how North Africa political dynamics
played out during the shifting power dynamics within the region: with the rise of
Mehmed Ali as the governor of Egypt, and the shift in the attentions of Hammuda
Pasha and Yusuf Karamanlı to the interior slave networks of the provinces.
Chapter Four, Transformations on Land and at Sea, builds off our initial
exploration of the relationship between the provincial inland and the coastlines by
examining how, after the Congress of Vienna and the sharp decline in the corsair
campaigns, the governors of Tunis and Tripoli both turned their attentions inland in an
effort to recoup their lost revenues. Further, it is in this section that we analyze how
the government of Yusuf Pasha proactively looked east to the strategies and polices of
Mehmed Ali in an attempt to both undermine the political ambitions of his rivals as
well as to expand his reach and influence southwards in to the broader Sahel.
Chapter Five, ‘Mehmed Ali’s Egypt and the New Face of Old Empires: 18241829,’ provides an analysis of the impact that Egyptian vali’s desire to build a navy and
expand his imperial reach to Crete and More had on the political dynamics of Ottoman
North Africa following the end of the age of corso, and the decline in Algiers’ sway
over the region. Moving on, we also re-examine the extent to which the last year of
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Morean campaign influenced the relationship between the governor of Egypt and the
officials of the High Porte. This chapter argues that in contrast to the dominant
narrative in the historiography, Ibrahim Pasha did not leave the peninsula until nearly
a year after the disastrous debacle of Navarino. Even then, the Egyptian commander
abandoned his post only after the rations and repeated mutinies forced his hand to
give up on his plans to take control of the peninsula.
Finally, in the epilogue and the afterward of this dissertation, we see how,
Mehmed Ali looked, with the encouragement of the French government of Charles X,
to fill the power vacuum left by a weakened Algiers. By the late 1820s, on the eve of
the vali’s invasion of Syria, both British and French diplomats courted the governor,
perceiving him as a crucial ally in the region. At the same time, during the succession
crisis in Tripoli following the deposition of Yusuf Pasha in 1832, both European
capitals looked to influence the contenders for the succession.
The themes of regionalism and regional networks binding together the three
North African provinces run like a red thread throughout the course of the study. At
the same time, they provide a point for departure for explaining the region’s
connections with the wider world, be it the Porte, European neighbors to the north, as
well as the southern expanses of the Sahel, providing a framework for the analysis of
the Ottoman Maghreb as part of the turn-of-the-nineteenth-century world history.
Imperial Models, Reimagined
Different historians have approached the provinces of North Africa and its
connections with the broader region, differently. In regards to the implementation of
imperial models, the idea of mechanics still rules supreme. Whether it is Barkey’s
hub-and-spoke, Mikhail’s argument for multiple centers within the Ottoman realms,
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Philliou’s work on Phanariot minority communities and their increased integration
and authority or the realms of the empire or Deringil’s analysis of Ottoman legitimacy
vis-à-vis the empire’s Islamic, dynastic, and Istanbul-centered nature, the notion of
the overwhelming draw of an imperial center still reigns supreme.38 A counterbalance
to this focus on a core locus is Kashani-Sabet’s work on the frontiers of Qajar Iran
and the importance of land in the definition the creation of identity.39
The theme that ties all of these models together, however, is the notion of
adaptability. While the approach to empires has always emphasized the malleable,
and ever-changing nature of the governance and administration, our models have
often turned to the world of abstract systems. Rather, this dissertation argues that we
need to find inspiration in a different type of model. In fact, the very notion of
imperial adaptability implies a life force that possesses its own mechanisms of
defense and resilience. Therefore, rather than turn to the abstract nature of mechanics,
this work argues that we could look to the environmental models on which so many
different modalities of life are sustained.
Nature loves patterns. Whether looking at the basic framework of a tree, an
acorn, a shell or even our own circulatory systems, there is an inherent cohesiveness
and repetition in the patters that are created, and recreated, over time. Whether it be
the roots of a tree that spread as far as its plot will allow it or the capillaries with that
connect various systems of the human body together, the patters, while inherently
simple on their own, are ever repeating and will reach as far as the space they are
given allows. Therefore, perhaps as an alternative to the mechanical conceptualization
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of empires we can draw our patterns from nature and from fractals in our
understanding of imperial models.
A fractal, by definition is a never-ending pattern, a small design and simple
design, be it in the shape of an ‘o’ ‘y’ or ‘x’ that, through a consistent feedback loop,
creates an ever-evolving network of forms on different scales and in different
directions. It is through this simple design that nature functions, be it in the shape of a
leaf or the formation of glaciers. Through its simplicity it becomes affordable, easy to
create and maintain the system, and also enables the structure with the resiliency to
withstand external or internal attacks. While it is beyond the scope of this introduction
to expand in great lengths on the mathematical or indeed environmental nature of
fractals, this dissertation humbly posits that these same regularities can be seen in
both the administration of provinces as well as the intimate operation of households
within the Ottoman realm.
After all, every periphery created a surrounding periphery of its own, and the
overall connection of systems of administration and interconnectedness, worked, very
much in paralleling patterns. While hub-and-spoke models tend to emphasize the topdown control of the center over the periphery, it goes without saying that the Sublime
Porte was unable to maintain direct communication, not to say control, over
peripheral actors of the vast empire extending all the way from the western limits of
Algiers to the Persian Gulf in the east. Centralized rule over a plethora of political
actors throughout such vast expanses is a difficult task even today, but it was a near
possibility in the context of early modern world, before time-space compression set
in.40 This challenge of governance haunted all premodern empires, despite the
40
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center’s ideological and bureaucratic claims otherwise.41 The Ottomans were not
exception to this rule, and while the Porte strived to show commitment to its role in
managing state affairs and dispense justice, the effective reach of its authority
depended on the cooperation of local elites.42
As a result, imperial governance took the form of a web of networks,
reminiscent of the fractal models, or of a central-place theory developed by Walter
Christaller in the field of human geography.43 The circulation of resources,
information and authority, took place along well-trodden corridors expanding from
the center to the secondary hubs in the periphery; in turn, the latter mediated the
communication with their own peripheries, following the models – albeit modified –
set out by the imperial center. This is not to mean that these peripheral hubs acted as
simple relay stations for the communication between the center and the periphery.
Instead, their brokerage position allowed them to take advantage of the existing
system for their own purposes, as well as construct their own political networks
independent from the imperial authorities. From the Porte’s perspective, this structure
of power was a double-edged sword: on the one hand, cooperation of peripheral actors
was crucial for effective control of the ‘well-protected domains;’ on the other hand, it
provided the periphery with resources that could be deployed to challenge the center’s
authority.
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Thus, the conceptualization of the imperial system of governance in terms of
fractal-like structure provides us with more opportunities than a simple ‘hub-andspoke’ model. Unlike the latter, which overemphasizes the agency of the center,
which effectively imposes its will on the periphery, the metaphor of fractals allows us
to examine the operation of imperial politics on multiple levels at the same time, thus
avoiding the pitfall of ‘seeing like the state,’44 without losing track of the inherent
interconnectedness between them. This framework allows us to explain the intricate
web of connections that bound together both the Ottoman center to its periphery,
North African provinces to each other, as well as different political and social actors
within the bounds of particular provinces.
Conclusion
With this methodological framework in mind, the analysis that follows
addresses the history of North African provinces during the turn of the nineteenth
century as a fertile testing ground for a development of said model of imperial
governance. In the pages that follow, this research strives to integrate different scales
of analysis in order to include political actors operating on different levels, from
Bedouin tribes to Ottoman viziers and European diplomats, all of whom had various
goals and agendas, but, despite their obvious differences, they belonged to the
interlocked web of networks and circuits that spanned throughout the region and
beyond.
By attempting to integrate these connected histories, this dissertation sets out to
provide a holistic depiction of the region’s political landscape at the moment of
transition. As a result, the study straddles across traditional divides established in
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historiography, bringing together different threads of scholarship and archival
evidence. In order to do this, the vantage point is fixed on the North African
provinces, thus, heuristically transforming the imperial periphery into the center of the
narrative, in which different circuits of power and politics came together, creating an
intricate web that spanned from ministerial cabinets of Paris, London and Istanbul to
the Sahel towns of Kano and Ghadames. At the same time, by extending my analysis
across early modern/modern divide, this research examines the continuities and
watersheds in the history of the region at the critical juncture in time, when traditional
imperial structure of the Ottoman Empire came to be increasingly replaced by the new
colonial idiom.
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CHAPTER ONE
THE CATALYST FOR CHANGE, 1774-1797
At the turn of the nineteenth century, Mediterranean waters were strewn with the
oars of commercial vessels, the slow heave of imperial fleets, and the rapid glide of
corsair cruisers. Heavily laden with the artifacts of empires, the sea’s waves carried
on them the broader interests of emperors and sultans, the ambitious machinations of
generals, and later, those of up-and-coming valis.
This opening chapter examines the historical relationship between the Ottoman
center and the North African territories in the last decades of the eighteenth century.
Beginning in 1774 allows us to examine the catalysts for reforms that began before
Selim III’s assumption the sultanate in 1789, and in doing so, step away from the
historiographical trope of the young sultan as the unique reformist of the age.
Moreover, it provides us with an opportunity to investigate the socio-political
behaviors and status quo of governance in the North African provinces during the
decades prior to the equally debated 1798 French invasion of Egypt. Lastly, opening
this study in 1774 questions the dominance of the early-modern/modern divide that
reigns supreme in western historical scholarship.
At heart, this dissertation is a North African history. But it purposefully opens
with a brief introduction of Catherine’s First and Second Turkish wars: the RussoOttoman wars of 1768-74 and 1787-1792, two conflicts that dominated Sublime
Porte’s attentions and engulfed the lion’s share of Constantinople’s resources during
the last decades of the eighteenth century.45 By then, the Ottoman Empire was fully
embroiled in these two increasingly costly struggles with first her Russian, and then
her Austrian, rivals. As the battles dragged on, the campaigns became increasingly
45
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burdensome, first financially and militarily, and later territorially and geopolitically
for the Ottoman state. The Porte’s losses of the age where extensive and included the
loss of the Crimea, first to independence, and then to Catherine II. This was a great
blow to both the socio-political welfare and the general confidence of the empire, the
ramifications of which catalyzed administrative as well as naval reforms within the
Sublime Porte.46 Indeed, Ottomanists have argued that it shook the very workings of
the High Porte, and the sultan’s imperial divan.
This background is critical for several reasons. First, one can trace changes in
the interaction between the Sublime Porte and the North African provinces back to the
second half of the eighteenth-century and the naval reforms of Abdul Hamid I.
Secondly, the events of the mid-to-late eighteenth century are critical for
understanding the transformation of the nineteenth-century North African world in
part due to the emergence of a central figure: Kapudan ı-Derya, Gazi Hasan Pasha.
The Ottoman Grand Admiral, whose policies and directives would become extremely
important in shaping the Porte’s relationship with North Africa to the point where his
presence could still be felt in Ottoman strategies long after his 1790 death.
Moreover, the impact of the two wars with Russia on the internal functioning
of the Sublime Porte and its diplomatic relations with the North African territories
was quite extensive. While Selim III has been widely credited as the reformist sultan,
one can actually trace the extensive naval modernization efforts to his predecessor
Abdul Hamid I, who through the directives of Gazi Hasan transformed the face of the
Ottoman maritime world after 1770.
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The naval reforms, which were largely instigated by the massive losses at
Çeşme, directly impacted the Porte’s relationship with the corsair navies of the North
African provinces. This, in turn, influenced how Constantinople regarded its North
African spaces overall. During this critical moment, we witness an evolution in the
Porte’s diplomatic exchanges with the North African territories of Egypt, Tripoli and
Tunis. The Grand Admiral played an important role in these transformations. As he
spent the formative early years of his military and administrative career in Algiers,
Gazi Hasan was quite familiar with the corso and the role it played in the North
African provinces. Correspondingly, we also see how the Ottoman Maghreb looked to
recalibrate their relationships with one another and with the Porte during this time of
extensive overhaul. After all, political transformations were taking place in the Porte
as well as in the provinces of Egypt, Tripoli and Tunis, which themselves in a state of
political upheaval.
Finally, looking at North Africa during the mid-to-late eighteenth century
pulls the historiography of the eighteenth century Ottoman Porte southward. There is
no question that a great deal of attention has been given to the impact of these two
wars on the structure and functioning of the Ottoman Empire. However, the broader
narrative and the consequences of Constantinople’s rivalries with its European rivals
have not been examined in the context of the Mediterranean or the Porte’s western
imperial domains. This is a critical omission in our historical understanding, since
access to the Mediterranean Sea and to the region’s trade routes was long considered
as a coveted prize for the various imperial centers— St. Petersburg included.
Background
In what are known in Russian circles as Catherine’s First and Second Turkish
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wars,47 the Russo-Ottoman wars of 1768-74 and 1787-1792 engulfed the lion’s share
of the Constantinople’s resources. By the late eighteenth century, the Ottoman Empire
was fully embroiled in two progressively costly struggles with first its Russian, and
then, its Austrian rivals. Eventually, the campaigns became increasingly burdensome,
first financially and militarily, and later territorially and geopolitically for the
Ottoman state. In fact, the ramifications of these two wars would go so far as to
catalyze administrative reforms within the Sublime Porte. The loss of the Crimea to
Catherine II of Russia was a great blow to both the socio-political welfare and the
general confidence of the empire. It shook the inner-world of the High Porte and the
loss of this geopolitically key peninsula was felt across the breath of the sultan’s ‘well
protected domains.’
Hostilities concentrated along the Porte’s northern Danube borderlands and
reignited the old conflict between St. Petersburg and Constantinople for control of the
territory. The resulting Ottoman losses proved extremely costly for the Sublime Porte
and transformed the topography of the empire’s holdings in southeastern Europe and
the Black Sea region. Meanwhile, the Russian Empress had finally obtained access to
warm water ports and grew more ambitious in her expansion efforts. Compounding
the Porte’s troubles, Russian victories in the Danube region incited cries for
independence across the broader Balkans.
The Russian Empire’s victory in the Russo-Ottoman war of 1768 was a hardwon one. Virginia Aksan has argued that the bravery of Ottoman frontline
infantrymen was well chronicled in both Ottoman and even Russian accounts of the
battles.48 Narratives abounded in the historical record about how in the Ottoman
47
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battalions’ efforts to defend the northern frontier, it became rather common for the
sultan’s soldiers to fight to the last man standing.49 However, despite these
noteworthy efforts, the naval losses of the 1770 Battle of Çeșme, which took
Constantinople by surprise and eviscerated the sultan’s fleet, where further
compounded by the 1774 Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca, which granted the Crimean
Khanate its independence, set the stage for the unraveling of the Porte’s political
hegemony along its northern frontier. In fact, the events of these short years realized
the empresses’ ambition for unhindered access to the Black Sea, and by extension
Mediterranean trade routes.
Officially the terms of Küçük Kaynarca only required that Sultan Abdul
Hamid I release the long-held vassal Tatar Khanate of the Crimea, which was
accorded its independence. The realpolitik in the Crimea however, was quite
different. Facts on the ground were such that Catherine’s influence over the territories
and specifically over the Tatar Khan, Şahin Giray, set the foundation for the Russian
annexation of the peninsula and surrounding lands in 1783.50 This allowed further
Russian and Austrian expansion into Ottoman domains; so much so, that AustroRussian military presence in Moldavia and Wallachia became increasingly run-of-themill by the mid-1780s.51
By the outbreak of the subsequent Russo-Ottoman war of 1787, the pendulum
of power swung strongly in Russia’s favor. Further advancing St. Petersburg’s
growing influence in the Danube region was Catherine’s secret alliance with the Holy
Roman Emperor, Joseph II, which made Austria St. Petersburg’s unwilling ally and
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coopted the Habsburg Empire into the second war. Having lost the last of the Ottoman
garrisons in Crimea in 1788 and the last protected domains of Braila in modern-day
Romania,52 Constantinople’s prospects for maintaining control along its northern
frontier continued to dwindle throughout the end of the decade. This narrative is well
known by both Ottomanist and Europeanist scholars. However, this dissertation
argues that the Danube was but only one front in the Porte’s ongoing struggles against
Russia.
Inside the walls of the High Porte, tensions grew about how to respond to the
looming threat of the empire’s territorial integrity. The loss of Crimea was a massive
blow, undoubtedly—and the loss of the sultan’s navy made Russian victories all the
more bitter for the imperial divan. Looking at the inner workings of the Porte’s highranking offices in the mid-1780s one can see a great deal of discord regarding how to
best address Constantinople’s growing Russian problem. While the several of Abdul
Hamid I’s advisers became increasingly hawkish in their outspoken support for
another war with the Russia Empire, one notable figure stands out for his cautious
stance against further hostilities with St. Petersburg: the well-respected Grand
Admiral, Gazi Hasan Pasha.53 Fearing further losses in the Black Sea and in the
Balkans, the admiral and was cautious to not feed into the rhetoric of war that had
engulfed the majority of the sultan’s advisors and remained the strongest voice for
diplomatic pragmatism throughout the mid-to-late decade.54
Empress Catherine and the Holy Roman Emperor Joseph II further flamed the
embers of war by staging a triumphant tour through the former Crimean Khanate in
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1787. This exhibit of political supremacy was seen as a humiliating blow is
Constantinople. As the Russian empress increasingly thumbed her nose at
Constantinople’s bitter losses and celebrated the soon to be established warm water
ports of Sevastopol and Kherson, the sultan’s inner circle became even adamantly
more hawkish in their rhetoric. Diplomatic wrangling grew progressively terse as their
calls for war became overtly belligerent and grew even louder still in 1787 after
Abdul Hamid I deployed Gazi Hasan Pasha to Egypt to thwart the Mamluk uprising.
With the calming pragmatism of the admiral deployed to Cairo, the Ottoman Porte
was ready to declare war on their Russian imperial rival by the summer.55
The second of Catherine’s wars, the Russo-Ottoman war of 1787 began when
an Ottoman naval detachment fired on Russian frigates off Ochakov in the Black Sea
during their assault on Kilburun. Gazi Hasan immediately withdrew from Egypt to
prepare himself and his men for the ongoing war effort. While the admiral was
equipping the weakened remains of the sultan’s navy, the Porte immediately turned to
its other resources in an effort to curtail the maritime losses of this new war with
Russia. For North Africa, this meant the conscription of the provinces’ corsair navies
and manpower. Tunis and Tripoli had previously been advised by the Grand
Admiral’s maritime networks against attacking or commandeering Russian merchant
ships in the Mediterranean. Gazi Hasan had been keen to curtail corsair attacks on
Russian vessels in the tense years leading up to war. However, this was about to
change.
The Georgian from Algiers
Cezayrli Gazi Hasan Pasha was a complex figure. A central member of Abdul
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Hamid I’s imperial council and a close confidant of the sultan, Gazi Hasan had nearly
thirty-years’ involvement in Ottoman affairs. A well-known figure across the vast
swaths of the sultan’s domains and his notables, the records of the admiral’s
movements and policies can be traced across Ottoman, Levantine, North African,
Russian, French, English, and Georgian archives in countless sources, as well as in
many more languages. Even the admiral’s epithet al-Cezayrili, or the Algerian,
reflected both the vastness of his travels and reach. After all, it spoke not of his native
home of Georgia or his adopted city of Rodosto, the place of his youth and
manumission, but rather the westernmost province where he cut his teeth in the
Ottoman maritime world—Algiers.56
Records offer little insight into Hasan’s early years in Georgia, the details of
his sale into slavery, through the devşirme child-levy, and his travel from the
Caucasus to Rodosto. Historians working with Russian archival sources however
have gleaned that he was born near the eastern Georgian town of Dusheti and that he
was “a Georgianized Armenian with an excellent command of Georgian.”57 After
arriving in Rodosto, the modern-day Turkish city of Tekirdağ that sits just northwest
of Constantinople on the Sea of Marmara, Hasan was sold to a well-known Mevlavi
merchant named Haci Osman Ağa, and his youth was recorded, at least in Turkishlanguage sources, as a relatively pleasant one. Known as plucky boy with a daredevil
streak, Hasan was raised among the merchant’s family. The young boy developed a
reputation for stubbornness, courage, and bossing around other children. Haci Osman,
his owner, grew quite fond of the young boy and on several times forbade his wife
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from selling Hasan, claiming that the boy was “like a son”58 to him. Despite these
claims within the Turkophone historiography, one could argue that the claims of
familial affection were likely exaggerated. After all, the lady-of-the-house had clearly
demonstrated she was more than willing to sell off the young slave.59
When he turned seventeen the young man joined the janissary corps, where
fought in the Austro-Russian-Ottoman war of 1735 and where he proved his valor in
the siege of Belgrade in 1738.60 Having established a name for himself as a brave
ocak in the service of Mahmud I, Hasan secured connections through a maternal
uncle, presumably in Georgia, to travel to the western-most Ottoman province of
Algiers where he was received by the dey of the province. The young man chose to
stay on in Algiers and eventually, became an important member of the governor’s
inner-circle and was eventually appointed as bey of the western Algerian province of
Tlemcen, an important costal region with a rich maritime tradition.61
Hasan grew increasingly knowledgeable about the rugged coastlines of the
region and about the maritime practices and of the North African corso, as he became
increasingly entrenched in maritime life of Algiers as well as the political practices of
notables of the Maghreb. His time in Algiers would set the foundation for Hasan’s
later work in the Ottoman admiralty.62 Moreover, it was a key moment in Hasan’s
political life since he was simultaneously forging both critical alliances and rivalries
with notable figures across the Maghreb and with the ruling family of Tripoli and the
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province’s bey, Ali Karamanlı and these influential years would later influence his
decisions as Grand Admiral.
Hasan remained in Algiers until a disagreement with the dey of the province
forced him to flee and seek refuge elsewhere.63 Little is recorded about the quarrel,
however it was likely political in nature as Hasan was forced to flee “the
machinations of the pasha of Algiers.”64
He escaped via Oran to Spain. There, he was received kindly by Charles IV,
and was eventually recommended to the king of Naples, and the latter’s emissary in
Constantinople. It was this connection that opened the path for Hasan’s return to the
Ottoman imperial center.65
After returning to Constantinople, Hasan enlisted in the Ottoman navy and
became a galleon captain in 1760.66 He worked his way up the naval ranks
exceedingly quickly. Within ten years, Hasan became Kapudan Pasha of the Ottoman
fleet under Mustafa III and was honored with the title of gazi after his performance in
the Battle of Çeşme.67 The circumstances surrounding the Battle of Çeşme and the
defeat of the Ottoman fleet in westernmost Anatolia was caused by a tactical mistake
on the part of Hasan’s predecessor, the Grand Admiral Mandalzade Hüsameddin
Pasha. Mandalzade Hüsameddin decided to dock the fleet anchor side, a decision that
allowed a small Russian squadron from the Baltic to advance before the attack with
fire ships and incinerate the Ottoman flotilla.68 Hasan had fought bitterly with the
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admiral about this decision; Mandalzade Hüsameddin was adamant in his chosen
tactic.
Afterwards, Sultan Mustafa III dismissed Mandalzade Hüsameddin and
appointed Hasan as his new Grand Admiral of the Ottoman Admiralty. Hasan not
only had vehemently opposed Mandalzade Hüsameddin’s tactical decision, proving
his skill in naval formations during the battle, but his personal actions had won him
the prestige of a war hero. After the ship under Hasan’s command caught fire—Hasan
proceeded to rescue his men, and from there swam to safety back near the Dardenelles
and “embarked on a daring manoeuvre,”69 that ultimately resulted in the recapture of
Lemnos from Russian forces.70 It was this demonstration of bravery that earned him
his gazi title, an honorific that was even coveted by various sultans of the Sublime
Porte.
Abdul Hamid I succeeded his elder brother Mustafa III in 1774. The new
sultan took Gazi Hasan as a close confidant. Under his advice and suggestion, Abdul
Hamid introduced several naval reforms led by the Grand Admiral. The backbone of
these reforms called for the remodeling of the navy along western lines. The Kapudan
Pasha looked to French shipbuilders, such as LeRoy and Durest to provide instruction
on the construction of new sailing ships. The new Ottoman fleet was intended to
match those of their European counterparts. Most importantly, these reforms included
the replacement of traditional oared fleet that comprised most of the contemporary
Ottoman vessels.71 As the Porte increasingly looked to its European rivals as the
standard by which to improve both the fleet and the technical training for the new
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naval recruits and more established officers.72 Baron de Tott, an Englishman and a
convert to Islam in the court of the Sultan, alongside a Frenchman named Karmoran
were tasked to establish a new mathematics school for naval officers in 1773.73 Three
years later, in 1776 Gazi Hasan himself established an engineering school for cadets
in the imperial shipyard on the Golden Horn, and became the school’s first
instructor.74
Despite his impressive rise in power, Hasan never forgot his Caucasian origins
or his early life in the Maghreb. In fact, his formative years had a long lasting effect in
shaping his decisions as Kapudan Pasha. His Caucasian heritage and his connections
with the North African maritime world of the corsairs would later become important
considerations in his tactical decision making. His role in the region would go a long
way shape Constantinople’s relations with both Egypt and Tripoli during his nearly
twenty-year tenure as Grand Admiral of the Ottoman navy. By the mid-1770s Gazi
Hasan looked to tighten the Porte’s reign on its naval officers as the admiralty looked
to build a corps of salaried, experienced sailors. It is here that we see the first signs of
Hasan’s ongoing apprehensions about the role of the corso in the Ottoman navy.
Throughout the substantial collection Ottoman records on the naval reforms, there
was no mention of any consultation with the various North African provinces or about
any efforts to include the corsairs in the massive naval overhauls.
This is an interesting omission and is surprising on several levels. First, the
Ottoman admiralty had typically turned to the corso for suggestions and advice
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regarding the sultan’s fleet.75 Long considered ocaks, or the equivalent of janissary
infantrymen, corsairs were historically important figures in the Ottoman maritime
world. As such, they maintained a certain cachet among Ottoman forces. Making their
exclusion in the naval reforms even more striking was that Hasan himself had spent
years in Algiers and was quite familiar with the North African maritime world.
Further still, the snub was rather pronounced as it was historically customary for the
Porte to turn to North African regarding maritime advice. North African corsairs
oversaw the creation of the first imperial shipyards on the Golden Horn, and
originally launched the Ottoman fleet—symbolically at least, the corsairs were the
sultan’s gazi warriors against European Christendom at sea.
This omission was not merely than symbolic in nature. Rather, it can be
interpreted as intentional omission on the part of the Grand Admiral within his
broader set of reforms. Particularly since sailing ships— the model that Hasan was
eager to introduce into his new fleet— had long been the favored vessels of the corso
navies. While his reform marked an important tactical shift from the traditional oared
vessels of the sultan’s navy and therefore required the extensive retraining for the vast
majority of Ottoman mariners, handling the vessel had been old-hat for the fleets of
the Maghreb. This was particularly true in regards to the shallop, a gun ship, which
the corsairs had routinely used in the eighteenth century but had only been
incorporated into the Russian and Ottoman fleets during the war of 1787.76 The
compounded nature of corsair expertise, historical precedent, and the admiral’s own
familiarity with the North African maritime world just made the silence even more
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striking.77
Before moving on, it is important to consider the he term corsair, or
sometimes ocak, that are frequently used throughout this text. For our work here, a
corsair was the operator of an armed ship, owned by either an Ottoman governor or
province, holding a state-sponsored commission or sanctioned the capture of any
enemy merchant or shipping vessel, especially in the time of war or state-sponsored
aggression. This classification entitled mariners to protection under Ottoman, as well
as broader Mediterranean, imperial and maritime practices and distinguished them
from the practice of illegal sea-robbery, or the classification of ‘pirates.’ In effect,
Ottoman corsairs were privateers: authorized agents of the Ottoman state. Thus,
making the Porte and Gazi Hasan’s exclusion of the fleets in the broader
modernization efforts even more remarkable. Their overall omission from the reforms
it was likely prompted by several factors.
First, Gazi Hasan’s difficult political relationship with the North African
provinces could have played a role in the corso’s exclusion. The Kapudan Pasha’s
animosity towards Tripoli, and specifically the Karamanlı ruler, was well known in
the diplomatic circles of the time. In 1786, the admiral went so far as to obtain a
firman from Abdul Hamid I to oust the Tripolitan bey from power.78 However, the
outbreak of rebellion among Mamluk grandees, under Murad and Ibrahim Bey in
Egypt, effectively postponed the admiral’s attempts to remove Ali Karamanlı.
Nevertheless, Hasan was undeterred. The admiral subsequently supported a
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Karamanlı rival, then still young Georgian corsair named Ali Burghol, in his efforts to
annex the regency and expel the aged Karamanlı bey.
Further complicating matters between the Kapudan Pasha and North Africa
governors could have been Gazi Hasan’s previous expulsion from Algiers. It seems
unlikely that Gazi Hasan would turn to the dey of Algiers for guidance after the
former’s abrupt exile from the regency in the 1760s. Gazi Hasan’s opinions of the
Husaynid rule in Tunis are not recorded in the Ottoman historical chronicles.
However, the rapprochement of his successor Küçük Hüseyin Pasha and the Tunisian
delegation of 1795 implied that Gazi Hasan’s snub of the corso in the maritime
reforms was at least intentional on the part of the Admiral.
Despite the overwhelming historical clues that point to an intentional
exclusion of the corso governors, Gazi Hasan was nevertheless a political pragmatist.
After all, Gazi Hasan was the only rationalist amongst the warmongering council of
Abdul Hamid I in 1787 and had long favored a more tempered approach regarding of
the ongoing hostilities with St. Petersburg. Even after the loss of Crimea, Hasan stood
unique in his opposition to the impassioned cries for war. Therefore, if he was able to
maintain such relative objectivity in regards to the Porte’s central imperial
adversary—Russia then it seems unlikely that his distaste for the Tripolitan bey, Ali
Karamanlı would have greatly influenced his strategies in the building of his new
navy or that he would have allowed his personally complicated past in Algiers to
interfere in the broader maritime reforms.
Nevertheless, the historical silence regarding the role of the corsairs in naval
reforms of the 1780s remains striking. Other explanations could be rooted in the
relative autonomy that the North African territories operated under in the years before
49
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Çeşme. Gazi Hasan was one of Sultan Abdul Hamid I’s strongest supporters, and
often served as the sultan’s enforcer of official policy. The Kapudan Pasha was
routinely deployed in the name of the Porte to quell rebellions and turmoil in the
provinces—much like his previously discussed 1787 trip to Egypt to thwart Mamluk
uprisings. While, he was personally considered a stern man, and who did not tolerate
either indecision or indiscipline kindly, Hasan was recorded as being remarkably and
equally just both among his own men and the people of various provinces.79
Al-Jabarti wrote of his arrival in Egypt, “cannons were fired to mark his
arrival. The people were happy and full of joy and took him for the Mahdī of the
age.”80Al-Jabarti continued that Gazi Hasan was willing to quickly execute looters,
regardless if they were Egyptian or his own men, if they participated in the pillaging
of private homes or in other misconducts. In fact, al-Jabarti’s treatment of Gazi Hasan
portrayed the captain as a severe but appreciated official and above all, a fair man.
The chronicler went so far as to say “[i]f Hasan Pasha had died while still in
Alexandria or Rosetta the people of the province would have died of grief and erected
over his tomb a shine with a dome and enclosure as a place of pilgrimage.”81
While Al-Jabarti’s description of Gazi Hasan is generous when compared to
those of other figures, Mehmed Ali especially, the chronicler made clear that the
Kapudan Pasha was not a man to suffer insurrection or disorder gladly. This
characteristic, coupled with the Porte’s territorial losses would likely have put
pressure on the sultan’s council to curtail in the independence of its other provinces,
Balkan and North African alike. Therefore, the growing tensions in the High Porte

79

ʻAbd Al-Rah̤ mān Al-Jabartı̄̄ , ʻAbd Al-Rah̤ mān Al-Jabartī’s History of Egypt, edited by Thomas
Philipp, Guido Schwald and Moshe Perlmann (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1994), vol. 2, 191.
80
ibid.
81
ibid, Vol. 2, 241.
50

Msdfasd

coupled with admiral’s likely aversion to the Maghreb’s relative freedoms, as well as
the relative disorder of the North African provinces in the 1780s that underscored the
admiral’s reluctance to include the corso in his broader maritime reforms—for fear of
further dissent within the empire. Lastly, Al-Jabarti’s description of Gazi Hasan was
very different from the one we will see in Tripolitan or other North African records
discussed below.
The turn towards European shipbuilders and engineers in the maritime reforms
of Abdul Hamid I were not singularly motivated by the high politics of the Porte or
the decision making of the Grand Admiral. Rather, it was symptomatic of the gradual
shift in the Ottoman Porte’s attentions and efforts to emulate their European imperial
rivals. This trend towards westernization gained support in the mid-to-late eighteenth
century, when sultans began to look west in an effort to ‘modernize’ their militaries.
While this trend first began to crystalize in the naval reforms of Abdul Hamid I, it was
later pushed much further by his successor Selim III and then again by Mahmud II in
the Tanzimat reforms of the nineteenth century. However, this turn towards Europe
was also a turn away from the traditional naval practices of the corso. This shift in the
Ottoman Porte’s attitude about the Maghrebi ocaklar was quite evident in the records
of the Ottoman state.
Eastern Wars in Western Waters
The decision to go to war with Russia in 1787 was a complicated one for the
officials of the Sublime Porte. Gazi Hasan was extremely reticent to provoke Russia
into war, for fear of additional losses after Ceşme and was doing everything in his
power to limit the further heightening of tensions between the two powers. The
Admiral’s cautious stance was well recorded in Ottoman documents. A close analysis
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of the Ottoman Porte’s records within the Prime Ministerial Ottoman Archives of
Istanbul indicated that, in fact, the only records regarding corso activity from the
period of 1781-1787 were dispatches reporting a restraint on the part of the North
African provinces in regards to Austrian and Russian commercial vessels they
encountered.82 This finding is supported by a naval dispatch, from the summer of
1787, immediately before the outbreak of war. The folio contained two signed pledges
from the governors of Tunis and Tripoli and an update of their navies’ recent
interactions with Russian trade ships in the Mediterranean.
The governors claimed that the provinces had abided with the Porte’s
previous orders that forbade their fleets from attacking or commandeering any
Russian trade ships. The governors wrote “up to now, our captains who ply the seas as
corsairs on our behalf have not harassed or inconvenienced Russian ships and their
captains when these have been encountered, nor have they attacked or seized any of
their gear or equipment.”83 The timing of these documents is of particular interest:
August 24, 1787. The Ottomans declared war on the Russians before the end of
month. It seems the Admiral was doing everything in his power to prevent the
outbreak of another war.
These assurances in the lead up to war highlighted the intricacy of the
relationship between the Porte and the provinces and offer important insights into the
nature of bonds between the two actors. By reading these pledges within the entire
body of Ottoman corso records from 1780s, one can see that a very interesting
phenomenon was taking place. The documents, both written in the hand of the
emissary Mehmed Ağa, provided the reader with various insights into how Porte
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thought about its North African territories. First, we see that Constantinople
immediately drew on all of various military and naval strengths, across the broad
stretch of the empire, both east and west in an effort to first prevent a war, and then
later to facilitate it.
By contrast, in a document from the very next month, from September we
learn that corsair fleets were actively engaged in coordinated attacks against Russian
and Austrian merchant ships off the waters of Trieste and Livorno.84 This second
report depicted a synchronized attack by the three North African corsair provinces—
Tripoli, Tunis and Algiers—against Russian and Austrian ships. This radical shift in
position not only demonstrates the governors’ eagerness to comply with the Porte’s
wishes and increase their own revenues at sea but also highlights the extent of the
cooperation between the Maghreb and the Porte. The resurgence of “the old warring
ways”85 in the Mediterranean were fully revived by the autumn of 1787.86
It is quite telling that these two provinces, geographically central between the
much larger territories Egypt and Algiers North Africa, and often overlooked in the
historiography of the mid-to-late eighteenth century Ottoman Porte, were among the
first to be drafted into the war effort in the east. The broader body of naval records
from the period noted that if any chance meeting between the corsair fleets and
Russian merchant ships in Mediterranean waters took place that the Russian ships
could be attacked and that the cargo to be given to the captain and crew of the corsair
ships.87 While the documents are worded such that if by chance their corsairs came
across these ships, the underlying message was the Porte very much encouraged
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wanted to limit Russian maritime expansion as much as possible.88
The rulers of the two provinces pledged their fleets’ assistance in curtailing Russian
trade in Mediterranean waters and the signed commitments from the Tunisian ruler
Hammuda Pasha and his Tripolitan counterpart, Ali Karamanlı have been preserved in
the records of the Ottoman Porte. The agreements, which make to a sultanic firman
requesting assistance detail the respective fleets would attack and commandeer any
Russian ships or cargo that they come across. The conditions of the agreement where
such the ships would then belong to the Porte, but the cargo would go to the
provinces.89 The Porte’s efforts to recruit the corso proved fruitful, for all parties
involved.
Similarly, communications from the Ottoman War Bureau concerning the
direct attack of Russian trade ships in the Mediterranean indicated the extent to which
the North African fleets were attempting to support the Ottoman war effort. Records
from om July 15, 1788 involved the direct attack of a Russian ships by North African
ocaks. Algerian corsairs seized a vessel under the command of the Russian Captain
Angel Stefan. The boat’s cargo, equipment, foodstuffs and crew where
commandeered for not carrying the proper papers, while the captain and his crew
were surrendered to the bey of the province.90 Similarly, Ottoman marine forces, the
“azab ocakları” from Tripoli confiscated the cargo and crew of another Russian ship
as “restitution” for the Ottoman state.91
These acts, on the part of North Africans but in in the name of the Porte, can
be analyzed in the light of imperial aggression by proxy and is telling of the Porte’s
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relations with its North African provinces on many levels. First, it shows that
Constantinople’s wars in the east directly impacted the region and were causal in their
political dealings with even the westernmost provinces. Secondly, it demonstrated that
the North African provinces responded positively to the Porte’s requests for support,
thus showing that the relationship between periphery and Porte was not as estranged
as previous literature has suggested. These two facts, taken together, show that the
Ottoman Empire at the end of the eighteenth century was much more politically
integrated than previously imagined.
These findings to indicate that the Porte was in continuous contact with the
North African governors and had effectively used the corso to impede as much
Russian trade as possible. They suggest that the Ottoman Porte adept at using North
African skill to their benefit and that the Porte was practiced in leveraging the
political distance between itself and its provinces— so as to not antagonize their
imperial adversaries into open warfare. The more Russian and Austrian merchant
ships looked to profit from the boom in Mediterranean trade, the more the Porte
looked to the North African provinces, and namely, their corsair fleets to undermine
their rivals’ commercial vessels in the region.
This is striking for several reasons. First, it demonstrated the eagerness of the
North African provinces to coordinate strategic maritime attacks on behalf of the
Porte. Both Tunis and Tripoli contributed three ships each to the broader Ottoman
efforts in the Mediterranean, while Algiers’s offered five vessels.92 However, the hatt
did not distinguish among the efforts the various provinces’ navies, nor does it outline
any tensions among the various navies of Tunis, Tripoli and Algiers. This is
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particularly notable because it shows direct cooperation between the provinces of
North Africa in their efforts to support the High Porte and to cooperate with one
another in the campaigns.
The historical context of this memorandum is quite significant. The 1780-90s
was a diplomatic difficult time in the relationship between Maghrebi regencies and
the Porte. Tensions between the respective administrations of Tunis and Tripoli and
that of Constantinople were at a century-long high. Nevertheless, the North African
regencies were eager to comply with the Porte’s requests. Moreover, the numbers of
ships provided were significant, particularly given the naval conditions of the
Tripolitan navy at the time, which was in a terrible state of disrepair. Thus, North
African provinces played a much more critical and central role in the Ottoman Porte’s
response to the hostilities with the Russian empire.
Lastly, these findings undermine two historiographically-accepted arguments
in the literature. The first was presented by Rousseau in his Annales tunisiennes in
1832 and has since been echoed in the literature as recently as the 2004 monograph by
Asma Moalla on the history of Ottoman-Tunisian relations. Both scholars claimed
that starting from 1777, ten years before the declaration of the second of Catherine’s
wars, both Tunisians and Algerians had effectively obfuscated peace treaties with
Russia and then with Austria in an effort to pursue their own commercial interests.
Rousseau wrote, “Trade had greatly suffered because of the attacks by [North]
African corsairs, and they [Russia and later Austria] wanted to put an end to [North
African] depredations, trying to negotiate peace with their masters.”93 This theory has
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survived and in fact, thrived, within the literature. Scholarship has since adopted an
assumption of North African maritime avarice against the growing Russian
commercial presence in Mediterranean waters and until now remained largely
unchallenged. In fact, Rousseau’s work, also was cited by Moalla, was used to
support her assertions that Ottoman-Tunisian political relations had reached a nadir by
the early 1780s because of the North African provinces’ insistence on attacking
Russian vessels.94
Further problematizing this point was that the idea a North African regional
indifference towards the Porte’s Russian problem in turn spurred the theory that the
North African provinces were unaffected and uninterested in the Porte’s dealings with
its Russian and Austria rivals. However, this was simply not the case. While
Rousseau’s claimed the provinces refused peace with the Porte’s imperial
adversaries, in what he presumed to be an effort by the North African provinces to
increase their revenues via maritime, the records of the Ottoman War and Navy
Bureaus indicated a zero rate of attacks on Austrian trade vessels from December
1781 until the 1787 entrance of Russia, and then Austria, into the war with the
Ottoman state.95
These findings are critically important. First, they demonstrate that while
excluded from the Grand Admiral’s broader maritime reforms, the North African
corsair regencies were still willing to engage first the proactive restraint, and then
later, the proactive assault on the Porte’s imperial rivals, thus demonstrating the North
African provinces’ goodwill towards the larger ambitions and objectives of the
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Sublime Porte. Admittedly, from the North African perspective, the Porte’s tensions
with Russia and Austria were correspondingly advantageous to the region’s governors
post-1787. Since, the more trade ships their navies could capture, the more profit there
was to gain for local administrators.
North African regencies continued to support the Ottoman efforts against the
expansion of Russian merchant trade throughout the end of the nineteenth century.96
Moreover, the 1780-90s would just lay the groundwork for the boon in privateering,
as well as diplomatic exchanges between the regencies and the Porte, which
accompanied Bonaparte’s invasion of Egypt in 1798.
Transformations in North Africa
The history of the corso and North African extends back into the sixteenth
century. Corsairs in the service of the expansionist sultan, Suleiman I, captured
Maghrebi space in the middle of the century when Greek-born corsair-cum-Admiral
Turgut Rais seized Tripoli in the name of the Porte in 1551. Tunis was similarly
captured in 1574. Having conquered the territory from the Knights of Malta, Tripoli
was put under direct Ottoman rule, and the region’s governors were appointed directly
by Constantinople until 1709. At the turn of the eighteenth century however, direct
Ottoman rule came to an end when the sitting beylerbey Mahmud, was deposed by the
kuloğlu of the city under the charge of Ahmad Karamanlı.
Since the sixteenth century the power of the kuloğlular, the offspring of
Ottoman soldiers and Tripolitan women, had grown within the administration of the
province. So much so that by the early eighteenth century the administration of
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Tripoli was under de facto kuloğlu control.97 It was with relative ease, and little
protest from the Porte, that in 1711 a notable kuloğlu named Ahmad Karamanlı was
able to supplant the Ottoman beylerbey Mahmud Ummais and declare himself bey of
Tripoli. After acquiring a firman that legitimized his rule, Ahmad Karamanlı set the
groundwork for his own dynastical order, and Karamanlı rule of Tripoli lasted from
1711-1836.98
Ahmad ruled Tripoli for over thirty-five years. He extended his control into
the southern territory of Fezzan, which had long maintained its autonomy from the
Ottoman-controlled north, and to the eastern territory of Cyrenaica. He rebuilt the
economic infrastructure of Tripoli by re-establishing the sub-Saharan trade networks,
which had long been neglected by the Ottoman beylerbeys, and by encouraging
Sephardi and Levantine merchants to settle in the province. While these early,
prosperous years of Karamanlı rule helped cement the dynasty’s control over Tripoli,
not all of Ahmad’s descendants possessed the bureaucratic acumen that marked these
early years as ones of socio-economic growth and political stability for Tripolitania.
By the end of the eighteenth century, the economic and political administration
of Tripoli was in shambles. The elderly bey Ali Karamanlı was slowly losing his grip
on power and his navy in a state of disrepair. Ali Karamanlı ruled Tripoli since 1754.
But with age and exhaustion he gradually succumbed to his vices. By the 1780s, the
bey spent the majority of his days in his harem, often drunk, and grew increasingly
negligent of the province. Time and age took a toll on Ali, who over the decade
progressively senile and had abandoned his role in the divan altogether. The governor
spent his days in the chambers of his favorite harim, with a woman know by the
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moniker of ‘Queen Esther,’ for her substantial sway in the court politics of Tripoli,
and her hold over the aging bey.99 By the end of the decade Tripoli was continuously
afflicted with frequent bouts of plague, famine, and endemic poverty— among all but
the very highest merchant class. The aging pasha was effectively running the province
into the ground.
The Porte and the Admiral Gazi Hasan foresaw these troubles. In 1778, Abdul
Hamid I sent the Tripolitan bey an official warning that highlighted Constantinople’s
concern over the general administrative negligence and ordered the Pasha to put the
affairs of the province in order immediately.100 Ali was not spurred into action. The
Porte grew even more dissatisfied with Ali’s failures, as diplomatic circles—both
within and beyond Tripoli—began to speak openly about their fears of an imminent
invasion.101
Anxieties were only heightened after Abdul Hamid I appointed Gazi Hasan
temporarily to the Grand Vizierate in 1786.102 Gazi Hasan, long regarded as an
adversary of Ali Bey in Tripoli, was seen by diplomats in Tripoli as an imminent
threat and feared Ottoman intervention would only worsen the socioeconomic
conditions in the province and further jeopardize their own security.103 Miss Tully, the
sister of the British Consul Tully wrote to London:
June 18, 1786,
A courier from Tunis confirms the dreadful news…that the Captain Pacha had
sailed from Constantinople with orders from the Grand Signior to depose the
Bashaw of Tripoli. It is supposed that the dissentions in the Bashaw's family,
and the total neglect of the kingdom (arising from that circumstance) makes
the Grand Signior fear that Tripoli may at last fall into the hands of
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Christians….[U]nfortunately, the Grand Signior promoted to the rank of
Captain Pacha, a Turk named Hasseen, who has been an avowed enemy of the
Bashaw of Tripoli for many years. This man, with a large fleet is expected
here from hour to hour. The Bashaw in the divan, this afternoon declared his
intention of quitting the town to-morrow [sic], and of waiting at one of his
palaces till the Turkish fleet arrives, and its destination is known.
And then again:
June 24, 1786,
Our apprehensions are for a time suspended. The Captain Pasha passed the
harbor of Tripoli a few days since, and is for the present gone to
Alexandria…But it is still affirmed he has a teskarra, or firman, with him for
this unfortunate Bashaw. 104
Gazi Hasan never docked in Tripoli. Discord in the east between the Ottoman
Porte and Egyptian Mamluks pushed the admiral to Alexandria in an effort to curtail
the ambitions of Ibrahim and Murad Bey, the co-ruling leaders. However, this was not
for lack of Ottoman interest in the affairs of Tripoli. Tully’s letters offer several other
insights into the state of Tripolitan affairs. First, it is quite clear that by the mid-1780s,
the British diplomatic corps regarded Ali Karamanlı as an unfit governor. After
abandoning the general governance of the province, his reaction to the threat of an
impending invasion was one of capitulation. Rather than attempt to negotiate with or
Gazi Hasan Pasha and his forces, Ali Bey immediately notified his divan of his
intention to flee and desert the city that he had neglected in the last several years of
his reign. Secondly, it is clear from Tully’s letters that the enmity between Gazi Hasan
Pasha and Ali Karamanlı was long standing.
While the reasons behind this malice are unknown, it seems possible that
Hasan Pasha’s twenty years in the divan of Algiers are the likely root of the acrimony
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between the two men.105 Gazi Hasan was a noted statesman, diplomat and
administrator. His detest for Ali Karamanlı’s growing inability to govern was widely
known in diplomatic circles, among Ottoman diplomats, and beyond. While Tripoli
was ultimately spared a direct invasion by an Ottoman naval fleet, the enmity between
Gazi Hasan Pasha and the Karamanlıs would culminate, shortly after the kapudan
pasha’s death in 1790, and cause a great deal of aggravation for the Porte that would
lay the foundation for Tripoli’s alliance with France during the French invasion of
Egypt.
Tripoli and Tunis
Foreign invasion, whether at the hand of a western imperial power, or at the
hand of the Porte itself, was not the only concern for Ali Karamanlı. His list of rivals
had grown long throughout his long reign, as hostility to his continued rule grew ripe
within the region, the province itself, and even among his own sons. Conditions took
a turn for worse in 1782, when the young Hammuda Pasha officially succeeded his
father as bey of neighboring Tunis. Ali Pasha unintentionally antagonized his young
neighbor to the west by betting on the wrong horse during yhr previous decades
struggle of Tunisian succession. The Karamanlı pasha had supported one of
Hammuda’s rivals within the Ibn Ali dynasty. Ali’s slight was not easily forgotten by
the young Tunisian governor, who had a much more powerful army than his neighbor
to the east.
Hammuda chose a dual course of action. First, he responded by regularly
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instigating border skirmishes between the two provinces. While the “attacks from
Tunis were indecisive”106 they nevertheless contributed to the general sense of unease
within Tripoli.107 Ali Pasha’s inability to thwart even these minor skirmishes showed
just how pervasive the sense of insecurity, and lack of confidence in the ruler was
within the Tripolitan capital. Secondly, Hammuda Pasha further antagonized Ali’s
authority as ruler of Tripoli by offering refuge and support to one of Ali Karamanlı’s
own dynastic rivals. Upon his assumption of the beylicate in 1754, Ali Karamanlı
assassinated his competitors within the extended Karamanlı family. However, a
Karamanlı uncle, Mustafa, escaped the assassination attempt and fled the province.
This rival, Mustafa lived in exile. However, his mere survival was a continuous threat
to Ali’s rule of Tripoli. With the support of Hammuda Pasha, and Ali’s weakened
hold on power, Mustafa once again became a new and viable threat.108
The intrigue and mystery that surrounded ‘Mustafa the Pretender’ was enough
to ignite the imagination and concerns of the diplomatic community within Tripoli. In
turn, this threw Ali’s continued rule more into doubt and further undermined his
authority. Miss Tully, the sister of the British Consul Richard Tully, wrote of the
threat caused by ‘Mustafa the Pretender:’
By private letters from Tunis, it is said that an expedition is fitting out, with
the consent of the Grand Signior, to convey the Pretender to Tripoli. He is
Tripolitan, who has lived at the court of Tunis for many years, and declares
himself to be an uncle of the Bashaw's, who escaped out of seven who fell at
his accession to the throne. This prince, if living, fled from Tripoli so very
young, that it would be difficult for anyone here to ascertain his being the
same person. 109
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It is not clear from Ottoman records if the Porte supported Mustafa’s claim to
the beylicate of Tripoli or not. What is clear was that a compendium of forces, both
external and internal, had gradually eroded any authority Ali Karamanlı claimed over
the Tripolitan province. However, despite these open acts of aggression towards Ali
Karamanlı’s continued rule, it was never Hammuda Pasha’s intention to flat-out
remove the bey from power. Given the internal disarray of Tripoli in the 1770-80s and
the superior military of the Husaynid dynasty of Tunis, Hammuda Pasha could have
easily annexed Tripoli and claimed it as his own. However, no such threat ever
manifested. Despite Hammuda Pasha’s willingness to undermine Ali Karamanlı’s
authority within Tripoli, it was never his intention to depose the Karamanlıs as a
dynasty from power. Rather, the Tunisian bey would eventually become of one
Tripoli’s, and subsequent Karamanlı successors, strongest allies in the region.
Ali Karamanlı’s rule had become all but obsolete by the time of the 1787 letter
that enlisted Tripoli’s support in the Porte’s effort against the Hapsburg and Russian
empires. As Ali was abandoning his responsibilities, his eldest son, Hassan had
effectively taken over the day-to-day running of the province. Hassan was well
regarded and respected in diplomatic circles and among the subjects of the
province.110 However, in the eyes of his father, Hassan was overreaching in his
power.111
Central to Ali’s concerns were that Hassan had developed his own private
corsair naval fleet, which he docked in specially constructed shipyards, while the
official Tripolitan navy sat in painful disrepair.112 The earnings of this small fleet

110

ibid.
ibid.
112
FO 76/3 340-2.
111

64

Msdfasd

were substantial, and Hassan was adeptly using the proceeds to curry favor and
support among the tribal leaders in the province.113 It is likely that the three ships sent
to the aid of the Porte in commandeering Russian ships off the coast of Italy were
from Hassan’s personal navy. This, in addition to the respect he had cultivated among
European consuls,114 effectively made Hassan the most immediate threat to his
father’s rule.
In response, Ali Karamanlı took to favoring his youngest son, Yusuf, and
allowing him the licenses of an heir apparent.115 This created a bitter rivalry between
the two brothers, as Hassan the eldest was the expected successor to his father.
Frictions between the brothers hit breaking point when Yusuf, and in turn Hassan,
took to arming themselves, their servants and assistants within the castle walls of
Tripoli. The rivalry between the brothers spilled over into the province’s
administration when they began arriving with armed bodyguards to the regular
meetings of the Tripolitan divan.116
British and the French consular records from the era show the extent to which
the province had suffered under the disarray of the 1770s and 1780s. Richard Tully,
the consul of England, noted the vast confusion among the province’s diplomatic
community in regards to who to meet with about official matters.117 It is notable that
despite the extensive trouble within the province, the Karamanlıs were still
demonstrating good will and supporting the Porte’s policies against the Russians.
Given that only one year had passed since the possible invasion of the province by
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Gazi Hasan, the willingness of the province to dedicate three of the five viable ships
remaining in its fleet showed its commitment to integration within the broader
Ottoman world. 118
Dynastic troubles came to a head in July 1790, when Yusuf Karamanlı
assassinated his eldest brother, Hassan, and set of fierce struggle for power between
him and his remaining brother, Ahmad. In response, the elderly pasha, Ali removed
from the city. Yusuf, in turn, responded by laying siege to his brother and father in the
city walls, diverting the revenue of the caravan trade, and further devastated the
already beleaguered city.119
Given the extent to which Ali Karamanlı’s rule was challenged from within
and beyond Tripoli’s borders, it is not long before the subjects of the province and the
chief tribes of Cyrenaica and Fezzan began to revolt. The province constituted a union
of three previously independent regions, namely: Tripolitania, Fezzan in the south and
Cyrenaica to the west. Upon the establishment of the Karamanlı dynasty and the
unification of southern and western provinces under Ahmad Karamanlı in the late
seventeenth century, Tripoli became the effective center for the unified territory.
However, the Bedouin chiefs were critical to the inland trade of the province, and
important leaders with the various provinces had also grown weary of the ineffective
rule of Ali Karamanlı. One particular revolt that is notable is the 1790 rebellion of
Misrata, a city looking to gain more autonomy from Karamanlı rule.
Not long after this, Sidi Useph [Ali’s youngest son] gained the Bashaw’s
[Ali’s] consent for the Bey [Ali’s eldest son, Hassan] and himself to be sent
out with a strong force, aided by the Arab’s in the Bashaw’s pay, against the
Mezerateens [the people of Misrata]. Sidi Hamet [Ali’s middle son] refused to
118
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go; and Shaif Shafanassa, one of the most powerful the Arab tribes, sent a
message to the Bashaw [Ali] that he would not see the Mezerateens ill-treated,
and that if he sent a force against them, he would attack the princes and would
bring the pretender, Mustapha, from Tunis, or one of the Beys of Egypt, to
take the thrown. 120
It is telling of Ali’s flimsy grip on the province that a tribal chief could
directly oppose him, explicitly threaten his heirs, and support the usurper who
undermined his claim to the beylicate. After over twenty years as the governor, Ali
became unfit to rule. His authority had been completely undermined. However, what
is particularly poignant, and speaks to an underlying cohesion among the provinces
was that in addition to the threat of reinstating Ali’s rival from within the Karamanlı
family, Mustafa the Pretender, Shaif Shafanassa also threatened to produce one of the
Egyptian Mamluks as a potential replacement to Karamanlı rule.
This reference showed a direct cooperation between the various important
leaders within the broader Tripolitan province and the de facto rulers of Egypt, the
Mamluk beys. For the Bedouin leader to suggest a Mamluk replacement in the same
breath as a Karamanlı one is to infer to a very intimate political relationship between
Egypt and Tripoli: one that could, potentially, have posed as a direct threat to the rule
of the Tripolitan bey. The historical connection between Tripoli and Egypt was not
lost Miss Tully, who continued “[t]he Beys of Egypt are considered the most likely
persons to be deputed by the Grand Signior to replace or succeed the sovereigns in
Barbary, as it is one of the ways of his promoting them and rewarding their services to
the Sublime Porte.”121
In addition to the internal recognition that a potential Mamluk ruler in Tripoli
would have received from within the province’s political elite, the to replace the
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Tripolitan rulers with Egyptian ones was an option considered by the Porte. Such
machinations point to a triangulation within the network of power in the OttomanNorth African world. Ali’s continued rule of Tripoli was in question, thus Tripolitans
themselves looked to Egypt and the Porte as viable options to fill the void left by his
weak position. Similarly, Constantinople looked to Egypt as a potential option to
alleviate the power vacuum within Tripoli. This network shows clear and direct
connections and cooperation among the rulers of Constantinople, the rulers of Egypt
and powerful political leaders in Tripoli. Had the Ottoman Porte, as has been
previously suggested in the historiography, been indifferent to North Africa or the
day-to-day administration of the provinces, these options would not have been as
prominent in the historical record. Further, if the autonomy of Tripoli was such that it
was an independent region unto itself, uninfluenced by its immediate neighbors to the
east or west or to that of imperial rule from Constantinople, the Ottoman Porte would
not have directly warned Ali Karamanlı nor would it have directly intervened in the
way it did within a few short years to follow.
Tunis under Hammuda Pasha
Tunis, much like her Tripolitan neighbor to the east, was struggling in its
diplomatic relations with the Porte in the last years of the eighteenth century. Among
the terms of 1774’s Küçük Kaynarca, the peace treaty that concluded the RussoOttoman war of 1768, Russia was to similarly settle peace with the three corsair
regencies of North Africa.122 However, Tunis and Algiers both obfuscated. The
provinces demanded excessive tribute amounts from Russia, arguing that minor
slights in diplomatic protocol prevented them from concluding an actual peace.123
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The relationship between Tunis and the Porte further soured after hostilities
erupted between the Tunisian regency and Venice in 1782. Constantinople, by then,
was fully embroiled not only in the ongoing struggle with Russia for power and
territory, but also with the great fire of 1782. As Tunis and Venice went to war over
the destruction of a Tunisian vessel and cargo in Malta, the city of Constantinople was
engulfed in flames. The fire consumed over 7000 buildings along the Golden Horne
and threw the city as well as the Porte into disarray. The impact of the fire was so far
reaching within the city walls that Sultan Abdul Hamid himself personally took over
administration the fire brigade to quell the losses as fast as possible.124
Again, crises in the center directly impacted relations between the Porte and
Tunis. It customary for the sultan to offer the traditional payment of i’ana (assistance,
militarily, financially or otherwise) when any of provinces went to war against
European rivals.125 However, this support never manifested—symbolically or
otherwise. In turn, Hammuda Pasha and the divan of Tunis became acutely aware of
the slight by their Ottoman administrators. The nineteenth century Tunisian historian,
Ahmad Ibn Abi Al-Diyaf (thereafter Bin Diyaf) referred back to this slight as a
turning point in the provinces attitude towards the Porte.126
Perhaps to return the snub, Hammuda Pasha distanced Tunis from the Ottoman
sphere. During the 1789 coronation of the new Selim III, the Tunisian bey refused to
send a congratulatory delegation to Constantinople to his pay respects. This was a
“serious breach in the protocolary obligations of the walis towards the sultan.”127 This
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blatant refusal to attend to the new sultan, and extension undercut the province’s
relationship with the Porte did not go unnoticed by Selim III or his inner circle in
Constantinople. However, a young recruit of the Grand Admiral, Gazi Hasan Pasha, a
Georgian corsair using the moniker Ali Burghol, would soon—albeit
unintentionally—ameliorate some friction between the Husaynid governor and the
Ottoman sultan.
Same Training, Different Ethos: Another Georgian from Algiers
The 1780s through early 1790s saw a great deal of disorder in the house of
Karamanlı. While fears of Gazi Hasan Pasha’s arrival, armed with a firman
denouncing the pasha and imposing Ottoman rule never manifested in 1786, it would
not be long before the directives of Gazi Hasan would ultimately remove the
Karamanlıs from power.
In 1793, with the patronage of Gazi Hasan, whose gravitas and political capital
in Constantinople extended well after his 1790 death to disrupt Admiral Küçük
Hüseyin’s early policies, a young Georgian by the name of Ali Burghol invaded
Tripoli. The former Kapudan Pasha’s mentee, Burghol arrived in the city, firman in
hand overthrew Ali Karamanlı, and claimed the province in the name of the Porte
with very little resistance.
Little is known about the personal history of Ali Burghol. What we do know is
that he was of Georgian descent, spent several years as a mariner in Algiers,
eventually rose to ra’is al-marsa, captain of the marines, and familiarized himself
with the broader region before he was exiled, for reasons unknown, in 1789.128 These
three characteristics mirror exactly the early life and career of his mentor, Gazi Hasan
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Pasha before him. Making the task of tracing his early life more difficult, Ali Burghol
is recorded under numerous names in different records. For example, in an acrostic
piyyut, Khalfon gave the surname of the corsair as ‘Ali Gurgi, which translated to: Ali
the Georgian. Various North African records have him recorded as Ali Cezayirli or alJeza’iri Effendi, as he seemed to, like his mentor before him, he adopted the epithet
“the Algerian” because of his time in the province. Others still, such as al-Jabarti have
him recorded as Ali Pasha al Tarabulsi, because he was successful attempt to supplant
Karamanlı power in Tripoli. Further complicating matters, the British consul’s office
at times referred to him as Ali Ben Zool. Most common however, is the moniker Ali
Burghol, which is used throughout this dissertation. Interestingly, he earned the
signature because he preferred to feed his men cracked durum wheat as the staple
food in the regime. Al-Jabarti described him as “‘fair-complexioned, with an immense
blond beard and mustaches. He spoke little Arabic. He loved pleasure and dissolute
living”129
After his exile from Algiers in 1789, Burghol sailed to Constantinople with the
hope of profiting from his connections in the Porte’s admiralty. Through his brother in
law, who served as a kahiya, or a lieutenant, under Gazi Hasan, Burghol was able to
gain access to some of the most influential figures in the Porte. There, he devised a
plan to exploit the discord in Tripoli for his own gain and serve as the kapudan
pasha’s emissary by removing Ali Karamanlı from power.130 As a fellow Georgian
who had also spent time in the corso of Algiers, Ali Burghol quickly won the trust
and patronage of Cezayirli Gazi Hassan Pasha. In turn, Burghol set about raising the
funds to build a small army of men to invade the Tripolitian city and reclaim it for the
129
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Porte.131 Al-Jabarti wrote of him:
Concerning “Ali Pasha (al-Tarabulsi), whose career has been narrated above in
brief, he was Algerian in origin, of mamluk of Muhammad Pasha, ruler of
Algeria. When Muhammad Pasha died, his son-in-law took his place and sent
‘Ali with a message to Husayn Pasha Kapudan. The brother (of ‘Ali Pasha)
known as al-Sayyid ‘Ali, was a mamluk of the Ottoman government and held
in high esteem by the Kapudan pasha, and was in charge of the flagship. The
Kapudan pasha praised him highly, and awarded him the governorship of
Tripoli, giving him firmans and weapons. ‘Ali Pasha went there, recruited
troops and ships for himself, and made an attack on its ruler, who was the
brother of Hammuda Pasha, ruler of Tunis. [Ali Pasha] waged war against him
for some months, and finally got possession of the land through the collusion
of its inhabitants, since they knew that he was the rightful ruler on behalf of
the Ottoman state. Hammuda Pasha’s brother fled to his brother in Tunis.
When “Ali Pasha took possession of Tripoli, he gave it over to his soldiery,
and they committed deeds of pillage, rape, immorality, and whoring viler and
more repulsive than those of the hordes of Tamerlane. He captured the ruler’s
women, took them prisoner and had them dishonored by his soldiers. Then
they demanded money from the people, and seized the property of the
merchants, levied a tax on the inhabitants, and seized their property. 132
Al-Jabarti was correct. In July 1793, Ali Burghol docked in Tripoli, equipped
with firman from Selim III, over 300 freshly hired mercenaries, “nine Greek, Turkish
and Roman ships”133 and forced the abdication of Ali Karamanlı, without so much as
firing a single rifle.134 The Tripolitan ruler surrendered immediately and, along with
his son Ahmad, capitulated to the Georgian, fled the city walls, and sought refuge on
the Tunisian island of Djerba where they received the support of Hammuda Pasha.135
Only Yusuf, the pasha’s youngest son, stayed to fight against Burghol and his forces.
Yusuf continued his siege of Tripoli’s walls during Burghol’s tenure, simply shifting
the target of his siege from his father to the Georgian corsair.136
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However, Ali Burghol did not stop at the conquest of Karamanlı-controlled
domains. The same year Burghol took over Tripoli, he occupied the Tunisian-held
island of Djerba. Long under populated and with scant military pretense, Djerba fell
easily to the Georgian corsair. Records of Burghol’s occupation of the Tunisian island
are chronicled in the records of Ibn Abi Al-Diyaf who retold how Burghol’s men
occupied the island, and subsequently forced the local administrator, Hamida ibn
Ayyad to fleet to Tunis, secured the Tunisian ammunition and supplies, summoned its
population and “flourished a writ, which he pretended to have been sent by the
sultan...”137
In response, Hammuda Pasha attacked. He sent an army of over ten thousand
men, reinforced with two detachments of troops from the dey of Algiers, forced Ali
Burghol’s troops out of Djerba and then Tripoli. Burghol, defeated fled the city as
quickly as possible, to Egypt.138 Al-Jabarti described Ali Burghol’s narrative as it was
retold to Egyptian audiences:
The deposed official [Ali Karamanlı] gathered a force together and returned to
Tripoli and besieged it on all sides. Those of the town who regretted his
departure and those who had suffered at the hands of ‘Ali [Burghol] Pasha
rose with him, and when the later saw his defeat was imminent, he took to his
ships with all the wealth and treasure he had amassed. He took hostage two
handsome youths from among the sons of the notables and fled to Alexandria.
Reaching Cairo, he took refuge with Murad Bey, who received him and
showed him the greatest hospitality in his home in Giza. They became intimate
friends. The cause of ‘Ali Pasha’s coming to Cairo and his not returning to the
pasha [Gazi Hasan Pasha] was that he knew he had become hateful in the eyes
of the government, for it was a rule of the Ottoman government that whenever
they appointed anyone governor of a province and he was unsuccessful, they
hated him, deposed him, and very often killed him, especially if he was
wealthy.139
Unable to return to Constantinople, Burghol fled to Cairo, where another
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commander with Georgian roots, this time Murad Bey, received him warmly. In part
because of his time in Egypt, and his familiarity with the Mamluks, Burghol would
eventually become, albeit briefly, the governor of Egypt.
After Karamanlı rule was reestablished in Tripoli, Yusuf staged a quick and
successful dynastic coup, overthrow his remaining brother Ahmad, and declared
himself as the new bey. The circumstances around Ahmad’s overthrow were as
peaceful as Burghol’s overthrow of their father a few years before. During an
excursion out of the beylical palace, Yusuf simply locked his older brother out of the
city walls and waited. Ahmad was offered a choice: exile or the governorship of the
eastern city of Derna. Yusuf did not have to wait long. His brother chose the latter,
but would ultimately flee the province altogether and seek refuge in Cairo with the
same Mamluks what had offer sanctuary to Ali Burghol before him. The new
governor, Yusuf Karamanlı, maintained animosity towards the Sublime Porte for its
perfidious support of Burghol.140 In revenge, Yusuf soon allied with the French
Republic against the Porte.
Tunis and the Porte
To defend the future of his reign, as well as to justify his actions against
Burghol—who was officially there under the Porte’s protection—Hammuda Pasha
sent a delegation to Constantinople in 1795. Effectively, Hammuda Pasha had to
account for reoccupation of Djerba and the removal of Ali Burghol from Tripoli in the
eyes of the sultan he had snubbed just a few years’ prior: the young Selim III.
The delegation was led by Yusuf Sahib al-Tabi and included and the
chronicler Ibn Abi Al-Diyaf’s father as a member of the mission. Tunisian records
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from these accounts demonstrated how relations between the Porte and Tunis were
soon improved based on the mutual admiration and respect the developed between the
Tunisian Yusuf Sahib al-Tabi and Gazi Hasan Pasha’s replacement in the Ottoman
admiralty, Küçük Hüseyin Pasha. Küçük Hüseyin Pasha was one of the closest allies
of Sultan Selim III, and had married the sultan’s sister, Esma Sultan. Thus, he was
critical in the new sultan’s attempts to reform the navy and the admiralty. Through the
records of Bin Diyaf, we see how al-Tabi and Gazi Hasan’s successor were able to
foster a much more amicable relationship with the Porte and with the Grand Admiral
than had been established under the thirty-year long career of Gazi Hasan. Scholars
familiar with Bin Diyaf have even gone so far as to suggest that the new Grand
Admiral Küçük Hüseyin, having only recently been assigned to the head of the navy
in 1792, resented having to endorse the young Ali Burghol, protégée of the since
departed Gazi Hasan Pasha, in his expedition and direct occupation of Tripoli.
The new Grand Admiral Küçuk Hüseyin’s personal feelings regarding the
Burghol affair were not chronicled in the Ottoman records. However, the information
provided in them offered context and suggested that the officials of the Porte were not
particularly disturbed regarding Ali Burghol’s forced departure from Tripoli and
Djerba. Working to Tunis’s favor was the difficult relationship between Selim and
Gazi Hasan.141 Animosity between the powerful admiral, who was one of the most
powerful and enduring political figures in history of the eighteenth century Ottoman
Empire, and Selim stemmed back to the 1785. When, with the support of the Grand
Vizier Halil Hamid Pasha, supporters of the young Selim made a move for the
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sultanate. However, their efforts to supplant Abdul Hamid abruptly ended when word
reached Gazi Hasan of the potential overthrow. In response, Gazi Hasan encouraged
Abdul Hamid to isolate the young Selim, effectively cutting him off from contact with
the outside world.142 Which lead to an acrimonious break between Selim, and later
rumors of the sultan’s involvement in the 1790 death of the admiral.
Looking beyond the internal machinations of the Porte, Burghol’s behaviors
after overthrowing the Karamanlıs was reason enough for his removal. In no way did
the Georgian corsair make himself, or his rule of Tripoli, advantageous for
Constantinople. From Ottoman sources we learn that while Tunis and Algiers were
active in limiting the expansion of Russian trade in the Mediterranean during
Burghol’s occupation from 1793-1794,143 Tripolitan ships had not been active in
Mediterranean waters. In fact, the only mention of the Tripolitan naval activity was in
a naval dispatch from the autumn of 1794, shortly after the exile of Burghol from
Tripoli and the reinstatement of the Karamanlıs to the beylicate of Tripoli. The
dispatch, which outlined the reinstatement of Sayid Ali, also mentioned Tripolitan
participation in the capture of a ship with a Russian imperial ensign off the island of
Chios.144 Moreover, western and North African records chronicle the destruction to
the commercial and maritime infrastructure of Tripoli while under Burghol’s control.
Rabbi Avraham Khalfon, the religious leader of the Tripolitan Jewish
community during the 1790s, described Burghol’s rule in Tripoli as a “reign of
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terror.”145 Burghol executed numerous subjects who were close to the Karamanlı
family. Khalfon’s own son, David who was a prominent figure in the Tripolitan
community, was slowly burned alive under Burghol’s orders.146
Similarly, in her entry from August 17, 1793, Miss Tully, the sister of the
British Consul of Tripoli, wrote of the rule of Ali Burghol, whom she addressed as the
Turk Ali Ben Zool, “within the last few days the scenes here have been too shocking
to relate, I therefore pass them over in silence.”147 She recalled in detail only one
specific account of life under Ali Burghol. This account, related the fate of Ali
Karamanlı's favorite harim, a women Miss Tully referred to as the Great, or at times
“Queen” Esther. Ali Burghol had had her chained in the castle, and demanded 5000
sterling pounds to release her to her back to her family, as she was related to wealthy
Jewish merchants in the province. This news reached the British diplomatic corps
with the arrival of Esther’s (by Ali Pasha) son, who the bey had not taken with him to
Djerba. Her son was only permitted to leave the castle in order to search among the
diplomats and the Englishmen’s houses for a long chain to confine prisoners. Miss
Tully continued,
On being asked for what purpose he could want it, he burst into tears, and said,
his mother… was expiring in the castle, chained so tight with a chain that it
was cutting through her wrists and ankles and that she must inevitable die
from anguish if not immediately relieved; and that the inhuman Turks had
agreed, if he [the son] found an easier chain, they would permit him to change
it, but otherwise she must remain as she was. 148
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Her family pleaded for time to raise ransom funds from Livorno. While her
eldest daughter Mazaltov, who was also involved in the court of Ali Karamanlı, had
managed to flee to Malta, not much else is known of the history of Great Esther, or
what happened to her after Yusuf claimed power. Several sources have identified her
as Esther Arbib, the mother-in-law of Rabbi and chronicler, Avraham Khalfon, but
that is the extent of the historical information available on her.149
News of the havoc that Ali Burghol’s occupation caused on Tripoli in general
and on Tripolitan trade and commerce in particular would have easily reached the
Porte though merchant and diplomatic channels. Ali Burghol’s downfall in Tripoli
and his expulsion from Djerba were of no great consequence to either the young
sultan or his new grand admiral. Thus, the efforts of the Tunisian delegation in
Constantinople had been extremely successful. Tunis and Hammuda Pasha were back
in the good graces of the Porte and the Ottoman admiralty.
Privateering, North Africa and the Porte
In The Regency of Tunis and the Ottoman Porte, Asma Moalla argued that the
estrangement in diplomatic ties between Tunis and the Porte could be largely
explained by looking west to Algiers. Moalla argued that Algiers effectively had
pulled Tunis into its sphere of influence by the mid-eighteenth century and that the
long history of antagonism between Algiers and the Ottoman Porte had spilled over
into Tunis’s relations with Constantinople. It is true that Algiers, the most powerful of
the corsair regencies and the most geographically removed of the Ottoman provinces,
was powerful enough to draw other provinces under its influence and even indirect
authority. However, Ottoman records indicate that diplomatic exchange between
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Algiers and Constantinople was as intricate and multifaceted as those with Tunis and
Tripoli.
Reading Ottoman documents on Tunis and Tripoli shows that, much like its
eastern neighbors Algiers also maintained complicated ties, and a demonstrable
interest in Ottoman Porte. For example, the hatt-ı hümayun from September of 1787
showed that Algiers provided five ships, in addition to the three from each Tunis and
Tripoli, to Constantinople’s efforts against Russian merchant trade in the
Mediterranean.150 However unlike the Karamanlı family in Tripoli Hussien Dey, who
had ruled since 1765, was in charge of a significant army and an even more
substantial navy. Thus, Algiers was not in a position to have to appease the Porte
during a political crisis. Since, if relations were merely those of an antagonistic
provenience simply looking to gain self-sovereignty from a far-flung imperial
overlord, the dey could have easily dismissed the Porte’s request without any
immediate repercussions.
Moreover, the Ottoman center historically recognized the comparative strength
Algiers in the region, and used it to the Porte’s advantage. Algiers, the strongest of the
three provinces, could sway the region and incite the other regencies into action.151
This is to say, that from the perspective of the Porte, up until the establishment of the
Mehmed Ali’s rule in Egypt, discussions of Tunis and Tripoli were often included in
discussions of Algiers. Given the common naval traditions among the three regencies,
and that the turn of the nineteenth century saw a boom in corsair activities, it is not
surprising that the Porte would often address maters of Mediterranean privateering
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regionally, rather than by individual province. However, the willingness of the
Ottoman center to look to Algiers to influence Tripoli and Tunis if anything highlights
the continuity of diplomatic exchange between Algiers and the Porte. Nevertheless, it
is interesting that the Ottoman Porte looked to first Algiers, and then to Egypt, as
interlocutors for its relationship with the other North African provinces.
Conclusion
Ottoman relations with the North African regencies were at times difficult, fraught
with tension and oftentimes quite conflicted. However, as this chapter has shown, the
political bond between the imperial center and the provinces was continuously present
at the end of the eighteenth century. North Africa was critical to understanding the
full scope of how Constantinople operated and dealt with its imperial rivalries in the
mid-to-late eighteenth century, when the Sublime Porte began reconsidering its
administrative and military structure in light of the strategic territorial losses in the
east. This chapter examined broad sweeping reforms that the admiralty was
attempting to push forward in the Ottoman navy and the effect that these changes had
on the provinces, which had long practiced, and indeed were economically reliant on,
the long established tradition of the corso. Under Gazi Hassan’s directive, massive
overhauls and extensive modernization efforts were taking place in the Ottoman
maritime world after the losses of 1770. However, these reforms did not immediately
imply that the Sublime Porte, or the admiralty, had turned its back on the tradition of
corsaring. Rather, as seen throughout, Abdul Hamid I turned to corsairs to limit the
boom of Russian trade in the Mediterranean.
Moreover, the wars and strategies of the mid-to-late eighteenth century Porte
directly impacted the broader Ottoman maritime world. This research demonstrated
80
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how broadly the ramifications of the Russo-Ottoman wars were felt across the empire
and the extent to which Istanbul’s competition with St. Petersburg weighed on the
vast realm of Ottoman domains. It was during the Russo-Ottoman war of 1787 that
Gazi Hasan, and the Sultan Abdul Hamid I looked to resurrect the “old warring
ways”152 of the North African corsairs. The regional navies, and the corsair ocaks of
the various North African provinces had unprecedented local knowledge and regional
expertise on the best maritime routes of the Mediterranean waters. The Ottoman
Admiralty looked to benefit directly from their knowledge. However, the timing of
the naval reforms which took place alongside Porte’s renewed reliance on the corsairs
to limit Russian merchant trade in Mediterranean waters further complicated the
attitudes of the Sublime Porte towards its North Africa provinces.
Ottoman officials and North African governors had a long and complicated
history of diplomatic exchange. The region’s quasi-autonomy allowed a relatively
substantial degree of independence from the Porte. More importantly that political
distance served both the provinces and the Ottoman center. It allowed the Porte a
certain political distance from the direct actions of the North African territories while
allowing the governors the impression of greater autonomy in their districts. Both
parties relied on this semi-autonomy to further their own interests. This was further
heightened at the turn of the nineteenth century when Ottoman and North African
interests often aligned. While shifts in power between the North African provinces
and the Porte were complex and at time difficult, the exchanges made for a very
entangled political interdependence.
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CHAPTER TWO
THE FRENCH INVASION IN CONTEXT, 1798-1801 REEXAMINED
As Bonaparte’s Armée d'Orient invaded Egypt during the summer of 1798, the
assault represented the first western occupation of the Porte’s Mediterranean domain
since the sixteenth century. It is not surprising then that a great deal of study has since
focused on Egypt immediately before, during and after the invasion. However, as we
shall see, 1798 was also an important year in the histories of neighboring Tunis and
Tripoli, and placed a spotlight on the regional ties underlying socio-political systems
in the southern Mediterranean. As Bonaparte turned to Tunis and Tripoli for logistical
aid, his behaviors and strategies highlighted the interconnectedness of the provinces to
one another as well as to the Ottoman Porte.
This chapter focuses on several aspects of the provinces’ relationship with
Constantinople. Throughout, it explores the adaptable and oftentimes paradoxical
relationship that the provinces of Tunis and Tripoli maintained with the Sublime Porte
as well as the relationship that the two privateering provinces maintained with their
eastern neighbor, Egypt. This chapter emphasizes that during a time of political crisis,
as imperial paradigms of governance were shifting, it was the needs of the provinces
that dictated the policies of the Porte, as well as other imperial centers. Temporally,
this chapter traces the lead up to the French invasion of Egypt in the late-1790s, and
examines the history of the region through the middle of 1801.
Tripoli under New Governorship
After seizing power on June 11, 1795, Yusuf Karamanlı became the ruler of a
weakened, impoverished territory that lagged behind neighboring Algiers and Tunis
in commercial status, regional power and in its official recognition by the Ottoman
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Porte.153 The prominent merchant class, which had provided Tripolitania with critical
economic revenues through commercial ties with Livorno, Malta and the broader
region, had largely fled due to the administrative tempestuousness that came to define
the rule of Ali Karamanlı, Yusuf’s predecessor, as well as a short-lived coup by the
Porte-supported corsair, Ali Gurgi— Ali the Georgian, or as he was commonly
known, Ali Burghol. Burghol’s “reign of terror” and specifically, his maltreatment of
the Jewish mercantile community of the province was well chronicled in the North
African memories of Rabbi Abraham Khalfon, an important figure in the province.154
Many merchants relocated to various coastal cities across the Ottoman
Mediterranean and, most notably, to Alexandria. In fact, a review of Alexandrine
court records from the late eighteenth century shows a substantial increase in the
number of Tripolitans buying and selling urban property in the coastal city and
engaging in day-to-day legal activities within the city’s courts since 1750.155
Moreover, this number increased over time. It was likely that a great number of these
merchants had fled to Egypt to avoid the disorder in Tripoli in the years prior to Yusuf
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Karamanlı’s 1795 assumption to power. In fact, sources from 1805 Alexandria
specifically point to the exhaustion that Tripolitans felt at the continuous political
crises of their province.156
In an effort to consolidate power, strengthen Tripoli’s position in the region,
and prevent another mercenary like Burghol from taking the city, Yusuf Pasha
implemented a new set of reforms focused on sea power and economic growth.
Among his first objectives was the re-fortification of the city walls and the
construction of new sailing fleet. Within the year, the Tripolitan navy had effectively
grown from three rickety corvettes to six armed vessels.157 His reforms, which were a
breath of fresh air after the dereliction of responsibilities by his father and the looting
of the town by Ali Burghol, where fully supported by the members of the broader
Tripolitan community, both the merchants and traders, as well as the powerful
Bedouin leaders from across the province.
This approach served a dual purpose. It strengthened Yusuf’s position within
Tripoli among the regency’s subjects and was a preliminary step in announcing the
return of Tripolitania as a maritime force within broader North African and Ottoman
worlds and was also an effective and rapid means of improving the territory’s long
neglected economy. Yusuf’s strategy proved effective and the governor’s efforts as
drew a great deal of attention. In his 26 July 1796 dispatch, the acting British Consul
to Tripoli, Simon Lucas wrote:
… [O]ur present Bashaw, Youseph Caramanli who is about the age of 24 or
25, is daily increasing in power, and strength, particularly by sea…Being now
peaceably fixed on his throne, and in the full enjoyment of the love and
confidence of his subjects, his first thought was to collect some cruisers and to
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repair his fortifications towards the sea, which are mounted with about 70
pieces of cannons.... about the beginning of this last spring, he began his
claims on all the Christian powers at peace with Tripoli…158
Rebuilding Tripoli’s navy allowed the governor to strengthen the province’s
economic position in two ways: first, a strong naval fleet allowed Tripoli to demand
tribute—effectively protection money—from western governments. The practice of
paying individual tribute to each of the North African provinces had been in effect
since the sixteenth century. In return for the payment, a peace was established
between the two parties. European governments effectively bought the security of
their maritime commercial fleet, while North African corsairs targeted their cruisers
towards less generous targets. As the Napoleonic Wars engulfed Europe however, and
especially with Bonaparte’s Italian invasion, tribute payments were disrupted by the
quick turnover of governments. For North Africa, this meant a substantial drop in
incoming revenues. This coupled with the increased maritime activity, motivated
North African fleets to revive the corso. Specifically, for Tripoli, Yusuf’s maritime
upgrades allowed his corsairs to resume campaigns along the shores of Sicily, in
Catania and Messina, as well as in the Aegean.159
Tripolitan ships would routinely attack and capture non-Ottoman vessels very
close to the Porte’s territory. Historically, orsairs traditionally operated as ocaks, a
rank of military corps traditionally reserved for janissaries. The use of the term
corsair or sometimes, ocak in this chapter echoes the Ottoman turn of the nineteenth
century understanding of the term. In effect, a corsair was the operator of an armed
ship, owned by an Ottoman governor or province, holding a state-sponsored
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commission that was sanctioned by the Porte, which authorized the capture of all rival
countries’ mercantile and naval vessels.
Within the world of the various North African fleets, this meant the provinces
had a long established tradition of dividing up territories along the Mediterranean
shores, with the lion’s share taken by the powerful Algiers. However, as Tripoli
increased its maritime presence, it slowly began to sail in territories previously
operated by only the better-equipped Algerian ocaks.160 Yusuf’s navy continued to
grow and by 1797, Tripoli’s fleet had grown to eleven armed vessels.161 This relative
boom in maritime influence continued through the years to come with the upheaval
that followed the 1798 French invasion. By 1803, two years after the outbreak of the
First Barbary War against the United States, Tripoli’s fleet had grown to nineteen
vessels and even continued to grow throughout the end of the war. By 1805, boasting
over twenty-four armed ships, Tripoli became “a new Algiers”162 in the world of
Mediterranean maritime power.163 The years of chaos in Europe, the French invasion,
the rise of English commercial interests in the region, as well as those of their former
American colonies, served the young Tripolitan pasha’s efforts to rapidly expand his
navy.
As Tripoli’s maritime power increased, the Porte began to pay more attention
to the reforms in the province. In the spring of 1797, Selim III sent a gift of a two
ships, equipped with twenty-four and thirty-six guns respectively, and a firman
allowing Yusuf to use a standard, or tuğ, of two horse tails rather than Tripoli’s
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historical one: a symbolic gesture that elevated Tripoli’s status to that of Tunis and
Algiers.164 This honor was of immense significance for the young leader – long
considered the weakest of the North African provinces, Tripoli’s position in the
Ottoman Empire had also been less influential than either that of Tunis, or the
powerful Algiers, as evidenced by the less influential standard of the pasha.
Effectively, the change symbolized the Porte’s recognition of Tripoli’s new position
in the political constellation of Mediterranean and explicitly acknowledged and
legitimized the governor’s position in the province.165
The Ottoman Porte however, was not the only imperial power to recognize
Tripoli’s increased geopolitical importance. Western powers also began consider
Tripoli in their broader rivalries for control in the Mediterranean.166 In Paris, the
Republican Directory was openly planning an invasion of Britain. However, as First
Coalition troops landed on Welsh shores and panicked the Home Office in London,
one of France’s top generals, Napoleon Bonaparte, was secretly mulling an invasion
of another sort. Egypt—Bonaparte’s intended target—would be a handsome victory
both economically and symbolically for the French Republic. Napoleon was
pragmatic in the planning: an invasion of Egypt would disrupt British maritime
commerce and undermine their trade with India, which was the Directory’s ultimate
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aim, while remaining less costly and more likely to prove victorious than a direct
invasion of England.167 To facilitate his objective, Bonaparte used a Maltese emissary,
Saverio Naudi, or Xavier Naudi as he was called within the Directory, to recruit
Yusuf Pasha’s alliance in Tripoli, to provide rations for troops after their departure
from Toulon, as well as communication routes through the east of the province.
In return for Tripoli’s support, Bonaparte, by way of Naudi, promised
financial reward, autonomy from the Porte, the imminent disbandment of the North
African corsairs’ nemesis, the Knights Hospitallers of Malta, at times going so far as
to promise independence for Tripoli.168 Bonaparte’s agent in this secret alliance is of
particular interest. The son of a Maltese shoemaker, Naudi was forced to flee the
island, first to Marseilles and later to Tripoli, where he continuously engaged in his
daring and perilous behavior. Edward Blaquiere wrote of him in Tripoli:
Mr. Naudi’s history is simply as follows…while pursuing the trade of a
watchmaker in Valetta, been concerned in the robbery of one of the churches,
he was obliged to take refuge in Marseilles, from whence he was a second
time driven away... Knowing [Tripoli] to be the receptacle of evil, he came
and contrived to obtain the Bashaw's confidence… once ingratiated with his
Highness, he soon became a principal actor in the civil and political atrocities
of Tripoly [sic] and continues to play a most dangerous, as well as
distinguished part in them…Exiled from Malta he is the avowed enemy of the
British interest…It is also positively asserted, that many of the piratical acts
committed by the cruizers at sea, may be traced to Mr. Naudi’s advice; in fact,
he is execrated by all the inhabitants and considered by everyone here as the
most dangerous subject in the Regency.169
This intriguing character would prove so resourceful in his efforts, that he
would later become the charge d’affaires for the Americans in Tripoli. After all,
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loyalty was as malleable for the political actors as it was for the provinces in the turn
of the nineteenth century Mediterranean. In the meantime, however, Naudi himself
wrote of the condition of his exile in a 1798 letter to the Directory. After falling out
with the French consul, and bored of being underutilized in Tripoli, Naudi politely
complained that if his help was no longer needed in city, requesting that some
measures be taken by Talleyrand, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, in order that he may
be granted a guarantee of good will [testomonianza della sua benevolezza] of which
the most honorable prize would be to ‘obtain glorious French citizenship.’ Naudi
claimed that such a request could only be made because of his devotion to the French
nation, which he openly expressed in 1790, in his homeland of Malta, and had been
unable to return since.170
He then traveled across North Africa, becoming a consular jack-of-all-trades,
simultaneously serving as a middleman for numerous diplomats, merchants, and
traders—all while working as a watchmaker on the side.171 While his allegiance to
the French nation could be questioned, we nevertheless learn that he was forced out of
Malta in 1790 and that his time in Marseilles was brief. In fact, by 1794, Naudi’s
position as an unofficial agent of sorts became more lucrative and he was serving as
the French Vice Consul’s First Interpreter in Tripoli. During this time, Naudi
entrenched himself in the French consular office and by the summer of 1796 was
working ‘not without risk to himself’ on behalf of the French Republic in the
province.172 His efforts were rewarded in a letter of introduction from the Consul of
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Tripoli’s office to the Directory in Paris. In it, the consul asked that Naudi be named
Vice Consul of the French Republic in Benghazi, as the port city could be used as a
strategic point for the French campaign in Italy, and for Venice in particular. Naudi
received the post and was transferred to Benghazi.173 By 1798 however, he had
returned to the city of Tripoli. It remains unclear if the consul wrote to Paris in the
hope of finally ridding himself of Naudi, who had ingratiated himself with diplomatic
circles, won the wrath of the English consular office and made several adversaries in
the city or if it was for purely strategic support in the east of the province.174 It is
entirely possible that the extent of Naudi’s ambitions had won him enemies within the
French diplomatic community of Tripoli. However, what we do know, from western
and North African sources alike, was that Naudi was the one chosen by the consul’s
office to negotiate with Yusuf Pasha on Bonaparte’s behalf.175 And, regardless of the
actual, or affected, depths of Naudi’s fidelities to France, his efforts as intermediary
proved effective. Yusuf Pasha agreed to aid the French in their Egyptian mission.
The Maltese middleman negotiated the following terms: in return for securing
communication and supply lines through Tripolitan territory and into Egypt, as well
as for supplying French troops in Malta with livestock, foodstuff and other
provisions,176 Naudi promised Yusuf would be given a handsome monetary reward,
various jewels and precious artifacts looted from the French royal palaces, the future
disbandment of the Knights of Malta and further autonomy from the Porte. France
was now equipped with the logistical resources it needed to invade Mamluk173
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controlled Egypt.
Egypt, Invaded
On July 2, 1798, under the charge of Bonaparte, over twenty thousand
Frenchmen docked in the coastal city of Alexandria, claiming the province for the
French Republic, the ‘natural’ ally of the Sublime Porte.177 Turning his immediate
attention to the de-facto rulers of the province, the general and his men looked to
dislodge the Mamluk grandees from power behind the thin disguise of restoring
authority to their ‘ally’ and ‘friend,’ the Ottoman sultan.
Egypt, a three-tuğ province, one the wealthiest in the sultan’s empire, was
under direct attack. The invasion of Egypt surprised Constantinople as much as it had
surprised other imperial centers across Europe. Indeed, Finkel compared the French
invasion of Egypt to the Russian fleet’s sudden appearance in the Aegean Sea and the
subsequent 1770 naval losses at Çeşme, which had spurred the widespread Ottoman
naval reforms under Gazi Hasan Pasha. She argued that the Porte simply was not
expecting Egypt to fall to the Corsican general.178 However, the French ambassador to
Constantinople had been informed of Bonaparte’s imminent invasion by the French
Foreign Minister Talleyrand, and the Porte had grown suspicious in the weeks before
Bonaparte’s arrival.
Nevertheless, the Directory was quite intent to keep news of their general’s
plans out of British and as many North African hands as possible. After all,
Bonaparte’s arrival at Alexandria had even surprised the majority of French soldiers;
Cole noted that most of the general’s men boarded in Toulon without previous
knowledge of their final destination. Needless to say, it surprised all the people on
177
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Alexandrine shores as well. The Republican flotilla docked a few days after the
arrival, and eviction, of the British fleet in Alexandria. The latter were turned away
from the “sultan’s land”179 by the governor of Alexandria, Muhammed Kurayyim.
On Sunday, the 10th of Muharram of this year (June 24, 1798) letters came by
messengers from the port of Alexandria reporting that on Thursday, the eighth,
[June 22] 10 English ships came…They said they were English and had come
in search of the French, who had set sail with a powerful fleet bound for an
unknown destination: ‘We are not aware of their purpose, perhaps they will
attack you and you will be unable to repel them and incapable of stopping
them.’ Sayyid Muhammad Kurayyim did not believe what they said.
Suspecting that this was trick, he answered them rudely. The English
emissaries replied: ‘We shall stay on our ships at sea, guarding the harbor. We
need nothing from you except provisions of water and supplies and food for
which we shall pay.’ Their request however was not granted and they were
told: ‘This is the sultan's land. Neither the French nor anyone else has access
to it. So leave us alone!’ The English…went away and set sail to obtain
supplies from shores other than Alexandria. ‘That God might determine a
matter that was done,’ (8:44). 180
The renowned Egyptian chronicler, Abd al-Rahman Al-Jabarti’s wry use of
Quranic scripture at the end of the quote was rather telling of his later experiences and
impressions of the French and their habits during the invasion, and more importantly,
of the destruction and turmoil that were to shorty follow. Having arrived in
Alexandria, Napoleon’s fleet, like the British had warned Kurayyim, quickly
overpowered the city’s defenses. By the following month, French troops had defeated
Mamluk cavalrymen on the outskirts of Imbaba in Cairo. Egypt fell quickly into
chaos.
Seas and Sultans: The Ottoman Perspective
Bonaparte had attempted to keep the details of his mission to Egypt as
clandestine as possible. To aid the general in his effort, Talleyrand, the French
Foreign Minister, became extremely evasive with the sultan’s ambassador in Paris,
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Sayyid Ali Effendi. Talleyrand deflected the latter’s questions as much as possible in
regards to Bonaparte’s intended mission and his gathering of troops in Toulon. This,
in turn, meant that the information reaching Constantinople via official channels about
the possibility of a French invasion was “at best confused.”181
However, from French records it was clear that Talleyrand had written to
Pierre Ruffin, the French emissary to Constantinople in early May of 1798 informing
him of Bonaparte’s upcoming Egyptian occupation. Talleyrand argued that
Bonaparte’s attack was directed at the Mamluks, not the sultan, and therefore should
not result in a breakdown of diplomatic ties between Paris and Constantinople. He
sent the letter on May 11, 1798.182 While these statements seem doubtful to modernday scholars, neither Paris nor the Porte wanted a war with the other. Despite Ruffin’s
attempts to keep news out of Ottoman hands, rumors were spreading.
By examining the Porte’s records, we see that on June 8, 1798, three weeks
after Talleyrand’s letter left Paris and another three weeks before the French fleet
docked in Alexandria, news had reached Selim III about the possibility of a French
attack on Egypt. 183 Officials in the high council had obtained news and reports of
Napoleon’s proposed journey to Alexandria while the French fleet was still en route
to Malta. In response, Ottoman authorities questioned Ruffin about the possibility of a
French invasion. While Ruffin demurred, the high divan was nevertheless clearly
aware of the possibility of an attack and made the sultan aware of the possibility.184
Why did the Porte not prepare better, or at least warn, Egypt of a potential invasion by
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the French? We may never be able to fully answer this question. However, what we
do know about the context of Ottoman-French relations at the turn of the century, as
well as internal dynamics of the Porte at the time, shed a clearer light on the position
of the Porte in the lead up to French invasion.
Constantinople’s main adversary in the previous decades was not republican
France, but rather imperial Russia. France on the other hand, had long been an ally to
the Porte. In his work on Napoleon, Dwyer went so far as to compare the
implausibility of the upcoming Russo-Ottoman alliance (with Great Britain) against
France “to Russia and the United States joining [forces] to fight China at the height of
the Cold War.”185 Admittedly, the Porte’s relations with revolutionary France was
much more amicable than with St. Petersburg. However, perhaps Dwyer’s claims
were slightly exaggerated, as they overlook the 1796 death of Catherine II, the
succession of her son Paul I, with his subsequent attempts at rapprochement with the
Porte. By 1798 diplomatic rumor mills were rife with French intrigues and admiration
for the rebel Osman Pasvandoğlu, an insurgent in Vidin who proactively agitated
against Ottoman control in the Balkans; and reports of his dealings with French
agents, by way of Russian officials in the region, always managed to reach
Constantinople.186 Paul was attempting to reframe Russians relations with the Porte.
It was not until September 11, 1798 over two months since Bonaparte’s troops
landed in Alexandria, long after news had reached the sultan, a full six weeks after the
British Admiral Nelson destroyed the French fleet at Aboukir, and after much urging
by both the English and Russian emissaries that the Porte finally declared war on
France. Ruffin, as well as the other members of the French diplomatic corps, were
185
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imprisoned in the fortress of Yedikule (Seven Towers.) Even then however, several
important figures, such as the Grand Vizier, Cenaze Hasan Pasha, the Şeyhulislam, as
well as other Europeanist reformers in the Porte remained vehemently opposed to the
war with France.187
Despite the relative disbelief that several Porte administrators maintained
regarding the ongoing French aggression, the Ottomans were not the only officials to
be taken aback by the behavior of their imperial counterparts. After all, Talleyrand
himself wrote Ruffin, explicitly claiming that Bonaparte’s invasion was not against
the sultan, but rather against the Mamluk governors of Egypt; and, more importantly,
Bonaparte himself refused to believe the Porte’s declaration of war. By the end of
October, the sultan’s firman, or official decree, proclaiming war and calling on the
Islamic obligation to fight against the invading French was being read in Friday
prayers across Egypt. Still however, Bonaparte refused to accept the genuineness of
the document.
Rather, the general wrote in his daily report from November 4th that
documents were forged by the Egyptian grandee, Ibrahim Bey, in an effort to rally the
Egyptian people against the French.188 The general’s incredulity regarding the sultan’s
war on the Republic would continue throughout the year. By mid-December,
Bonaparte was still writing letters to the Grand Vizier in an attempt to intercede with
the Porte.189 It seemed that for as disbelieving as the Porte was about the ongoing state
of affairs in Egypt, French officials were right beside them in their utter denial.
French officials, Napoleon included, seemed to have fallen victim to their own
187
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propaganda efforts.
Tunis and the Invasion
Given the conflicting messages coming from both Constantinople and French
forces in Cairo, the overall reticence of the sultan’s imperial council to declare war,
and Bonaparte’s subsequent rejection of the Porte’s position, it was perhaps not
surprising that the governors of Tunis and Tripoli were cautious and wary in their
initial responses to the French invasion.
Records indicate however that the governor of Tunis, Hammuda Pasha, unlike
his Tripolitan counterpart, had not been made aware by the Directory of Bonaparte’s
plans for invasion. Upon being informed of the French mission in Egypt, the
governor’s first response was to turn to the Ottoman center. Concerned for Tunisian
trade with Europe and in the Levant, the bey immediately wrote to his agent in
Constantinople. In turn, the bey’s representative informed him that upon the arrival of
the French fleet, a squadron had left quickly for Constantinople, and that the Kapudan
Pasha had been advised to leave Widdin (Vidin) immediately and to arm his ships.190
Devoize, the French consul to Tunis had originally hoped that Hammuda Pasha would
support the French mission and, much like Tripoli, provide French troops with the
livestock and provisions they needed in Malta and Egypt.191 However, this hope
quickly evaporated as dissatisfaction and acrimony grew among the Tunisian elite
towards French citizens in the province. Tunis, for as much as it relied on French
ships to export her commodities and manufactured good, also had extensive
commercial ties with Egypt. In fact, several of her merchants openly worried about
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their investments in the province. Devoize, the French consul, wrote of the general
tension, “day by day, the dissatisfied grow in number, and it rumored that over sixhundred Tunisian merchants have all their capital in Egypt.”192
Frictions were somewhat abated when Bonaparte released the North African
captives from the Knights Hospitallers’ prisons in Malta in the summer of 1798. The
general then asked the provinces to release any and all Venetian and Maltese captives
they held. Bonaparte considered them to then be “subjects of France.”193 While the
dey of Algiers quickly dismissed this request,194 Tunis’s Hammuda Pasha stood the
most to gain from the prisoner exchange, as over four hundred of the six hundred
released captives were Tunisian subjects. In response, he allowed for the release of
sixty-four Maltese prisoners from his jails.195 Nevertheless, this was at best a
temporary reprieve, as tensions continued to grow throughout the summer.
By September, the consul Devoize placed all French citizens in Tunis under
curfew. They were ordered to return to the French national house, the fundouk, by
nine in the evening so as to remain under guard throughout the night.196 By the end of
the month, on September 25, an emissary from the Porte with three firmans, one for
each of the provinces, “asking that they remain on their guard and defy the French
who had invaded Egypt.”197 This forced an end to all French commercial activities in
the province as it kept the Republic’s diplomatic circle behind their protected walls.
While sources indicate that Hammuda Pasha, unlike his Tripolitan counterpart,
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was unaware of Bonaparte’s expedition, we also know from these sources that the
intelligence networks of the North African corso were central to the various
intelligence gathering resources of both European and, as we shall see below,
Ottoman networks. In fact, Devoize, unlike Ruffin, his counterpart in Constantinople,
was not privy to Bonaparte’s secret plans by way of the French Foreign Minister.
Rather, the French consul to Tunis obtained news of the Egyptian expedition through
information circulating among the province’s corsairs after the French fleet docked in
Malta.
Immediately, Devoize began a flurried correspondence with the French
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Talleyrand, and attempted to keep the Minister abreast of
news and information through the very same networks of Tunisian corsairs. The
information relayed back to the Directory was so useful that Talleyrand wrote to the
consul thanking him for efforts and urging him to continue to gather as much news as
possible for Paris. Ben Tahar discussed the dependence of the Tunisians, as well as
the French, on news from the corsair networks.
…[C]onsular correspondence suggests that the Tunisian government was
regularly informed—maybe even better than the French government—about
the situation in the Mediterranean. Without being masters of the
Mediterranean, the Barbary corsairs, especially Tunisians, ‘that cover the sea,’
constituted a first class information network for the government of the
Regency. The foreign policy of Hammuda Pasha Bey was indeed, as we know,
largely determined by the information, which reached him through his
representatives (wakil) in Alexandria, Izmir, Tripoli and Malta. Collected in
all ports of the Mediterranean, the military and political information were used
by the authorities in Tunis to guide their strategy with regard to any event
likely to related to Tunisian interests. 198
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Caution Turns to War
However, these early months of caution, tension and political ambiguity would
soon change. Imperial centers, Ottoman, French and British alike needed the support
of the provinces in order to actualize their political objectives. By the end of year, the
Ottoman Porte had secured the support of both the beys of Tunis and Tripoli, and
correspondingly governors responded positively and acted on the Porte’s requests. A
dispatch submitted to the sultan in the winter of 1798 informed him that Tripoli had
cast six corsair ships off her harbor in an attempt to target and intercept French packet
ships and interrupt Bonaparte’s sea lines of communication.199 From this same
document we learn of the Porte’s concern regarding a potential invasion of Tripoli,
and the casting of two gunships and a frigate towards Toulon’s harbor, with the
possibility of sending more vessels if necessary.200 The Tripolitan governor had
responded positively to the Porte’s request for assistance.
In doing so, Yusuf Pasha demonstrated the paradoxical nature of his
relationship with the Porte. On one hand, we have a situation where the governor
clearly allied with the French in a planned invasion of neighboring Egypt, securing
supply and communication lines through his territory. Yet, on the other, we see from
Ottoman records that his fleet was actively undermining the same French
communication lines that he was supposed to protect. Moreover, not only had he

Sans être les maîtres de la Méditerranée, les corsaires barbaresques, tunisiens notamment, « qui
couvrent cette mer », constituaient un réseau d’information de premier ordre pour le gouvernement de
la Régence. La politique extérieure de Hammûda pacha bey était du reste, on le sait, largement
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supplied six ships, which as we shall see below was the same number as his Tunisian
counterpart, but he was willing to further employ his maritime fleet in the service of
the sultan and was proactively sending reports to the Porte regarding the status of the
ongoing Egyptian crisis.
While it was clear that the governor of Tripoli was effectively playing both
sides of the fence during the French invasion, his efforts to do so are particularly
interesting because he was under no obligation to help the sultan. After all, the Porte
was hardly in a position to remove him from power if the Tripolitan bey refused to
assist the Ottoman war effort. The high council was far too preoccupied with the
occupation Egypt. Yusuf could have seized the opportunity— much like Osman
Pasvandoğlu, his counterpart in the Balkans— to rebel against Selim III and act as the
independent sovereign of Tripoli. However, the Tripolitan bey chose not to.
We also know from the Porte’s records that Tunis was active in the Ottoman
war effort. The same report that notified Selim III of Tripolitan aid in limiting French
communication lines also discussed the role of Tunis, and Hammuda Pasha’s
involvement, in assisting the Porte. Much like his Tripolitan neighbor, the Tunisian
bey was preparing six war ships, armed with his corsairs, to limit French tactical
support to Bonaparte in Egypt. Additionally, we see that the bey of Tunis was
gathering information, likely through the very same corsair intelligence networks, to
send to Constantinople. Further, the beys of Tunis and Tripoli agreed that all
documents, French parcels and letters would be sent directly to Constantinople.201
From Ottoman records preserved in Istanbul we can see that the Porte’s call for
support from the two North African provinces— and more importantly the proactive
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reaction of Tunis and Tripoli to the requests— offers important insights into the
ongoing political relationship between the Ottoman center and two of its western most
territories. In an act of further solidarity with the Ottoman Porte, Tunis officially
ratified its support on January 3, 1799 by declaring war on France.
To inform the French, Hammuda Pasha requested an audience with the
Republic’s consul. Devoize met the governor on the Bardo Palace. The consul was
accompanied by Hammuda Pasha’s former ambassador to France, Mohammed
Khodja and provided an escort of fifty cavalrymen and two aghas to protect him from
the insults or attacks of the people on the journey. Upon arrival, the French flag was
lowered. French diplomats were placed under house arrest in their consular houses of
the funduk. Hammuda Pasha, following Algiers’s lead, declared war on the French
Republic. This official break in diplomatic relations was a significant shift for the
French in the province. In the previous months, the bey had attempted to maintain a
pragmatic relationship with the French, and even expressed a measure of contrition
when notifying Devoize of his declaration.202 However, Hammuda Pasha remained
quite loyal to his ties with the Ottoman Porte. In fact, more French citizens in Tunisia
would ultimately be detained than any of their counterparts in Tripoli or in Algiers.
The French community in Tunis was held under house arrest for nearly
eighteen months.203 This was exceptionally long given the one-month confinement of
their counterparts in Tripoli and Algiers. However, in her treatment of the broader
French-Tunisian relations throughout the Egyptian occupation, Moalla turned to two
contemporary sources that echoed one another in their interpretation of Tunis’s role in
the Ottoman war effort. Specifically, she cited Alphonse Rousseau’s Annales
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tunisiennes, ou aperçu historique de la Régence de Tunis and the notable Tunisian
chronicler, Bin Diyaf’s It’ḥāf ahl al-zamān bi-akhbār mulūk Tūnis wa ‘Ahd al-Amān
to argue that “the Regency had no active involvement in the war. No attacks were
carried out by Tunisian corsairs against French ships during the war.”204
French consular records as well as Ottoman imperial records mentioned above
and in the following sections suggest otherwise. Records from the Sublime Porte
indicate that Tunisian ships were actively engaged in Ottoman efforts against the
French even before Hammuda Pasha’s declaration of war in January of 1799. In his
published volume of French consular records with Tripolitan officials, Plantet also
demonstrated otherwise. Writing on behalf of Bonaparte, Commodore Ganteaume
wrote directly to Hammuda Pasha:
The great, incomparable general Bonaparte… has restored the ties of friendship,
which had existed for so long between Tunisia and France. Why then do your
corsairs come every day to insult our flag, continue to capture our ships and those of
our allies that carry subsistence meant for [our] armies? These last days [alone,] two
transports carrying provisions for French [troops] on the island of Elba were caught in
the Piombino channel. A small corvette of the Republic was [also] challenged head
on at the same time and place. These hostilities must cease. I know […Bonaparte…]
does not want to make war with you, because he is your friend and because his anger
would be terrible for you and your country; but he wishes [his] respect be
reciprocated; that you respect the flag of the Republic, that of its allies, its ships, and
especially, that you no longer continue to take provisions intended for our troops. 205
This explicit and detailed letter was sent directly to the governor of the
Tunisian province and clearly indicated that his corsairs were in fact targeting both
French supply and gunships. Therefore, based on both Ottoman and French records,
this chapter argues that Tunisian corsairs did in fact participate in the broader
Ottoman efforts against the French during the time of the Egyptian occupation. This
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letter was sent while the French were still in Egypt and before the Porte officially
ceased its war efforts against France. The Tunisian attacks on French vessels took
place after the Tunisian governor officially restored peace with the Republic,206 thus
demonstrating that Hammuda Pasha’s system of alliances was much more
complicated than previously imagined. Moreover, Commodore Ganteaume clearly
indicated that the attacks from late May were not the only assaults on French ships on
the part of Tunisian corsairs. It seems that Tunisian mariners, acting on the part of the
bey, were intentionally targeting Republican vessels.
The attacks on French vessels were motivated by economic self-interest, rather
than by an act of political solidarity with the Porte. However, given the ongoing
hostilities in the Mediterranean Sea at the time, Tunis’s demonstrable assistance to the
Sublime Porte throughout the invasion, Hammuda Pasha’s consistent communication
with Constantinople during the crisis, Devoize’s growing despair at the conditions of
French diplomats in the province, as well as the tacit, but flippant, disregard of the
official French-Tunisian peace accord mentioned above, this chapter demonstrates
that the reality of French-Tunisian alliance during 1798 was largely artifice.
One could argue that the delay in the compilation of both Rousseau and Bin
Diyaf’s chronicles may account for some of this historical discrepancy. Rousseau’s
work was first published in 1832. Bin Diyaf’s eight-volume chronicle was written
after the fact, from firsthand accounts of sources that were familiar with the events.
Bin Diyaf, a Tunisian reformist who came from a notable family and who had access
and ongoing relationships with individuals at the highest levels of the province’s
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government before and after French occupation is widely regarded as historical
chronicler of Tunis. As such, his claims have remained largely unchallenged in his
accounts of events at the turn of the nineteenth century. Given the delayed time of
their inscription, it is understandable that they would be more prone to historical
error— as their narratives were recorded several decades after the events they
described. While the merits of these sources and especially of Bin Diyaf, who is in
still considered Tunisia’s national historian, are irrefutable and the chronicles are in of
themselves an important historical record, their claims about the turn of the nineteenth
century are not above critical analysis.
As Tahar and several others have noted, Bin Diyaf considered himself a
reformer much in the vein of Egyt’s Rifa’a al-Tahtawi and his later counterpart Khair
ul-Din al-Tunisi. In his writings, Bin Diyaf heralded Bonaparte’s Egyptian occupation
as a watershed moment that introduced modernity to the region. While this view has
since been largely dismissed, albeit relatively recently, as an orientalist trope in
western academia, it nevertheless very much guided Bin Diyaf in his understanding of
events and his framing of history. Therefore, I argue that he had a very specific reason
for promoting a glossy, amicable interpretation of the historical relationship between
Tunis and France, as he viewed the events with an (overly) generous gaze of
‘development.’ In fact, Tahar explicitly wrote:
For the reformers [like Bin Diyaf] ... the Egyptian expedition was the starting
point of an [regional] awareness of the instrumental superiority of Europe to
the whole of the Muslim world ... references to the glorious past of Islam and
the present of the Europe led them to adopt the ideas of the French Revolution,
including concepts of civilization and homeland. In contrast to the reformist
ideology, the reaction of the contemporaries of the event, in this case the
powers of Tunis, was to consider the French expansion in the Mediterranean
as a danger and a threat to the regional balance. That efforts should be taken to
preserve the interests of [Tunis] and those of a social class which had links and
close ties with France as well as with Egypt and the Sublime Porte. Tunis
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Powers were thus in a paradoxical position ... between 1798 and 1801. 207
When read alongside Colla’s analysis of the two-hundred-year
commemoration of the invasion among Egyptian scholars within Egypt, we see a
corresponding parallel in the subsequent interpretation of history. One where North
African nationalists eventually took up the banner of the early reformists, such as Bin
Diyaf, and “were willing to suppress some of the negative aspects of the French
Expedition so as to construct an image of benevolent exchange.”208 Therefore, the
post-colonial nationalist retooling of 1798 within Tunisian history has, much like its
Egyptian counterpart, embedded the invasion within a framework ‘exchange’ and
‘insight’ rather than in the contemporary discourse of political threat and imperial
bloodshed.
The well-argued premise of Moalla’s work was intended to deconstruct the
Tunisian ‘autonomy thesis,’ which regarded the province is working largely
independently of the Porte. Thus, the fact that she did not further challenge Bin
Diyaf’s readings of Tunisian-French interactions is even more surprising, especially
given her careful analysis of Hammuda Pasha’s extended incarceration of French
citizens in Tunis and her extensive use of Plantet.209 However, she too struggled with
her interpretation of Bin Diyaf and his historical accuracy. The author wrote, “[t]he
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authority enjoyed by Ibn Abī’l Ḍiyāf among contemporary historians explains why
the version thus presented by him of a lip-service war declaration against France by
the Tunisian authorities has been accepted without discussion.”210 It is only with
access to Ottoman records, as well as the Tunisian and French sources that Moalla
very successfully analyzed, that one can piece together a more holistic view of
Hammuda Pasha’s interaction with the French and the Porte during the French
invasion. In fact, this regional retooling of the French invasion, both within, and
beyond the borders of Egypt, seeks in and of itself of a socio-intellectual thread that
bound the three provinces, and the histories, of Tunis, Tripoli, and Egypt together.
Tripoli and the Invasion
It was perhaps not surprising that the covert alliance between Yusuf Pasha and
Bonaparte did not remain secret for long. British forces maintained a sharp eye on the
Alexandrine harbor and quickly turned their attentions back to Egypt after their
previous expulsion by the city’s governor. After the destruction of the French fleet by
British forces in August of 1798, the British were eager to remove French forces from
Egypt and urged the Porte to declare war on France. By March 1799, through the very
same Tunisian networks that Hammuda Pasha and Devoize were using in Tunis,
Yusuf’s alliance with Bonaparte became widely known. Then British flag officer,
Viscount Nelson, wrote to Tripoli:
Reports have reached me from Tunis, and also by intercepted French letter
from Malta, that your Highness has renounced the deference of the true
[Muslim] faith, and joined in a new alliance with the French infidels, who are
endeavoring to overthrow the Ottoman Empire…. I have, therefore, sent a ship
to receive not only the contradiction of this report from your Highness’s own
hand, but also an assurance that you will use every exertion for the destruction
of that band of robbers, who have so wantonly attacked the Grand Signior in
part of his Dominions where they thought to have found no opposition.
I beg leave also to acquaint your Highness, that the French in Malta pretend
210
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that your subjects will supply them with provisions: this I believe to be equally
false with the other reports. As the subject of a Sovereign who is in the closest
alliance with the Sublime Porte for the defence [sic] of the Ottoman Empire,
and being also in alliance with your Highness, I shall anxiously wait your
Highness’s answer; for should evil councilors have abused the goodness of
your heart, I beg leave, with all respect, to offer the Victor of the Nile as the
mediator between your Highness and the Sublime Porte: for it will be my duty
to join with the Admiral of the Ottoman Fleet in chastising those enemies of
the True Faith and of the Grand Signior, who have so much betrayed the trust
your Highness hath reposed in them. 211
This remarkable letter offers several insights into the contemporary events on
the ground. Ut is clear that British officials, as well as their French counterparts, were
reliant on the Tunisian corsair intelligence networks, so much so that a rumor of
province’s alliance with the French was enough to cause concern among influential
figures in the British navy. In effect, records indicate that all of the major imperial
powers of the Mediterranean: Ottoman, English and French were reliant to varying
degrees on corsair information. The letter reveals why Yusuf Pasha was perhaps so
eager to align with the French in the first place: an alliance with revolutionary France
would hoist Tripoli into the political considerations of the major maritime powers in
the Mediterranean. If he was allied with one, then he effectively had the attention of
the other, as well as that of the sultan in Constantinople. In response to the letter,
Yusuf was quick to deny the allegations in a letter to Nelson, although he continued to
supply foodstuffs to French forces during their occupation of Egypt.212
The following month, in April 1799, Selim III sent Yusuf an elaborately
crafted caftan and a firman that declared him “the generalissimo of all Ottoman troops
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in Barbary,”213 which likely assuaged whatever remaining insecurities the Tripolitan
had in regards to the influential navies of Tunis and Algiers. The firman requested
Tripoli’s aid in allowing the Porte’s ships, loaded with maritime and military supplies,
to reach British Commodore Ball, who was in charge of the blockade against French
forces in Malta.214 In return for the recognition from Constantinople, Yusuf confined
the French consul as well as the entire French diplomatic corps in their residences in
the city walls, effectively putting them under house arrest.215 This information is
confirmed by British consular reports, on the 4th of July, 1799 Simon Lucas wrote
“your grace that on the 29th of that this Bashaw ordered the French flag to be struck
and declared war with that Nation in imitation of the other Barbary states, and on a
visit which I made to him a few days after, he assured me that nothing but his love
and regard for the English who he looked upon as the best”.216 By spring of 1799, all
three of the regencies were officially at war with the French.
Shortly after declaring war on the French Republic, Yusuf Karamanlı
leveraged Tripoli’s geopolitical centrality to further entrench the province within the
Ottoman war efforts against his French ally. With Egypt occupied by French forces,
the northern coastline of Tripolitania could be used as a strategic hub in Ottoman
efforts to regain control of Egypt. The kapudan pasha, the Grand Admiral of the
Ottoman fleet, Küçük Hüseyin, headquartered the Ottoman flotilla on the island of
Corfu and looked to the North African provinces to supply local men for a standing
army that was to be sent to Cairo.217 Derna, meanwhile, the small port-city on the
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eastern end of the Tripolitan province, became the headquarters and training ground
for this Ottoman army, which was comprised exclusively North African ground
troops.218
As the Ottoman Porte was attempting to assemble a new army in Derna, it
called on Tripoli, Tunis and Algiers to supply Constantinople with men. The
provinces looked to each other for the finally tally in the militants that each governor
provided. While Yusuf Pasha promised the Porte 10,000 Tripolitan soldiers,219 he held
back their deployment so as to see how many men his counterparts in Algiers and
Tunis would provide before committing troops of his own. This caution had two
motivations: first, he was reluctant to provide the sultan with more troops than his
western neighbors. Second, he was interested to see how Tunis and Algiers were
benefiting from the competing imperial interests in the region.220 Time and time
again, Tripoli and Tunis turned to one another, as well as to Egypt and Algiers, to
strategize their political decisions.
The continuous theme that emerged when analyzing Tripoli’s relation to the
Porte, and the French occupation was that despite Yusuf’s seemingly clear-cut
alliance with Bonaparte, after the actual arrival of French fleet in Egypt, the region’s
realpolitik took precedence. North African governors were concerned about a major
shift in the regional power and how it would affect their territory and their shores. The
bey of Tripoli was as willing as the governors of Tunis and Algiers to provide the
sultan with the manpower needed to fight the French with whom he had allied. This
adaptable and at times conflicting system of alliances explains how the regencies of
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Tripoli and Tunis negotiated their position within the world of much bigger empires
across the Mediterranean and that alliances were far more flexible than previously
imagined. This system of paradoxes operated in between Tripoli’s relations with the
Porte, as well as its relationships among more influential provinces, such as Tunis and
Egypt. However, very soon, despite Yusuf’s difficult ties to Constantinople, the
region, and Egypt, his immediate concerns would focus on the eastern realm of his
province and a different sort of threat—that of his deposed older brother, Ahmad.
After Yusuf Pasha overthrew his older brother Ahmad Pasha and assumed
control of the province in 1795, the new governor offered his sibling a choice: exile or
the governorship of the eastern port city of Derna. Ahmad Pasha chose the latter.
However, while we know from British consular records that Yusuf assumed power
“to the great joy of all his loving subjects,”221 historical records remain unclear about
Ahmad Pasha’s historical trajectory. Abun Nasr wrote that rather than go to Derna,
the deposed pasha diverted his ship first to Malta, and then traveled to Tunis where he
remained under the protection of Hammuda Pasha until briefly returning to Derna in
1804.222 Again, in a moment of crisis, it was Ahmad Pasha’s sense of regionalism that
underscored his decision to seek refuge in Tunis, under Hammuda Pasha.
It is difficult to precisely trace Ahmad Pasha’s movements after his exile. We
know from American sources that by March 1802, the former governor had long since
left his Tunisian exile and was in Malta.223 Sources also inform us that Ahmad Pasha
continued to build support among Tripolitans throughout the course of exile, and
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might have clandestinely traveled back to Derna in an effort to secure his base.224 By
the time Ahmad eventually returned he “placed himself at the head of an army of
Arabs at Derna and had gained some considerable advantages in the field over the
army of [his brother.]”225 What is clear was that Ahmad Pasha remained closely tied
to the community of Derna and looked to eastern Tripolitania for support.
This is particularly compelling since Derna was the headquarters and training
ground for the Kapudan Pasha and his army of North African recruits. While Ottoman
sources do not indicate an explicit effort by the Porte to recruit the deposed pasha into
their campaign against the French during his earlier years of exile, we do know that
Ahmad Pasha held a great deal of influence with the Ouwald Ali tribe near Derna, the
same cavalrymen who Ottoman records indicate were actively recruited to fight
against French forces outside Alexandria.226
Tunis, Tripoli and the Porte
While both Bonaparte and Nelson had been eager to sway Tripoli to their
respective war efforts, and while revolutionary France and Great Britain both relied
on Tunisian intelligence in their various maritime efforts, these two powers were in no
way the only imperial forces with a very sharp eye fixed on the North African coast.
After the shock of the French invasion set in, Constantinople’s strategies also turned
to North Africa in the wake of territorial occupation.
By examining Ottoman records of the invasion, we see that the Porte’s interest
in and reliance on the North African regencies extended beyond the first, politically
turbulent months of the French occupation. Throughout the conflict between
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Constantinople and the Republic, we see that Tunisian and Tripolitan vessels were
routinely involved in Porte’s efforts against the French. For example, on August 9,
1799 Selim III was notified of a communiqué from the Kapudan Pasha Küçük
Hüseyin to the Grand Vizier, Kör Yusuf Ziyaüddin Pasha, regarding dispatching
Awlad Ali cavalrymen to Alexandria to fight the French.227 Similarly, on October 5,
1799 a naval report that was copied to the sultan indicated that a Tunisian ship used
by Ottoman forces in defense of Abukir Castle had been damaged in battle. In
response the Ottoman customs official of Alexandria, Üsküdarlı Hüseyin allocated
thirty silver coins from the reserve for damages.228 Meanwhile, military reports from
the end of the month indicate that Yusuf Pasha’s officer continued to transmit
information back and forth [gidip gelen] between the bey in Tripoli and the Ottoman
Porte.229
Ottoman records confirm details concerning the provinces’ relationships with
the French after they declared war in the early days of 1799. In a war report from
March 26, 1800 we see that the emissary of Tunis was detained, along with his
translators and staff, in France. In response, Hammuda Pasha had his corsairs prepare
the fleet. They were ordered that upon any contact with French ships, they were not to
burn or sink the ships, but bring them to the provinces for the judgment of the bey.230
From the Porte’s records we can see that Constantinople kept a very close eye
on the maritime pursuits of the provinces themselves. The bey of Tunis had written to
the Sublime Porte informing officials that he had warned his corsairs against
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approaching any English or Austrian ships off his waters.231 This report, which
updated the center about the ongoing affairs of the Tunisian province, and was copied
to the sultan, indicated that at the highest level of government, Ottoman officials were
extremely interested in the affairs of the regencies. Similarly, in a war report from
October 18, 1800 we learn that three Russian-owned ships were captured off the coast
of Sardinia by Tunisian corsairs. While the Porte and St. Petersburg were allied in
their efforts against the French, the vessels under discussion were not flying the
Russian imperial ensign. Mehmed Reis, a captain for Hammuda Pasha,
commandeered the ships and sailed back to the province. However, a Russian official
traveled to Tunis to reclaim the ships and cargo. Rather than risk a diplomatic
incident, Hammuda Pasha ordered that the Russian captain to be reimbursed for his
loss and provided him with some updates, likely gathered from his corsairs, about
trade in the region.232
Seas and Sand: Tripoli and Egypt
The classic text on the Egyptian perspective of the French invasion has long
been al-Jabarti’s chronicle, Ajāʼib al- āthār fī 'l-tarājim wa-'l-akhbār. This work has
been mined extensively for historical information on the Egyptian notables’
experiences of the invasion, and specifically for the Cairene scholar’s perceptions of
the invading French forces. However, little work has contextualized this key text in
the broader North African world. This is a curious omission as al-Jabarti made
extensive mention of the role of North Africans and specifically, Tripolitans, in daily
Egyptian life, as well as in various efforts against the invading French, and especially
in regards to the close social, religious and intellectual ties among the provinces’
231
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elites.
In the first pages of al-Jabarti’s Volume III, which opens with the French
docking in Alexandria, we see that news of the French invasion had just reached
Cairo and the Mamluks, the province’s de facto governors, were preparing their
attack. Upon receiving this news, Murad Bey, a Mamluk commander and a governor
of Egypt, immediately began to prepare for battle with the French. He was joined in
his efforts by two “intimate friends living with him in Giza:” Nasif Pasha and Ali
Pasha al-Tarabulusi 233
Ali Pasha al-Tarabulusi accompanied Murad Bey, first in his battles against
Bonaparte’s forces in Cairo and later in Upper Egypt, as a close confidant of the
governor and, on several occasions, paid Egyptian and North African soldiers out of
his own pocket to facilitate their efforts against the invasion.234 In a twist of fate,
further interweaving the history of the provinces together, Ali Pasha al-Tarabulusi
was none other than Ali Burghol, the Georgian corsair who had seized Tripoli from
Karamanlı rule in 1793. The fact that he chose to fight with the Mamluks spoke to a
sense of regional loyalty in the face of invasion. This is particularly important, since,
Ottoman forces did not arrive on Egyptian soil until the late spring of 1801.
Moreover, Burghol’s time with Murad Bey and their efforts against the French would
not be the end of the former corsair’s ambition or days in power.
In fact, it is from al-Jabarti’s chronicle that we learn what happened to Ali
Burghol after he was forced out of Tripoli by Tunisian forces in 1795. al-Jabarti’s
quote is far too rich to not include in its entirety.
… he was Algerian in origin, a Mamluk of Muhammad Pasha ruler of
Algeria. When Muhammad Pasha died his son-in-law took his place and sent
233
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Ali with a message to [Küçük] Husayn Kapudan Pasha… the kapudan pasha
praised him highly and awarded him the governorship of Tripoli, giving him
firmans and weapons. Ali Pasha went there, recruited troops and ships for
himself and made an attack on its ruler, who was the brother of Hammuda
Pasha, ruler of Tunis. He waged war against him for some months, and finally
got possession of the land through the collusion of its inhabitants, since they
knew that he was the rightful ruler on behalf of the Ottoman state. Hammuda
Pasha’s brother fled to his brother in Tunis. When Ali Pasha took possession
of Tripoli, he gave it over to his soldiery, and they committed deeds of pillage,
rape, immorality and whoring viler and more repulsive than those of the
hordes of Tamerlane. He captured the ruler’s women, took them prisoners and
had them dishonored by his soldiers. Then he demanded money from the
people, and seized the property of the merchants, levied a tax on the
inhabitants, and sized their property. The deposed official gathered a force
together and returned to Tripoli and besieged it on all sides. Those of the town
who regretted his departed and those who had suffered at the hands of Ali
Pasha rose with him and when the later saw his defeat was imminent, he took
to his ships with all the wealth and treasure he amassed.
He took hostage two handsome youths from among the sons of the
notables and fled to Alexandria. Reaching Cairo, he took refuge with Murad
Bey, who received him and showed him the great hospitality in his home in
Giza. They became intimate friends. The cause of Ali Pasha’s coming to Cairo
and his not returning to the Kapudan pasha was that he knew that he had
become hateful in the eyes of the government, for it was a rule of the Ottoman
government that whenever they appointed anyone governor of a province and
he was unsuccessful they hated him, deposed him and very often killed him,
especially if he was wealthy. In 1207 (1792-3) [Ali Pasha] went on pilgrimage
by way of al-Qulzum, and deposited his treasures with Rashwan Kashif,
known as the kashif of the Fayyum, because of the relationship existing
between them in their own country.
When he reached the Hijaz, and the pilgrims from Tripoli arrived, they
saw him accompanied by the two youths [held hostage] and went to the Syrian
amir al-hajj and told him about ‘Ali Pasha, [that he] has the two youths, and
that he used them for shameful purposes.’ So, he sent off a troop of his
retainers with them during a time when he was off his guard, and they trapped
him in a careless moment and discovered him sleeping with one of the youths.
The Tripolitans reviled him and cursed him, cut off his beard, and assaulted
him with their weapons, wounding him severely. They insulted him and took
the two youths from him, and almost killed him, had it not been for a troop
from the forces of the amir al-hajj. Afterwards, ‘Ali Pasha returned to Egypt
by sea, and stayed as the guest of Murad Bey for more than six years until the
French arrived in Egypt. He fought on the side of the [Mamluks] and went into
exile with them in Upper Egypt and beyond…Ali Pasha was faircomplexioned, with an immense blond beard and mustaches. He spoke little
Arabic. He loved pleasure and dissolute living[.]235
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Al-Jabarti’s retelling of the life of Ali Burghol provides us with some key
insights into how the news of the former corsair circulated among the elite circles
with whom Al-Jabarti interacted. This impression overlaps with the one presented in
Ottoman and Tripolitan sources, while simultaneously differing in key components.
First, in a manner similar to the chronicles in the Tunisian Bin Diyaf’s writings, we
see how oftentimes, historical fact and legend are interwoven in the narrative of
chroniclers when they are not themselves present during the history they were writing
about.
For example, as noted previously, Ali Burghol was Georgian, not Algerian in
descent. As al-Jabarti wrote, Burghol could have easily joined a Mamluk household
while a mariner in Algiers; unfortunately, we do not know this for certain from the
primary sources that remain. What we do learn from al-Jabarti was that Burghol
chose, like Gazi Hasan before him, to quasi-adopt his Algerian training as a means of
identifying himself. Perhaps it was an attempt to model himself after the notable
Kapudan Pasha or perhaps having purported North African roots served another
purpose. However, given the Georgian ties and patronage networks of several of the
Egyptian Mamluks and Porte officials perhaps it was to distance himself from his
Caucasian counterparts.
Regardless, it was first Gazi Hasan who took Ali Burghol under his protection
while serving under Sultan Abdul Hamid I. Küçük Hüseyin only begrudgingly
supported Ali Burghol’s mission to Tripoli because his predecessor’s name and
support continued to hold sway after the admiral’s death. It certainly was not because
Küçük Hüseyin “praised [Burghol] highly” that he or Selim III provided him with the
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firmans to oust the Karamanlı dynasty from power.236 However, the internal rupture in
the Porte between the supporters of Gazi Hasan and the supporters of Küçük Hüseyin,
was strongly felt across the provinces.
Moreover, Ali Karamanlı, then the bey of Tripoli, was not the brother of
Hammuda Pasha in Tunis. The Karamanlıs descended from kuloğlus, the local
administrators who were born of Ottoman janissaries and Tripolitan women.
Meanwhile the Muradid dynasty of Tunis were the decedents of a Corsican renegade,
Jacque Senti, who was captured and bought by the first dey of Tunis as a Mamluk
during the sixteenth century and adopted the name Murad I. Lastly, Ali Burghol did
not sever all ties with the Ottoman Porte despite his and his men’s debauchery during
his rule in Tripoli. Rather, he eventually became a close confidant of the Ottoman
Grand Vizier, Kör Yusuf before his eventual downfall at the hands of the Mamluk
cavalrymen with whom he fought.
It is also worth analyzing Burghol’s repeated salvation by Murad Bey.
Effectively, Murad offered the former corsair sanctuary twice: first, after the Georgian
corsair fled Tripoli in 1795, and then again after he was attacked by the Tripolitan
mob outside Mecca, each time after Burghol endured a brutal and humiliating defeat
when his options were likely limited. What benefit the Mamluk grandee gained from
repeatedly sparing Burghol’s life remains unknown. Al-Jabarti referred to the men as
‘intimate’ friends on several instances, but did not elaborate on how they knew one
another. This is interesting since al-Jabarti was voracious in attacks against his
adversaries and was not particularly fond of either of the men. In fact, he repeatedly
laced his descriptions of both Murad Bey and Burghol with a great degree of
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rancor.237 Nevertheless, his text remained silent and his description of Burghol’s
relationship with Murad’s household—and at least in reference to the corsair’s time
with the Mamluks—was quite evenhanded. In any case, we are left to wonder what
political benefit they served one another, if they were distant relatives, lovers,
childhood acquaintances, the strongest of allies or any combination there within; and
more importantly, what the ruler of Egypt had to had to gain by keeping Burghol
alive. While the records do not indicate an explicit reason for the depth of the
relationship between the two men, it is clear that they was a sense of loyalty between
them.
In addition to the rich detail concerning Tripolitan officials, al-Jabarti’s
chronicle also provides us with key insights into the history of elite Tripolitan
scholars as well as common people in various neighborhoods in Cairo during the
French invasion. For example, al-Jabarti made careful mention of the clergy of alAzhar and their eagerness to establish contact with the French General.238 To facilitate
this exchange, the clergy called upon a prominent Tripolitan merchant, Mohammed
Effendi al-Faydali, to serve as their emissary with the French.239 In this moment of
crisis, it is very significant that the clergy of al-Azhar turned not to an Egyptian, but to
a Tripolitan to serve as their representative with the invading forces. I argue that this
gesture represented the deep-seeded trust between Egyptians and Maghariba at the
end of the eighteenth century and a well-established cultural and regional
understanding between the elite of both provinces.
Al-Jabarti’s text cited several more examples of the close ties between Tripoli
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and Egypt throughout the turn of the nineteenth century—well before and long after
the French invasion. Another key example is that of Sheikh Abdullah al-Sharqawi,
the prominent Egyptian notable, who was the newly appointed president of Egypt and
the Grand Imam of al-Azhar. Al-Sharqawi was harboring Tripolitans in his personal
home, because of the aid that they were supplying to Murad Bey.240 This not only
won him the wrath of Bonaparte, but also caused his homes and personal property to
be seized by French forces in Cairo.241 While the Tripolitan merchant had fled the
capital by the time the French arrived to the sheikh’s home,242 it nevertheless caused a
great deal of chaos among the difficult relations between the religious and political
elite of Egypt and their French invaders. After all, from Bonaparte’s perspective, even
the Grand Imam of the leading institution in Egypt was intimately allied with the
Tripolitans and North Africans that French forces were fighting against in the south of
the province.
However, al-Jabarti did not limit his discussions of Maghrebi people to the
affairs of officials in Egypt. Rather, his chronicle is filled with accounts of the day-today affairs as well as the social disputes between Maghariba traders such as Hajj
Muhammad ibn Qimuh al-Maghrebi and their Syrian counterparts, the narratives of
Maghariba living in Cairo during the French occupation and their inability to return
west because of the blocked roads, the experiences of Maghrebi pilgrims on their way
to Mecca passing through Cairo, the presence of Maghrebi troops, and several other
accounts of al-Jabarti’s own friendship with several sheikhs and scholars from alAzhar.
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One particularly touching mention was al-Jabarti’s eulogy of the Shaykh
Shamil Ahmad ibn Ramadan in Su’ud al-Tarabulusi, who al-Jabarti referred to as “the
virtuous master, our very famous friend, the distinguished scholar, reciter of the
Koran, from al-Azhar…. He assumed this position of sheykh of riwaq with sagacity
and dignity. He was spoken highly of and became famous. He was a distinguished
man, tall, of splendid appearance and cheerful. When he assumed the position of
shaykh of the riwaq our friend shaykh Hasan al ‘Attar praised him in a qasida…”243
These examples listed above mention only a small percent of the North
Africans who feature in Aja’ib. Indeed, al-Jabarti’s work is heavily peppered with
anecdotes and narratives of several Tripolitans and Maghariba across the multitude of
social classes in turn of the nineteenth century Egypt. While it is beyond the scope of
this chapter to analyze each North African mentioned in al-Jabarti’s writings, it is
worth stressing that the sheer quantity of North Africans mentioned, and the familiar
tone adopted by chronicler in his writings imply the ties between the provinces were
so strong that Tripolitan and Maghariba presence within Egypt was so significant that
they were taken by al-Jabarti as what was normal, and utterly familiar in turn of the
nineteenth century Egypt.
North Africa and the Broader Ottoman World
So far, we have examined the relationship and role of the provinces in the
socio-political history of turn of the nineteenth century North Africa. Further, we have
seen how prevalent the Maghrebi community was in daily Cairene life. Moving
forward, it is also important to note that political relationships in the Ottoman realm
were not solely bilateral between the rulers of Tripoli and of Constantinople, or
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regional as we have seen among the provinces of Egypt, Tripoli and Tunis. Rather,
the political crisis of 1798 highlighted North Africa’s relations with the broader
Ottoman world, Syria, and specifically with Cezzar Ahmad Pasha of Acre.
Born in southern Bosnia, Ahmad had spent several years in the households of
the Egyptian grandees, where he forged a reputation for his contentious and difficult
character, as well as for his fierce loyalty. After slaughtering over seventy Bedouins
in retribution for the murder of his Mamluk patron, he was called Cezzar—the
butcher— and was soon forced to flee to Syria. Arriving in Beirut in 1770, he set
about establishing a new army of Albanian, Syrian and North African mercenaries—
and “turned Albanian to recruit warriors.”244 By 1798, Cezzar was firmly established
as the governor of Acre and would be a critical component in the northern resistance
that limited Bonaparte’s expansion into Ottoman Syria.245
Having lost control of Egypt, first to Mamluk control and then to the French,
Constantinople wanted to reclaim the province. However, the Porte was uncertain
about how to best respond to the invasion. In 1799, the governor of Acre, Cezzar
Ahmad Pasha, wrote to Selim III asking to be named serasker of Egypt and to be
given the funds necessary to raise an army against the French.. The sultan and the high
council were open to his request and initially considered it as viable option for the
continued occupation. However, after extended consideration, the Porte ordered
Cezzar to defend the Syrian coastline but to not extend his forces into Egypt.246
Constantinople’s concerns of yet another overly ambitious regional leader who, like
the Mamluks before him, would impinge Ottoman sovereignty won out. Rather, the
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Porte turned to the British in their efforts against the French.247
Ultimately, the imperial divan arranged for two missions to Egypt. The
Kapudan Pasha, Küçük Hüseyin, commanded the first regiment. The second regiment
was made up of the Sultan’s new nizam-ı cedid soldiers, trained under his new set of
reforms, and were placed under the command of the Grand Vizier, Kör Yusuf
Pasha.248 While Selim III was willing to remove the French by force with the aid of
10,000 English troops, the Porte remained optimistic that a more peaceable solution
could be found with the French.249 Both missions arrived in Egypt in the spring of
1801.250 In addition to the troops from the Ottoman center, the Kapudan Pasha’s men
rendezvoused with an attachment of Albanian and Macedonian reinforcements in the
Mediterranean. Among these men was a young Kavalan, conscripted by his uncle,
second in command of 300 Macedonians, named Mehmed Ali. The reinforcements
joined the roughly 25,000 Ottoman, Arab and Bedouin troops under the Grand Vizier
that had marched through Gaza, and assembled in Alexandria.
However, before Ottoman troops arrived in Egypt, documentation from the
Porte pointed to an interesting collaboration between the provinces of the Maghreb
and the Mashriq. Here, I refer to an imperial order issued by the High Divan on
September 3, 1798. The document discussed a coordinated response between Yusuf in
Tripoli and Cezzar Ahmad in Syria. Yusuf supplied 2,500 armed soldiers from
Fezzan, who were to rendezvous with Syrian forces north of Gaza and bulwark the
Syrian leader’s resistance against the imminent French attack to the north of Egypt.251
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It is worth noting, that these men were sent from North Africa before the bey declared
war on France in the summer of 1799, and before the Porte began amassing troops.
The cooperation between two provinces in the Mashriq and the Maghreb in an effort
to limit French occupation of Ottoman domain is remarkable and spoke to a broader
sense of collaboration between the provinces.
Similarly, in March of 1799, in a report to the sultan, we learn from Ottoman
records that the local deputy in Manisa, in Anatolia, recruited 2,000 ground troops
who were to rendezvous with gunners from Tripoli and march on Egypt. These
reports to the sultan demonstrate the adaptable, contradictory relationship between
Tripoli and the Porte. Having allied with Bonaparte, and exiled his older brother for
blocking French communication lines through the eastern part of the region, Yusuf
remained firmly within the Ottoman world and quite often supported Constantinople.
Moreover, these coordinated efforts between officials beyond the immediate control
of the imperial center during the time of invasion, not only demonstrate how
decentralized power was within the Ottoman Empire but also point to a uniformity
and far reaching military collaboration between geographically distant provinces of
the empire. Unfortunately, few sources remain in modern-day Istanbul that can further
elucidate how regional officials communicated and coordinated efforts together
against the French invasion. Nevertheless, the ongoing cooperation between provinces
was compelling particular since, the sultan and the high council were still weighing
their response options in the Sublime Porte.
Back in Cairo
Having just arrived in Cairo, Ottoman forces under the Grand Vizier and
Kapudan Pasha were immediately thrown into the battles and chaos of the French
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occupation. Despite the anarchy, and infighting among the Mamluk households, the
combined Ottoman and British forces were effective in unfurling the vestiges of
French control in Egypt. Al-Jabarti dated the withdrawal of French forces to July of
1801.252 Peace treaties were signed by Ottoman and French emissaries on October 9,
1801.253 Even though the sultan withdrew the last of his troops the following winter,
the Porte was determined to maintain authority over Egypt. However, after three years
of French and British presence, and infighting among the Mamluks and various other
officials, control over Egypt required the ability to fill a sizable power vacuum that
the French officials in Egypt, Kleber and Menou, had left behind. To do this, Ottoman
officials in Constantinople looked to officers whom they could trust and who had
developed in their careers under the careful eye of their superiors in Constantinople.
In addition to being knowledgeable of the internal workings of the Porte, they were
expected to have a support base that came from the center of the empire.
Through his ties to the admiralty, Hüsrev Pasha, an Ottoman naval official of
Georgian descent, was successfully appointed as the new governor of Egypt. Much
like his mentor, the Grand Admiral, Küçük Hüseyin Pasha, Hüsrev was of Georgian
heritage, and similar to Gazi Hasan Pasha before him, was purchased as a young man
in the Caucasus, after which he became a slave in the imperial household of his
mentor, the man who would later become admiral. In fact, Hüsrev rose to power
through to the same patronage networks that had long secured the positions of many
officials before him. With the proactive campaign on the part of Küçük Hüseyin,
Hüsrev’s connections secured him the governorship of Egypt in 1801. However, his
actually tenure in Egypt would not last for long.
252
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The Porte had not forgotten the disloyalty of the Mamluk households in the
years before the French invasion. Moreover, infighting among the Mamluk grandees
had weakened their alliances since 1798. By the spring of 1801, the households were
in disarray. Murad Bey died that April from the plague. Meanwhile, Ibrahim Bey was
in Syria attempting to attack the French from under Cezzar’s protection. This left the
remaining cavalrymen and the collection of households in the charge of two grandees
of Murad Bey’s house: Uthman Bey al-Bardisi and Muhammad Bey al-Alfi. Despite
new leadership, internal wrangling and battles with the French took a toll on the
households over three years.
By 1801, the households were extremely fragmented. The Porte attempted to
take advantage of the frictions, and strike a fatal blow to the grandees and their hold
over Egypt. However, despite several attempts on the part of the Kapudan Pasha and
the new governor, which were largely thwarted by British officials who had alliances
with the grandees, the households remained the biggest obstacle for direct Ottoman
governance. In an effort to end their consortium on power, Hüsrev’s primary task as
governor was to remove the beys from positions of authority. Al-Jabarti extensively
chronicled the trouble Ottoman officials had in capturing, and holding, the grandees.
For example, in an episode that was popularized among locals as the flippantly named
the “expedition of the donkeys” Hüsrev Pasha, the Ottoman governor was unable to
secure access to horses. He ordered his soldiers to gather around 3000 donkeys from
Bulaq, Cairo, and Old Cairo in an effort to subdue the Mamluks. Ottoman troops were
on donkeys for the battle. However, the grandees, well known for their prowess oh
horseback, dealt a swift and humiliating blow to the governor in the Delta and his
men. Al-Jabarti described the event:
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This fiasco caused an estrangement between the pasha and the army… the
pasha [Hüsrev] ordered the soldiers to leave Cairo. They demanded their pay;
he asked them by what right they deserved pay, since they had accomplished
nothing. They, in turn refused to leave (Cairo) Muhammed Ali Sarcheshme
was the most prominent man among them. The pasha tried to trap him, but
with no success… The pasha left Cairo and fled to Damietta. This was the first
appearance of the name of Muhammad Ali and from this time forward his
importance increased... 254
Al-Jabarti’s description of Hüsrev’s attempts to subdue the Mamluks showed
not only the futility of the governor’s efforts to wrangle control of the province away
from the grandees, but also demonstrated his frustration in his thwarted attempts
exercise control in the province. The new governor was in a bind; Constantinople
wanted to control Egypt but had not supplied Hüsrev with the necessary manpower or
resources required enforce the Porte’s policies. While he had some luck in
successfully curtailing the rebellion in the capital, Hüsrev’s efforts across the province
proved unproductive. He was reprimanded for his inabilities. After being defeated by
his grandee rivals on the outskirts of Giza, the Ottoman governor was forced to flee
Cairo.255 In the guise of protecting the people of Damietta, al-Bardisi followed Hüsrev
to the port town, and subsequently captured him there. Defeated, the governor was
now a hostage. The Mamluks demanded amnesty in return for his release.256 Hüsrev’s
successor as governor of Egypt would be none other than Ali Burghol al-Tarabulusi,
the same corsair who had conquered Tripoli.
Conclusion
The Ottoman, as well as western imperial, response to the French invasion of
Egypt was reliant on the provinces of Tripoli and Tunis. We saw the paradoxical but
interwoven ties among the three provinces and the Porte and examined how Tripolitan
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reforms, under Yusuf Pasha, increased the provinces’ commercial status as well as the
pasha’s influence within the Ottoman Empire and the broader region. We also
analyzed the relative pragmatism that North African governors had in their
relationship and alliances with both the Porte and Europe, and demonstrated that
despite attempting to benefit, commercially and politically, from French and British
interest in the southern shores of the Mediterranean, the governors of the provinces
were actively supporting the Ottoman Porte. In doing so, the governors of Tunis and
Tripoli were looking to maintain the regional status quo without cutting off their ties
with either the Ottoman center or Europe.
The ties between the three provinces were exceptionally strong at the end of
the eighteenth century. This chapter investigated the importance of the Maghariba
community in the lives and affairs of contemporary Egyptian scholars, ulema and
officials and explored the important role that Maghrebi people played in day-to-day
Egyptian life. It has demonstrated the close ties between the Mamluks of Egypt and
former officials of the region and compared primary source materials, and notably
diplomatic records, to published chronicles of the time. In doing so we can see how
chroniclers’ ideologies, and indeed personalities, impacted the histories they told. We
saw how historical figures chose to be remembered, and the rich narratives that they
told about their adventures and travels to the contemporaries of their time.
Throughout this section, the ties that stand out the most prominently are the regional
ones that oftentimes overlooked the demarcations of individual provinces, particularly
in times of political crisis such as the French invasion of Egypt.
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CHAPTER THREE
CORSAIRS AND CARAVANS, INTERNAL STRUGGLES FOR POWER,
1801-1814
By the summer of 1801, Yusuf Pasha was firmly in power in Tripoli. Egypt
was in chaos. The governor of Tunis, Hammuda Pasha, was attempting to consolidate
power within the walls of the Bardo and limit the influence of Algiers in his territory.
In this chapter, we see how regional shifts in political authority, namely the decline of
Algerian influence and the rise of Mehmed Ali in Egypt, began to change the balance
of power in North Africa. Moreover, this chapter examines how the beys of Tunis and
Tripoli began to shift their attentions away from the corso and towards the inland
networks of the trans-Saharan caravans and examine the ways in which the
governments of Tripoli and Tunis attempted to navigate economic difficulties after
the Congress of Vienna, how they attempted to expand their revenues streams inland
and how they managed competition from their political opponents.
French forces left Egypt on July 3, 1801. British and Ottomans troops soon
followed in 1803.257 As Hüsrev Pasha, the Mamluks, and various factions including
Mehmed Ali’s Albanians were fighting for control of Egypt, Tripoli was going to war
with the newly independent United States. While a great deal of ink has been spilt on
the narrative of the First Barbary War, this historiography remains largely fragmented
across the language divide. In doing so, both sets of literature, Arabic and
Anglophone, have since become relatively sympathetic towards the role of the war in
the formation of American and Libyan national histories and identities.
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I use the surviving historical records to extrapolate the impact of the First
Barbary war on the people of Tripoli, the governance of the province, and the regional
approaches and strategies that were used by Yusuf Karamanlı to ameliorate the
province’s political conditions, to further his objectives well as those of Tripoli’s
respective allies and look to see how this relatively minor conflict between two
equally “petty”258 powers impacted the political trajectories of the provinces and the
broader Mediterranean and Ottoman worlds.
Tripoli at War
With the 1783 Treaty of Paris, King George III recognized American
independence. Thereafter, the United States was forced, as all other sovereign
governments, to negotiate tribute rates and peace treaties with the North African
provinces. No longer protected under the British naval ensign flown by His Majesty’s
fleet, American merchant ships were open to attack by Ottoman, as well as other,
privateers. The first vessel seized in North Africa, the Betsey, which was captured off
Moroccan waters 1784. The crew was held in Tangier. The following year, the
American vessels the Dauphin and Maria were similarly captured off the coast of
Algiers. News of American captives in North Africa drew the attention, and the
imagination, of popular readers in the United States, commercializing the genre of
North African captivity narratives. The popularization and mass consumption of this
category of literature has, as some scholars have argued, since become a touchstone in
the rise of tension between the US and North Africa and broader Muslim world.259
However, despite these early captures, the increased number of skirmishes and
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even rumors that Benjamin Franklin had been taken captive, by the time Jefferson
took the presidential office in 1801 the new leader merely considered the ongoing
conflict with the corsair regencies as a “sideshow”260 to the main act of the ongoing
battles with the more powerful Britain and France.
Jefferson dismissed North African governors as “petty tyrants”261 of the
region. But, as Lambert succinctly wrote “while the characterization of the Barbary
States as ‘petty’ was largely correct, it must be noted that the United States in 1783
was an equally petty presence in the Atlantic world.”262 Lambert’s argument for the
need for a clearer and more historically accurate perspective on the role of the United
States in the global stage of the early nineteenth century, was entirely accurate. After
all, the French, British, and Spanish were the mercantile giants of the turn of the
century, not the Americans. Thus, it was from a position of regional disadvantage and
political distraction that the young United States attempted to negotiate a foothold into
Mediterranean trade.
Tripoli was also emerging from a position of political weakness and was
distracted by more pressing crises of governance during the 1780s and early 1790s.
Only one year after Yusuf Pasha assumed governorship, Tripoli and the United States
finally negotiated the terms for peace, on November 4, 1796. Despite the seemingly
endless diplomatic wrangling in the lead up however, the full sum of tribute remained
unpaid by the United States. Folayan argued that the American refusal to recognize
Tripolitan autonomy, preferring to defer to Algiers in its negotiations, was the pasha’s
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main reason to go to war.263 Thus, the rise of Tripoli within the Ottoman and
Mediterranean world in the second half of the 1790s, and Yusuf Pasha’s repeated
attempts to clarify his position with the newly independent American government fell
on deaf ears, further frustrating the governor. James Cathcart, the US Consul to
Tripoli wrote:
I am order'd by the Bashaw to inform you that you may wait for the answers to
the letters from the Dey of Algiers and Bey of Tunis if you think proper, if not
you may let it alone that he is an Independent Price and not be intimidated by
Algiers, Tunis nor even the Grand Signore, that if we wish to be at Peace with
him we must pay him for it and that he commands in his Kingdom as well as
the Dey of Algiers does in his.264
Rhetorical bluster aside, the quote offers important insights into how Yusuf
imagined his role as governor and the position of Tripoli in the region. First, it spoke
to the sense of trans-provincial cooperation that Yusuf looked to Tunis and Algiers to
reaffirm his ‘independence,’ or at least, his right to negotiate peace independently
with the United States. This measure spoke of an underlying sense of partnership
among the North African provinces, as he could just as easily have suggested that the
U.S. seek the affirmation of his right of negotiation from the Ottoman Porte, or even a
European ally. Regardless, the request was amicably met by the governors of Tunis
and Algiers, both of whom sent praise-filled letters to the Americans reaffirming
Tripolitan tribute autonomy.265 Thirdly, the phrasing of Chathcart’s note, ‘nor even
the Grand Signore’ underlined that while the bey very much thought his province on
par with Tunis and Algiers, he still maintained a deference to the authority of Istanbul,
and inferred the strength of the Porte in relation in a display of vociferous affect.
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Interestingly, this note was from the spring of 1799 and overlapped with the
previously discussed firman that declared Yusuf “the generalissimo of all Ottoman
troops in Barbary.”266 Thus, the exchange likely further peaked the governor’s ire
towards to the young American states.267 In a conversation with his Algerian
counterpart, Yusuf said of the Americans:
The Americans have revolted ... I am ready to make a mess of them ... Thanks
to our fighting forces, all nations except the Americans respect us ... It is my
binding duty to teach them their limits ... I recommend them to avoid such a
sinister action ... They are relying on the British, but I don’t care at all about
their role in this affair... 268
Diplomatic relations ultimately failed on May 14, 1801, when the pasha
declared war on the US. For two years, from 1801-1803, Tripoli and the United States
remained locked in ongoing low-grade but nevertheless destructive clashes. American
ships, such as the Philadelphia would blockade Tripolitan harbors and Tripolitan
cruisers similarly attacking and destroying American vessels. Tensions worsened in
1803 when the same Philadelphia, which had been used in various American naval
barricades, ran aground. Gunships under the command of the Tripolitan admiral
Murad Ra’is quickly captured the American frigate and took the crew captive.
It is worth noting that the vessel that captured the Philadelphia was none other
than the previously mentioned Betsey, which itself had been captured twice, first in
1784 in Tangier and then again by Tripolitan corsairs in 1796. Rebranded the
Meshuda, the schooner was under the command of the Scottish-born Peter Lysle,
Captain of the Tripolitan marine. Lysle, who upon converting to Islam adopted the
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name Murad after a renowned seventeenth-century corsair, was a formidable
adversary to American diplomats and a fascinating if enigmatic historical figure.
Little is known of Murad Ra’is’s early life before he was hired as a deckhand
for the Betsey while the ship was still docked in Boston in the 1780s. The American
historian Tucker, who searched for records of Murad in 1960s Tripoli, London and
Edinburgh to little avail, suggested that before arriving in the United States, Murad
spent some time in North Africa, served with Mamluks (although Tucker did not
specify in which province) and was purportedly fluent in Arabic.269 Folayan claimed
that at some point in his career, he avoided a court-martial for theft and mutiny aboard
the British vessel the Hampden and that Murad declared his conversation to Islam in
June 1794.270 We also know was that he was born on a farm in either Perth or in
Clydebank, Scotland, that he was fair-haired with a sandy beard, and a remarkably
adept sailor. At some point between his days on the Betsey and his time in Yusuf’s
divan, he seemed to have picked up a general distaste for Americans—or at the very
least, the American consul to Tripoli, James Cathcart. Indeed the latter’s diplomatic
correspondence was filled with countless complaints and rebuffs on the part of the
admiral.271
Murad, it seemed, amused himself being a partner in the “drunken triumvirate
who delighted in plotting ways to gall the Yankee consul.”272 The other two figures
being Simon Lucas, the British consul to Tripoli, and an English doctor named Bryan
McDonough. This rich detail into Murad’s antagonistic character suggested that the
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triad’s aversion to the American consul was based largely on common British ties and
a likely disdain towards a newly released British colony. This is to say that it did not
underscore hostility between American and Tripolitan officials.273
By the time he was boarding the Philadelphia, Murad’s days as a deckhand
were long over. The corsair had risen from his previously humble position of ra’is in
the Tripolitan Marine. Murad was also the son-in-law of the pasha, Yusuf Karamanlı.
As the husband of the pasha’s daughter, Murad and became the governor’s close
confidant and often played the role of intermediary on behalf of his father-in-law.
While a great deal of historical research has focused on captivity and conversion in
the North African regencies, it is nevertheless worth noting that this rather remarkable
advancement of position was not entirely dependent on an individual’s willingness to
adopt Islam. After all, Simon Lucas, the English consul to Tripoli and Murad’s
colleague in the efforts to infuriate the American consul, James Cathcart, the
aforementioned offended American consul to Tripoli, as well as William Eaton,
Cathcart’s counterpart in Tunis all served as their respective government’s emissaries
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and had all been taken captives in their earlier lives in the region.
Moreover, Murad’s particularly meteoric socio-economic advancement was
not unique in Tripoli. After all, the admiral was not the only western-born renegade in
Yusuf’s divan. The governor’s Prime Minister was a Russian-born former marine,
Muhammad D’Ghies, had similarly been taken captive, converted and eventually rose
in Tripolitan political circles.274 Similarly, the German-born Swede John Wilson, a
member of the Philadelphia’s crew turned renegade after being taken captive in the
city. Much like the others, he sought to entrench himself in the Tripolitan
administration. The commonalities among these three men: Murad Ra’is, Muhammed
D’Ghies, and Wilson, whose convert name was not preserved in the historical record,
besides their obvious wiliness to convert was a language proficiency, be it either
Arabic or the lingua franca, as most importantly, their willingness to serve the
Tripolitan pasha. Effectively, religious conversion impacted which government you
could serve in North Africa, but not one’s overall chances for social mobility.
However, it certainly facilitated one’s prospects.275
In addition to his captain duties, Murad had also become the de facto warden
to the captured crew of the Philadelphia. The sailors officially became the prisoners
of the pasha, and the new, young United States was forces to cope with the
ramifications, both at home and abroad of having an American naval crew suffer the
“indignities” 276 of becoming North African hostages.
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The Chaos in Egypt
Conditions in Egypt did not improve after the withdrawal of Ottoman and
English troops in 1803. The officially appointed Ottoman governor, Hüsrev Pasha
was facing endless troubles in subduing the ongoing revolts, curtailing the power of
the Mamluk households and attempting to mitigate the growing threat from a young
Macedonian quartermaster and his Albanian contingency.
Before a particularly humiliating “fiasco”277 named the ‘expedition of
donkeys’278 Mehmed Ali appeared only once before in al-Jabarti’s chronicle.279 The
quartermaster’s first recorded mention in Ajai’b was from a few months prior, in April
of 1803. From the entry we learn that the Macedonian officer was allied with Tahir
Pasha, commander of the Albanian troops.280
While Al-Jabarti wrote of Mehmed Ali only in passing, the entry was as
telling as it was fleeting. In a few spare lines, we learn two important characteristics
are noted about the young Macedonian. First, he was an ally of the Albanian
commander. Secondly, he was a quartermaster in charge of distributing wages.281
These two characteristics: his position, and his alliance with the Albanian forces,
would prove pivotal in his later attempts to control Egypt. As quartermaster, Mehmed
Ali had access to soldiers’ wages. Therefore, he was in a position to leverage the ever-
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shifting alliances of 1803 Cairo to his advantage.282 Troops, Ottoman or otherwise,
routinely mutinied if unpaid; and his position as sarçeşme enabled him to navigate
and manipulate the loyalties and actions of various brigades behind a veil of relative
neutrality. After all, he was responsible for distributing wages, but not for
administering them.
We see that Mehmed Ali was also cultivating an amicable relationship with
Tahir Pasha, the Albanian commander. Long known in the Ottoman world for their
unruly albeit courageous conduct, the Albanian irregulars were much stronger and
better equipped than the three-hundred men that accompanied the young officer from
Kavala. Mehmed Ali’s alliance with Tahir and his men provided him with ready
manpower in tumultuous Cairo, as well as with access to the soldiers needed in his
eventual rise to power. As we shall below, within a few short years their loyalty
became a cornerstone to facilitating his ambitions during his early, precarious period
in power.
Mehmed Ali’s ties with this particular division are also telling about his
capacity for political opportunism. Historically, the narrative of his rise to power has
become so engrained with his alliance with the Albanian battalions that he has often
mistakenly been remembered as Albanian himself. Perhaps this was his ultimate
objective, since the loyalty and support of four thousand men provided him with much
more clout than would have otherwise been available to an officer in his position.
However, I argue that Mehmed Ali was likely following a strategy similar to other
aspiring governors of the time.
Turning Albanian
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In fact, Mehmed Ali’s efforts to ‘turn Albanian’283 mirrored the actions of two
of important contemporaries in the Ottoman world: Acre’s Cezzar Ahmad Pasha and
Osman Pasvandoğlu of Vidin. These three individuals, none of whom were Albanian
themselves, all employed similar strategies to garner the support and loyalty of the
notorious Albanian units.
The appeal to Albanian ethnic ties constituted a well-established practice since
the seventeenth century, when the harsh conditions of the Albanian hinterland and the
prospect of career advancement throughout the military ranks and officialdom
provided incentives for mercenaries to join the Ottoman military system. These men
were often followed by the support of the fellow countrymen from the region.
Constituting the part of the larger ‘westerner’ grouping within the imperial
establishment, the officials of the Albanian origin and their patronage networks
became one of the most important factors in the politics of the early modern Ottoman
world.284 While their fortunes diminished throughout the course of the eighteenth
century, the military tradition, militarization of Albanian countryside and their ethnic
and regional solidarities made them a ready group to be addressed by the likes of
Mehmed Ali, Osman Pazvanoğlu or Cezzar Pasha.
The first, Cezzar Ahmad, was born in southern Bosnia and left for Cairo as a
young man. After spending several years in the households of the Egyptian grandees,
eventually rising to the position of bey. In Egypt, Ahmad forged a reputation for his
contentious and difficult character, as well as for his fierce loyalty. After slaughtering
over seventy Bedouins in retribution for the murder of his Mamluk patron, ‘Abdualla
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Bey he was nicknamed him Cezzar—the butcher.285 The death of ‘Abduallah
nevertheless left him in a vulnerable position, as he had lost his protector among the
Mamluks. He faced seriously peril when he became “dangerously compromised in
Mamluk political intrigues”286 with the influential Ali Bey al-Kabir, himself a
Georgian from Abkhazia. Cezzar Ahmad was forced to flee to Syria. There, the
narrative of Cezzar Ahmad’s life becomes murky. Making his way first to Beirut in
1770, “turned Albanian to recruit warriors”287 and established a new army of
Albanian, Syrian and North African mercenaries—and By 1775, he was firmly in
control of Acre. Having previously asked Selim III to be named serasker of Egypt
during the French invasion, Cezzar Pasha commanded a significant army and
maintained a brutal reputation. From Philipp we know that Cezzar governed Ottoman
Acre with a firm hand and was interesting in expanding his powerbase.288 The
Albanian forces continued to serve his interests while he remained in control of Acre.
The second figure, Osman Pasvandoğlu, was the Bosnian vali of Vidin in
modern-day Bulgaria during the 1790s. Like Cezzar Pasha, Osman ‘turned
Albanian’289 in an effort to recruit soldiers to fight against Ottoman rule. Born in
1758, Osman was the son of Ömer Pasvandoğlu, a wealthy landowner originally from
Tuzla in Bosnia. In part because of their local influence, Ömer was eventually forced
out from Vidin after being accused by the Porte of inciting the local population
against the authority of the Ottoman state. After eventually obtaining clemency and
returning to Vidin, Ömer met a tragic end and was executed for treason in 1788. His
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son Osman fled first to Serbia and later to Albania. During this time, Osman began
amassing a brigade of mercenaries. Fighting for the sultan in the Austro-Ottoman war
of 1787-91 allowed Pasvandoğlu was allowed to return to Vidin in 1791, and, with the
support of his soldiers, the Pasvangii, he began raids in Wallachia and Serbia to the
north and west.
After several years of amassing landed estates and recruiting support for his
cause, Pasvandoğlu’s territories stretched from the Danube river to the Balkan
mountain range, and from the Black Sea coast to Belgrade.290 Zens argued that
Pasvandoğlu was able recruit so much support because of his ability to cater to the
concerns of specific groups of people—among whom were the Albanian infantrymen
who played a central role in the governor’s ability to maintain his administration. 291
The last of these three individuals, Mehmed Ali was born in Kavala. During
his rise to power in early nineteenth century Egypt, Mehmed Ali depended on the
Albanians as the foundation of his powerbase. Likely born in 1770, little is known
about his life before he arrived in Egypt in 1801. Fahmy noted that his father, Ibrahim
Ağa was not originally from Kavala, but from Konya in central Anatolia, and that the
family might possibly have had Kurdish familiar roots.292 Mehmed Ali’s family was
of means, and it was his parent’s effort to “bring me up [as] a gentleman.”293 His
maternal uncle played a role in the administration of Ottoman territories as the
governor of Kavala. Through these connections, Mehmed married a woman named
Emine from the village of Nusretli in 1787, when Mehmed was seventeen years

290

Robert Zens, “Pasvanoğlu Osman Paşa and the Paşalık of Belgrade, 1791-1807," International
Journal of Turkish Studies 8, no. 1-2 (2002): 94-98.
291
ibid, 103.
292
Fahmy, Mehmed Ali, 4-6.
293
ibid. 4.
140

Msdfasd

old.294
Likely through these same connections, Mehmed Ali was appointed secondin-command of the three-hundred auxiliary troops from Kavala that were sent to
Egypt. We know from al-Jabarti, that by the spring of 1803, Mehmed Ali had already
formed an alliance with Tahir Pasha, the Albanian commander with four-thousand
mercenaries under his control. In fact, it enabled his rise to power in 1805. These
three officials, all of whom shared notable backgrounds, were able to successfully
cultivate the support of the Albanian irregulars in their efforts to seize power.
This point is worth analyzing because while numerous officials, Ottoman or
otherwise, attempted to curry favor with the notoriously rowdy Albanian battalions
and failed. Historical records point to a somewhat deliberate effort on the part of these
men to ‘turn’ Albanian, and in doing so entrench themselves in the irregulars’ good
graces.295 I aruge that because of the several commonalities among them and the
irregular forces with which they were attempting to sway to their favor.
First, while these three figures: Cezzar Pasha, Pasvandoğlu and Mehmed Ali
all had influential connections by ways of their respective families, none of them had
access to established patronage systems, such as the Mamluk households or the
Caucasian networks that influenced the official distribution of political appointments
from within the Porte. Thus, much like the Albanian irregulars, they were all political
outsiders in the hierarchical systems during the time they were attempting to rise to
power. While they held more influence and political capital within the Ottoman
military system, than a typical Albania recruit, they were nevertheless removed from
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the standard mechanisms that allowed for political advancement.
The distance from the traditional military hierarchies allowed these three
figures to ingratiate themselves with the Albanian irregulars who were similarly
outsiders to the system. Aksan wrote, “the irregulars were blamed for almost all
disturbances”296 during times of inter-service rivalries. This research argues have been
easier for another outsider such as Mehmed Ali, Pasvanoğlu, or Cezzar Pasha to rally
the support of the Albanian mercenaries rather say, Hüsrev Pasha, as the Macedonian
quartermaster could more easily sway their allegiance.
These three strongmen also came to power in a time of widespread Ottoman
reforms, be it Abdul Hamid’s efforts to curtail the power of the provinces and
restructure the Ottoman navy, or his successor, Selim III attempts at creating an
entirely new military system within his nizam-ı cedid. Rereading al-Jabarti indicates
that Albanian irregulars in turn-of-the-nineteenth-century Egypt had fallen even
further within the Ottoman military hierarchy. After all, the chronicler mentions how
the Albanians were just as detested by the janissaries and Mamluks in the new nizam-ı
cedid under the Grand Vizier, Kör Yusuf Pasha.
This resentment that the irregulars faced within the system would have made it
easier for ambitious figures such as Cezzar Pasha, Osman Pasvandoğlu and Mehmed
Ali to make use of the irregulars’ frustrations and manipulate a powerful, but
disregarded, corps for their own political ambitions. The common Balkan origins of
these three officials who were after all, two Bosnians and a Macedonian, would have
contributed in their efforts to cement the loyalty of the Albanian mercenaries. In the
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age before nationalism, regionalism was an important factor in group solidarity—and
better to work for a fellow Balkan outsider than say, a Mamluk or Porte official, who
needed your skills on the battlefield, but nevertheless treated you with contempt.
The Rise of Mehmed Ali
We what we know for certain from al-Jabarti is that any politically ambitious
leader in post-occupation Egypt was thrown into a complicated game of strategic oneupmanship that required strategic alliances and a cunning wit in order to survive. By
1803, after Hüsrev Pasha fled to Damietta and was taken hostage by the Mamluk
grandees, the quartermaster only had to stand idly while Janissary foes assassinated
his former ally, Tahir Pasha in his home in the following months.297
“[T]he departure of [Hüsrev] Pasha, the governorship of Tahir Pasha, his
[subsequent] murder, the entry of the [Mamluks] into Cairo…these and other
events took place in conformity with Divine Providence and by the immediate
agency of Muhammad Ali’s devious stratagems. First, he sought to undermine
the authority of his superior [Hüsrev Pasha] in collusion with Tahir
Pasha…then he lured Tahir Pasha to his death and cooperated with the
Egyptian [Mamluks] in their entry (into Cairo) and assumption of power. He
made a show of utter friendship, aid assistance and cooperation with them,
waiting to take advantage of their unsuspecting natures.”
It is interesting and telling that al-Jabarti blamed Mehmed Ali for the downfall
of these two men— Hüsrev Pasha and then Tahir Pasha after him. Al-Jabarti’s
chronicle Aj’aib, which is considered among the most compelling accounts of turn-ofthe-nineteenth-century Egyptian life, his narrative was regularly peppered with his
editorialized views of people’s characters and histories. For example, Tahir Pasha’s
“dominion had lasted 26 days; had his life lasted any longer, he would have destroyed
all culture and civilization.”298
What we see throughout al-Jabarti’s text is a tendency for the chronicler to
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highlight the faults and embarrassments of his foes, but to fall silent on those of his
friends. For our purposes here, and as Gran argued in his work on Egyptian notables
and intellectuals, The Islamic Roots of Capitalism, the chronicler’s imaginative style
serves us in two ways. First, it is clear that al-Jabarti was prone to judgments when
describing the characters - beys or pashas with whom he did not agree or approve.
Secondly, his silences offer particular insights into which governors or elites he
supported and considered colleagues. This was particularly true in the case of Hassan
al-‘Attar, the prolific scholar of Maghrebi descent, and later the Grand Sheikh of alAzhar.299 One could argue that al-Jabarti’s use of the phrase “devious stratagem,”300
was soon reflected in the popularized view of Mehmed Ali as a manipulative
schemer— or as Fahmy paraphrased from nineteenth century traveler’s chroniclers
“the old spider in his den.”301 Regardless of whether Mehmed Ali was obligated to
behave in a politically ruthless manner to secure his survival during the early years of
his rule, it was clear that the reputation stuck with the governor throughout the rest of
his career.
Within the historiography, there is a fascinating entanglement between the life
of Mehmed Ali and the writings of al-Jabarti. In his dissertation, Verdery argued that
al-Jabarti’s descriptions of Mehmed Ali was considered so controversial that his
chronicles were only published in 1880, and after much hesitation, by the vali’s
descendent, Tawfik Pasha. In fact, Verdery wrote “ that [Aja’ib] was printed many
years earlier, during the actual reign of Mehmed Ali and that all copies were
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withdrawn from circulation and destroyed after Mehmed Ali learned of the
unfavorable light in which he was portrayed.”302 This was perhaps true. However, we
know that the chronicle must have been relatively well-known before its publication,
as Ayalon mentions several contemporaries who had copies of it, and even more
borrowed from it in their own works.303 Nevertheless, it is correct that the vali had
attempted to limit his circulation by the time he was firmly in power but we do not
really know the extent to which Aja’ib was read by Egyptian, and western, elite. It
seemed that the chronicler’s opinion of the vali, as well as his opintion of Mehmed
Ali’s mistreatment of Umar Makram, and other Egyptian uluma had permeated into
his text.304
After his humiliating defeat at the hands of the Mamluk cavalrymen, Hüsrev
Pasha was taken hostage by the grandee al-Bardisi in the port of Damietta. After the
death of Tahir Pasha, the Ottoman Porte appointed another governor for Egypt.
However, this time, Ottoman officials chose none other than Ali Burghol, the
Georgian corsair who seized Tripoli in 1793 and fought with Murad Bey to be
Hüsrev’s successor. Al-Jabarti wrote extensively about Ali Pasha al-Tarabulusi and
his, in the chronicler’s interpretation, ravenous desire for power. The circumstances of
his return to favor among Constantinople elites remain unknown. However, by 1803 it
seemed that Ali Burghol was once again firmly in the good graces of the Porte. On
July 10, 1803, the former corsair arrived in Alexandria with a firman from the sultan
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declaring him the new governor of Egypt.305
From Ottoman correspondence with Hurşid Pasha, the governor of
Alexandria, we see how Ali Burghol attempted to consolidate power in Alexandria.
After arriving in the port city, he quickly turned his attention to the Albanian soldiers
who he claimed were the enemy of the Egyptian people, and had several of them
killed.306 Hurşid Pasha wrote a concerned letter to the Vizier, but it seems that
Burghol’s strong man tactics, and his efforts to create a rift between the Mamluks and
the Albanians, whom had forged a short-lived alliance.307 Burghol looked to build up
his forces in Alexandria before traveling on to Cairo. Al-Jabarti wrote of the corsairs
return to Egypt:
Then he left [the Mamluks] and went on the other side of the mountains to
Syria. The [Grand] Vizier Yusuf Pasha sent him, after the defeat, with letters
to the Ottoman government, and he remained [in Istanbul] until the army
revolted against [Hüsrev] Pasha and ejected him. When the news reached
Istanbul, he asked for the governorship of Egypt, under the presumption that
the connection of the Ottoman government with Egyptian and its domination
would continue, though only Tahir Pasha and the Albanians were there. He
took along an immense quantity of money, and arrived in Alexandria, where
he heard of the upheaval which had taken place – the death of Tahir Pasha, the
expulsion of the Janissaries, the alliance of the Albanian party with the
Egyptian [Mamluks,] and their seizure of [Cairo.] He now wanted to devise a
plan and to hunt the eagle with the raven thereby gaining a renewed, secured,
and permanent sovereignty; but his schemes availed him nothing, and the fates
have him no aid. He was like one digging his grave with his own hands, or
cutting off his own nose, not knowing that the city of Cairo was the
Conquering One. Many the tyrants that she has conquered, even though they
were almost pharaohs. If God’s aid be not with the champion, the first cause of
harm to him is his own striving. 308
Constantinople’s choice in appointing Ali Burghol as Hüsrev’s successor was
likely multifaceted in its reasoning. Given his familiarity with the Mamluk households
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and specifically with Murad’s Mamluks, among whom al-Alfi and al-Bardisi were
counted, Burghol was in a unique position to leverage his previous experience in
Egypt, and broader North Africa, to his advantage.
After Murad Bey had since succumbed to the plague, Burghol could have
persuaded several of the lesser grandees to support his claim to the governorship, as
his ties to the household were secure and because he too had fought with them against
French occupation. By 1803 the grandees were strongly divided amongst themselves,
and Ali Burghol would have likely looked to benefit from infighting among them.
Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly, Hüsrev Pasha his predecessor, was the
protégée of the current Kapudan Pasha, Küçük Hüseyin. Given that his mentee had
just been humiliated and taken prisoner in the province, the Kapudan Pasha would
have wanted to insulate himself from further political embarrassment. Moroever, Ali
Burghol’s known taste for risky political takeovers— be it in Tripoli or Egypt—and
his former alliance with the since deceased Gazi Hasan, who had haunted Küçük
Hüseyin’s early years as admiral, the corsair would have been an inconsequential loss
to the Porte in the case of his failure.
Simply put, Burghol was a small gamble that had a potential for significant
rewards. After all, he had overthrown the Karamanlıs in Tripoli and had made it as far
as Djerba in Tunis. Perhaps his strongman tactics could be put to good use in settling
a chaotic Egypt. Upon arriving in Alexandria in July 1803 with three ships, fivehundred men and the vali of Thessaloniki,309 Burghol wrote to the Mamluks “the
sword of the sultanate is long; it may be that the sultan will seek against you the aid of
some of your opponents over whom you have no control.”310 We do not learn from
309
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Ottoman sources which opponents he referred to here. However, the Porte looked to
Ali Burghol, faute de mieux, as an emissary with a capacity to wield a strong hand and
rustle the province under his control.
From the Ottoman Porte’s records, we know that the Alexandrian governor,
Hurşid Pasha wrote to the Grand Vizier on July 13, 1803 informing him of Burghol’s
arrival in Alexandria. In this same naval report, which was copied to the sultan in a
hatt-ı hümayun, we learn that Selim III had been informed that Al-Bardisi had
followed Hüsrev Pasha to Damietta and of the looting and raiding in the port town
and in Rashid.311 The sultan was keeping a very close eye on the ever-shifting
dynamics of political authority in the province. Regardless of the Porte’s reasoning,
much like his predecessor before him, Burghol’s governorship of Egypt would not
last for long. In fact, on his way to Cairo, after securing the support of several
thousand soldiers, the Mamluks he attempted to subdue ultimately struck down
Burghol, a compelling example of the transregional connections in the Ottoman
world. Al-Jabarti wrote of his death:
Before him were the Maghrebi soldiers, behind him the Egyptian [Mamluks.]
When they came to the country around al-Qurayn, they dismounted, and the
Maghrebi contrived to have an altercation with [Ali] (Pasha’s) servants, which
they blew up out of all proportion until recourse was had to weapons. The
Egyptian soldiers rioted in the rear, and the pasha and his men were now in the
middle. The tide of battle swept over them, and 14 of his men fled to the
valley, while 13 threw themselves into a nearby irrigation ditch in their
consternation. One of the Mamluks fired on the pasha with his carbine and hit
him. Together with him were killed his nephew Hasan Bey, his kathuda, and
the remaining eighteen. As the pasha fell, on the verge of death, he saw one of
the two amirs and called out to him, “You there! I beg you: I have a shroud
inside my saddlebag. Wrap me in it and bury me: don’t leave me unburied.”
When the pasha died, the [Mamluk] gave some money to one of the Bedouins,
along with the shroud. He told the Bedouin: “Go to where they are fighting,
take the pasha, shroud him, and bury him in a grave.” The Bedouin answered:
“I don’t know him (by sight).” [The Mamluk] said he is the one with the
largest beard of them all.” So [the Bedouin] did as he was commanded, and
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they dug trenches for the rest of them and buried them, and that was the end of
the matter. 312
Ali Burghol, the Georgian corsair who trained in Algiers, governed Tripoli,
was allied with Murad Bey, and briefly served as the Ottoman governor to Egypt, was
dead. Rather symbolically, in the hour of his death, Ali Burghol was flanked by North
African and Egyptian combatants and shot in the middle by the Mamluks he sought to
overpower. Al-Jabarti makes little mention of Sulayman Bey and Muhammed Bey’s
rationale in killing Burghol. Instead, the chronicler, much like Ibrahim Bey after him,
assigned the blame squarely on the quartermaster, Mehmed Ali. Despite blaming
Mehmed Ali, al-Jabarti argued that the death of Ali Burghol was of no particular loss
for the fortunes of Egypt, or for the city of Cairo. In his animated style of prose, the
author wrote that the blame in the corsair’s downfall was as much Burghol’s doing as
anyone else’s objectives in Cairo, and actions in Alexandria:
All of it was the evil result of his deeds, the wickedness of his soul and the
foulness of his disposition. I have heard that he said to his soldiers: “If I get
what I desire regarding the Egyptian [Mamluks] and with a victory over them
and the Albanians, I will give over the city and the populace to you for three
days to with as you wish.” The proof of this was what he did in Alexandria
during his stay there in the way of tyranny, cruelty, and confiscation of the
property and goods of the people, and his soldiers’ lording it over them with
tyranny, rapine, and immorality; to say nothing of his insulting scholars and
showing his contempt for them.313
We know from the correspondence between Hurşid and the Porte that Burghol
was attempting to curtail the power of the Albanian contingency in Alexandria, and in
doing so had caused a great deal of havoc in the coastal town.314 Cairo was without a
governor. Hüsrev Pasha was still a Mamluk hostage. In an effort to dislodge the
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grandees from power, Mehmed Ali ordered the Albanian faction to take to the streets
demanding their back pay from the provisional rulers. Al-Bardisi, who assumed
power then attempted to levy a tax on the Cairene merchants to pay off the Albanian
irregulars. Much like Pasvandoğlu before him, Mehmed Ali won the support of the
masses, including the merchants in the city, who in turn marched against al-Bardisi’s
new tax levies.315 Fahmy wrote “News of this tax spread like wildfire from one
neighborhood to the next and on 7 March 1804 the masses took to the streets in a
huge demonstration carrying banners, dying their hands with indigo, hitting on drums
and showing, ‘Of how much will you fleece me, Bardisi?’”316 Shortly thereafter, in
the chaos that followed the demonstrations, Mehmed Ali had his men attack the
houses of the grandees in the city, and al-Bardisi and the other Mamluks to flee Cairo.
Mehmed Ali quickly released and dismissed the former governor Hüsrev Pasha,
sending him back to Constantinople, and took control of the city and the Citadel of
Cairo.317
One rival remained: the third Ottoman appointee, the former governor of
Alexandria, Hurşid Pasha. Hurşid had been the governor of Alexandria since 1801
and was familiar with politics in Egypt.318 However, much like al-Bardisi before him,
Hurşid Pasha needed soldiers and found himself forced to levy a tax on the merchants
and artisans of the city in order raise money for Syrian troops to come to his support.
This won him the scorn of the Cairene merchants and ulama of al-Azhar, a
development whose flames Mehmed Ali was quick to fuel.319 Tensions came to a
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head in May when the people of Cairo demanded that Mehmed Ali replace Hurşid
Pasha as governor. Bitter fighting broke out between the two rivals’ supporters in the
city, until on July 9, 1805 a firman arrived from Istanbul appointing Mehmed Ali as
the vali of Egypt. Hurşid left for Constantinople and the young quartermaster was
now the governor of one of the richest provinces in the Ottoman Empire. After a
protracted battle with three different governors, first Hüsrev Pasha, then Ali Tarabulsi,
and then Hurşid Pasha, Mehmed Ali finally received the long awaited, albeit reticent
support of the Porte. While still in his thirties, Mehmed Ali was appointed the official
governor of Egypt. After his investiture, the young vali looked to secure his new
position and curtail the previous anarchy.
Egypt and the First Barbary War
Mehmed Ali was not the only regional actor vying for control of a North
African province. By the winter of 1804, Ahmed Karamanlı, the deposed older
brother of the Tripolitan pasha was in Upper Egypt with the Mamluk grandee al-Alfi.
From American sources we learn that the deposed pasha “after a series of vicissitudes
and disasters”320 Ahmed was besieged with the Mamluks in the villages of Miniet in
Upper Egypt. With Ahmed were a few Tripolitans and Bedouin auxiliaries under his
command.321 In an effort to speak with Ahmad Pasha, the American council to Tunis,
William Eaton had taken it upon himself to find and recruit the deposed bey to the
American war effort.
To obtain access to the exiled Tripolitan governor in Egypt, Eaton first had to
arrange a meeting with the Ottoman Grand Vizier, Kör Yusuf Pasha.322 In yet another
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demonstration of the interconnectedness in operation in the nineteenth-century
Mediterranean as well as the interconnectedness among the provinces and the Porte,
the nineteenth century American officer knew that to access the former governor of
Tripoli, who was fighting with the Mamluks in Upper Egypt, official protocol first
required him to speak with the Grand Vizier of the Ottoman Porte. Upon meeting with
the Grand Vizier, who spoke French, Eaton explained his position and his ambitions
for regime change in Tripoli.323
After the meeting, and effectively receiving Porte's blessing, the American was
free to ally himself with Yusuf's younger brother, and attempt to overthrow the
governor in Tripoli. In turn, Grand Vizier agreed to provide a letter of amnesty and a
passport for Ahmed Pasha, Eaton was able to arrange a meeting the former governor
in Cairo. Eaton wrote of Ahmed Pasha’s response to the diplomatic chain of
command, “This fortunate occurrence assured the Bashaw of our highest respect for
the Grand Seignior; and cautioned him against any steps which might go to
compromit our good intelligence with that Sovereign.”324 A demonstration of
judicious political engagement with Porte officials allowed the consul to convince the
Ahmed Karamanlı Pasha to speak with him, but also to reassure him that the
American government was sensitive to the entangled political hierarchy systems in
the broader region.
After speaking to the Grand Vizier, Eaton sent messengers to Ahmed and
waited for him to arrive from Upper Egypt. In the interim however, the American
happened to come across some Tripolitans who had recently fled the province.
Unaware that he was speaking with an American, with whose government province
323
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was at war, the Tripolitan merchant spoke openly to Eaton about the conditions in the
city. He wrote:
A Tripolitan who had left Tripoli 90 days’ prior, was an Arnaut Turk [Albanian,
who supposed Eaton to be English and said,] "Tripoli had lost many men in the
different attacks of the American's last summer: the town as much damaged: and
the inhabitants under such a state of consternation that no body slept in the city
and that no business was done there." ... the man continued "He observed that
the war had been unfortunate to the cruisers. They had been led to believe that
the Americans were all merchant men and that they should have nothing to do
but to go out of and bring them in, but they found them devils, from whom
nothing was to be gained in war and therefore he was quitting the service of
Joseph Bashaw. The bashaw was nevertheless determined not to make peace
with these infidels until he shall have humbled them and made them pay for the
damages they had done to his navy and city. He acknowledged that Hamet
Bashaw had many friends in Tripoli (still) but that Joseph Bashaw had taken
care of him! It is ascertained that the later has employed assassins to poison the
former. These undoubtedly have been reported that they have executed their
commission; and hence we account for the report of Hamet Bashaw's death.325
It is impossible to corroborate this chance meeting between the Tripolitan
merchant and William Eaton. Nevertheless, Eaton’s account of the encounter was
likely accurate. The American war with Tripoli had wreaked havoc on the Tripolitan
economy and the twenty-one-day bombardment of the city had ensured in massive
losses for city. Moreover, further details in Eaton’s account that overlap with the
information found in Ottoman archives. During his time in Egypt, Eaton met with the
chief of the Awlad Ali tribe. The same tribe from Derna who had sent cavalrymen in
support of the Porte’s efforts against the French occupation of Egypt, which
historically had strong connections with both the provinces of Tripolitania and Egypt.
Eaton claimed that the chief knew of his plan. The leader told Eaton:
… [T]hat twenty thousand men, Barbary Arabs, were ready to march with him
from this border to recover their native country and inheritance: repeated that he
knew our plan and how that he had seen me, he would pledge his head to the
Turkish General to bring me Hamet Bashaw in ten days. The Turk accordingly
dispatched him the next morning on this message. 326
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The claim was particularly insightful, since it referred to the forced relocation of
over twenty-thousand Tripolitans that left province, either because of the ongoing
aggressions with the Americans, their support for Ahmed Karamanlı when he was the
governor of Derna the previous year, or a combination of both. Moreover, the
conversation that took place between the leader of the Awlad Ali tribe and the
American counsel underscored the connection of the information systems between
Ottoman and North African officials. As this meeting happened shortly after the
latter’s meeting with the Grand Vizier and had the Ottoman’s permission. It indicated
that the ties between Ottoman officials and regional elites were extremely strong and
worked on systems of alliances and mutual cooperation.
Tripoli during the War
Eaton’s letters are an insightful lens into the affairs of nineteenth century
Tripolitans in Egypt, we can also glean critical information from the records of
Americans who were present in the city of Tripoli itself. In addition to the relatively
short length of their imprisonment, the American captives were given a great deal of
personal freedom in Yusuf’s Tripoli. So much so that the records of the American
servicemen held in Tripoli in 1805 offer critical insights into the governance and
operations of Tripoli and the interworking of Yusuf’s divan. Tripolitan economic and
commercial interests can also be found in the writings of the ship’s crew. While
technically prisoners of the pasha, the American marines were given remarkable
access to the governor, his family, the operations of his divan as well as the broader
city and the markets of Tripoli.
William Ray, an American serviceman in Tripoli recorded invaluable insights
into the operations of turn-of-the-nineteenth-century province. Ray’s impressions of
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the market and commercial interests of the province are particularly worth analyzing.
In his journal, he wrote:
The markets of Tripoli are well supplied with excellent fish. Their commerce
and manufactures, compared with those of our own country are very
insignificant. An inland traffic is carried on with Arabia and [Central and SubSaharan Africa.] To Arabia they sell woolen manufactures, Morocco leather
indigo, cochineal and ostrich feathers, for which they reserve silks muslin, salammonia, saffron, sugar coffee, senna, cassia and other drugs. To [Central and
Sub-Saharan Africa,] they send salt, silk, and woolen manufacture which they
barter for gold dust, ivory and [slaves]. This trade is carried on by caravans.
They exchange commodities with Tunis and sometimes with Egypt. Their
exports are Morocco leather, hides, wool, oil, ostrich feathers, barilla soap,
way honey cattle, horses, guns, figs olives, dates, almonds and various other
fruit. They carry on a considerable traffic with Malta, chiefly in Maltese
bottoms and sell them a large number of cattle, sheep, goats, mules and camels
for which they receive European goods, and plank for ship and boat building,
their principle manufactures are blankets and woolen cloths, leather, carpets,
mats, saddles, tinsel cords, muskets, pistols, sabers, power, soap embroidered
handkerchiefs, sword knots, jewels, rings, etc. 327
Ray’s assessment of the manufactured products of Tripoli as ‘very insignificant’
compared to those of the United States at first seems to have been more an arrogant
flair intended for his American audience than historical observance. Allison noted,
Ray entitled his narrative the Horrors of Slavery but apparently passed his days
composing poetry and lamenting his conditions.328 His attempts at literary prose aside,
Ray’s account was regularly peppered with the recorded observations of the
Tripolitan markets, the customs, practices of marriage, death and birth in the province,
and the accounts of the governor’s relations with his family and members of his
divan. These records, aside from further subverting Ray’s taste in descriptive titles,
allow us a lens into the day-to-day life of Tripolitan subjects of Yusuf Pasha.329
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When compared with commercial records of the age, Ray was largely correct in
his assessment of the relative decline of Tripolitan trade. The province had long been
reliant on maritime trade for its economic viability and had become dependent on
foreign commercial vessels to export the various commodities: the leather, wool and
ostrich feathers that Ray listed above, as well as raw materials from the west of the
province, such as madder.330 The trade of all of these commodities had been hit hard
by the previous years of instability within the province. Moreover, the outbreak of the
Napoleonic wars, the subsequent destruction of the French shipping industry, the
American blockade of Tripolitan ports, as well as a simultaneous war that Tripoli was
waging against the Swedish crown, all had a massive impact on province’s revenues.
Effectively, these “wars which continued uninterrupted throughout the first
decade of Yusuf’s rule, not only deprived Tripoli of the commercial shipping of
combatant nations but also prevented the ships of other nations from arriving in
port.”331 The pasha attempted to compensate for the lost revenues by looking inland,
and tightening his grip over rural populations and on the caravans. The young
governor’s attempts to increase revenues by making “unusual demands for money [for
the tribes] and [stripping] their wives of their jewels”332 eventually backfired in the
pasha’s later efforts to recruit troops. His attempts at extracting funds for the war with
the United States proved economically disastrous for the governor and the province,
as by the end of the war in 1805, the governor’s funds were so low that “his steward
[had] run a debt for the supply of the kitchen.”333
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Ray’s account also allows us to glean information into how destructive the
bombardment of the Tripolitan city and its walls had been to the infrastructure as well
as the administration’s later ability to rebuild the city. The author informed readers
that construction in Tripoli was dependent on two central components: white stone
extracted from Tripolitan quarries and hauled a great distance to the harbor, and
cement imported from Egypt.334 While Ray does not offer any further information on
the sale or transport of building materials between the two provinces, we can
speculate that the export of all Egyptian manufactured goods had slowed after the
French invasion of 1798, as Egypt was in its own state of disorder. Other than
highlighting the economic ramification of the French invasion of Egypt for Tripoli,
we can presume the province experienced difficulties in securing the martials needed
to reconstruct the city and its walls.
Moreover, a key element of the Tripolitan economy that Yusuf looked to exploit
after coming to power in 1795 and that Ray only skimmed over, was the province’s
commercial activities in a different kind of commerce: slavery. While it is important
to distinguish among various forms of captivity in Tripoli, this chapter cannot delve
into the numerous manifestations of slavery that existed in the province. After all,
several of the Mamluk agents of the pasha, many of his officials, the American
captives from the Philadelphia who, as we shall see below, served as doctors and
companions to the pasha’s family, and the numerous other westerners that Yusuf’s
mariners had taken hostage were all categorized as slaves. Moreover, the Neapolitan
slaves who Ray described as living “in abject slavery,”335 the black men and women
who were similarly taken captive—by caravan traders rather than corsairs—and sold
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in markets throughout the province or the broader Mediterranean, as well as countless
others individuals, all faced various forms of enslavement. In short, the concept of
slavery in turn-of-the-nineteenth-century Tripoli, much like the rest of the Ottoman
world, was a multi-layered system of subordination where different individuals were
accorded different levels of agency and privilege and correspondingly denied different
levels of agency and privilege.
In an attempt to fit the American hostages into this larger framework of North
African slavery, Americanist historians have argued that, “[i]t was not bad to be a
slave because one was harshly treated”336 but rather, for the men of the Philadelphia
“slavery was wrong because it denied them their liberty.”337 However, one could
argue that this was a rather insincere understanding of ‘liberty’ for several reasons.
First, many Americans were actively involved in the capture, subjection, and bondage
of countless individuals who were to be bought and sold in the newly independent
United States. Secondly, similar to their Tripolitan counterparts, American vessels
also took Tripolitan captives along the province’s shores throughout the war. Lastly,
the men of the Philadelphia, and especially the officers, were given some of the
greatest degrees of freedom allowed for subjects in the province of Tripoli. In fact, it
is through the breadth of access accorded to these men that what we learn more about
Yusuf Pasha and his family.
Jonathan Cowderly was the crew physician aboard the Philadelphia and
became Yusuf Pasha’s personal family physician. As the governor’s doctor he was
given unprecedented access to the members of the household and to Yusuf’s council.
From Cowderly’s records, we learn that the governor had epilepsy, that he routinely
336
337

Allison, The Crescent Obscured, 112.
ibid.
158

Msdfasd

suffered seizures and was under the care of Tripolitan marabouts who attempted to
exorcise various demons from the governor.338 We also learn that Yusuf had three
wives, one Bedouin and two of whom were black. Yusuf made a habit of marrying his
children off to officials in his divan, as Ray substantiated in “January of the next year,
the Bashaw’s eldest daughter was married off Sayyid Selim, the chief casileda
[treasurer.]”339 According to the same source, Yusuf’s first wife, who Tripolitans
referred to as the queen, was around the age of twenty-three and had given birth to her
ninth child on June 18, 1804.340 In addition, Yusuf Pasha married his eldest son, who
Cowderly claimed the British consul flippantly referred to as ‘the Tripolitan Prince of
Wales,’341 off to the eldest daughter of his rival, his brother Ahmed, the ex-Pasha who
was contemporaneously on his way to Derna.342
Cowderly’s account of his time in Tripoli, and the genuine kindness offered to
him by the Pasha and the members of the Tripolitan divan was quite remarkable. For
example, after treating the pasha’s eighteen-month old child for a fever, Cowderly
was given a horse and with the protection of his appointed dragoman, allowed to visit
the personal gardens of Yusuf Pasha. En route, before arriving at the governor’s
gardens, the doctor detoured and visited Murad Rais in his estate. “[C]oming to
Admiral Lysle's garden we found him there, and he invited me in. It was very
beautiful. He loaded us with its fruits and offered me access to it whenever I chose,
and said I was welcome to anything growing in it. I concluded to postpone going to
the Bashaw’s garden until another day.”343 It is through this intimate and
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unprecedented access to Yusuf Karamanlı and his inner circle that we glean insights
into the Tripolitan experiences of the war. Through Cowderly, we also learn of
Yusuf’s growing political worries. “The Bashaw shewed the greatest anxiety for
peace. He was sensible of the danger he was in from the lowness of his funds and the
disaffection of his people.”344
The doctor was correct in his assessment. Tripolitans were growing increasingly
frustrated throughout the turn of the nineteenth century with their new, young
governor. The fallout from years of turmoil had taken a toll on the province and the
new bombardment campaign on the part of the American navy was further
exasperating Tripolitan frustrations. While Yusuf had a bomb shelter in his rooms and
could pass the days protected from the explosions, most residents did not have much
access to protection and were growing wearier of the constant struggles of the last
years. The economic struggles of Tripoli had hit the food markets and by 1804, there
was little bread to be found in the province, even for the members of the Pasha’s
extended family.
The bashaw ordered the market people to not sell grain to anybody but his
household. There was no bread t be had for money. A dispute took place
between the bashaw and the renegado Lysle about the purchasing of some
barley. Lysle was considerably intoxicated and insisted on his right to
purchase grain in the market. The bashaw was highly affronted and flew at
him with all his might, struck him and ordered his mamelukes to disarm him
and put him in prison, which they strove to obey and carried him off. The
bashaw however soon ordered him released and then ordered [Lysle’s] servant
who was supposed to be the cause of the quarrel bastinadoed with five
hundred blows, which was immediately put into execution. 345
The leniency accorded to Murad, and the severity of punishment inflicted on
the admiral’s servant was rather symbolic of the conditions that most Tripolitans
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faced in their turn of the nineteenth century lives, as well as those that the captives of
the Philadelphia experienced. While Doctor Cowderly was allowed great deal of
freedom, and indeed, hospitality on the part of his Tripolitan captors, enlisted men and
the ship’s crew were not accorded such graciousness. Indeed, the accounts of William
Ray rebuked the officers of the Philadelphia nearly as much as the Tripolitan captors
for, at times, the pitiful conditions that the lowest ranking servicemen experienced.
After years of war, plague and siege, Yusuf Pasha’s decision to wage war on the
young United States, regardless of his political reasoning, had disastrous
consequences for the residents of the province. Everyone, including the governor
himself, was facing the severity of wartime conditions.
Tripoli, much like Egypt and Tunis, had an active history of Mamluk
households in the governor’s service. However, little records survive outside of
modern-day Tripoli. Despite this unfortunate omission in the historical materials
available, we are better able to piece together Tripoli’s involvement in another
manifestation of slavery, the one of the trans-Saharan caravans.
By the end of the eighteenth century, most of the major desert caravan routes
cut through Tripolitan territory at one or more points along their journey. From the
west to east, these routes were: the Ghademes-Air-Kano Road that ran along the
Tripolitan boarder into the city of Ghademes and ended in Tunis, the Tripoli-FezzanBornu route; the Fezzan-Kawan Road from Lake Chad to Murzuq which split off
either north to Benghazi or east through the Augila Oasis arriving in Alexandria or
Cairo, and the Cyrenaica-Kufra-Waidi route that was later renamed the Sanussi route
because of their the movement’s lodges along the caravan road.346
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However, while the slave trade from the caravan routes was an important
component of the late eighteenth century economy and for the inland cities of the
provinces, Wright calculated that former British Consul in Tripoli, Honorable
Archibald Fraser, was correct in his estimation that “[t]he General Ballance [sic] in
Trade against Tripoli is paid of[f] by the sale of slaves taken in their piracies and the
Money spent amongst them by the Agents and Consuls of the several European
powers with whom they are at peace.”347 This antidote would account for Yusuf’s
attempts throughout the previous decade to build up his maritime strength. With
access to the harbor cut off by the Americans, trade with the interior of the province
and indeed with its neighbors to the east and south became an important means to
attempt to secure the economic prospects of the province.
As Yusuf Pasha looked to extend his authority beyond the walls of Tripoli, his
attention turned south to the regions of Fezzan and southern Cyrenaica. Immediately,
Yusuf first faced rebellion from the Amazigh populations of the Gharyan Mountains
of western Tripoli. After refusing to pay their annual tax, they assassinated Yusuf’s
emissary, Haj Ahmad Agha al-Khaznadar and then seized the goods of a transSaharan caravan, which consisted of of five hundred camels weighed down with grain
and monies.348 In response, Yusuf sent his forces, dispersed the population, killed the
leader, Shaikh Abd al-‘Onafi, and put down the rebellion. In retribution, the people of
Gharyan were forced to pay an indemnity of 100,000 Spanish dollars.349
By 1805, Yusuf was attempting to regain sovereignty over Derna. His brother
Ahmed had fled by sending over one-thousand men to quell any remaining dissent in
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the eastern costal town by offering amnesty to those who helped his deposed brother
capture the city. The following year, Yusuf attempted to secure his control over the
southern province of Fezzan, and to thwart the revolts of the nomadic Awlad
Sulaiman tribe which had “cut off a commercial artery”350 of the trans-Saharan trade
route from Fezzan to Tripoli.
As this central route connected Tripolitania with the markets of Bornu and
Hausaland, it was particularly problematic for the leader for various reasons. First, the
Awlad Sulaiman were being supported by the Saif al-Nasr clan who had long since
resisted Karamanlı rule. His early successes in thwarting domestic rivals that looked
to undermine Tripoli’s trade networks would continue throughout the decade. Yusuf
turned his eye towards the areas bordering the Sudan region, namely Ghadames and
Fezzan. Folayan argued that this focus was largely motivated by commercial rather
than political reasons. Both Ghadames and Fezzan were important centers for
commerce, and that Ghadames linked Tripoli to Timbuktu by way of Tuat, as well as
linking the center with Hausaland via Ghat, and then Bornu via Murzuq. In addition to
these important point for trans-Saharan trade, Ghadames also was a meeting point for
caravans from Tunis and Algiers.351 Access to the Ghadames caravan route would
become a point of contestation between Tripoli and neighboring Tunis.
Wright’s research demonstrated that Tripolitan activity in the Saharan slave
trade played a central role in the economy of the province. He cited records from the
former British Consul in Tripoli Fraser, when analyzing the role of the slave trade in
the economies of the region and calculated the consul’s numbers to argue that slave
trade constituted about 86% of the import economy in Fezzan “32,000 sequins for
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only 800 slaves, out of 37,380 sequins total”352 and a corresponding 82% of the
import economy of Ghadames.353 “(8,000 sequins for 200 slaves out of a total of
9,725 sequins, including 1,000 sequins’-worth of gold dust).”354 While records do not
indicate on the Tripolitan center’s reliance on the caravan trade throughout the turn of
the century and specifically throughout the years of irregular American maritime
blockade, it is likely that Tripolitan participation in the caravan trade compensate for
the loss in revenues from the ports.
The inland routes that connected the provinces, not the sea, that proved to be the
most economically, as well as politically effective means of exercising one’s attempts
at political autonomy. While Yusuf was attempting to regain control over the larger
province and expand his reach southwards, his older brother was in the company of
five-hundred mercenaries, several hundred Bedouins, and Tripolitan nomads, as well
as a handful of Americans, marching from Alexandria to the port town of Derna.
The chronicle of Ahmed Karamanlı and William Eaton’s march to Derna are
well chronicled in American historiography. Suffice is to say that in the eleventh
hour, the American government and Yusuf Karamanlı agreed to peace. The
Americans were released. Jonathan Cowderly “bid the Bashaw a final adieu, at which
he seemed much affected.”355 Yusuf remained in control of the province, while
Ahmed Karamanlı who marched to Derna with the Americans, was forced into exile
in Syracuse, Sicily, abandoned by the American men he trusted.356
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Despite the American evacuation and the political ineffectualness of his brother,
the governor of Tripoli had to reclaim authority over his political adversaries in
Tripolitania. To do so, Yusuf began a systemic attack on his brother’s allies, as well
as his own rivals in the province. In a September 17, 1805 letter to London, the
British consul to Tripoli wrote:
‘Leon Farfare,’ a Jew, was assassinated. A trader in gold dust was hung as being
the murderer, but as it is known that a principal (sic) officer of the Bashaw
administered poison to the deceased a few days previous to his death there can
be no doubt but that his fate was condemned. A letter by the deceased to the
bashaw's brother is said to have been intercepted and this circumstance together
with the probability of his having been privy to some of the secrets of the castle
may have awakened the bashaw’s suspicions. He was the principle merchant
here [with] the bashaw's confidence and the secretary in all his transactions with
the Christian powers, broker to several consuls and had served me in that
capacity in the month of March.357
It was interesting and telling that the Pasha blamed the death of the merchant
on a trader in gold dust from the caravans. Farfara’s role as a negotiator for Yusuf
Karamanlı with the Americans, a notable figure among diplomatic circles, and his
duties as a banker, were similarly noted in Jonathan Cowdery’s notes.358 After the
war, Yusuf Pasha needed to eliminate all threats of rebellion within the province, the
next chapter in Tripolitan history was marked by its relations with the interior of the
province and with the trans-Saharan merchants. Indeed, both Tunis and Tripoli turned
their attentions on the political as well as the economic consolidation of their
provinces after the turn of the century.
Meanwhile in Tunis
While the end of the eighteenth century brought chaos for both Egypt and
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Tripoli, Tunis was comparatively peaceable. In fact, the province experienced
economic growth under Hammuda Pasha. After the 1795 delegation to the Porte
regarding the forced removal of Ali Burghol, political relations between the
administration of the Tunisian bey and the Porte remained quite positive. Tunis, like
Tripoli, supported the empire’s efforts against the French throughout the invasion of
Egypt and participated in the broader Ottoman war effort by placing French diplomats
under house arrest, and keeping them imprisoned longer than either Tripoli or Algiers.
Unlike his neighbors to the east however, when Hammuda Pasha assumed
power in 1782, the province was already in a relative state of prosperity. The ongoing
wars with France and the succession troubles that consumed the middle of the
eighteenth century had finally ended.359 Moreover, Hammuda’s predecessor, Ali II,
instituted a set of reforms that set the foundation for the centralization of power within
the Bardo. So, his heir-apparent Hammuda was able to step in to the framework that
his father established, backed with the support of a stable divan, and continue the
system of reforms before his official investiture in 1782.
Despite the different contexts in which Yusuf Karamanlı and Hammuda Bey
came to power, by the turn of the nineteenth century the governors were pursuing
similar strategies to expand commercial revenues and secure their respective hold on
power. The uniformity of approach is a particularly compelling demonstration of the
regionalism and cohesion present in the socio-economic and political systems of the
provinces. This is to say that despite distinctive political and economic conditions,
Tripoli and Tunis simultaneously turned their attentions inland and expanded the
cross-provincial trade that effectively tied the provinces of Egypt, Tripoli and Tunis
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geographically together: the trans-Saharan caravan trade. In effect, the reign of
Hammuda Pasha was marked by his attempts to consolidate power within province
and to invigorate the trans-Saharan caravan networks.
Positive relations with the Porte, and the governor’s attempts at economic
expansion did not imply that Tunis was not coping with its own set of internal
difficulties. Plague and famine throughout the eighteenth century had, much like in
Tripoli and Egypt, repeatedly devastated the province. In fact, an outbreak of plague
was the major instigator in the 1784-92 war between Tunis and Venice. Troubles
arose when Tunisian merchants from Sfax chartered a vessel, flying Venetians colors,
to transport cargo from Alexandria to Tunis.360 However, contagion spread among the
crew en route between the North African cities. The merchants ordered the captain,
Angelo Emo, to return, and dock in Tunis, which was equipped with quarantine
measures. Emo however, decided to sail to Malta, where officials ultimately destroyed
the merchants’ cargo and set fire to the ship.361
In response, the merchants from Sfax demanded indemnities. The Venetians
offered a meager compensation of 140,000 sequins, which the Tunisians quickly
refused as unacceptable. Tensions between the two parties grew, and eventually,
escalated to war.362 By January of 1784 the Venetian envoy had been expelled from
Tunis.363 Tunisian corsairs began active campaigns against Venetian vessels.
Aggressions continued until Emo– who by 1792 became an admiral in the Venetian
navy– lead a bombardment targeting the ports of La Goulette, and Sfax.364 A cease-
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fire between the two parties was reached shortly thereafter and secured favorable
terms for the Tunisian merchants.365 However, even this war, which were largely if
not exclusively, spurred on by the commercial interests of the province underlined
Hammuda Pasha’s unwavering focus on Tunisian economic expansions.
The Tunisian governor’s efforts to consolidate power and expand the Tunisian
economy were not based on western or even domestic challenges to his position.
Rather, historians of Tunis argued that Hammuda was attempting to unravel the
remaining vestiges of influence that neighboring Algiers held within the province.366
The succession crisis of the mid-eighteenth century allowed the neighboring deys to
exploit the infighting among the various Tunisian contenders. In effect, the general
disorder “encouraged the rulers of Algiers’ ambitions to control Tunisian
resources.”367 In effect, Algerian influence remained quite prevalent in the province
until the last decades of the eighteenth century when Ali Bey’s reforms began limiting
the westernmost regency’s exploitation of Tunisian reserves by enforcing the Bardo’s
authority within its provincial domains and over its commercial interests. Trade
between Tunis and Europe began to grow substantially under the governorship of Ali
Bey, particularly as the then governor allowed broad concessions to European agents
interested in trading with the province.368
Therefore, by the time Hammuda came to power in 1782, the framework was
already in place to limit their western neighbor’s influence within the province. Early
on, things were looking quite optimistic for Tunis. Hammuda’s commercial reforms
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took advantage of the “bumper harvests of the mid-1780s”369 and revived trade with
Europe. Nevertheless, the established practice of trade concessions worked
exclusively to the European merchants’ favor undermined local interest in the
province’s agricultural trade. To reverse this, Hammuda Pasha opted for a policy that
required western merchants to obtain an export license (taskara).370 In the new
system, western agents were then required that they use the beylik as the middleman
in the transactions, rather than deal directly with the Tunisian merchants themselves.
Forcing Europeans to obtain licenses in order to trade with the province proved
profitable for Hammuda’s administration in two ways. First, it allowed for a new
stream of revenues. Secondly, it spurred on domestic trade that the beylik could then
tax. However, not everyone was happy with these new reforms. MacGill, in his
Account of Tunis wrote:
A more substantial reason for the decline of the commerce of Tunis…[is] the
ill-advised conduct of the Bey. From an ill directed desire of grain, he has not
only become a merchant himself but also permits the whole of his ministers,
and the people of his court to follow his example. The produce or manufacture
which the subject brought to market, he could formerly dispose to the highest
bidder; now it is laid hold of by the rapacity of these princely and diplomatic
merchants, and if paid for, which is not always the case, it is paid at the price
they choose to give, and at which the cultivator or manufacturer cannot afford
to sell.371
This quote was written in 1807 by Thomas MacGill, an English merchant who
traveled to the province and found the new polices frustrating to his commercial
interests. MacGill’s claims of Tunisian excess at the highest level of governance were
rather overstated. Contemporary travel narratives of the age referred to Hammuda’s
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early years in power represented a ‘Golden Age’ or the ‘Augustan age’ of Tunisian
history.372 Vilification and hyperbole aside, pragmatism stood out as the key
motivator in Tunisian directives. In his analysis of the young governor, Abun-Nasr
wrote:
Taking over from his father at a time when Tunisia was prosperous, he
increased its prosperity by the careful management of state revenues. We are
told that he was so careful not to burden the public treasury with his personal
expenditure that he was often described by the vainglorious Tunisians as
having a miserly disposition. He set an example to his minsters and
government officials by wearing only locally produced garments, and in order
to encourage them to take an interest in agriculture he rode every week to his
estate to supervise the work in person. He discouraged the widely practiced
custom of giving charity to the poor, and urged its seekers to go and work.
While delegating to the ‘ulama the tasks of administering justice, he looked
personally into complains about the conduct of government agents. 373
The general description of Hammuda Pasha as an economically judicious
governor also echoed throughout the vast collection of materials written on turn-ofthe-nineteenth-century Tunisia. His efforts to revitalize agricultural production of the
province were not his only attempts at increasing revenues. Nor was he solely focused
on trading with his primary grain market to the north—nor could he have been—as it
was soon about to be difficult to feed his own population much less maintain his grain
trade with Spain or France.
The turn of the century had disastrous consequences for the agricultural
commerce of the province. The destruction of the French commercial fleet had, as
with Tripoli, greatly reduced the maritime traffic between Tunis and its major trading
partners, which was particularly ill-fated as Tunisian merchants relied on European
vessels for the transport of passengers and goods from the province.374 Reliance on
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French and Venetian ships was not the only factors working against Tunisian
commercial interests. Rather, the endemic famine and grain shortages effectively cut
off the grain trade between Tunis and Europe.
Valensi wrote, “during the whole of the first third of the nineteenth century,
only two years of good crops may be noted.”375 While this is true, the famine of 1805
was particularly devastating for the province. So much so, that Hammuda Pasha
prohibited the exportation of grain. These restrictions stayed place through the end of
the decade and had massive consequences for Tunisian trade. MacGill described the
conditions of maritime trade:
The trade of the coast of Barbary has certainly declined considerably of late
years. But though this commerce as at a former period much more extensive
and lucrative, and might once perhaps have been more worth of the attentions
of a nation; yet notwithstanding the low state to which it is reduced…[He
continued,] [t]he famine, which did so much mischief in the regency of Tunis
(1805,) induced the bey to prohibit the exportation of grain from his state; and
as plenty was not for some seasons restored, he has not as yet deemed it
prudent to remove his prohibition. Grain being the chief article, which drew
ships to his ports, that branch of traffic, has been entirely destroyed. Now that
the crops are abundant, were he again to permit exportation, it is much to be
doubted whether, under the present circumstances it would resume its former
activity.376
Maritime interests also shifted away from the corso after 1805.377 In his work,
Panzac argued that the relative abandonment of the corsairing practice had less to do
with the investment of the beylik, since the authorities continued to equip ships at
more or less the same rate as before, but rather in private individuals’ decreased
willingness to fully kit out the ships. He argued, “[b]efore 1806, fitting out of ships by
private individuals represented 80 to 95% of the total, and after that date, only 20 to
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30%. From then on, privateering lost much of its appeal.”378
This information, coupled with the ongoing risk of plague that accompanied
Mediterranean travel and which had previously devastated on the province, such as
during the eighteen-month long epidemic of 1784, spurred the governors’ efforts to
expand inland.379 Afterwards, Hammuda Pasha looked south, and specifically towards
integrating the Ghadames caravan trade into the broader provincial commercial
resources.380 During the worst months of the epidemic, the pasha suspended trade of
the caravans as well as the maritime ports, the pasha was looking to expand the
overland trade networks with Central and Sub-Saharan Africa. In fact, it is from Miss
Tully’s account that we learn that an official of the Bornu government was visiting
Tunis and Tripoli in an effort to discuss trade relations between him and the two
North African provinces. Miss Tully wrote:
A black prince of Bornou [sic] is here at present; his come from Tunis and is
returning to Bornou... The prince has one of the best houses in the town
allotted to him by the Bashaw...The [officials] do not wish to let out their
troops for hire, and seldom lend them; when they do, it is only to
Mahometans. They seek after no conquests, are content with their own
situation, and for many years, have not stood in need of auxiliary soldiers.
They could raise if required, great armies expeditiously, from the number of
their subjects and the goodness of their horses, as they possess the best
qualities of those animals being as serviceable as those of Arabia and as
beautiful as those of Barbary.381
From Miss Tully’s records coupled with the reports of Robin Hallett, we learn
that the emissary’s caravan consisted of twenty camels and “slaves [that had been]
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seized in wars and raids and as tributes,”382 as was the customary practice for visiting
officials of the time. Contemporary sources indicate that the emissary was in the
North African provinces for “political, intelligence and diplomatic reasons as well as
trade interests.”383 While unfortunately we do not have further details of the regarding
the mission, we do know from other traveler reports the frequency of the slave
markets in Tunis. From Edward Stanley wrote of the 1786 Tunisia slave markets and
caravan bazaars in great detail:
The market for black slaves is held on Friday in the Bazar, on a place like a
stage, raised about three feet with benches round, and a platform in the middle,
to walk them up and down and shew [sic] their limbs to the purchasers; no
Christian is allowed to buy a black slave. I have seen many among them, of both
sexes, with fine regular features, very different from the Guinea blacks. These
people are brought to Tunis from the interior parts of Africa, by caravans which
come regularly once a year, but from what part I could never learn. I was
informed by a merchant, that they were five months on their journey, bringing
ostrich feathers, gold dust, slaves, gums and a variety of other articles, which
they sell and exchange for goods proper to carry back. 384
While Stanley rich notes on the Tunisian slave markets of the late-eighteenth
century are remarkable in their own right, we can also compare them with later
accounts, such as Marcel and Frank’s Histoire de Tunis: précédée d'une description
de cette régence that was first published in Algeria in 1851, and offered accounts of
the sales of slaves in nineteenth century Tunis. From Frank’s notes we learn that
much like in the eighteenth century, Christians and Jews were not allowed to purchase
382
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slaves as “this prerogative is only granted to Muslims.”385 However, the most notable
difference between Stanley and Frank’s account was the scale of the markets and
numbers of human beings bought and sold in Tunis. We see how from the weekly
affair Stanley wrote about that theTunisian slave markets become systemized over the
turn of the century. “Once the sale is completed and ratified by the seller and the
buyer, in the same market, there are writers (kâtebs) that a purchase contract
(heddjéh,) to avoid any kind of dispute between the two parties.”386 The
bureaucratization of the slave markets not only underscored Hammuda Pasha’s
interest in expanding the commercial revenues of the province, but also his propensity
for having the regency act as a middleman in Tunisian commerce. Moreover, Frank’s
account also offers readers a lens into the prices and demand for different slaves
within the Tunisian markets:
Prices of black men and women widely vary, depending on their age and the
intrinsic value that gives them their particular qualities; the most beautiful
black women, in all the splendor of the youth, normally cost 600 dollars; girls
[typically] sell for a lower price, and their value will likely be higher or lower
depending on how close they are to the age of puberty. [Meanwhile,] young
boys and men are much cheaper because they are less popular. 387
From Frank’s account were we further learn about the interconnectivity of the
provinces in regards to the slave trade. For example, his point of reference was not the
slave markets of Algiers or Morocco, but rather those of Cairo. Repeatedly throughout
his text, he compared the number of slaves in Tunis, the commerce of the caravans,
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the visual inspection of slaves, as well as even the rate of plague outbreaks to those of
Egypt, and specifically the Cairene markets.388 This reference point alludes not only
to the socio-economic connections among the provinces but also highlights the
viability of the intra-Ottoman slave trade between the North African provinces and the
Ottoman Porte in the early nineteenth century.
Bin Diyaf wrote that among Hammuda Pasha’s customary gifts to Selim III
was a number of black slaves [raqiq al-Sudan] sent to the Ottoman sultan as a
consular present [hadiyya] from the Tunisian bey.389 When Montana compared these
findings with Ehud Toledano’s research the eunuchs of the Porte, who were
historically sent via Tripoli, Tunis and Algiers to Constantinople, we have this
underlying system of inter-Ottoman economic cooperation.390 To further substantiate
this argument, we can look to Tunisian historian Lucette Valensi work on the records
of the Venetian consul in Tunis. Where from her work on the inventory of ships
registered with the emissary’s office, we see twenty-nine of the two hundred and
eighty-four vessels that left Tunis were destined for either Egypt or Istanbul and
carried slaves.391
Montana’s work on the history of the slave trade in Tunis was thought
provoking and reincorporated the trans-Saharan caravans into the broader structure of
the Tunisian economy. Similarly, Dyer and Write’s work underscored the importance
of the trans-Saharan caravans in Tripolitan economy. This dissertation builds on this
body of work by arguing that rather than read these two patterns independently of one
another, comparing the slave trade of the provinces allows us to speculate that
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Tunisian and Tripolitan participation in the trans-Saharan slave trade mimicked one
another in a pattern that followed the broader socio-economic and political
regionalism. Moreover, commercial expansion and political centralization of the
provinces’ inlands were not the only motives that drove the actions of Hammuda
Pasha and Yusuf Karamanlı. While the Tripoli governor was dealing with the
ramifications of his war with the Americans, the Tunisian bey was preparing to
undercut an external rival of his own, namely the Algerian dey.
Tunis: A Different Type of Rival
Since the mid-eighteenth century, the political reach of the Algerian province
entrenched itself into the workings of their Tunisian counterparts. Historically, the
province of Algiers maintained a socio-political status that elevated it above its
neighbors. Moalla argued that the Porte’s appointment of an Algerian commander for
the sultan’s campaigns and the use Algerian janissaries to subdue the revolts in the
Tunisian province at the turn of the eighteenth century indicated a particular affinity
on the part of the Porte for its westernmost province. While Moalla did not cite any
Ottoman language sources, we know from Ottoman documents in the Porte that
Constantinople routinely tied Tunis and Tripoli in with Algiers when discussing the
corso.392 However, turn of the nineteenth century brought with it new economic
models that pushed beyond the maritime or even privateering interests of the
provinces.
Nevertheless, Moalla wrote “the Algerian threat of a complete annexation of
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the Tunisian Regency, hanging like the sword of Damocles that only the Porte could
prevent from falling on the beys’ heads still represented an efficient dissuasive tool
against [Tunis’s] possible dissidence,”393 This dissertation argues however that by the
turn of nineteenth century, the politics of North Africa were no longer so clear cut.
Algiers was historically much stronger than its eastern neighbor. Tunis was also
routinely subjected to Algerian sway, and several instances of diplomatic bravado.
Algerian emissaries would not infrequently thumb their nose at the Tunisian bey and
his councils.394 Nevertheless, the Tunisian victory over Algiers in the 1807 war
demonstrably showed that while influential the power of the dey was not authoritative
within the Tunisian province.
While Moalla’s historiographical paradigm called for the inclusion of the
Tunisian province into the broader Ottoman world was invaluable in its analysis of
the Tunisian beylicate and its relations with Constantinople, Tripoli, and with Europe,
the scholar’s arguments concerning Ottoman-Tunisian relations in regards to Algiers
are more debatable. Moalla specifically pointed to Cezayirli Gazi Hasan and his early
maritime training within the westernmost province as a “renewed acknowledgement
of the particular status enjoyed by the Algerian corsairs”395 at the turn of the
nineteenth century. Indeed, the author drew a continuous line connection Algerian
captains, from the sixteenth century corsair Barbarossa Hayreddin Pasha to the
Georgian admiral who died nearly two hundred and fifty years later. However, Gazi
Hasan’s relationship with the North African regencies was complicated at best. Gazi
Hasan himself fled Algiers for Spain. Moreover, as we saw in Chapter One, the
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corsair captains of North Africa were not included in the Admiral’s broad sweeping
maritime reforms within the Asitane. In fact, the captain struggled to find the most
constructive approach to limit the growing autonomy of the Ottoman provinces—
North Africa included. Lastly, during the failing years of Ali Bey’s governorship in
Tripoli, Gazi Hasan supported a fellow Georgian corsair, Ali Burghol, in his 1793
attempts to overthrow the Karamanlıs—not the governor of Algiers, who had at his
ready disposal an army far superior to the 300 mercenaries who accompanied
Burghol. I argue that rather to Algiers, Gazi Hasan’s ultimate loyalty was that to the
sultanate of Abdul Hamid I. Moalla’s problematic use of sources is also reflected in
her analysis of the 1807 war. The author wrote:
Hammuda, who had been for years engaged in reforming and improving his
army, finally declared war on Algiers in 1807. The first battle between the two
armies near Constantine, in the east of Algeria, ended in a shameful rout for
the Tunisians. A new expedition was sent to the western frontier two months
later, under the command of Yusuf Sahib al-Tabi solemnly invested with full
powers by the bey. Yusuf managed to inflict a severe defeat on the Algerians
and came back crowned with glory in August 1807.396
While Moalla’s assessment of the two major battles in the 1807 was largely
correct, her nationalist reading of events colored her text and were based exclusively
on the chronicles of Bin Diyaf, who she previously referred to as “our national
chronicler,”397 thus, invoking the question of Moalla’s intended audience.
Nevertheless, her overall assessment was accurate: tensions remained high between
Algeria and Tunis during the turn of the century.
Hostilities erupted after Hammuda Pasha offered sanctuary and support to
Mustafa Ingliz, the exiled dey of Constantine (in eastern Algiers.)398 After a few
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antagonistic diplomatic exchanges on the part of both governors, in January 1807
Hammuda Pasha sent his army on a mission to invade Constantine. Hammuda’s
troops, which were largely comprised of Ottoman trained janissaries, were forced out
by their Algerian counterparts in May.399 The Algerian victory proved to be short
lived, when the Algerian dey’s men were subsequently defeated outside of Salata in
Tunis, and then again repulsed the following year when their forces attempted to
invade in June 1808.400 After the Tunisian victory outside of Salata, Hammuda Pasha
ended Tunisian bey’s annual tribute to Algiers, and cast off the remaining vestiges of
his neighbor’s influence. Abun Nasr wrote of a third attempt by the Algerian dey to
invade Tunis, this time by sea, in 1811, but Tunisian corsairs were able to block their
Algerian counterparts from attacking their harbors.401
Hammuda Pasha’s soldiers repeated ability to ward off Algerian attacks
clearly demonstrated that the likelihood of successful Algerian invasion was simply
not possible by the turn of the nineteenth century. Moalla’s depiction of the Algerian
threat “hanging like the sword of Damocles”402 over Tunis simply did not apply to the
governorship of Hammuda Pasha. Regardless, it was in Moalla’s assessment of the
Porte’s response to the hostilities between Tunis and Algiers that her sources proved
to be weakest. Moalla wrote of the conditions between Hammuda Pasha and the
Sublime Porte:
The precarious nature of Selim [III]’s power probably prevented him from
standing firmly in support of Tunis against Algerian domination in the
Maghrib region. The Tunisians were therefore left, or secretly encouraged, to
fight their own war against the Algerians, in order to create a new status quo,
which the Porte would readily sanction.403
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Moalla, in her notes, cited a reference to an article by Charter discussing the
Porte’s official neutrality in the hostilities between Tunis and Algiers, with reference
to a November 1807 firman from Selim III that instructed the provinces to direct their
frustrations towards Christian Europe rather than one another.404 This was likely
correct, as the Sublime Porte did not benefit from having its provinces at war with one
another. However, the author did not cite any further Ottoman primary, or secondary,
sources to substantiate her claims beyond this statement of official neutrality.
Moreover, Ottoman records from late 1807 only have one preserved document
regarding the provinces of Tunis and Algiers: the annual official re-investiture of the
bey Hammuda Pasha and the Algerian dey Ahmad Pasha for the following year.405
In1808, a memorandum was sent to Mustafa IV informing the sultan of the death of
Ahmad Bey and the succession of Ali III to the governorship of Algiers.406 Moreover,
Ottoman records do not indicate that there was any correspondence Hammuda Pasha
and the Sublime Porte regarding Algiers in the year before Selim III’s deposition.407
If one were to speculate on the behavior of the High Divan, then the Ottoman
Porte would have likely deferred to the provinces to resolve their own disputes and
only stepped in. This is to say, it would only intervene officially or otherwise, in
excessive instances of administrative dereliction or antagonism towards
Constantinople’s policies—much like we saw with the sultan’s delayed sanctioning in
the removal of Ali Karamanlı of Tripoli and Gazi Hasan’s repeated attempts to curtail
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the Mamluk grandees of Egypt before the French invasion.408
Despite Moalla’s problematic reading of Ottoman-Tunisian history in regards
to neighboring Algiers, her contribution to the field remains quite valuable. Her
research was the first historical attempt to dismantle the Tunisian nationalist paradigm
in regard to the province’s relationship with the High Porte. Her visionary attempt to
cast off historiographical notions of Tunisian provincial autonomy continue to be
essential contributions that will serve as the foundation for new models in North
African history.
‘Systematic Pacification’
Folayan argued that from 1806 through the mid-1810s, Yusuf Karamanlı was
effectively attempting to systematically pacify the province.409 Simultaneously,
Mehmed Ali and Hammuda Pasha were also attempting similar measures in their
respective territories. The years1806-7 brought war for the Tunisian governor and
Yusuf Pasha’s attempts to quell the Awlad Suleiman revolts while Mehmed Ali
attempted to consolidate power and curtail the lawlessness of the recent Cairene
experience. In effect, three governors of the North African provinces were undergoing
similar efforts to consolidate power under their authority and in turn either mimicking
one another in the process, or concurrently learning and adapting to their
circumstances in paralleling ways.
In effect, each power holder needed to eliminate their local rivals for power,
reinforce their control over the domestic economies, and reaffirm his connection and
loyalty with the Ottoman Porte. Matters were further complicated in Constantinople in
May 1807 when spurred by wide scale yamak revolt, the Shiekh ul-Islam issued a
408
409

See Chapter One of this dissertation for more detail.
Folayan, Tripoli during the Reign of Yusuf Pasha Qaramanli, 48.
181

Msdfasd

fatva that forced the abdication and imprisonment of Selim III. His cousin Mustafa IV
replaced him. Ottoman notables had been increasingly disgruntled with the
reformist’s nizam-ı cedid, and choose Mustafa IV as a successor who would be more
sympathetic to the traditionalist calls for consistency and stability.410 Mustafa IV’s
sultanate lasted just over a year and by July 1808, he too was deposed—this time in
favor for Selim III’s brother—Mahmud II. Mahmud II continued with his brother’s
reforms, and would later lay the foundation for the tanzimat, or reorganization, period
of the 1830s.411
In Cairo, Mehmed Ali Pasha was similarly attempting to thwart his rivals.
Fahmy listed a triumvirate of his adversaries: the ulama, the Mamluks and the Cairene
merchants.412 In an effort to curtail their efforts against his new governorship,
Mehmed Ali first placed the Sheikh al-Sarqawi under house arrest in 1806, curtailing
the religious scholars’ economic influence in the province by eliminating their tax
exemptions, seized their multazims or tax-farming territories if any duties remained
unpaid, pared down their ability to hold tax-free or rizqa land which were mostly used
for awqaf, religious endowments, or madaris, religious schools.413 However, the most
significant threat to Mehmed Ali’s tenuous rule was the Porte. After all,
Constantinople had only supported his claims for the governorship after much
hesitation and foot-dragging on the part of the Asitane. In 1806, the Kapudan Pasha
arrived in the Alexandrine harbor, this time with Musa Pasha, the former vali of
Thessaloniki who had been appointed as Mehmed Ali’s replacement.414
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However, Mehmed Ali still maintained the support of his Albanian soldiers
who had become exceptionally wealthy and powerful in the shadow of the governor,
as “not a man among them [had not] acquired a number of houses, wives, estates for
tax-farming and unbelievable power.”415 After negotiating with the ulama, who had
just revolted against the governor because of his attempts to curtail their commercial
interests, the young Pasha leveraged enough support to give the Ottoman officials no
choice but to leave Egypt, and reappoint Musa Pasha as the governor of
Thessaloniki.416
A more salient threat came the following year, in the spring of 1807. Five
thousand British troops landed in Alexandria in an effort to restore their Mamluk
allies under the leadership of al-Alfi, a grandee who spent time in England currying
favor with British officials during the French invasion. However, British objectives
were similarly thwarted in Rosetta when they fell captive to the scheme elaborated on
the part of the city’s governor, Ali Bey al-Salaniki.417 Mehmed Ali, had their heads
sent on spikes to Cairo, where they were hung from Bab Zuweila. The governor
eventually ordered the ears be chopped off and salted as a gift for the sultan, and their
heads buried.418 By November of that year, Mehmed Ali received a firman from
Mustafa IV thanking him for protecting Egypt from the “heathen English.” The
Mamluks continued to be the most powerful adversary to Mehmed Ali’s control of
Egypt. In May 1810, shortly before Mehmed Ali had the Mamluks massacred in the
citadel, the grandee Ibrahim Bey commented on the new governor:
We have already experienced his ways and his treachery. We have witnessed
his dealings with those who served him and helped him to gain control of this
415
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country…Foremost was his master Muhammad Pasha Khusraw [Hüsrev
Pasha] and then his kathuda and khazindar Uthman Agha Kinj, his drinking
companions. Whith his friend the late Tahir Pasha he took over the Citadel and
burned the palace. Then he set the Turks against Tahir Pasha, and they killed
him in his house. Then he appeared friendly towards us [the Mamluks] ready
to help us as if he were one of our soldiers. He joined with Uthman Bey alBardisi and seemed to show him sincere friendship and brotherhood and swore
fidelity to him. Then he incited him against ‘Ali Pasha al-Tarabulusi. He was
killed, and we were implicated. Then he worked to betray al-Alfi and his
followers through his brother (al Bardisi). He set the soldiers against us with
demands for pay. He counseled ‘Uthman Bey to put a tax on the people…
Ahmad Pasha Khurshid [Hürşid Pasha] arrived and named him vizier, and he
set out to fight us. Then his desire to overthrow Ahmad Pasha came to light
and he quickly returned to Cairo, sowing discord between him and his soldiers
until they turned against him. He told Sayyid ‘Umar the qadi of the shaykhs
that Ahmad Pasha wanted to assassinate them, so they stirred up the people.
Then followed warfare, and the houses were burned. Sayyid ‘Umar spent great
effort in helping him, and he seemed to show him friendship and goodwill.
When he reached his objective and secured his power he turned him out of
Cairo and exiled him from his homeland, violating all the promises and
agreements between them… You and others have witnessed it. Who can trust
this man or conclude a truce with him? 419
Ibrahim Bey’s anger with the young governor is palpable in his text. By the
summer of 1810, tensions came to a head between the Mamluks and Mehmed Ali. In
a letter from the governor to the Grand Vizier from July 14, 1810, the governor wrote
the amirs of the Egyptian households h continued their revolt against “direct Ottoman
rule.”420 Because of their disloyalty to the sultan, Mehmed Ali argued he went to
battle against them, captured several, and held them hostage. The remainder fled,
sought refuge in Upper Egypt or attempted to flee to Sudan.421
After the infamous assassination of the Mamluks, Mehmed Ali assumed the
responsibilities—and wealth—of vali on March 5, 1811. However, the High Porte
was displeased with Mehmed Ali’s assassination of the Mamluks and his seizure of
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power. In response, Constantinople called him the “smallest of viziers”422 and that it
was only out of his pure longing for control that he got to be where he was.423 Fahmy
noted in both All the Pasha’s Men and in Mehmed Ali that the pasha maintained a
difficult relationship with the Porte throughout his entire tenure as vali.424 However,
the ambitious governor’s influence would eventually reach the Hijaz, Crete, Sudan,
and Syria. Mehmed Ali began looking to expand his influence westward.
The vali’s correspondence from 1810-13 suggests that he was also establishing
his influence in broader North Africa. First indicators of Mehmed Ali’s interest in the
Maghrebi provinces, and specifically their vessels and maritime expertise, can be
traced back to January 26, 1811. In a letter the English Admiral of the Fleet, Mehmed
Ali referred to the agreement between the British government and the Porte. The
Kapudan Pasha, Kucuk Husseyin agreed to allow English trade ships to dock in the
port of Alexandria. In the letter, the vali referred to maritime trade between Egypt and
Sweden, and the logistical troubles that Egyptian ships faced in their attempts to sail
across the Mediterranean, during the ongoing Napoleonic Wars, in their trade with
Europe.425
Mehmed Ali was comparing the ports of Alexandria with French and North
African ports regarding their capacity for different kinds of vessels. This early
suggestion, from before the assassination of the Mamluks, points to the vali’s early
interest in using the maritime expertise of his neighbors’ provinces to his own
advantage, as it was only under the protection of British gunships that vessels could
securely dock and depart from the Alexandrine harbor. Moreover, the letter
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effectively pointed to a dual relationship between the English and Egypt at the time.
The English were assisting the Egyptian vali, and in turn, the Porte, in their maritime
trade but at the same time, still posed a serious threat to the province. It had only been
five years since the British invasion of 1807, and the empire’s power was growing at
sea in the light of the French commercial maritime decline. Mehmed Ali, in a strategic
power play, was serving as middleman in the ongoing between the Ottoman Empire
and Great Britain.
Tripoli
As the governor of Egypt was attempting consolidate power, the vali of Tripoli
was effectively adopting similar strategies to secure his own position. One of the most
significant changes with the turn of the century was the shift in the provinces of Tunis
and Tripoli away from the corso. After the war with the United States, the Tripolitan
governor also turned his attention inland. First, he turned his attentions first to Derna,
in an attempt to reconsolidate power in the eastern part of the province, and then to
suppressing the Awlad Suleiman revolts within the territory. The Awlad Suleiman,
the Bedouins that lived in western Tripolitan between Fezzan and Tripoli had allied
with the Saif al-Nasr clan, to the north, which had long resisted Karamanlı rule in the
province. Effectively, the Awlad Suleiman were using their influence in Fezzan to
block the trans-Saharan routes from effectively reaching Tripoli. This measure was in
retaliation to Yusuf Pasha’s attempts to clamp down on the payment of annual tribute
rates by the clans in order to refill the coffers after the end of the war with the
Americans.426
In response, the governor sent a battalion under his eldest son Muhammad Bey
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to subdue the Saif- al-Nasr forces outside Sirte. In the battle that followed, the sheikh
of the Saif-al Nasr clan was killed, and their resistance quickly crumbled thereafter.427
The Awlad Suleiman continued to resist the governor’s attempts at centralization.
Yusuf looked to centralize his power over two main territories for the trans-Saharan
routes: Ghadames to the far west of the province and Fezzan. The Tripoli-Fezzan
route had been under the control of Tripolitan merchants. The Ghadames route cut
through western Tripoli on the way north to Tunis were the two most frequented paths
in the first third of the nineteenth century. To consolidate the Tripolitan center’s hold,
Yusuf Bey sent forces under his son Ali to Ghadames in 1810. The town quickly
surrendered to the forces. Residents paid twenty thousand gold mithqals and mahbubs
to Yusuf. Furthermore, the pasha imposed a governor of his choice on the town to
collect ten percent of all the trade that passed through the city.428
Having curtailed the power of the traders in Ghadames, and centralized and
imposed his man as the governor of the city, Yusuf Pasha turned his attention to
Fezzan in 1811-1812. Fezzan, was not incorporated into the broader Tripolitan
province until the middle of the eighteenth century. By the early nineteenth century,
the space had since fallen out of Tripoli’s control. In a fascinating power-share
arrangement, Yusuf Karamanlı allowed the Awlad Muhammad governors of Fezzan
to continue to use the title of ‘sultan’ seal on all internal correspondence within the
territory. However, any correspondence between the de facto governor of Fezzan and
Tripoli was endorsed with a smaller seal of the title of ‘Sheikh.’ In return for internal
autonomy, Yusuf insisted that Fezzan’s annual tribute be regularly collected from
Murzuq, and that the sum equivalent to five thousand Spanish dollars be paid in gold
427
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dust, henna or slaves. The individual appointed by the governor, Muhammed alMukkani, to serve as bey al-nawba, or ‘collector of the Bashaw’s tribute.’429
Yusuf’s influence in Fezzan was about to grow exponentially. In 1810, alMukkani reported to Yusuf that the annual tribute rate could be easily tripped if the
Pasha were willing to invest al-Mukkani with the powers of governor of Fezzan rather
than tribute collector. Moreover, infighting among Awlad Muhammad successors
worked to Tripoli’s favor when the nephew of sultan offered to collaborate with alMukkani in return for the latter’s support in his claims to the sultanate of Fezzan. One
week after assuming his uncle’s position, the young governor was confronted by alMukkani demanding increased tribute rates. The young successor could not afford to
pay, and as a result was promptly executed. In the chaos that followed, the Fezzan
Mamluks along with the Awlad Suleiman tribe attempted to resist the new governor’s
forces, but reinforcements from Tripoli quickly secured al-Mukkani’s power.
In return for Yusuf’s official investiture Mukkani tripled the annual tribute
rate was tripled from five to fifteen thousand Spanish dollars. Having secured Fezzan,
Yusuf shifted his attentions eastward, and mounted campaigns to quell rebellions in
Benghazi and Derna the following year. As was the case in Yusuf’s support for alMukkani in Fezzan, the governor was driven by economic interests and his push
eastward was spurred by the backlog of tribute payments. Under the command of his
son Muhammad Bey, who thrwarted the Awlad Ali rebellion of 1810, the governor’s
son returned to Tripoli in February 1812 with “several head of cattle, twenty-two
boxes filled with money and jewelry all valued at about $80,000.’”430
In Tunis meanwhile, a janissary revolt broke out in September 1811. Like in
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Constantinople and the reforms of Selim III, the Tunisian janissary jund forces
rebelled against the centralization efforts that Hammuda Pasha was implementing. In
response, Hammuda became increasing severe towards the Tunisian jund and the
notables that supported the jund. In 1805, the governor sanctioned the dismissal of the
notable dey, Ibrahim Busnaq and in 1808, another janissary Muhammad Qara Bunnali
was executed, under the pretense of conspiring with the Algerian dey against
Hammuda Pasha. Revolt broke out in September when janissaries seized the citadel in
Qasbah. However, the uprising was quickly put down by Hammuda’s forces, and the
fleeing janissaries were assassinated by the governor’s men under the command of
Yusuf Sahib al-Tabi, the same commander who lead a successful defeat of Algerian
forces in 1807.431 In September of 1814, Hammuda Pasha died and was succeeded by
his brother ‘Uthman, followed before the end of the year by his cousin, Mahmoud.
The age of Hammuda Pasha, and the bey’s resolute and austere model of governance,
had come to an end.
Conclusion
The turn of the nineteenth century brought new patterns in the regional
behaviors of the North African provinces. We saw how shifts in political authority,
and declining interest in the corso spurred a renewed interest in the inland networks of
the trans-Saharan caravans and examined how the governors of Tunis and Tripoli
attempted to legitimize their rule during a period of political transformation. The two
governors, much like their counterpart in Egypt, were forced to navigate internal, as
well as regional, threats to their authority. The turn of the century brought a new era
that was marked with the internal consolidation of power and, in the last years of the
431
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Napoleonic wars, North African rulers attempted to shift their commercial pursuits
from the corso of the sea to the caravans of the sand. This chapter gave a Tripolitan
face to a Tripolitan war using sources that are often overlooked in Arabic
historiography and have better contextualized the regional ramifications and contexts
of the war.
Moving forward, it touched on the North African provinces’ engagement in the
practice of slavery and on how the commercial and economic interests drove policy in
the region. It used contemporary accounts to elucidate both the experiences of western
and of black slaves in Tripoli and Tunis, and are able to better contextualize the
various manifestations of subjection experienced in the region. The cross-provincial
ties that bound governors such as Ali Burghol, and Ahmed Karamanlı to the broader
region and how tribes, notables, and officials regularly traversed the provincial
divides of North Africa, and how alliances did not either begin or end with borders.
Lastly, this chapter also interrogated how political changes in the region were
historically embedded in the broader diplomatic world of the Porte, and how political
change needed to be addressed through the Porte’s hierarchical systems, and in turn,
how political transformations in Constantinople trickled down to regional revolts in
the North African provinces.
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CHAPTER FOUR
LOCAL RESPONSES TO THE NEW ORDER, 1814-1824
The turn of the nineteenth century brought significant changes to the wider
political structures of the North African provinces from 1801-1814. This chapter
continues in the vein of political transformation, and examines North African
procedural adaptability in the years between the 1814 Congress of Vienna and the
1824 Egyptian campaign in Morea. By focusing on 1814-24, we are able to connect
the North African revival of the corso and the corresponding upsurge in European
antagonism against the North African maritime practice to the subsequent maritime
conscription of the regencies’ fleets by Mehmed Ali’s campaign in Morea.
The interim period was an era of change within the economic and political
policies of Tunis and Tripoli. A ‘period of adjustment’ that accompanied economic
and commercial transformations of the age that were spurred by the Congress of
Vienna and the subsequent 1816 Anglo-Dutch attack on Algiers. The frantic
restructuring, and the effective end of the corso highlighted the resourcefulness of the
provinces as well as their attempt to survive the changes of the day.
This chapter ends right before the active conscription of Tripoli and Tunis up
into the 1824 efforts of the Egyptian vali and his son Ibrahim Pasha, in the Greek War
for Independence. Their active participation in the key moment highlighted how
North African power dynamics began to swing sharply towards Cairo’s favor by the
mid 1820s. Moreover, isolating the timeframe between 1814-1824 allows us to delve
into the dynastic troubles that had a massive impact on the government of Tunis, the
1818-20 plague that struck the province and crippled its economy after the death of
Hammuda Pasha.
Lastly, it also examines how Egypt and Tripoli paralleled one another in their
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underlying imperialist expansionist endeavors inland. Post the decline of the corso,
Yusuf Pasha began on several levels to mimic his neighbor to the east.
Conditions in the Provinces
By the summer of 1815, European actors increasingly exerted pressure on the
provinces, and to a lesser extent the Porte, for the North African governors to abandon
the long held tradition of the corso. Hammuda Pasha, the governor of Tunis, whose
rule ushered in a period of reform and governmental centralization, as well as a
tightening of the bonds between Tunis and the Porte, died in 1814. After the previous
years of instability, the growing interference of Algiers into Tunisian administration
and intra-familiar rivalries of the eighteenth century, the Husainid dynasty of Tunis
began to flourish under Hammuda Pasha.
The governor, despite his administrative successes was nevertheless not the
legitimate heir to the beylik.432 Upon coming to power, Hammuda had taken the place
of his older cousin Mahmoud, who was ahead of Hammuda in the line of Husainid
succession. However, the supplanting of one cousin over another was considered
acceptable, or at least represented such, by Bin Diyaf and by the various officials in
the Bardo Palace of the time.433 Mahmoud suffered from painful gout that would
leave him incapacitated, and by the time Hammuda came to power in the eighteenth
century, the province was just beginning to emerge from the succession troubles of
the previous decades.
It was not surprising that after Hammuda’s 1814 death, various contenders for
power began to emerge from the woodwork of the Bardo Palace. Robert Greenhow
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wrote:
Many changes had in the mean time [sic] taken place in Tunis. On the 15th of
September 1814, Hamouda Bey, while taking a cup of coffee after a long
day’s fast in the Ramadan, fell down and expired… he was not the rightful
heir to the throne, according to the European laws of succession for Mahmoud
and Ismael, the sons of Mahmed the elder brother of [Hammuda] father, were
still alive, retaining in as state prisoners in the palace. On the death of
Hamouda, his brother Othman assumed the crown but it did not rest long on
his head; he had a powerful enemy in the Sapatapa Sidi Yusuf, who was
anxious to govern himself, and considered that the aged Mahmoud would be a
more convenient representative of royalty. The troops were accordingly
corrupted, and on the 20th of December, Othman was murdered by the hand of
Mahmoud himself, who having also dispatched the two sons of his victim,
assumed the title and power of Bey, without opposition. 434
Shortly afterwards, the new Tunisian governor, Mahmoud Bey, had Sapatapa
Sidi Yusuf assassinated and threw his body to the mob outside the palace walls.435
With this bloody assassination, Mahmoud Pasha’s position as bey was secured and he
governed Tunis for a decade, from 1814 until 1824. As Tunis was facing an internal
crisis, all three of the corsairing provinces—Tunis, Tripoli and Algiers—were
simultaneously about to experience a drastic reduction of their economic revenues.
However, in a turn of events for Tripoli, Yusuf Pasha was attempting to
consolidate power over the broader province of Tripolitania by extending his reach
beyond the walls of the city into the eastern and southern spaces of Cyrenaica,
Ghadames, and Fezzan. To do so, the Tripolitan governor turned to his sons and
trusted agents. Specifically, he looked to individuals that he could use as political
proxies that would be willing to exercise the will of the pasha in beyond the
provincial center.
In the south, Yusuf backed Mohammad al-Mukkni’s political takeover of
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Fezzan in 1810.436 By seizing power and overthrowing the Awlad Mohammad sultans
from the region and entrusting a governor in the region who was entirely dependent
on Tripoli’s militaristic strength for its survival, Yusuf’s will was thus practically
guaranteed in al-Mukkni’s Fezzan. After all, the latter was entirely dependent on the
Tripolitan pasha to maintain his hold on power, and the governor knew it. Al-Mukkni
had held true to his promise to triple the governor’s revenues from the trans-Saharan
caravans.437
Around the same time the governor was making a move for Fezzan, Yusuf
equipped his eldest son, Mohammed, with an army to curtail the Bedouin rebellions to
the east of the province. Cyrenaica was a region that had long operated with a
significant degree of autonomy from the Tripolitan center. By sending his son to
subdue the revolts of the Awlad Ali—a clan that historically lived in the region that
crossed over the Tripolitan-Egyptian frontier, Yusuf was effectively reversing
Cyrenaican administrative self-rule. Mohammad, as per his father’s orders, went east
in 1810, and was given the significant size of the army to defeat the Awlad Ali. He
returned victorious to Tripoli with their slaves, livestock and funds.438
These efforts on the part of the Tripolitian governor to extend his authority
beyond the provincial center allowed him expand his influence into the broader sphere
of his domains. More importantly however, they allowed him to prevent the potential
for ambitious political rivals, such as the Awlad Ali, from gaining power in the far
reaches of the province. Effectively, the governor was establishing a basis for political
behavior where any dissenting, or even potentially autonomous voices would not be
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tolerated—as in the case of the Awlad Mohammad sultans of Fezzan and their
removal by al-Mukkni. The pasha was willing to overthrow, or at least undermine, the
pre-existing power structures with new systems that were inherently more
sympathetic to his interests. Moreover, it is important to bear in mind that these 1810s
inland expansion became part of a larger aggressive political pattern pursed by Yusuf
Pasha throughout his reign.
A Return to the Old Warring Ways
By 1815 all three of the provinces had proactively revived the corso. So much
so, that the number of campaigns waged on the sea had grown exponentially over the
course of a year.439 In a radical volte-face from the previous years, which brought a
near-abandonment of the maritime practice, by mid-decade the three provinces fully
revived their efforts to actively target and attack western vessels. The shift across the
corsair provinces was matched by their effort to expand their maritime commerce and
– in the Tunisian and Tripolitan case – to further their inland trade networks. To give
an example of how significant this return to the corso was, the number of Tunisian
campaigns from the years of 1813 and 1814 combined numbered at only thirteen. The
number of campaigns engaged in during 1815 was a far more significant forty-one.440
There were two interlinked factors behind the radical turn away from the corso
in the early years of the century. First came the commercial shift, as North Africans
begun to expand into the world of merchant shipping. After the outbreak of the
Napoleonic wars, and the subsequent English blockade, French commercial shipping
effectively came an effective halt in the Mediterranean.441 This limited the region’s
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access to the French commercial vessels that North African merchants relied on to
transport their goods to Europe and across the Ottoman Empire. To offset these
losses, North African merchants increased their participation in the commercial world
of maritime commerce as several of them maintained long-standing commercial ties
with various port-cities such as Marseilles and Livorno.
Panzac wrote, “the arrival in Marseilles on 5 November 1809 of a convoy of
six Maghrebi commercial ships was an exceptional event, not only because of the
number of ships, but also because of their flag—North African ships were now
replacing French vessels that were victims of an implacable British blockade. Even
their limited cargoes provided a valuable contribution to a maritime market that was
particularly depressed.”442 Panzac was overall correct in his assessment. However, I
contend that we can push this argument further still. After all, the shift away from the
corso towards commerce was likely spurred on by several other North Africanspecific factors that were effectively centered on the British blockade of French ports.
After all, it was under the auspices of European captains that the two most
significant incidents of plague hit eighteenth-century Tunis. Port authorities in Malta
successfully contained the first outbreak when they burned a Tunisian vessel from
Sfax, preventing the infection from physically reaching the province.443 However, the
Venetian captain’s refusal to return the vessel to Tunis, a port equipped with the
necessary quarantine measures, the subsequent destruction of the goods onboard lead
to the outbreak of the 1784 war between Tunis and Venice.444 Not only did the war
lead to the eventual blockade of various Tunisian ports, but the measures taken by the
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Maltese officials did not even spare the province from further outbreak.
Later that year, a French captain’s similar disregard for quarantine procedures
and his negligence in allowing a handful of infected pilgrims on to the porte of La
Goullete lead to worst outbreak of the plague in the century, which later became
known as the as al-waba’ al-kabir [The Great Epidemic.]445
These instances had massive consequences for Tunisian trade. The second
effectively brought a temporary halt to both the caravan and the maritime commerce
of the province as Hammuda Pasha attempted to contain the epidemic. These
outbreaks demonstrated to North African officials the wide-reaching consequences of
a general disregard for their maritime procedures on the part of European captains.
Therefore, a general turn towards ‘in-house’ commercial endeavors is not particularly
surprising—particularly given the scope of these two events and their disastrous
effects on the province’s economy. Additionally, the turn of the century and the
subsequent revival of the trans-Saharan trade caravans made the need for accesses to
commercial vessels even more pressing across the provinces of Tripoli and Tunis. The
decreased availability of French commercial vessels, the ones traditionally used to
transport commodities from the provinces was only exacerbated when the inland
networks of the caravans began bringing more slaves, gold dust, and numerous
commodities to the provincial coastlines for export.446
The burgeoning interest of North African merchants in commercial shipping
and their attempt into engage in ‘legitimate’ maritime trade was ultimately
unsuccessful. Numerous European customs and port officials deliberately
undermined North African traders’ attempts to engage in maritime commerce.
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Targeted and blocked by difficulties, routine ill will, and the general widespread
duplicity on the part of European port authorities —North African traders encountered
countless obstacles in commercial shipping.447 This description was succinctly
summed up in a 1813 letter from the French consul’s bureau of Algiers regarding the
troubles that North African merchants had in southern European ports of entry, and in
turn the growing sense of frustration within the Maghrebi provinces:
No one is persuaded more than I of the damage done to our enemy by the
severity of our customs offices, and it is primarily in foreign places—where
one hears the cries of the merchants of London and sees the degradation of the
English merchandise—that it is easiest to be convinced; but may I be
permitted to say that the customs houses of Marseilles and Leghorn have
perhaps shown to the citizens of the Barbary states a gratuitous harshness
which in no way belongs to the Emperor’s policy. When in Marseilles in
January 1811, various Algerian ships were sequestrated there: the crews had
been forcefully removed from their vessels and thrown onto the street without
any assistance whatsoever. They came to me despair shouting in an outbreak
of: “Give us bread or kill us.” I arranged for them to be given sustenance, but
this was stopped as soon as I left Marseilles. What happened when the
Algerians returned here? They came en masse to the palace of the dey crying
out “Char-Allah!” (God’s Justice) against the French consul. This event
exposed me to the greatest danger. And in addition, the sequestrations may
have been extended unnecessarily: they have exposed the merchandise to
ruinous deterioration and in some cases even total loss for the owners. 448
While the above quote is from the French consul to Algiers, it is clear in the
historical record that the difficulty in accessing European markets was endemic for all
North African traders—Algerian, Tunisian and Tripolitan, alike.449 The Tunisian bey
would recall these commercial rebuffs after the 1815 revival of the corso. Historians
have attributed a return to the campaigns because of the systematic closing off of the
various ports and efforts at expanding North African maritime commerce. The corsair
campaigns off North African shores were far more aggressive after the 1815 upsurge

447

Panzac, Barbary Corsairs, passim.
Panzac, The Barbary Corsairs, 1800-1820, 262.
449
Ibid also see Panzac, The Barbary Corsairs, 259-60.
198
448

Msdfasd

than they had been in previous centuries.
After the mid-decade return to corsair campaigns, various historians, such as
Panzac have gone so far as to argue that the provinces no longer respected the peace
accords that they had struck with various European countries.450 The accepted
argument has become one where, rather than abide by the centuries-old practice that
protected the commercial fleets of their tribute-paying allies, North African
campaigns began to target any and all mercantile ships that they could capture, friend
or foe alike. “North African corsairs’ greed and their contempt for earlier treaties had
no bounds…”451 To support this argument, he quoted two sources, and several uncited
statistics about the multifold increase in capture of vessels and slaves off the coast of
the Italian cities. First, Panzac used the translated firman discussed below in this
section, and this quote from the French consul to Tripoli concerning a ruse that Murad
Ra’is, the Scottish-born Admiral, had concocted to capture Latin American vessels
headed for Iberia:
The plan was obviously to deceive some valuably-loaded Portuguese or
Spanish ship from Mexico or Brazil, or flying the flag of some other nation
that was neither at peace nor at war with the regency, and surprise it outside
the Straits [of Gibraltar], because they boarded twenty new uniforms in
European style, each made up of a blue jacket with little silver buttons, a white
linen waistcoat and trousers and a raphia hat. The captain decked himself out
in a blue morning coat trimmed with gold braid, double on the collar and
sleeves. 452
The above source demonstrated that Murad’s scheme was remarkably clever
and, arguably, rather amusing. However, the French consul nevertheless specifically
mentioned that the Tripolitans, despite their disguises, were attacking ships that they
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were “neither at peace nor at war with[.]”453 In effect, the statement did supported
Panzac’s claim of utter avarice or a general contempt at the hands of the North
African fleets towards any and all vessels they encountered. Rather, if anything, it
demonstrates that the fleets were quite deliberate and strategic in their attacks.
It is in the second source that Panzac uses that his argument became much
stronger. Citing a translated firman in Devoulx’s Le Rais Hamidou, Panzac argued
that the corsairs’ greed was most apparent in their attacks on Ottoman as well as
European vessels. The firman, and in particular Mahmud II’s exasperated tone with
the Algerian dey from Ramadan, 1230 [early August, 1815] were quite clear in
Devoulx’s translation:
The corsairs of the regency of Algiers [among others] are capturing
commercial ships belonging either to the subjects of the Sublime Porte, or to
nations that are at peace with it; they reduce to slavery their captains and
sailors and seize their cargoes. The Sublime Porte is responsible for these
ships; they are in possession of safe-conduct passes, and the Sublime Porte is
at peace with them. The European governments never cease to lodge
complaints against you and to make it known that you are capturing their
ships. I am giving you this warning in order to cause you to cease these
aggressive acts and abandon this sanctionable course of action. Recall how I
defended you in allowing you to recruit soldiers in Smyrna, and in listening to
the speeches of your agents throughout the Empire. I sent you firmans on this
subject; furthermore, I recently sent you a kapidji bashi named Mohammed
with the mission of representing me. This kapidji bashi is in Algiers bearing
written orders and is responsible for supervising their execution. You, first of
all, prince of princes, and all of you, captains and heads of the regency, submit
yourselves to God and to His Prophet, and obey the orders of the Prince of
Believers, the Vicar of God on earth. May my firman be carried out, may my
orders no longer be ignored. This is my will…454
Reading both the translation and Devoulx’s opinionated commentary on the
events in Algiers, one could understand how Panzac, when reading this firman alone,
got the impression of a relentless voraciousness on the part of the North African
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corsairs towards any and all vessels, Ottoman or not, that came across their path. It
was likely Devoulx’s materials that led Panzac to see the modus operandi of the
corsair campaigns after 1814 as ceaseless and indiscriminate.
Before analyzing Devoulx’s material, however, it is important to step back and
access the surviving Ottoman records to establish a context for the events that
Devoulx wrote about in his original manuscript, and specifically for the details
surrounding the above-stated firman. Looking to the Sublime Porte to establish a basis
for Constantinople’s perspective, I mined through the entire collection surviving
Ottoman documents that concerning the corsair provinces. Through these sources, we
can see that by 1815, Panzac’s argument was partially correct—North African
corsairs had in fact fully revived the campaigns and had reengaged in the corso. The
body of Ottoman archival materials however does not support the second part of
Panzac’s argument or demonstrate avid rapaciousness and the scope of the corsair
attacks.455 In fact, only one surviving Ottoman document referenced a corsair attack
on a vessel that was under the protection of an Ottoman subject.
The incident took place on May 22, 1815. In an internal Ottoman procedural
memorandum from the Cevdet Dahiliyye, we learn that news reached Constantinople
about a coordinated attack on the part of Algerian, Tunisian and Tripolitan corsairs
against one of the Porte’s own vessels—a cargo ship under the protection of Tanas
Ra’is of Missolonghi, carrying grain and supplies to artillery battalions to Preveza,
near Ioannina, was attacked.456 In response, the Porte notified the North African
455
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provinces that they were not to commandeer any ships or supplies under the
protection of the sultan.457
This attack is historically fascinating. Not only did it break with long-held
alliances and ties of loyalty, not to mention the frequent overlapping-consensus
between the Porte and the provinces; it also demonstrated an outright display of
antagonism on the part of the provinces towards fellow subjects of the Porte. For as
intriguing as this one particular incident was, there is no other mention of it, or of any
other corsair attacks on other Ottoman vessels in any of the surviving documents in
Constantinople.
If we return to Devoulx’s manuscript for further insights into the firman, we
acquire another piece of information regarding the document that constituted the basis
of Panzac’s argument. Immediately before introducing the firman, Devoulx wrote:
At that time, Greece was merely a [Ottoman] province. It may therefore seem
strange that the Algerians, who themselves were vassals of the Porte, would
have dared to make a run at the expense of the [other] subjects of their
sovereign. The fact is certain, however. And it turned out that the Algerians
were by no means hindered from laying their hands on vessels that belonged
to either subjects or tributaries of [the Porte] in regards to the nations that were
at peace with the Grand Sultan, it would be useless to note that treaties do not
always protect from the affronts of Algerians. I have at my disposal dispatches
in which the Sublime Porte addressed in this regard, [with] severe admonitions
to the Dey of Algiers and captains of his navy, threatening to treat them as
enemies if they persisted in this direction.
These acts of blatant insubordination multiplied under the administration of
Hajj Ali Pasha and took the character of a real aggression. The Ottoman Porte,
justly indignant at such methods, confiscated a fondouk that the Regency of
Algiers had built to serve Smyrna deposit barracks recruits, withdrew all its
officers from this Regency, ordered a fleet of fall upon the Algerian vessels
and prepared an expedition against Algiers.
But before the complete execution of these orders, on 11 [Rabi’a el-Thani]
1230, [March 23, 1815] El Hadj Ali Pasha was murdered in the bathroom of
his apartment, replaced by El Hadj Mohammed, the treasurer, who was
himself murdered seventeen days later, and Omar Pasha was succeeded. On
coming to power, he hastened to send an envoy to Constantinople to
ameliorate the sovereign wrath. And Sublime Porte, perhaps happy to
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welcome his claims of fidelity and devotion, forgive the past with the hope
that the future would be irreproachable. 458
Reading Devoulx, we are left with several impressions. First, the North
African corsair attack on the Ottoman vessel took place off the coast of modern-day
Greece. Secondly, the sultan had grown increasing frustrated in his efforts to curtail
corsair attacks in general. Most importantly, we are informed that the Porte began
outfitting an expedition for the province of Algiers. However, none of these claims
are directly substantiated from by text of the firman that Devoulx translated as proof
of his argument. Further undermining Devoulx’s claims, Ottoman records do not
indicate that the Porte was preparing an attack on Algiers in either 1815 or 1816.
Moreover, there was an extremely important red flag in Devoulx’s chronology. The
author clearly demonstrated that the tension between the province and the Porte had
abated after the assassination of Haji Ali Pasha in late March of 1815.
The firman that Devoulx considered to be “severe admonitions to the Dey and
his navy”459 arrived in Algiers in Ramadan, 1230 [early August, 1815], over four
months after the death of the dey, Ali Pasha—the same watershed moment in which
458
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he argued Algiers’ previous disloyalties had been forgiven, and positive relations
between the province and the Porte had once again been restored. Given this rather
striking inconsistency in Devoulx’s timeline, even if his translation of the order was
correct, the author’s analysis of the events surrounding the firman, as well as his
general assessment of the relationship between the North African provinces and the
Porte were ultimately, flawed.
Rather, we have an instance where the general information presented to the
chronicler was largely accurate, but nevertheless a historical figure, in this instance
Devoulx himself, skewed the details of a narrative in order to shape the argument that
he wanted remembered. In Devoulx’s case, the narrative he presented was effectively
an argument for insatiable Algerian maritime avarice. His intentions in depicting the
province as such remain unclear. However, one could speculate that the authors
unfamiliarity with the region and its maritime practices, a distaste he may have had
for Algiers or the corso itself underlined his description. Finally, he could simply
attempt to put a popular spin on his narrative, boosting the sales of his book.
Nevertheless, it is clear that his jumbled timeline had particularly lasting effects on
our contemporary understanding of nineteenth century North Africa.
Moreover, one cannot use Devoulx as a basis to access North African
maritime behavior in general. First, it is important to remember that Devoulx himself
was only familiar with one province, and was in fact, writing the historical narrative
of one corsair in particular, Raïs Hamidou. However, over the years, historians of the
region have used Devoulx’s materials to flesh out broader patters about nineteenthcentury North African practices in general. For example, Panzac used Devoulx as a
source to access the behaviors of all three of the North African regencies. In fact, he
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went so far as to state, “corsair activities were [in 1815] very close to becoming pure
and simple piracy...”460 This statement is particularly enlightening because not only
did it demonstrate that Devoulx’s sources have since been used by scholars to
mistakenly perpetuate an idea of a North African general malice towards Europe and
indeed the Porte, but it also shows that Panzac himself was drawing implicit
conclusions about the regional cooperation, or at times collusion, that the provinces
had with one another. After all, Devoulx’s Raïs Hamidou had no direct relation to
either the broader history of Tunis or Tripoli.
Therefore, it is critical that we return to the records of the Porte, to see what
Constantinople had to say about the behaviors of its westernmost provinces,
particularly in regards to their attacks on the Sultan’s ships. By returning to the
sources – specifically to the internal report of the Porte and the presumably accurate
translation of the order by Devloux (since no corresponding copy of the decree has
been preserved in Constantinople) – and reading them against the broader collection
of surviving document of the Porte, we arrive at a narrative of 1815 North African
maritime practice very different from the one of Devloux or Panzac.
By taking a critical eye to Devloux’s chronicle in general, a much more
corresponding record of interaction, and indeed of specific engagements between the
1815 corso with both Europe and the Ottoman center emerges. First, Ottoman
documents point to one clear attack on the empire’s vessel by North African cruisers-off the coast of Prezeva. However, Devoulx himself commented within his chronicle
on a particular attack off the coast of Greece. In fact, this was his only specific
reference to a corsair campaign against Ottoman vessels. When looking at these two
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points—the Ottoman record of a sole attack, and Devloux’s off-handed comment
about an attack’s location, and reading them alongside the chronology of the events,
which placed the incident in May and the firman’s arrival to Algiers in early August,
it is quite likely that Devloux was referring to the same attack off Prezeva that Porte
officials wrote about: the one that involved a vessel under the command of Tanas
Ra’is.
Further, in examining the exasperated firman outlined above, it remains clear
that the message from Mahmud II to the dey was referring to corsair attacks on ships
the Porte was responsible for keeping safe— meaning western ships with whom the
Porte had amicable trade and political relations. In fact, the reference that the sultan
made to attacks on proper Ottoman ships was only in passing. When the document is
read in this context, as well as in part of the larger body of Ottoman documents on the
1815 corso, the historical evidence for a North African ‘take no prisoners’ approach
to the campaigns that Panzac argued for simply does not hold up.
Moreover, working exclusively from all the available Ottoman documents for
the period of 1814-1817 concerning behaviors of the North African navies, one can
see two major trends in the patters of the corsair campaigns. First, we can easily
substantiate Panzac’s argument that there was a noted return to the corso in the
middle of the decade, as Ottoman records indicate that the number of attacks in
general had very much risen. However, reasons behind this shift, and indeed the scope
of the attacks conducted, were very different from the one presented in the literature.
In fact, rather than attack random targets their ships happened across, North African
corsairs targeted the ships of one country in particular—Austria.
Moreover, all three provinces’ fleets had the same specific target in mind. This
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is a particularly important, and an entirely logical, reaction to the political context of
the time. After all, by the summer of 1815, the attentions of the European powers and
their officials, many of whom were in Austria because of the ongoing Congress of
Vienna, had turned towards North African shores. By the summer of 1815, it was
clear from European sources that western powers were looking to end the practice of
North African privateering, a proposition that would have disastrous effect on the
provinces’ economies.
Targeting Corsairs: Fallout from the Congress of Vienna
Reviewing Ottoman documents from May 1815 through May 1817 offered a
very different scenario. In the Ottoman Archives, there are twelve internal reports
from either the records of the War Office and copies of memorandums sent to Sultan
Mahmud II that involved attacks by North African cruisers during this period. Of
these twelve, ten targeted Austrian vessels, captains or commercial interests. In fact,
the only two incidences did not involve Austrian merchants or officials were the
previously mentioned internal report concerning the attack off the coast of Preveza.461
The other report, fromb Ottoman War Office regarding the seizure of a Russian ship
under the command of the Captain Panayot and its cargo by Tripolitan corsairs in July
1816.462 The report informed Porte officials that the Russian embassy had filed a
corresponding complaint.463 The remaining ten documents all involved Austrian
property or persons. While this nevertheless can still be considered an aggressive
return to the maritime practice, the timing and scope of the attacks is far too
politically aligned for it to have been spurred on by anything other the changing
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political currents in Europe and the Porte.
To offer some context regarding the Congress of Vienna, and why the North
African corsairs were so targeted in their mid-century attack: in September of 1814,
various European officials had met in Austrian capital to negotiate a viable peace plan
for the continent after drawn out Napoleonic wars. European attention towards the
Maghreb began in the summer of 1814, when the English Admiral Sidney Smith
wrote a “Memorandum on the Necessity and Means of Ending the Piracy of the
Barbary States”464 and circulated it among diplomats. Early on, the document—and
specifically author’s disgust towards the continued practice of white, Christian,
slavery, in light of the growing trans-Atlantic abolitionism movement was
nevertheless met with resistance.465 Over the course of the next year however, and
after the easy American defeat of Algerian forces in June of 1815, which despite a
couple of short-lived days of hostility was termed the Second Barbary War, European
governments began to pay heed to the negotiated peace—and the particularly
favorable terms for American shipping interests in the Mediterranean.466
By October, Sardinia brought forward a petition calling for European
intervention into the ongoing corso campaigns. In response, the various powers
present in the Congress of Vienna unanimously condemned the practice, and in turn
tasked England, the strongest naval presence in the Mediterranean, with putting an
end to the centuries-old practice.467 Given the maritime information networks of the
time, and the centrality of the corsairs in relaying this information from one
Mediterranean port to another, it was thus not particularly surprising that Austrian
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vessels were the most sought after targets of the North African cruisers.
Returning to the Porte’s documented attacks on Austrians offered a great deal
of insight into the historical context because the documents also demonstrate the
voracity with which both Austrian, and North African, mariners targeted one another.
The first reported incident of a North African corsair attack after the one off
Prezeva came from November 1815, a few short weeks after the Congress’s
condemnation of the corso, when Algerian, Tunisian and Tripolitan fleets were out
hunting for Austrian commercial ships.468 Similar reports of attacks on Austrian
targets were filed in December 1815, as well as February, and every month from June
to November 1816,469 with attacks oftentimes repeatedly occurring in the same
month.470 The tenacity with which North African corsairs targeted Austrians is
particularly exceptional in its doggedness, and did not correspond at all with the
image of a general greed and avarice that was presented by both Devoulx and Panzac.
For example, by the summer of 1816, the assaults had taken on a personal
element in their scope. A September report regarding the attack and brutal murder of
Ali Ra’is, one of the Tripolitian governor’s captains, alongside that of his artilleryman
at the hands of some Austrian merchants outside a coffeehouse in Trieste was
particularly violent and highlighted the tensions between the regencies and Austrian
mariners.471 Rather than argue of a haphazard, indiscriminate methods in the cruiser
campaigns, the records indicate that there was a real and demonstrated antagonism
between the two parties, which presumably was largely spurred on by the political
changes of the time.
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Tensions came to a head between the North African provinces and the various
European powers after the bombardment of Algiers. Under the command of the
British Lord Exmouth, Britain ultimately violated the peace agreement between it and
the province. In August of that year, under the guise of diplomatic exchange, the
Anglo-Dutch fleet sailed past the provinces’ fortifications and immediately
bombarded the city.472 While the attack was extensive, most of the city was
nevertheless spared because of the strength of its inner fortifications. However, the
Algerian maritime fleet was almost entirely destroyed.473
In an effort to offset Algiers’s maritime losses, both the Sultan of Morocco
and Mehmed Ali of Egypt sent vessels to the dey to replace the ones destroyed by the
Anglo-Dutch attack. In what Panzac referred to as an act of “Muslim solidarity,”474
the North African provinces were the ones that offered support to Algiers in this
moment of crisis. This was an evident display of solidarity on the part of Egypt and
Morocco, and the ties that bound the provinces together were far more regional in
nature rather than religious or political. After all, records do not indicate that the
Porte, or Mahmud II offered to provide assistance to the dey or any other
predominantly Muslim province across the Ottoman domain. So, while this research
agrees with Panzac’s assessment of the Moroccan and Egyptian support as being a
sign of solidarity, it was more regional rather than religiously based.
Immediately after the attack on Algiers, Exmouth wrote to both beys of Tunis
and Tripoli demanding that they abandon the centuries-long practice of the corso.
Panzac argued that “the Anglo-Dutch fleet’s actions had brought a definitive end to
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the activities of the Barbary corsairs.”475 Through Ottoman records, we can
corroborate that North African corsairs had greatly scaled back their campaigns after
the 1816 attack under Lord Exmouth. However, while North African privateering was
being condemned by European officials, these same individuals had turned an eye
towards colonizing North African space. In a letter to the Porte from May 1817,
Iskerlet, the Voivode of Boğdan (Moldavia) informed the Porte that the Knights of
Malta, who remained displaced after the French occupation of 1798 wanted to seize
Tripoli from the Ottoman Empire and had already secured the support of the French
Republic.476 While these plans never reached fruition, they nevertheless foreshadow
the upcoming French invasion of Algiers within just over a decade— an event that
would radically transform the political configuration of Ottoman North Africa.
Shortly after the attack on Algiers, during the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle in
the autumn of 1818, the European Alliance of Power which consisted of Great
Britain, Russia, Austria and Prussia, met to discuss the withdrawal of military forces
from France, and negotiate the implementation of reforms post-Congress of Vienna.
The Concert of Powers, effectively all five of European powers, agreed on the 39th
protocol “to make a formal effort by means of negotiations to induce the states of
Barbary finally to abandon their practical depredations…”477 TheCongress was seen
as a threat by the Barbary powers—a threat that was crystalized when the states
subsequently sent warning to the provinces of a joint attack was met with indignant
frustration on the part of the regencies, particularly in light of their previously
thwarted efforts at commercial maritime trade. The bey of Tunis, Mahmoud Pasha, in
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a letter to the French Admiral who arrived at the province with the news was:
Let him be called robber and pirate who captures ships and takes belongings
without reason, without justice, and outside all laws, disregarding customs and
treaties. As for us—thanks be to God!—we have never had evidence, or heard
it said, that in our ports we have failed to respect customs or treaties; to
deserve such intimidation from you [. . .] it is not appropriate, since in the past
the goods of our own merchants have been taken, and treaties of friendship
have been broken by people of whom we would never have believed it
possible. [. . .] How can we agree to your demand that we never again arm our
ships? And if it happened that war broke out between one of the Powers and
the Ottoman Porte, what would we answer, when asked to arm our ships to go
to its aid, following the custom that we have always practised? [sic] 478
This quote offers us several key insights into how the North African governors
themselves were attempting to negotiate the changes they were facing. First,
Hammuda Pasha pointed to the previous difficulties encountered in their efforts at
commercial trade as a reason for a return to the corso. The frustration that we
previously experienced with the blocked commercial attempts of the Maghreb left a
lasting impression on the governors. Moreover, it would not be long before the
Tunisian governor’s words and the question of Ottoman military support would
become one of the chief concerns of the North African corsairs. After the 1820s
outbreak of the Greek uprising, Mehmed Ali’s efforts the rebels would soon be
greatly dependent on the North African maritime expertise of the corso.
We learn of Constantinople’s perspective in a hatt-ı hümayun dated from
August 16, 1819.479 The various European powers had applied as much pressure on
the Porte as possible to eliminate the corso threat posed on European shipping. We
also see that the Porte was aware European powers reached a decision regarding the
corso, largely spurred on by Britain’s insistence in the elimination of the privateering.
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And that France, Russia and Austria have remained largely silent and indifferent.480
His Majesty’s government made the most noise to put an end to the corso. The
memorandum to the sultan also informed us that letters were sent by the Kapudan
Pasa to the ocaks, warning them about the radical change in conditions, as well as
admonishing them not to harm any British ships. The admiral was also careful to
inform the provinces that they should expect such behavior and policy requests from
the ambassadors of Europe.481
Trending Inland: Expansionist Efforts of Tripoli and Egypt
Before delving into the Tripolitan Pasha’s efforts to expand his territorial
reach, it is important to step back for a moment and access the conditions in Tunis
from 1815-1824. After the 1816 consolidation of power under Mahmoud Pasha,
Hammuda Pasha’s effective, if not immediate successor, grew ill. The death of
Hammuda Pasha, the succession troubles, the poor health of Mahmoud Pasha, and the
effective end of the corso in 1816-7 were further compounded by the 1818-1820
outbreak of a plague.482 As the situation in Tunis became increasingly tenuous, the
regency faced an era of decreased agricultural production and famine, as plague
spread throughout the regency. Mahmoud attempted to increase levies on the transSaharan caravans to recoup some of his losses, but conditions pushed Tunis to the
brink throughout the decade.483
Turning Inland
Maritime changes in the mid-1810s had a massive impact on North African
socio-economic conditions in the provinces. However, the provinces were by no
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means exclusively focused on the sea or on maintaining their regional position
exclusively through the sea. While a great deal of work has been done on the political
‘entrenchment’ and ‘expansionist’ efforts of Mehmed Ali during his early years in
Egypt,484 he was by no means the only North African governor interested in
expanding his territorial dominion into the Sahel.
Yusuf Karamanlı, the governor of Tripoli, much like his Tunisian counterpart
Hammuda Pasha, was attempting to extend his control into the southern spaces of the
province and to expand his revenues from the trans-Saharan caravans. However,
efforts to expand his reach were pursued along lines very similar to those of his
Egyptian counterpart and were directed in subduing Bedouin populations of
Tripolitania. By 1810, Yusuf’s support, the territory of southern Fezzan was firmly
under al-Mukkni’s control and the administration by the middle of the 1810s. After a
successful expansion into the south, Yusuf turned his attentions east, and attempted to
strengthen his control over Cyrenaica and the Bedouin peoples that lived along the
Egyptian frontier.
The eastern portion of the province was historically accustomed to operating
with a certain degree of autonomy from the Tripolitan capital. Indeed, as al-Ahmida
discussed, pastoral Bedouins, such as the Sa’adi, maintained strong social systems in
the eastern spaces of Tripolitania and worked in conjunction with other clans, such as
the Awlad Ali and the Jwazi, to establish an intricate and sophisticated pastoral
economy in the region.485 Effectively, the Cyrenaican economy worked so that during
the rainy years excess livestock, grains and provisions were produced and sold off to
either Egyptian or Maltese markets. The net profits were then used to offset the years
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of unforeseen droughts and to ameliorate the accompanying food shortages of the arid
seasons. This is particularly important and points to a sense of regional histories as the
Bedouins traditionally regarded Egyptian towns, such as Sallum, Sidi Barrani, Marsa
Matruh and even extending to the coastal city of Alexandria, as their “natural” market
in the nineteenth century.486 In fact, Egypt and Malta were Tripoli’s two most
significant trading partners of the time.487 Moreover, as Aharoni studied, the
nineteenth-century composition of the Bedouin population in Egypt maintained
historically very close ties with the broader Maghreb, as a great deal of the people
were themselves of Maghrebi descent. In the published translation of his doctoral
dissertation, he wrote, “[t]he biggest waves of migration [to Egypt] came from the
Maghrib (North Africa), and they reached their peak towards the middle of the
eighteenth century. This migration set its hallmark on the Bedouin populations of
Lower and Middle Egypt. It was the second wave of Bedouins of Maghrebi origin
which entered Egypt in the seventeenth century and returned to Cyrenaica.” 488
This was particularly true in the case of the Hanadi and the Awlad Ali, which
would often form confederations with smaller Bedouin communities in western
Egypt.489 Ahmida discussed Yusuf’s efforts to enlist the support of the various
Bedouin chiefs into his network of agents, and tasking them with the responsibility of
collecting taxes from his people, at a reduced rate reserved for themselves, or his
frequent use of “the army and local tribes”490 to put down rebellion. While the system
worked effectively at curtailing widespread Bedouin uprising from gaining traction,
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Tripoli was unable to eliminate the Bedouin confederations, or undermine the
relatively high degree of localized power, such as we saw with the sultans of Fezzan.
This arrangement thus allowed the provinces of Fezzan and Cyrenaica to maintain a
de facto autonomy from the Tripolitan governor.
The system was such that the eastern province that Benghazi and Derna
routinely had their own administrators, as well European consular representatives who
were largely autonomous from the governor in Tripoli in the day-to-day affairs of the
region. In fact, as we saw in the previous chapters, the region of Cyrenaica served the
Tripoli administrators as a region for quasi-exile, one where potential troublemakers,
such as Ahmad Karamanlı, Yusuf’s older brother, and Saverio Naudi, the French
emissary of Maltese extraction, were sent if they posed a threat for the powers that be
in Tripoli.
Given the strength of the Bedouin confederations the day-to-day
administration of Cyrenaica worked very much along the same lines of the Awlad
Mohammad sultans of Fezzan. Within this system, the sub-provinces were accorded a
relatively high degree of internal autonomy within the broader Tripolitan domain as
long as their regional administrators maintained a system of alliances to the governor
in Tripoli. Under the governance of Yusuf Karamanlı, however, the power of Bedouin
leaders was increasing seen as a threat by the pasha. In turn, Tripolitan governor spent
a great deal of effort to reestablish his authority over the eastern provinces in the
period from 1805-10.
By 1811, the growing power of the Awlad Ali from the Jebel Akhdar area
outside of Derna and their refusal to pay the impost levied on them, became
increasing troublesome for the governor. Rather than attempt to negotiate with the
216

Msdfasd

elders, the governor sent his eldest son, Mohammed Bey, to curtail the rebellion and
reestablish Tripolitan control over the eastern realm. Mohammed Bey successfully
suppressed the uprising. However, he circumstances surrounding his return were rife
with concerns regarding his increasingly aggressive behavior. From travelers’ reports,
we can the diplomatic gossip circulating in the Tripolitan center about Mohammad
Bey.
Reports claimed that in the process of curtailing the power of the Awlad Ali,
the governor’s son became increasingly jealous of his father’s political authority. He
wanted to overthrow Yusuf and claim the province for himself. From these surviving
sources, we can trace tales of the heavy hand that Muhammad Bey purportedly used
with the Bedouins of the east, the brutality that he inflicted on his own slaves and,
finally, his desire to eliminate his father. A Sardinian physician, Paolo Della Cella,
traveled to the province in 1817 as a guest of consul. In a letter to his medical
colleague in Genoa, the doctor wrote of the rumors circulating around Mohammad
Bey, and his growing desire for power:
…Mahmet Karamanli, eldest son of the present Pacha of Tripoli; …of
disposition the most brutal…there is no cruelty with which he is not stained,
no violence which he has not committed; one of his choicest pleasures was to
watch the convulsive motions, comparative sufferings, and dying agonies of
some of his slaves, to whom he occasionally caused graduated doses of arsenic
to be administered…having been employed by his father at the head of a small
army, to reduce to obedience a tribe of Bedouins who had infested the shores
of the gulph, [sic] ravaged the adjoining districts, and (proh nefas!) refused to
pay the customary tribute, he so fully executed the commission that not a
single one of the whole tribe remained alive.
Upon his return to Tripoli, elated with the success of his sanguinary
expedition, and accustomed to the most implicit and blind obedience to his
orders; he no longer treated his father with respect, but in one of his many
sallies of passion struck at him with a poniard, which was fortunately warded
off by a female slave. 491
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While Della Cella’s description of Mohammad Bey was unwavering in its
depiction of Mohammad’s ruthlessness, it nevertheless remains unclear how accurate
his claims of the bey were. After all, Della Cella visited Tripoli in 1817, well after
Mohammad Bey attempted patricide in 1813 and his subsequent forced departure
from the city. Moreover, the Awlad Ali, continued to be viable political opponents—
for both the governor of Tripoli as well as his Egyptian counterpart Mehmed Ali
Pasha long after their supposed elimination at the hands of Mohammad Bey in 1810.
Reports of the latter’s aggression towards his father and the attempt on
Yusuf’s life were recounted in multiple sources. Because of the attempt on his life,
Yusuf decided to give Mohammad the governorship of Derna and Benghazi, as he had
previously done with his brother Ahmed. Further exasperating this instance of
historical déjà vu, by attempting to assassinate and overthrow his father, Mohammed
Bey put himself and the governor in the exact same position that Yusuf had put his
own father in nearly twenty years before. After all, as a young man Yusuf too had
rebelled against the elderly Ali Karamanlı, laid siege to the city of Tripoli, and
assassinated his older brother, Hassan.
Perhaps it was partially because of the similarity of experiences that Yusuf
decided to simply expel Mohammad Bey from the city walls out to the east, rather
than adopt a more radical position and exile him entirely or even assassinate him,
eliminating the possibility of any threat posed by his son. Regardless of Yusuf’s
motivations, the pasha removed all imminent dangers on his life while maintaining a
close eye on his eldest son.
From Della Cella, we learn that upon his arrival to Derna, Mohammad Bey
allied himself with the Jwazi of the region in his efforts to proactively mount a
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rebellion against his father. Over the next few years, Mohammad’s efforts proved
effective. By 1817 his position in Benghazi and Derna began to pose a serious threat
to his father’s rule in the Tripolitan center. Folayan went so far as to claim that
Mohammad’s efforts in the east were successful to the point that the bey had nearly
carve out “a state within a state”492 in the eastern sphere of the province. Yusuf was
about to respond.
During the governor’s efforts to amass and send force east, Della Cella arrived
in Tripoli. It was at this point that the account of the traveler adopted first-person
voice: during the summer of 1817. This is an important because up until his arrival in
the summer, the information we are offered about Mohammed’s exile from Tripoli
was historical hearsay, and was therefore difficult to corroborate. Nevertheless, after
his arrival in the province, Della Cella became a more reliable source, particularly as
the physician accompanied Ahmed during the march east. The doctor wrote of his
entanglement in the affair:
…Instead of punishing [Mohammad after his attempt on Yusuf Pasha’s
life]…his father sent him out as governor of the provinces of Bengasi and
Derna, upon the eastern frontier of his territories, inhabited by a powerful tribe
of Bedouins called Zoasi, long affected towards the Pacha and frequently
breaking out into open rebellion. But no sooner was the new governor arrived
at Bengasi, then the Pacha found that in his son he had given a chieftain to the
malcontents; and the rebellion spreading rapidly throughout those provinces,
the Pacha judged it expedient to dispatch a considerable body of troops under
the command of his second son, Bey Ahmet, in order to check the progress of
the insurrection and punish the treacherous conduct of the rebellious son.
Bey Ahmet having a degree of caution…desired that a physician might attend
him upon the expedition, the Pacha, to whom my profession was known,
earnestly requested the Sardinian Consul to offer me the appointment... and
found me eager to accede to the proposal. 493
The Sardinian did in fact accompany Ahmed Bey out east. However, it is
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unclear how much the physician knew about Yusuf Pasha’s upcoming move against
his son. After all, the language that Della Cella used, “[to] check the progress of the
insurrection and punish the treacherous conduct of the rebellious son”494 hardly befit
the massacre that was to follow.
Nevertheless, as news spread along the coastline of the “considerable body of
troops”495 under Ahmed Bey’s command, their intended destination and targets, the
Bedouin leaders quickly backed away from Mohammad Bey’s rebellious position.
Concerned for their safety, Mohammed’s allies ultimately abandoned him and his
cause. So extensive was the change among the Bedouin elders that by the time of
Ahmed’s arrival in Derna, the overwhelming majority of his brother’s allies had fled
the area altogether.496 Mohammed Bey was left with no choice but to flee Derna and
seek refuge in Bomba, a small town to the southeast close to the frontier with
Egypt.497
When Ahmed finally arrived, the remaining inhabitants quickly surrendered
themselves, threw themselves at his mercy, renounced their rebellion, and pledged
their loyalty to Yusuf Pasha. At first Ahmed appeared to have conceded to the
Bedouins’ claims, and pacified the city without so much as having to fire a shot.
Rereading Al-Jabarti
From al-Jabarti we learn of Mohammed and his sons’ arrival in Cairo and their
subsequent visit to the vali Mehmed Ali
During [mid-April 1817] [the grandson of] Yusuf Pasha, governor of Tripoli
and his younger brother arrived, requesting that their father, [Mohammed]
who was fleeing from his own father [Yusuf], be permitted to come to Cairo.
Having been put in charge of the district of Darnah and Benghazi,
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[Mohammed] had alienated [Yusuf], causing him to plan an attack.
Thereupon, [the grandson of] Yusuf Pasha and his brother were sent to the
ruler of Egypt with gifts requesting that their father [Mohammed] be allowed
to take refuge with [the Egyptian ruler] in Cairo. Permission was granted. He
is the son of my brother. After living in Cairo he had gone to the Hijaz with
the pasha and then returned to Egypt, where he lived in al-Sab’Qa’at[…]
The same day the son of the pasha of Tripoi arrived in Cairo, accompanied by
about 200 of his men. The pasha quartered him in the house of Umm Marzuq
Bey in ‘Abidin and provided stipends and rations for him and his men. 498
Mehmed Ali Pasha was easily inclined to provide Mohammed and his family
with political refuge in Cairo.499 For all his efforts at securing his position in Egypt
and expanding his empire, the Hijaz was not the only military campaign that the
Egyptian vali was conducting in 1817. The Awlad Ali cavalry, which Mohammed
Bey had been dispatched from Tripoli to fight in 1810, was rebelling against Egyptian
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forces along the border in 1817. One can easily see the hand of Yusuf Pasha, and by
extension Ahmad Bey and his actions against the Bedouins of the east, as the source
of the trouble. Not only does this reinforce Ahmida’s claims of an Awlad Ali alliance
with Mohammed Bey but it also strengthens the assertion that Della Cella’s claims
that Mohammed Bey behaviors were likely exaggerated. It is from the Cairene scholar
that we learn the fate of the Awald Ali. Al-Jabarti wrote of their engagement with
Hasan Bey al-Samashirji:
Hasan Bey al-Samashirji returned from Darnah and another village called
Sabwa accompanied by some of the Awlad Ali. This tribe had split into two
groups, one of which, remained obedient, the other rebelled and withdrew into
the district. Sent by the pasha against the rebels, Hasan defeated them in the
first engagement, but they defeated him in the second. He then returned to
Cairo where the pasha augmented his troops. Reinforced by the loyal group of
the tribe, these troops launched a surprise attack, killing their brothers and
raising their camels and sheep which they sent to Fayyum. The Bedouin
thought this plunder would satisfy their adversaries. On the other hands, the
loyal tribal chiefs of the Awlad Ali who return to Cairo with Hasan Bey
thought that pasha would realize that the victory was due to them and would
therefore relinquish his claim to the booty. This booty, supplemented by other
livestock, he was expected to give to them. They encamped in Giza and Hasan
Bey went to the pasha, who summoned the tribal notables in order to confer
robes of honor on them. When they arrived, he had them imprisoned! A few
days later, all the booty was brought from the Fayyum, and the tribesmen were
released. It is said that the sheep numbered 16,000 or more, and the camels
8,000 or more, including females. 500
As per Egyptian sources, it is clear that Mohammed Bey’s forces had not
eliminated the Awlad Ali in 1810, despite the information given to Della Cella in
Tripoli to the contrary. Rather, there remained a powerful kinship network whose
territory straddled the Tripolitan-Egyptian frontier that challenged both Tripolitan and
Egyptian governors’ efforts at centralization. As in their territory straddled the border,
their frequent crossing between the provinces made it difficult for either governor to
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suppress them.501
In his discussion of nineteenth-century pastoralism and trade, Ahmida wrote,
“When Muhammad rebelled against his father in 1817, the Awlad Ali and the Jwazi
supported him. The Awlad Ali and the Jwazi took advantage of their alliance and
usurped the land of their cousins, the 'Abaydat, killing their chiefs.”502 While this
could very well be the case, it would be highly improbable for the Awlad Ali to
formed an alliance with Mohammed Bey, or the Jwazi, if the former had ruthlessly
massacred them in 1810. Rather, we have another instance of the radical disjuncture
in how chronicles are more susceptible to the desired histories that their
contemporaries wanted to be remembered rather than the actual histories they were
reporting. It is without doubt that Della Cella was given inaccurate information.
Moreover, the vilification of Muhammad Bey’s character by either Yusuf Pasha
or his brother Ahmed Bey in Tripoli was entirely strategic in its purpose. After all, it
would be more difficult to find historical compassion for Ahmad, his Jwazi allies, and
their subsequent annihilation at the hands of the Ahmed and Yusuf Pasha if they had
been tarred with the brush of political brutality themselves.
The Elimination of Political Rivals
Having removed his older brother from the broader Tripolitan province entirely,
Ahmed Bey proceeded to Bomba and then to Benghazi. On September 5, 1817
Ahmed invited the leaders of the Jwazi to the town on the pretext of discussing peace.
Despite his promises of a general amnesty, however, Ahmed Bey had his men
massacre everyone in the city. Here, Della Cella became a reliable source, as he
witnessed the following events firsthand. Della Cella description:
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[The Pasha’s] instructions to his son were to dissimulate, and seem to forget
the past, but to take ample vengeance at a favourable moment. The Bey and
his courtiers entered so fully into their sovereign's intentions, that the Zoasi
were treated as the most favourite subjects…Under these exterior tokens of
kindness, lurked and ripened the design of assassinating first the chiefs, and
then the whole of the tribe… meanwhile, it was industriously rumoured, that
the Bey had sought and obtained his father's permission solemnly to bestow
the red mantle upon the chiefs of the Zoasi tribe, as a reward for the signal
attachment they had shewn him…[some Jwazi] ventured to express to the
whole tribe their suspicions of treachery; but the dice were now
thrown…Accordingly, the whole tribe of Zoasi appeared …and covered the
adjacent plain with its flocks and herds… the hapless chiefs, amounting to
forty-five, made their grand entry into Bengasi…[while the bey] was partaking
of it with them… the Bey's guards, with drawn sabres, suddenly rushed into
the apartment, and executed the sanguinary orders…I hastened to the fort as
the only place of security, [as the chiefs were] struggling and expiring in the
blood which was flowing from their wounds, while the Bey on horseback,
armed with a musket, in the midst of his Mamelukes and of the dead, was
swearing and raving like a madman, because the troops were not yet upon the
march against the Bedouins…[then] Bey himself heading his cavalry, and
advancing at full speed, invested the Bedouin encampment, when all the
children and men who had remained there were massacred, [several of the
women where stampeded underfoot the horses]... a few days after…twentytwo hostages…were massacred by the Bey's soldiers…their bodies were then
thrown into the sea. Amongst them were two boys, one of whom was seven
years of age, the other only five…the bodies of the children, being cast upon
the shore near the town…and devoured by dogs, no person daring to remove
or inter them. A few of the Zoasi… now fled for safety to the sepulchre of a
Marabout, called, from the place of his interment, Oecia. The Bey not daring
to violate so holy an asylum, ordered that no succour should be afforded
them... The whole town was sincerely but silently interested in the fate of
these persecuted people; upon the third day a copious spring of water issued
from the tomb of the Marabout; the ground close to it was found sprinkled
with dates and other articles of food, the hungry were fed, the whole
population of Bengasi and the adjacent villages flocked to admire and
reverence such a portentous event, and the Marabout's reputation rose, in
proportion as that of the Bey sunk into hatred and horror. In a few days we are
to march for Tripoli; I full of real affliction at the bloody scenes which I have
just witnessed; the Bey and his followers, though vexed at not having
completely exterminated their enemies, consoling themselves with the plunder
they have collected during the expedition.503
Della Cella’s graphic description of the relentless violence Ahmed used and the
brutality with which his men tracked down the very last person standing— be it young
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boys or unarmed people hiding in a Marabout’s shrine— highlighted the desire of the
Tripolitan governor’s to eliminate any and all potential threats to his rule. Moreover,
argue that there were strong corollaries between the ways in which Yusuf Pasha
responded to the rebellion of Cyrenaica, and Mehmed Ali’s equally brutal massacre of
the Mamluks in the Cairo Citadel a few years before.
The assassination of the Mamluks at the hands of Mehmed Ali’s men has been
well studied in the historiography of Egypt. Nevertheless, it is worth offering a short
description of the massacre for the sake of comparison. Fahmy wrote of the March
1811 bloodshed:
Heralds were sent to the markets announcing, “Yarin alay,” or “Tomorrow
there will be a procession”. On the eve of the procession Mehmed Ali sent
notification to all Mamluk leaders – with whom he had reached a temporary
truce allowing them to stay in Cairo – inviting them to the Citadel with their
retainers to witness the official bestowal of the command of the Hijaz
campaign on his son Tousson and cloaking him with the ceremonial robe. He
pleaded that his son would be honored to have the Mamluk leaders march with
him through the streets of Cairo after receiving the full regalia from his father;
the Mamluks were therefore told to arrive attired in their ceremonial robes in
the Citadel...Not realizing that this “auspicious hour” would be the hour of
their death, the Mamluks ascended in great pomp and ceremony to the Pasha
in his divan, or council chamber, in the Citadel. After spending an hour
drinking coffee with him, the leaders left in a procession that descended again
in the prescribed manner and passed through a narrow path that led down to
the city. After all the troops had passed through a certain gate, an order was
given to close that gate trapping the Mamluk beys with all their retainers in the
narrow pathway. The Pasha’s soldiers were then ordered to open fire and to
spare no one. The shooting went on for an hour, killing over four hundred and
fifty Mamluk beys; the heads were severed from the corpses and displayed to
Mehmed Ali who by then had retired to his harem. The bloodbath continued in
the city below as the Pasha’s soldiers were unleashed into the Mamluks’
households where they pillaged their property, raped their women and killed
any remaining Mamluk who dared to hide. 504
It is demonstrably clear from reading the narrative of the two events that both
governors’ plans for the elimination of their political adversaries were remarkably
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similar. Both governors lured their political rivals under the false pretense of peace
and amnesty to an honored event that involved the cloaking of a ceremonial robe—be
it for Tusson Pasha or the Jwazi elders. Their corresponding political rivals, with all
the corresponding pomp and regalia attended both events. After their agents
welcomed the officials, feigning friendship and hospitality towards them and
conversing with them, the governors had their men ruthlessly massacre their
opponents on sight. This critical point underscored the lengths to which North African
political actors paid attention to, and oftentimes mimicked, the tactics of their regional
counterparts. In doing so, it highlighted the sensitivity of the regional political ties, as
well as the networks between the provinces, and their rules.
In the ensuing chaos, the Jwazi, like the Mamluks before them, were hunted
down by the governors’ men, their property seized, and all the women and children
found were either brutalized, murdered or both.505 The details of the events, the
systemic attack on all Jwazi/Mamluk bystanders afterwards, and the short timespan
between the two events— less than six years in fact—strongly indicates that Yusuf
Pasha was mimicking Mehmed Ali Pasha’s efficient elimination of his rivals, the
Mamluk grandees.
The historical similarity was later mirrored in the historiographical
interpretation of events. Folayan argued that Yusuf Pasha’s chief incentive in the
complete subjection of the Jwazi and his behaviors in Cyrenaica, was not political
retaliation, but rather economic profit.506 Admittedly, the Jwazi leaders’ property was
quite significant and generously subsidized to the coffers of Ahmad’s father in
Tripoli. Upon his return to the capital, Ahmed Bey arrived with over 10,000 heads of
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sheep, 6,000 oxen, 4,000 camels, chests of money and a large number of slaves.507
However, while the Mamluks of Cairo similarly possessed notable wealth, it was not
the main incentive behind Mehmed Ali’s assassination of the grandees. Rather, their
continued political threat to his authority posed the most significant liability to the
governor.
As Della Cella himself mentioned, Ahmed Bey’s troops already plundered the
Jwazi livestock, cattle and camps, and reaped whatever spoils they could find before
tracking the survivors to the Marabout’s tomb.508 Effectively, reaping the spoils of
war did not stop the Pasha’s son from an attempt to eliminate his enemy. Granted,
sanctuary in a religious shrine made it easier for the compassionate allies of the Jwazi
to unearth a well, scatter the area with food and supplies, and claim divine
intervention, thus allowing the supporters to cleanly escape any retribution from
governor’s son. Nevertheless, Yusuf’s intention in this attack, much like Mehmed
Ali’s before him, was the utter obliteration of his political adversary, not the
economic gain from the accompanying violence—if anything, we see from Della
Cella’s account that Ahmed Bey’s men only took solace in their vast spoils after being
unable to entirely eradicate the Jwazi
Several similarities exist between Folayan’s analysis of Yusuf Pasha’s desire to
expand his territorial reach, his reliance on a handful of trusted agents, be it alMukkni in Fezzan or his sons, and the nationalist historiographical work of by
scholars of Egypt, such as Marsot. This is to say, not only were the historical means
that both the governors’ used similar in their efforts to expand the geography of their
respective domains, but subsequently historians of North African have since
507
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interpreted the behaviors of both governors through the discourse of commercial
incentive. However, the central difference here is that while more contemporary
works, such as Fahmy’s All the Pasha’s Men, have dismantled the Marsot and
Lawson’s arguments of territorial expansion as spurred by financial incentive, very
little work has questioned Folayan’s analysis of Yusuf Pasha’s incentive for his
expedition to Bornu.
North African Imperialism, Expanded
In Tripoli, plans for the pasha’s southern expansion into Bornu first materialized
in 1817, after al-Makkani’s firm seizure of Fezzan from the Awlad Mohammed
sultans. Yusuf Pasha decided to take advantage of the political instability in Bornu
after the Fulani Jihad and the chaos of the invasions which were followed by growing
rebellion in Kanem and Baghirmi which, with the support of the Wadai Sultanate, was
attempting to break free from the Bornu Empire.
The Tripolitan governor made no secret of his desire to expand his reach
southwards into the western Sudan.509
In his work on the history of Tripoli, Folayan wrote off Yusuf Pasha’s rationale
behind targeting his attentions specifically on Bornu, south of the Kaouar [Kawar] salt
oases in what is now northeastern Niger:
However, the whole of the Saharan stretch south of Fezzan to the Kawar oasis
did not offer much attraction to any would-be imperialist. It was extremely
difficult to hold together or control effectively, not only because of the
predominantly nomadic nature of its economy, but also largely because of the
extreme individualistic character of the various small units which at best
formed an extensive but very loose confederation. For areas of reasonable
political organization one had to move down to the region of Lake Chad. 510
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Folayan’s 1970s assessment of Yusuf Pasha, the governor of Tripoli’s, interest
in Bornu as “would-be imperialist”511 was nothing short of monumental and
groundbreaking for its time, despite his later hesitance with the idea. And as we shall
see, would later be followed by a similarly inspired work on the behavior and actions
of Mehmed Ali in the Sudan.
Bornu, the Historical Context
The Bornu Empire, which by the late eighteenth-century was centered in the
Lake Chad basin out west towards Hausaland and had enfolded the historically
proceeding Empire of Kanem of the north, in what is now modern-day Niger, into its
broader territory. By the turn of the century, the Kingdom of Wada’i, adjacent to
Bornu to the east, had annexed territory in Darfur to its east, and embarked on a new
political push into the northern spaces of Bornu, the ones that constituted the spaces
of Kanem. Wada’i forces were largely successful in these attempts.
By 1806-8, Sabun, the Sultan of Wada’i claimed both the territories of Kanem
in the north and Baghirmi in the southeast from Bornu. These losses were in part due
to the growing pressure Bornu was facing to the west. Trouble was compounded by
the Fulani jihad of Uthman dan Fodio that declared against Bornu and absorbed most
of Hausaland in 1808. Accusing the Babur of polytheism and of aiding in the Hausa
efforts against them, the Fulani attacked and defeated Bornu forces under Mai Ahmad
ibn Ali. They claimed and destroyed the capital of Bornu, N’Gazargamu, in 1808.512
Greatly weakened by these losses, the remaining Babur rallied around a new
figure, Sheikh Muhammad al-Amin al-Kanemi. A notable figure of both Fezzani and

511

ibid.
ibid, also see Dixon Denham and Hugh Clapperton, Narrative of Travels and Discoveries in
Northern and Central Africa, in ... 1822, 1823 and 1824, by Major Denham, Capt. Clapperton and Dr.
Oudney, With an Appendix, (London: John Murray, 1828).
229
512

Msdfasd

Kanembu heritage with extensive property in Marzuq, the center city of Fezzan, alKanemi first trained as a religious scholar in Egypt, most likely at al-Ahzar, before
returning to Bornu to “settle as a learned man of Faqih, [Islamic jurisprudence,] in
Kanem.”513 Dixon Denham, the Englishman later appointed as the lieutenant governor
of the British colony in Sierra Leone, wrote of al-Kameni during his early 1820s
travels in Bornu:
Born in Fezzan, of Kanem parents, though on the father's side descended from
a Moor, [al-Kameni] had, after visiting Egypt, proceeded to Kanem, as sheikh
of the Koran, where he was greatly beloved and respected, on account of the
extreme correctness of his life, and the benevolence of his disposition; while
the miracles and cures which he performed, by writing charms, were the theme
of all the country round. Soon after the conquest of Bornou, El Kanemy
formed a plan for delivering that country from the bondage into which it had
fallen; and, stirring up the Kanemboos to assist him by a well-planned tale of
having been called by a vision to this undertaking, he made his first campaign
with scarcely 400 followers, and defeated an army of the Felatahs nearly 8,000
strong. He followed up this victory with great promptitude and resolution, and
in less than ten months had been the conqueror in forty different battles.
Nature had bestowed on him all the qualifications for a great commander; an
enterprising genius, sound judgment, features engaging, with a demeanour
gentle and conciliating: and so little of vanity was there mixed with his
ambition, that he refused the offer of being made sultan; and placing
Mohammed, the brother of sultan Achmet, on the throne, he, first doing
homage himself, insisted on the whole army following his example. The
sheikh built for sultan Mohammed his present residence, New Birnie,
establishing himself at Angornou, three miles distant, and retaining the
dictatorship of the kingdom pro tempore. Such a commencement was also
extremely politic, on the part of the sheikh; but his aspiring mind was not
calculated to rest satisfied with such an arrangement. The whole population
now flocked to his standard, and appeared willing to invest him with superior
power, and a force to support it. One of the first offers they made was to
furnish him with twenty horses per day, until a more regular force was
organized, which continued for four years. He now raised the green flag, the
standard of the Prophet, refused all titles but that of the ‘servant of God;’ and
after clearing the country of the Felatahs, he proceeded to punish all those
nations who had given them assistance, and with the slaves, the produce of
these wars, rewarded his faithful Kanemboo and other followers for their
fidelity and attachment. 514
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Under the leadership of al-Kanemi, the Bornu began to re-stabilize. Eventually,
by 1812, al-Kanemi succeeded in defeating the forces of the Fulani jihad in Bornu.
However, for as successful as he was in his efforts against Uthman dan Fodio’s forces
the troubles sharpened Yusuf Pasha’s interest in Bornu for himself. Yusuf sent his
agent in Fezzan, al-Mukkni on a diplomatic mission to Bornu in 1807-8. While the
latter was initially met with hospitality, diplomatic engagements with Babur officials
quickly soured. Historians have since directed the blame for this fallout on none other
than Awlad Mohammed officials in Fezzan who were happy to continue as the
middlemen between Bornu and Tripoli.515
Tripoli remained keenly aware of Bornu’s strategic location in the trans-Saharan
slave trade after al-Mukkni’s takeover of Fezzan in 1810. And the governor kept a
particularly sharp eye on the political instability in Bornu and looked to profit from it.
Under al-Mukkni the number of raids (gharzzie) into Babur territory rose
exponentially. By1816 Kanem, in north Bornu, alone was raided twice. In the years
following the 1816 Anglo-Dutch attack on Algiers, Tripoli’s interest grew further
still, and was likely spurred on by the governor’s increasing close relationship with
the British consul to Tripoli, Consul Hamner Warrington. He arrived in Tripoli as
Consul General in 1814, and Warrington like other consuls before him, was especially
interested in the British exploration of Africa. He later became involved with the
Fezzan expeditions of Richie and Lyon, Gordon Laing’s efforts to reach Timbuktu,
those of Dixon Denham, as well Clapperton and Oudney who traveled to Bornu.516
It is unclear if the Tripolitan Pasha’s interest in expanding the slave trade
through Bornu was the catalyst that first ignited Warrington’s interest in the efforts of
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British explorers in Africa and his ready willingness to facilitate the endeavors of
several of his countrymen. However, we can trace the consul’s early taste for the
looting of antiquities. Shortly after his arrival in Tripoli, he convinced the pasha to
gift several Roman columns from Leptis Magna. These columns still stand in the
gardens of Virginia Water in modern-day Surry. However, this was only the
beginning. Warrington continued to raid the antiquities of Tripolitania and Cyrenaica
as much as he pleased, and even wrote in 1821, “I flatter myself [that] His Lordship
will shortly have the best private collection in England.”517 A great deal of this
collection now stands preserved in the British Museum.518
In order to facilitate his ransacking and to ease British expeditions into Africa,
Warrington realized that he needed to cultivate a friendship with the pasha, which he
readily did. Maltese circles often referred to him as the “Bashaw of Tripoli”519 and the
French wrote of his influence, “more a master of the country than then Pasha himself,
a [mere] gesture on his part made others tremble.”520 In 1965, Bovill wrote of the
Consul and his intentions, “The idea of the British flag and British trade being carried
into the heart of Africa stirred him deeply, and he longed for the day when the Union
Jack would be hoisted on the Niger.”521
Despite his rather tedious inclination towards colonialism, it is through
Warrington’s records that we can trace Yusuf Pasha’s intentions to expand his reach
into Bornu. In August of 1820, Warrington wrote to the Foreign Office with the
governor’s explicit proposal of territorial expansion. The consul wrote, “His Highness
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says that if England would advance him twenty-five thousand pounds, he would repay
it in a few years, and which could enable him to take Bornu and Sudan and fix a Bey
at each place and that the produce of the country would enable him to relinquish the
Slave Trade particularly as there is much Gold Dust at Sudan.”522
The same year that Warrington wrote to England relaying the Pasha’s interest in
expanding his reach southwards was the same year that the Tripolitan governor’s
neighbor to the east, Mehmed Ali began his own southern expedition in the Sudan.
Under the command of his son Ismael, the vali dispatched nearly four-thousand
troops. Fahmy noted that the vali wanted exploit the allegedly abundant gold mines of
the region, capture the remaining Mamluk amirs in Kurdufan that were actively
engaging in the slave trade, and establish better control over the Red Sea trade. Most
importantly however, Mehmed Ali wanted to capture as many able-bodied Sudanese
men as possible, and forcibly conscript them into his Egyptian soldiery.523
It is critical to also distinguish between Mehmed Ali’s desire to control the
Sudan, and Yusuf Pasha’s corresponding drive to do the same in Bornu. First,
Mehmed Ali did in fact send Ismael and his men south in 1820; Egyptian forces
conquered the territory in 1821; and Sudan remained under Egyptian control until the
1885 capture of Khartoum by Mohammed Ahmed al-Mahdi. However, while Yusuf
Pasha was explicit and adamant in his desire to expand into Bornu, his imperial
ambitions never materialized into military campaigns. This point however, it was not
for lack of effort on the governor’s part. Rather, it was the governor’s decision to turn
to the British for support in his imperialist endeavor that ultimately blocked his
attempts altogether.
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Despite Yusuf Pasha’s claims however, there was little gold dust to be found in
Bornu.524 Historians have since argued that his claims were likely a ploy to cover his
real interest in expanding the trans-Saharan slave trade and that the popularization of
abolitionist sentiments in Europe was the main reason behind British officials’
unwillingness support the governor’s imperialist project. This second point is correct,
in that abolitionism was gaining traction in Great Britain and across Europe.
On the other hand, British imperial interest in the African continent was also
expanding rapidly in the 1820s. The Foreign and Home Offices were increasingly
paying a great deal of attention to appointment of diplomatic officials, such as
Warrington, who themselves expressed a keen interest in British colonial expansion,
and were actively supporting British explorers, such as Denham on their missions into
the different parts of the Central-Saharan and Sahel regions.
Admittedly, the 1807 prohibition on British subjects’ engagement in the slave
trade did likely spur some suspicion regarding the Tripolitan governor’s actual
ambitions. After all, the Pasha’s middleman with the British government was himself
a seasoned British imperialist with a keen interest in African exploration. Therefore,
Warrington would have known that gold dust did not arrive in Tripoli from Bornu via
the Air-Kano caravan passage but rather via western route from Timbuktu-Gao.525
Nevertheless, it is important to return to Bovill’s assessment of the British
Consul General to Tripoli, man who “longed for the day when the Union Jack would
be hoisted on the Niger.”526 Moreover, it is also important to remember that the
British themselves had established a colony in neighboring Sierra Leon twenty-years
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before, in 1800. British officials were deeply interested in expanding their foothold on
the African continent. In fact, they would annex Lagos in 1861 and would incorporate
the territory of modern-day Nigeria, the same space that comprised significant part of
the Bornu Empire in 1820, into the British Crown’s colonial possessions before the
end of the century.
The procedural causality for British reticence in supporting Yusuf Pasha on
his Bornu mission, and specifically for refusing him the loan that he first requested in
1820, and then requested again in 1824, likely had more to do with the Colonial
Office’s own interest in the region. After all, His Majesty’s government was openly
interested in expanding its colonial positions. Moreover, given the growing weakness
of Yusuf’s hold after the 1815 Congress of Vienna, the prominence of Warrington’s
position in Tripoli, this research speculates that the British government was likely
bidding it’s time for regime change in Tripoli. British Foreign and Home Office
records unfortunately do not indicate why the plans of Tripolitan pasha were not
given more attention in London, and British records at Kew did not explicitly indicate
that London was waiting for conditions to grow more favorable towards its own
colonial interests. However, the implicit tone of the records exchanged between the
British consul and London indicate that Warrington saw the Pasha as more of a
hindrance to the prospects of British colonialism in Africa rather than a help.527
The willingness of the pasha to discuss his expansion into Bornu with British
officals was particularly striking considering that there was no record of the pasha’s
intended Bornu expedition in the Ottoman records. It seemed that the North African
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governor—much like Mehmed Ali in Sudan—turned to Europeans in his efforts to
colonize Bornu and and Kanem, and their efforts to construct and build their
respective armies and not to the Porte. Given this, and the tenacity with which Yusuf
Karamanlı attempted to outmaneuver both al-Kanemi in Bornu, going so far as to hold
the latter’s children hostage in Tripoli, one is left with a sense that much like his
neighbor to the east had done “[b]y absorbing the Sudan into Egypt’s borders,
Muhammad ‘Ali distinguished Egypt from the Sudan and brought Egypt a little closer
to Europe,”528 One could argue that Yusuf Pasha had hoped to do the same with
Tripoli central and his southern Saharan neighbors.
Tripoli’s Relations with Bornu
Despite the hostility that Yusuf Pasha’s agent, al-Mukkni, demonstrated
during his regular invasions into Kanembu territory, Sheikh al-Kanemi reached out to
Yusuf Pasha in his efforts to suppress the rebellions of 1817 Baghirmi. It remains
uncertain as to why al-Kanemi chose to ally himself with Tripoli, when the pasha’s
own agent had been so hostile towards Barbur territory. However, Folyan speculated
that al-Kanemi believed that the spoils of war and the plunder of the Baghirmi forces,
which could only be put down with Tripoli’s assistance, would have been enough to
secure amicable relations between him and his neighbors to the north.529
Yusuf agreed to help al-Kanemi in the latter’s endeavor against Bahirmi, and
even went so far to entrench himself as al-Kanemi’s ally. The governor even replaced
al-Mukkni with a corsair of Georgian descent named Mustafa al-Ahmar in 1820.
However, Tripoli’s attempts to feign friendship with Bornu did little to deter the
interests of the governor. Between 1817-1820, Yusuf Pasha’s imperialist ambitions
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became one of the central concerns of his administration. So much so, that after the
removal of al-Mukkni, Yusuf sent al-Ahmar from Marzuq in 1821 with a force of
nearly five hundred cavalry carrying thirteen-hundred infantrymen and over two
thousand pack animals to organize a joint attack with al-Kanemi’s forces outside the
new Babur capital of Kuka. These cooperative military attacks were largely
successful, and al-Kanemi believed so certainly in his alliance with the Tripolitan
governor that after the joint mission of 1821, the governor of Bornu sent his three
young children to Marzuq with al-Ahmar, as he believed Fezzan to be safer.530
In late 1821, al-Kanemi’s suspicions began to slowly grow. The initial cause for
concern corresponded with the arrival of three British explorers in Tripoli, a Dr.
Oudley, Captain Clarington and the Major Dixon Denham. However, rather than
outfit them with a traveling party and supplies, Yusuf delayed them in the city for
over a year.531 After much negotiation with the British Consul Warrington, the three
British men were allowed to proceed from Tripolitania to Bornu under the protection
of two hundred armed men. By the time the party arrived in Bornu however, they
were met outside of Kuka with between somewhere between three to five thousand
Babur troops heavily, armed and ready to meet any external threat. Folyan wrote of
the event, “This must have been humiliating for the Arabs who had on the road
spoken contemptuously of Bornu’s military strength and boasted to the British
explorers that they alone could ‘eat up Bornu’.”532 In fact, by 1822 al-Kanemi had
become outspoken in his fear of a Tripolitan threat and forbid the explorer Oudley
from traveling outside his immediate protection, stating, “should accident befall you,
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the bashaw [of Tripoli] will make it a plea to invade my country.”533 Tensions grew
over the next several years and by late 1822-1825 Bornu “lived under the constant
fear of military invasion.”534
Yusuf was so persistent in his desire to expand his reach into Bornu, that by
1823 he openly stated to the British Consul Warrington that he was holding alKanemi’s children not explicitly as hostages, but rather were being held in Marzuq to
ensure “the future submission and fidelity”535 of al-Kanemi. It was not until after the
1824 denial of Yusuf’s second loan request by the British for 50,000 pounds— a
request that Consul Warrington supported—that Yusuf Pasha finally abandoned his
plans to invade and control Bornu. Only then did he allow for the release of alKanemi’s children.536
The historian Folayan first classified the behaviors of Yusuf Pasha as
“imperialist” in the 1970s. Folayan’s work, based on extensive research in the Foreign
Office Archives in England, was explicit in the imperialist objectives of Yusuf’s
behaviors. Nevertheless, the historian remained ambivalent in the underlying motives
behind the Pasha’s interest in Bornu. Folayan argued that Yusuf’s interest in Bornu
was largely, if not exclusively, economic in nature.537 While it is true that by the
1820s Tripoli’s finances were in a growing state of distress, the governor’s
relentlessness in his pursuit of territorial expansion, as well as in his efforts to gain the
support of the British government, finds a clear parallel in the behaviors of his
Egyptian neighbor, Mehmed Ali, and the latter’s expansion into the Sudan. Yusuf was
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looking to mimic the behaviors of his eastern neighbor, both in the elimination of his
political rivals within Tripolitania as well as his rivals to the south of the desert.
Despite his expressed desire to expand his territory, by 1824 Yusuf Karamanlı
was facing a much more pressing concern regarding his governorship in Tripoli. As
the decade immediately following the end of the corso wore on, the condition of the
governor’s finances grew increasingly dire. Having been refused loans from the
British government, Yusuf turned to two sets of creditors: European merchants and to
Mehmed Ali in Egypt.
By 1823, Mehmed Ali in Egypt was looking to recoup his funds. That year, he
sent an emissary from Cairo, Mohammed Dorbi to Tripoli to offer the governor an
option. Yusuf would repay the 250,000 monies to the vali; otherwise, the Egyptian
governor would be willing to forgo the debit, if his Tripolitan counterpart were to
place the western cities of Derna, Benghazi, and the southern territory of Fezzan
under the direct sovereignty of Egypt for a period of twelve years.538 Yusuf refused,
claiming that the offer was “little better than a permanent conquest of the best part of
his territory.”539 This move on the part of Mehmed Ali would open a new age of
Egyptian domination in North African affairs.
Conclusion
In this chapter we saw how, as Mehmed Ali was organizing an expedition into
the Sudan, Yusuf Karamanlı was simultaneously looking to expand his reach
southwards and extend his power into Bornu. We examined how the seeds of North
African imperialism were planted, not just in the divan or the political ambitions of
the vali of Egypt, but rather regionally. Moreover, we investigated the overwhelming
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similarity of the methods used by the Egyptian and Tripolitan governor, their broader
ambitions in the region, as well as the empires that they turned to for support in their
respective quests and argued that these waves of imperialist expansion were sparked
at similar moments, approached from similar tactics, and underscored an effort by the
two governors to bring their provinces “closer to Europe”540 by turning almost
exclusively to the British in the expression and attempted implementation of their
imperialist agendas.
By highlighting these radical changes in the lead up to 1824, which
represented another key watershed moment for the provinces, this chapter highlights
how early-nineteenth century North African provinces and their rulers not only
cooperated in times of crisis, such as the bombardment under Lord Exmouth, but also
mimicked one another in their efforts to eliminate their political rivals, as well as the
tactics they applied to further their imperialist agendas.
The larger objective of this chapter was to juxtapose North Africa’s
relationship with the sea and Europe to the north as well as that with its relationship
with the desert and the Sahel to the south. Its purpose is to stretch out our
conceptualization of North Africa not as an exclusively Ottoman or Mediterranean
space, but also an African one. Doing so highlights the historical narrative of the
region as a vital part of the larger African continent. This dissertation, which in its
primary objective attempts to reformulate our understanding of how different spaces
work together in a region like North Africa also attempts to draw our attention to how
the governors of this region worked and coordinated efforts, both with their European
and Ottoman neighbors, as well as with their African ones. The larger objective of this

540

Powell, A Different Shade of Colonialism, 47
240

Msdfasd

new lens is an attempt to tease out the historical connection between the seas and the
sands of the Saharan desert.
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CHAPTER FIVE
MEHMED ALI’S EGYPT AND THE NEW FACE OF OLD EMPIRES
1824-1829
I know very well that I do not have a navy, and that I cannot build one in the sands of
the Pyramids. Therefore, great losses will incur, but eventually, I will have one, and
then I will overtake and defeat the Greeks.541
Historians of Egypt have long recognized Mehmed Ali’s massive appetite for
territorial expansion. By 1820, the pasha’s reach extended into the Hijaz and was
beginning to expanding into the Sudan. But the governor of Egypt remained
undeterred by either the militaristic or the economic costs of his empire building
efforts. Rather than limit himself to the eastern Mediterranean, the vali of Egypt had
already expressed a desire to grow his empire westward and administer the Tripolitan
territories of Fezzan and Cyrenaica. With the emergence of this new, compelling and
powerful political center in Cairo, Mehmed Ali demanded the attentions of both his
provincial neighbors as well as those of imperial authorities in the Porte and beyond.
The Egypt of Mehmed Ali was about to became a regional center in the broader
Maghreb as well as in the Eastern Mediterranean.
As European imperial rivals began to recognize the growing influence of the
Egyptian governor’s ever-expanding political capital, the vali proved to still be in
early stages of his empire building. Over the course of the next decade, his reach span
first into Crete and Morea, and then again into Syria and parts of Anatolia. It is the
thesis of this chapter that we can trace two overarching themes in the behaviors of the
North African provinces during the 1820s. First, there was an overwhelming shift in
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how both Ottoman and European imperial powers came to view the region after the
days of the corso finally ended, and namely who the power players in the region were.
Since the days of Barbarossa Hayreddin Pasha, Algiers had historically commanded
the largest naval and militaristic reserve in the region, and in turn wielded the
strongest influence among both its neighbors and beyond. This was about to change.
Over the course of the decade and the events in Morea, Egypt overtook Algiers in its
prestige and influence as a regional center. Secondly, we see the continuation of a
theme we witnessed in the previous chapter. While Mehmed Ali was attempting to
eliminate his political rivals, consolidate his power over the entirety of Egypt, and
reshape his army, he was setting an example to follow by his western neighbors.
Tripoli, and later Tunis, were about to adopt exceedingly similar standards for their
own standing militaries by means of extensive drilling, training and highly disciplined
regimentation programs.
In this chapter, we analyze three major points regarding the Egyptian role in
the Ottoman struggles with the Greek Orthodox rebels of the 1820s. First, we will
examine the lengths to which the Egyptian vali attempted to build a navy, the tactics
he used to achieve these aims, and lastly its subsequent destruction in the Battle of
Navarino. Secondly, we will explore the last year of Ibrahim Pasha’s campaign in
Morea, which, this dissertation argues is critical in the vali’s invasion of Syria in the
1830s, and signified nothing else than an explicit rupture in Cairo’s relations with the
Porte. In the twelve months following the 1827 naval losses in the Bay of Navarino,
Ibrahim Pasha refused to abandon his post or his men and return to Cairo. However,
because of the naval blockade, the supplies and rations of the Egyptian regiments had
been reduced to almost nothing. Matters were complicated by Mahmud II’s refusal to
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allow the Egyptian army to leave the mainland and ultimately resulted in the souring
of relations between the vali and the sultan. Lastly, we look to European sources, both
Russian and British to contrast the historical depictions of Ibrahim Pasha, to introduce
important Russophone sources into the historical literature of North Africa, and to
analyze how extremely contradictory the historical representations of the future
governor of Egypt were. The objective of this chapter in tying these three distinct
points of analysis together is to be able to reincorporate the extent to which turn of the
nineteenth century Egyptian history is in fact both Maghrebi and Mediterranean
history.
Egypt and the Porte, in a North African Context
In the 1810s, Egypt’s regional influence was expanding rapidly as both Tunis
and Tripoli struggled economically. The succession of the ailing Mahmud Bey to the
Tunisian governorship and the subsequent outbreak of plague in 1818 effectively
undercut the province economically and politically well into the mid-1820s.542 Tunis
was suffering through internal crises and thus remained relatively silent on the
imperial stage of the broader Ottoman world. Mahmud Bey’s administration struggled
to reestablish a measure of socio-economic stability similar to the one that had
marked the years of Hammuda Pasha’s government, albeit under direr and much more
severe economic constraints. Meanwhile, the Karamanlı pasha of Tripoli’s attempts to
curtail the financial losses following the decline of the corso were largely
unsuccessful. His imperialist ambitions toward Bornu were thwarted by expanding
British colonial interests beyond their control of Sierra Leone, and his position as
Tripolitan vali increasingly threatened by both the increased influence of European
542
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diplomats and the political ambitions of his three sons.
However, while the Congress of Vienna had enormous consequences for the
socio-economic prospects of both Tunis and Tripoli, they were by no means the
provinces hardest hit by the effective end of the corso. Algiers was the most
debilitated. As the province with the strongest maritime tradition, the end of the corso
had particularly devastating consequences not only for the economic and political
conditions of the westernmost province, but also on its position within the broader
Mediterranean and Ottoman worlds. The leverage Algiers was able to wield over its
neighbors to the east began diminishing after the turn of the century. This decline was
further exacerbated after the bombardment of the city walls by the Anglo-Dutch
fleet.543 Gone were the days when both Ottoman and European powers considered
Algiers to be the apex power among the triumvirate of corso regencies. Long
considered the socio-political and economic center of the three provinces maritime
activities, the corso tied not only the narrative of the provinces together, but also
framed the historical conceptualization of the region. This spatial imagination was
about to change.
Moreover, Algiers was simultaneously the most villainized in western popular
imaginations.544 This paved the way for the province’s eventual fall to the
expansionist interests of imperial France, while its reduced socio-political state
accelerated a power shift east, towards Egypt. A weakened Algiers allowed for a new
Cairene political center of gravity to emerge within the broader North African region.
The emergence of the Egyptian center in the Maghreb was not simply a
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byproduct of the vali’s desire for territorial expansion or his growing influence in the
broader Ottoman world. Rather, was also a manifestation of a weakened Algerian
hold over the Western Mediterranean during a time when Tunis and Tripoli were
floundering in their efforts to restructure their economies. Never one to miss an
opportunity, Mehmed Ali was beginning to reconsider his broader position in the
Maghreb—a state of affairs that would only be heightened by the outbreak of revolt in
the Morea over the course of the decade.
From the center of the empire, the 1820s brought a new set of political crises
that threatened the territorial integrity of the sultan’s well-protected domains. In the
Morea, Tepelena Ali Pasha had effectively carved out a small empire for himself and
his sons, Veli and Mukhtar Pasha. Tepelena Ali Pasha was officially the governor of
Ioannina. However, his de facto territory extended from Mukhtar’s paşalık of Avlonya
[Vlorë] in modern-day Albania, through Macedonia, Northern Greece and south into
Veli’s eyalet of peninsular Morea.545 A formidable regional player, Ali Pasha grewn
frustrated with the demands of the Porte. His subsequent calls for independence greatly
disturbed Mahmud II and his officials in Constantinople. Regardless, the behavior of
the Ioannina governor was not the sole cause of concern for the empire’s territorial
integrity in Southeastern Europe. Tepelena Ali Pasha’s behaviors simultaneously
spurred the militarization of the Greek Orthodox rebels in Morea.546
Greek language chroniclers from the era were explicit in drawing a connection
between the rebellion of Ali Pasha and the growing unrest in Morea. One wrote, “it
cannot be doubted that the declaration of the Porte against Aly was the immediate cause
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of the Greek insurrection.”547 Instigator though he was, the Albanian governor of
Ioannina was not the root cause of the tension. Subversion of Morean public order can
be traced back to the 1770s, and the uprising that took place under the Russian Orlov
brothers—two officers from the Russian Imperial Army.548 Their efforts were effective;
and their political agitation received support among the Greek Orthodox communities
of the region. Constantinople sent in battalions of troops, which comprised mostly of
Albanian irregulars in an effort to quell the uprising.549 In doing so however, the Porte
unintentionally helped to prime the region as a political tinderbox.
While the Albanians troops successfully subdued the Orlov rebels, their
behavior and the subsequent plundering of the territory effectively replaced one form of
disorder with another, only further undermining Ottoman authority and the social order
in Morea.550 By the time Tepelena Ali Pasha began his efforts against the Porte nearly
half a century later, the seeds political protest had long since been planted, had matured,
and were effectively ripe for the harvest.
Questions of causality aside, the rebels of Morea gradually gained both the
attention and support they needed for their cause. The fight for Morea would eventually
ignite the Greek Revolution, spur European involvement in the region, cost both
Mehmed Ali and Mehmed II their naval fleets, spark yet another war between the Porte
and Russia, antagonize the Egyptian vali into invading Ottoman Syria and Anatolia, and
most of all, transform the topography of the sultan’s domains in the Balkans.551
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Tensions escalated and the stage was set. Even Ali Pasha’s death two short
years later did little to quell the rising tide of dissent among the Rum [Orthodox] in the
Morea.552 As the rebellion gained traction among the Orthodox communities of the
peninsula, the problem of the insurrection grew increasingly troublesome for the Porte.
Initially, Constantinople was slow to react. It first sent in Albanian troops do what they
had previously done before during the Orlovi Rebellion while the Porte attempted to
implement a containment policy to the limit the breadth of the revolts.553
To quell the significant rise in the Orthodox piracy off the peninsula and
neighboring islands— a great deal of which was directly targeted against Ottoman
vessels—Sultan Mahmud II focused his early attentions on the naval realm. He
appointed none other than Mehmed Ali’s old rival, Hüsrev Pasha, as Grand Admiral of
the Ottoman fleet in 1822. Chosen mostly for his successes in rebuilding the Ottoman
fleet in the Black Sea, Hüsrev’s appointment as the Kapudan Pasha would eventually
lead to more fractionalization within the Ottoman world, and most importantly to a
bitter rupture between Constantinople and one of its most powerful governors, Mehmed
Ali of Egypt.
Despite the sultan’s initial gesture towards a proactive naval response, the Porte
ultimately delayed any decisive action against the insurrection. So much so, that by the
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middle of the decade, the effort against the Morean rebels were at their nadir, and the
Ottoman forces that had been sent to the region grew increasingly desperate for tactical
support.554 The poor management of the early years of the Morean conflict however
was not out of pure administrative negligence on the part of the Sultan or his officials.
The reason behind the Porte’s half-measures in quelling the rebellion was that Mahmud
II’s attentions were focused on a much more immediate threat. In that, while the
rebellion in the Morea threatened the empire’s territorial integrity in the Aegean, Ionian
Seas and in the broader Balkans, the reformist sultan turned his attention to adversaries
that were quite literally, much closer to home.
Mahmud II’s westernization attempts eventually produced the 1839 Edict of
Gülhane that officially introduced the tanzimat overhauls. By 1820, the sultan had
grown increasingly focused on limiting the power of his adversaries within the Asitane
itself. Mahmud II paid considerable attention to reining in the substantial power of the
frequently disloyal janissaries. The elite forces of the kapıkulu had long proved
extremely resistant to the military reforms of the age— regardless of whichever sultan
was attempting to implement them. After all, the janissary revolts had put an end to the
sultanate of Mahmud II’s reformist predecessor, Selim III. Mahmud II was determined
not to make the same mistake.
In an effort to pare down the power of the elite infantrymen before the
‘Auspicious Incident’ of 1826 and the disbandment of the yeniçeri class, contemporary
sources argued that the sultan had little choice but to center his attentions on the
“military and civil preparations [needed] to secure his position… as he apparently
realized that any failure in these areas would mean disaster.”555 For Morea, this meant
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that the sultan’s priorities did not align with the ongoing troubles in the Morea. In her
work on the Phanariot communities, Philliou argued that in order to cope with the
simultaneous crises, Mahmud II had little choice but to outsource the general war effort
against the Greek Orthodox rebels.556
This effectively meant that the Porte once again became heavily reliant on the
irregular Albanian forces. The difference between the strategy and the similar efforts 50
years earlier against the Orlov brothers however, was that the Porte used the latter as a
stopgap measure, while the Grand Vizier increasingly applied pressure on the Egyptian
vali to spur his involvement in the conflict.557 The extent of Mehmed Ali’s reach, as
well as the military aptitude of his son Ibrahim, had been recently displayed in both the
Sudan and against the Wahhabis of the Hijaz. Constantinople needed Cairo, again. But
the former still had to draw the latter’s interest to make the vali commit to the ongoing
conflict. Eventually, the Porte was successful, and Mehmed Ali’s influence would soon
extend to the islands of the eastern Mediterranean.
Before Crete: The Early Response
Before delving into Mehmed Ali’s role—as well as his use of the naval fleet of
his North African neighbors— first in Crete and then in Morea, let us reassess the
historical position of the Egyptian governor in the ongoing struggle before his troops
landed in Crete. Historiographically, Mehmed Ali’s early interest in the Greek
Orthodox uprising has uniformly been presented as ambivalent. The narrative given
within the literature is such that the pasha could only be prompted, finally and
hesitantly, into action after a significant amount of diplomatic negotiations with and
prodding by the Porte, after the sultan enticed him with paşalıks of Crete and later
556
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Morea. The literature tells us that it was only after said prompting that the vali first sent
his son-in-law, Hussein Bey, to put down the Cretan revolt. Notable examples of this
approach can be seen in Dodwell’s assessment of Mehmed Ali’s “benevolent
detachment,”558 before the sultan offered the governor the island. The same argument
was later implicitly echoed in what Fahmy argued was the governor’s ‘ultimate’
objective of Syria, which – as he argued – was to serve as a ‘cornerstone of the Pasha’s
‘empire.’”559
What we see in both these monographs, as well as in the broader historiography,
was that scholars of North Africa, as well as their Ottomanist counterparts, have long
considered the invasion of Crete to be a mere precursor to Ibrahim Bey’s efforts in
Morea. And in turn, Morea was framed largely as a catalyst for Mehmed Ali’s more
audacious and enterprising invasion of Syria and Anatolia. At the same time, scholars
presumed that Mehmed Ali’s involvement in the uprising was largely limited to his
charged correspondence with the Porte, Ibrahim’s later struggles in Morea, the father
and son’s tumultuous relationship with Hüsrev Pasha, the pasha’s growing desire for
Syria, and the resulting power struggle that ensued between the two camps—Egyptian
and Ottoman.560
In as much, the governor’s behaviors before Ibrahim’s 1825 peninsular
campaign—but after Hussein Bey’s 1823 conquest of Crete—have been largely
portrayed as overwhelmingly indifferent. So much so, that one could be forgiven for
thinking that the vali’s interest in the Peloponnesian revolts was inextricably tied to
Ibrahim landing in Methoni and his subsequent troubles on the peninsula. To support
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his argument of ‘benevolent detachment’561 Dodwell relied heavily on Douin and other
Francophone sources. He claimed that prior to his involvement in Crete in 1822,
Mehmed Pasha viewed the rebellion with explicit indifference, as well as a detectable
bit of disdain towards the interests of the Porte. Dodwell wrote:
In true opportunist vein, he had got rid of the Albanian troops whom he did not
want by encouraging them to leave his service for that of the rebel of Janina. He
was informed of the activities of the Greek revolutionary societies which had
been established in Cairo and Alexandria, but took no measure against them. He
did nothing to hinder the embarkation of Greek volunteers at Alexandria. He
even set free a party of Greek slaves sent to him by the Dey of Algiers.562
As we shall see below however, this was simply not the case. Given the
location for the outbreak of violence as well as the maritime expertise of the rebels in
the Aegean and Ionian Seas, it was not long before the Porte revived its interest in the
Mediterranean corso. In fact, the outbreak of the rebellion marked an important shift in
the Porte’s engagement with the corso after the Congress of Vienna. The change was so
significant within official Porte’s documentation that by the early 1820s, one could
argue that the Greek uprising, and the rebels’ reliance their maritime prowess had, albeit
briefly and entirely unintentionally, reversed the fortunes of the North African corso
well before the Egyptian vali’s involvement in the region.
First, one can observe a significant increase in the Ottoman Porte’s internal
documents regarding the broader workings of the North African provinces, as well as a
newly revived interest in the corsairs’ maritime activity of the eastern Mediterranean
and Aegean Sea. This marked a dramatic shift from the Porte’s behaviors in the
previous years. Immediately after the Congress of Vienna, official Ottoman
documentation regarding any and all North African corsair attacks or campaigns in
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Mediterranean waters had dwindled almost to null. In fact, between the winter of 1816
and the summer of 1820, only a handful of notices made their way to the sultan
regarding the practice. And even these overwhelmingly focused on the ongoing
European and British effort to eradicate the practice, and made passing mention of the
Maghrebi corso in the Mediterranean Sea. The dearth of sources was not for a lack of
actual campaigns. North African corsair attacks continued well after the Congress of
Vienna, and even spurred the Anglo-Dutch bombardment of Algiers in 1816, and the
European sieges of Algerian and Tripolitan ports in 1820. Nevertheless, the records of
the Ottoman Porte remained overwhelming silent on the maritime activity of the North
African corsair fleets between late 1816 and 1820.563
From 1820 onwards however, just as the Greek Orthodox insurgency was
gearing up, there was a significant increase in the number of Ottoman reports regarding
corso campaigns in the Mediterranean. Interestingly, the first few reports from the
Porte’s records point to the efforts of the rebels, who had already begun an ardent
maritime campaign of their own, as well as to a strong suspicion on the part of the Porte
that their Russian imperial rivals had involved themselves in the ongoing struggle. What
is most fascinating however, was that it is through Egyptian records that we are able
trace the subsequent efforts at intelligence gathering.564
A careful analysis of Ottoman sources, as well as Mehmed Ali’s
correspondence with Ottoman officials and his North African neighbors point to a far
more nuanced response on the part of the Egyptian governor in the early years of the
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uprising, well before Egyptian forces’ 1822 involvement in Crete. For example, while
internal Ottoman documents indicated the Porte’s suspicions of an ongoing Russian
imperial involvement in the Greek uprising, it was only by way of Egyptian sources that
we could trace the Porte’s reaction to the above-mentioned misgivings.565
In Cairene archives, one can find a letter Mehmed Ali wrote to Constantinople
discussing his ongoing efforts to trace Russian involvement in the uprising. By way of
the report, we learn that the Grand Vizier had tasked the provincial governor of Egypt,
and likely several other provincial leaders, with the responsibility of speaking with and
gaining information from the various Russian consuls across the Empire. In response,
Mehmed Ali wrote to the Grand Vizier, Izmirli Hacı Salih Pasha in early June 1821 to
update him about his ongoing efforts regarding the Porte’s potential Russian
problem.566
From this source we learn that the tenacity of the ongoing revolts in Morea and
Messinia heightened the suspicions of both the Egyptian vali and the Porte. In response,
the Egyptian governor began to investigate which if any, and to what extent, the Porte’s
imperial rivals were providing tactical support to the Greek rebels. First on his list to
interview was the Russian General Consul to Egypt, Giorgio Čivini.567 In his meeting
with Mehmed Ali, Čivini, denied any Russian involvement in the Greek uprising, and
firmly rejected allegations of Russian association, or support for the rebels. So much so
that the consul decidedly announced to the Egyptian governor that the “Russians do not
support subversive missions against other imperial powers.”568
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Clearly, the Egyptian governor was not indifferent to the troubles in the Morea.
Moreover, the timing of this document between Cairo and Constantinople is particularly
telling. First, it was clear that Mehmed Ali was involved in the early political strategies
of the Asitane and that he was in close contact the High Porte during the first outbreak
of revolts. This confidential correspondence of the vali and the information he provided
regarding the Russian consul in Egypt suggests that vali’s interest in the conflict was
more salient than the ‘benevolent detachment’ 569 Dodwell so strongly attempted to
convey. This is especially true if we account for the fact that the hostilities between the
Morean rebels and the Porte broke out in February, merely four months earlier.
Secondly, the willingness of the pasha to interrogate the Russian consul on
behalf of the Porte, in early summer of 1821 indicated not only that the Egyptian vali
was indeed involved in the early years of the Greek uprising. It also highlighted a
central concern of the Porte—that the Russian Empire, under Alexander I, was looking
to expand its foothold in southeastern Europe and to do that it was leveraging its ties to
the Orthodox coreligionists.570 Ever since the treaty of Küçük Kaynarca, and the
protector status claimed by Catherine II over Eastern Orthodox subjects in the Ottoman
Empire, officials in the Sublime Porte became increasingly wary of Russian influence
within the sultan’s domains.
The documents under discussion clearly reflect the Porte’s pre-established
worries that their Russian imperial adversaries were providing aid to the Greek rebels.
To offer further context, it was not only Russia’s efforts at cultivating ties with
Orthodox communities in the Ottoman Balkans, or the trouble that the Orlov revolt had
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caused previously for the Porte. Rather, concern both within the provincial and the
central spheres of the Ottoman world went far beyond the questions of historical
meddling on the part of Saint Petersburg. In the years immediately before the uprising,
influential pro-independence movements, such as the Filiki Eteria, [The Society of
Friends] had gained significant traction among the Greek subjects of the Ottoman
Empire.571
The Society of Friends was one of the most prominent groups of the time. A
pro-independence movement that originated in 1814 Russian-controlled Odessa, the
Friendly Society had become increasingly popular among the numerous Ottoman Greek
subjects across the empire. Under the administration of a Russian official (of French
extraction) the Duc de Richelieu, Greek migration had increased substantially at the
turn of the century in Odessa. The development of the new port on the Black Sea coast
went in line with the larger colonization project, as the city and the region became
increasingly important under Russian control post the 1792 Treaty of Jassy.572
Correspondingly, ties between the Ottoman Greek Orthodox of Odessa and the Russian
administrators increasingly solidified throughout the Napoleonic Wars. The closer the
Orthodox community became with Russians officials in Odessa, the easier it became for
Ottoman officials to suspect a Russian hand behind Greek Orthodox rebellions. While
authorities in Saint Petersburg remained highly suspicious of any sort of secret
societies, the active involvement of high-ranking individuals, most importantly,
Alexander Ypsilanti, had to raise doubts regarding the attitude of the Russian court
towards the Society’s plans. Due to its sizeable Greek population, its commercial
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importance, especially after its conversion to a porto franco, Odessa became the hub of
Greek political activity.573
Moreover, Ottoman official records show that the sultan and his officials were
aware of, and sensitive to, Russian-Greek cooperation even before the outbreak of the
war. A diplomatic memorandum sent to Mahmud II in 1817 indicated that Ottoman
officials in the Morea kept a close eye that the presence of Russian soldiers on
Orthodox corsair vessels in the Aegean.574 After the outbreak of hostilities in 1820,
the news of a potential Russian hand backing the rebels came as no surprise to the
Porte and only further added to the considerable concern about European imperial
involvement in revolts.
Given this general state of wariness, I argue that the letter from Mehmed Ali
to the Grand Vizier pointed to a far more proactive involvement of the Egyptian
governor in the early years of the conflict than had been previously imagined. After
all, the rebellion broke out in April of 1816, and within a few short weeks, the
governor of Egypt had already questioned the Russian consul in Cairo and reported
back to the Sublime Porte on his findings. This begs the question of whether Mehmed
Ali was actually indifferent to the developments, or was his response perhaps more
strategic and pragmatic than has previously been imagined.
New Russianist historical scholarship on Saint Petersburg’s involvement –
even if involuntary – underscored the importance of the Russian connection in the
early years of the revolt. Frary, who based his work on Russian and Greek sources,
wrote in his 2015 monograph:
The Greek War of Independence dragged the Russian Foreign Ministry into a
complex international entanglement affecting the broad region from the
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Balkans to the Nile to the Caucasus. The internationalization of the crisis
involved more than great power diplomacy: it resulted in a Russian–Ottoman
war, the devastation of Crete and the Morea by an Egyptian army, the arrival
of a French expeditionary force in the Peloponnese, a Russian blockade of the
Dardanelles, and the disruption of Black Sea commerce and communications.
575

However, while this new study underlines the complexity and the extensive
geographical implications that Russian involvement in the rebellion had on both North
Africa and the broader Ottoman world, very little North African scholarship has
focused on Mehmed Ali’s equally relevant and complex ties with Russian officials, or
Greek independence movements in Egypt. For example, Dodwell in the quote discussed
above pointed to the known presence of Greek independence movements in Egypt.576
However, he did not elaborate on which ones were active or how prevalent they had
become in Cairo or Alexandria. This is a general theme throughout the literature, as
more contemporary works by scholars such as Marsot and Fahmy have also overlooked
the early role of the vali in the revolts.
Unfortunately, we lack detailed information regarding the activity of Greek
independence movement in nineteenth-century Egypt, at least as can be found within
the registers of the Egyptian National Archives in Bulaq. However, it would not be a
stretch to speculate that such organizations, including The Society of Friends, had
grown increasingly popular in 1820s Alexandria—particularly given the cosmopolitan
nature of the city, the relative prominence of the local Greek community, and the role of
the city’s port as an eastern Mediterranean shipping hub.577
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Supporting this thesis, we see that in his correspondence with the Porte,
Mehmed Ali expressed a looming concern of Russian interference in the ongoing
revolts. For instance, we learn from Ottoman records that in March 1820 the governor
of Egypt traveled to Alexandria to meet the Russian Consul and discuss Saint
Petersburg’s involvement with the rebels in Morea.578 This was a different interview
(and indeed a different Russian Consul) than the audience Mehmed Ali had with Čivini
in the summer of 1821. Similarly, in a letter sent to his agent, Nacib Efendi, from June
1822, the vali passed along information he had received from his kathüda, Mehmed
Lazoğlu, regarding the possibility of Russia using the Greek Orthodox rebels in their
efforts to gain more leverage over the Ottoman Porte. Effectively, the pasha of Egypt
was requesting that his agent in Constantinople find out more information about the
contemporaneous state of affairs on the peninsula.579 Given the extent of
correspondence transmitted between Cairo and the Porte during the years prior to
Ibrahim Pasha’s 1825 landing in Morea, it would seem that the Egyptian Pasha’s role in
the early years of the conflict merits historiographical reconsideration.
Meanwhile in Tunis and Tripoli
Before delving into the Tripolitan and Tunisian role in the Ottoman Empire’s
efforts against the Greek war, it is important to step back and consider the situation
within the province during the 1820s. As we saw previously, Yusuf Karamanlı, much
like Mehmed Ali, was keenly interested in expanding both his economic as well as his
territorial footprint within the region, specifically into Bornu. However, unlike his
Egyptian neighbor, Yusuf’s primary objective in expansion to the south were driven
by the economic rationale of the province.
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In the case of Egypt, Fahmy challenged Marsot and Lawson’s reasoning that
economic incentive was the cornerstone of Mehmed Ali’s expansions.580 The
historian argued that the Egyptian vali’s expeditions in the Hijaz and in Morea were
only taken on after extensive prodding and incentivizing by the sultan and that these
efforts ultimately ended up costing the pasha more than he got out of them. However,
Fahmy was himself less convinced by this argument when it came to Mehmed Ali’s
expedition to Sudan. He stated, “[t]he Pasha might also have been lured by the alleged
abundance of rich gold mines in Sinnar. More important [still] was the need to
conscript the black Sudanese in the army he was contemplating and which he had
already undertaken the first steps to create.”581 In the case of Tripoli, it is even harder
to overlook the impact of the Congress of Vienna on the Tripolitan economy, and in
turn the extent to which the loss in provincial revenues impacted the expansion into
Bornu.
While Yusuf’s effort to make political use of the weakened state of Bornu post
the Sokoto invasion proved to be unsuccessful, his efforts in Cyrenaica and Fezzan at
suppressing the Bedouin communities revolting against his centralization efforts had
yielded better results. The governor of Tripoli managed, by way of a bloody massacre
very much akin to the massacre of the Mamluks in the Cairene citadel, to subdue the
Jwazi rebellion as well as to send a message to any would-be political rival in the
western part of the province about the extent of the governor’s reach.582 In doing so,
the Tripolitan pasha forced his strongest adversary, his eldest son Mohammed into
exile in Egypt.583 Despite these early efforts at political containment, the pushback
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against the Bey’s consolidation of power began to crystalize before the end of the
1820s. A compendium of internal pressures, spurred on by the bey’s increase in
taxation levies, the growing influx of European influence and traders in the province,
coupled with tensions within the Pasha’s family and the rapacious political appetite of
his older sons, all combined to gradually chip away Yusuf Bey’s hold on power.584 In
as much, while Yusuf Pasha attempted to rebuild his navy in the early 1820s, and by
extension his position in both the region and the broader Ottoman world, his
continued administration was under the greatest threat from within the city walls of
Tripoli itself.
By the mid-1820s, Tunis was under new leadership. The previous bey,
Mahmud ibn Muhammad was a cousin who had seized power from the reigning
dynastical branch of the family, and in turn his governorship was as complicated as it
was controversial.585 The death of Hammuda Pasha, the succession crisis of Uthman
ibn Ali, his subsequent assassination, and replacement by his cousin Mahmud ibn
Muhammad compound with the trouble of the economic downturn after the effective
end of the corso and the Congress of Vienna, while plague of 1818 further crippled
the economy.586 Collectively, these forces decimated Tunis.
The historical trajectory of Tunis was about to change. Mahmud ibn
Muhammad died in 1824 and was succeeded by, Hussien II, an accepted member of
the previously reigning Husainid to the Tunisian beylicate, that same year. The new
governor’s succession not only saw a change in leadership but also a positive shift in
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Tunisian socioeconomic stability. The popular support behind Hussien II’s
appointment to the beylicate was well known among both North African Ottoman
officials at the Porte. A memorandum to Sultan Mahmud II made note of the popular
resentment of the Mahmud Bey’s seizure of power.587
Upon his assumption in 1824, Hussien II was intent on rebuilding the province
and his fleet as quickly as possible. By August of that year, two short months after
assuming the beylicate, the governor of Tunis was in active discussions with his North
African counterparts and the Ottoman Porte regarding the expansion of his naval fleet,
and was already engaged in conversations regarding the assignment of North African
oarsmen to the Ottoman tersane.588 By the autumn of that year, Tunis sent a fleet of
ships to the Alexandrian dock where they were to be equipped and kitted for battle.589
Tunisian involvement in Egyptian preparations for the Morea campaign continued
throughout the next year and was not limited to either vessels or mariners. In an effort
to expand the province’s economy and to recoup some of the financial losses from the
downturn in trade with Europe, Tunis began to export grain to both Egypt and
Anatolia in preparation for the Morea campaign.590 This assistance was not
unidirectional in nature, either. Ottoman reports from 1824 indicate that an English
fleet was sailing off Tunisian waters in an effort to deter the new bey from expanding
its fleet. In response, he governor turned to both his North African neighbors and the
Porte for assistance. Soldiers where sent from Izmir to rendezvous whether Algerian
counterparts and from there were sent to Tunis to offer assistance to their Tunisian
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counterparts.591
This collegiality between the two provinces, and specifically between the dey
of Algiers and the bey of Tunis, was short lived. In September of the following year
(1825) the Asitane reprimanded the governors of both Tunis and Algiers for their
behaviors towards one another.592 An order was written to the Tunus Beylerbeyi and
to Mahmud Paşazade Hüseyin Paşa concerning the enmity between the peoples of
Algiers and Tunis. The Porte reprimanded the Tunisian governor for offering
sanctuary to escapees from the Algerian army. The Sultan had to deem this sort of
activity as inappropriate and damaging to the greater efforts of the Ottoman Empire
and demanded that the escapees should be rounded up and returned to Algiers.593
Overall however, relations between Tunis and the Ottoman court remained
overwhelmingly positive. In the summer of 1827, the Sultan wrote to his Grand
Admiral, the Serasker Mehmed Hüsrev Paşa, ordering the Admiral to award medals to
the Tunisian soldiers that were sent to accompany the new recruits in training. Given
their exemplary performance, the Porte felt extra recognition was due beyond the
standard salary and supplies given, as the Tunisians had set an example for other
officers from the provinces.594
The mid-1820s proved to be more complicated for the Tripolitan pasha. By
1825 the pasha was nearly sixty. He found himself confronting growing opposition
from a plethora of forces within Tripoli. First, and most dangerous to his continued
political rule, was the overzealous aspirations of his youngest son Ali who explicitly
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looked to overthrow him.595 The behaviors of the rebellious young man were further
complicated by the administrative overreach of the equally ambitious British consul,
Hanmer Warrington, as well as the growing dissatisfaction of the Tripolitan elite
about the ever-increasing influence of western and European residents within the
province. The three forces together proved to be an explosive cocktail.
One source of trouble for the pasha was the increasing prominence and
influence of Europeans, mostly from Malta, within the province. Over the course of
the early 1820s, the growing prominence of Maltese traders began to threaten that of
the province’s elite. Historically, Malta and Gozo were the islands most heavily
raided by the corsair campaigns, and its captives constituted the greatest percentage of
slaves held in the Tripolitan bagnios. Over the first two decades of the century
however, the sheer number of Maltese, as well as the growing prominence and wealth
of the community, was increasingly felt and resented by the local Tripolitan elite.596
Local disgruntlement grew after the turn of the century when control over the import
of specific foodstuffs and items, such as wine, enabled the Maltese in Tripoli to
establish a stronger foothold in the province’s economy. However, a controlled
monopoly over key imported goods was not the only reason for the growing
resentment of the new Maltese residents, who by the early 1820s counted in the
several hundred, in Tripoli.
Rather, it was equal parts the protection accorded to them by the influential
British consul, Warrington.597 After the 1814 Treaty of Paris, the Maltese archipelago
became an official colony of the British crown. Officially British colonial subjects,
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the Maltese of Tripoli were provided with the full protection and support of
Warrington and the British consular office.598 Local resentment, both in Yusuf’s
extended household as well as among the Tripolitan notables was further exasperated
by what was seen as Consul Warrington meddling in local affairs. In what Folayan
called the British diplomat’s efforts to “promote British influence”599 Warrington
extended the protection of British consular office even beyond British subjects and
colonial subjects. His new protégés came to include Bedouin sheikhs disputing with the
vali, rebelling factions from Fezzan such as the Gharian rebels in the late 1820s, as well
as the family of the exiled son of the governor, Mohammed whose family had been
granted asylum in the British funduk.600
Yusuf grew impatient; it seemed that Warrington’s hubris had finally caught
up him with him. The days where the consul was the pasha’s preferred confidant were
long over and in fact, by the late 1820s Warrington had fallen out of favor within the
Tripolitan palace. Yusuf, frustrated by the wave support that his exiled son
Mohammed was receiving as well as the ever-expanding reach of the British official,
went so far as to confront Warrington about his infamous nickname. Because of the
consul’s influence within the province, Warrington had earned the nickname ‘the
Bashaw of Tripoli’601 among the various European diplomats of the Mediterranean,
and was regularly referred to as such by his colleagues and peers.
The actually pasha however, was not amused. In an audience with Warrington,
Yusuf declared, “I am even told by other consuls that you are the Bashaw and not
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me.”602 Taken aback, Warrington denied an intentional overreach, and humbled
himself in front of the provincial governor.603 However, Yusuf was not the only
Tripolitan official irritated by the sway of European influence within the province. In
fact, the growing power of the British consul had become an explicit threat for the
Tripolitan government. In response, Yusuf appointed Hassuna D’Ghies as his new
chief and foreign minister. From a notable family, whose economic interests extended
throughout Tripolitania and from Timbuktu in the south and to Paris and Marseilles in
the north, D’Ghies was frustrated with the political status quo and the languishing
power of the province. First, he traveled to London on an official mission in 1821-3,
during which D’Ghies attempted to curtail the influence of the British consul, as well
as that of his French counterpart, Rousseau, within the province.604
Yusuf Pasha eventually appointed Hassuna D’Ghies as his Chief and Foreign
Minister in the early months of 1826. Throughout his tenure as Chief Minister, from
1826-1829, D’Ghies’ central objective was to extend Yusuf Pasha's political authority
within the province. In fact, the minister considered it his responsibility to help lift the
Tripoli pasha “from the state of degradation into which his authority and his revenue
have fallen.”605 First on his list was the British Consul Warrington and his French
counterpart, Rousseau. By April of 1826, D’Ghies implemented a new set of policies
in an effort to curtail the influence of the European diplomats. Most upsetting to
Warrington however, was the order he received to stop serving as the official
representative of not only Great Britain, but also to Austria, Portugal, Rome, Naples,
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Tuscany as well as the Kingdom of the Netherlands.606 Justifying the measure to
Yusuf Pasha through the framework of personal profit, and specifically through the
governor’s reduced income in consular presents from the several states that
Warrington represented, D’Ghies was successfully able to curtail the power of the
diplomat for hire.607
Further undermining the consul’s influence within the province was the
minister’s new regulations regarding disputes within the city. Throughout the first half
of the decade his influence became increasingly blatant— both in regards to the
protection the consular office gave to the growing Maltese community as well as the
refuge and protection that was similarly accorded to Tripolitan subjects, and namely
the influential opponents of the Bey, which pose the greatest threat to the continued
viability of Yusuf’s administration. To further limit the consul’s influence in the city
walls of Tripoli, D’Ghies instructed his agents in the government to begin a covert
propaganda campaign against the British consul and the British government.608 The
Tripolitan minister wanted the people of the regency to blame the British government
as the source of their own hardship, both socially as well as economically. According
to D’Ghies’ orders, both Yusuf’s imposition of tax increases, as well as the resented
prominence of the Maltese community were both squarely the fault of the British
consul. But the propaganda campaign had an unintended side effect. By the next year,
the Maltese of the province as well as the British diplomatic corps, and the consul’s
own family became the subjects of routine street harassment, assault and sometimes
murder.609 Folayan note that within the month of July 1826 alone, Warrington had
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chronicled three such attacks within the city of Tripoli itself.610
Despite the ongoing troubles with the province the governor remained
committed to provide as much support as possible to both the Porte and to his
Egyptian counterpart. It remains unclear as to whether Yusuf Karamanlı believed that
these measures would somehow deter the encroachment of both Ottoman as well as
Egyptian imperial interests into his province. However, what is clear from Ottoman
records is that the province of Tripoli remained extremely engaged in the ongoing
efforts in the lead up to Navarino as well as in the Russo-Ottoman war of 1828-1829.
Building an Egyptian Navy
From Ottoman and Egyptian sources alike, we can trace the extent of the
Egyptian pasha reliance on the fleets and the manpower of the North African provinces
during the Morea conflicts. The vali had used North African infantrymen before—
namely Bedouins from Cyrenaica, irregulars and mercenaries from the broader
Maghreb had fought in his campaigns in both the Hijaz and Sudan.611 Through his
correspondence with his agent in Constantinople, Nacib Efendi, we can see that the
Egyptian governor regularly supplemented his ground forces with North African
recruits from both Tripoli and Tunis in the years before his maritime involvement in
Crete and Morea.612 However, it was only after the outbreak of the uprisings in the
Morea that the extent of Mehmed Ali’s full involvement in the North African political
sphere began to crystalize and take shape.
The involvement materialized in the form of the Egyptian pasha’s direct
requests for North African troops and supplies. Mehmed Ali sent letters to the governor
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of Tripoli, Tunis and Algiers from as early as late June, 1821.613 The vali wrote to his
North African counterparts asking them to provide him with troops and provisions in
his efforts against the rebels. Along with his letters and requests, he included two fatvas
from the Ottoman Şeyh ül-İslam and the Emirü’l-mü’minîn in support of the request for
ships of war to be sent from the three provinces to Alexandria, where they were later to
rendezvous with the vessels of the Ottoman imperial fleet.614
The framing of the letter highlighted the North African provinces’ shared
Islamic obligation towards the Sultan and the empire, and would effectively foreshadow
the upcoming role of Mehmed Ali as the interlocutor between the North African
provinces and the Porte.615 This critical shift was extremely noteworthy, as until the
1820s, it was Algiers rather than Egypt that had overwhelmingly dictated the broader
imperial maritime policies of the region. A paradigm shift was taking place - rather than
contact the dey of Algiers primarily, and by extension the governors of Tripoli and
Tunis, the Ottoman Porte reached out to Mehmed Ali and an effort to secure ships and
mariners from the North African provinces.
Returning to Istanbul and the Porte’s records, we learn the fate of these requests
as well as of an active intervention of Mehmed Ali before his men landed in Crete. In
the Prime Ministerial Archives, we find a memorandum sent to Sultan Mahmud II from
December 1821, which indicates that Tunis, Tripoli and Algiers had in fact sent the
ships for Mehmed Ali’s efforts and in response to Mehmed Ali’s previous request. The
Maghrebi vessels had already arrived in Alexandria, and were then reinforced on the
orders of Mehmed Ali Pasha. After sailing from Egypt alongside the vessels of the
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Ottoman merchant navy, they dropped anchor in Rhodes for the winter and were to be
sent in various directions. The Tripolitan navy was rearmed and sent to the shores of
Cyprus. There, the authorities commissioned it help suppress rebel-led piracy and the
maritime insurrection that had broken out on the island. Meanwhile, the navies of Tunis
and Egypt would be sent with the merchant fleet, after weather allowed, to Dersaadet in
Istanbul. These engagements, both with the North African fleets as well as with the
Ottoman Porte had taken place before the Egyptian governor was offered the paşalık of
Crete and well before his son Ibrahim’s involvement in Morea.616
Despite the overwhelming body of historical evidence that indicates a proactive
response on the part of each of the North African provinces in the early years of the
revolt, one must maintain an accurate perspective of the Egyptian vali’s early interest in
the uprising. This is to say that if the Egyptian governor was driven mostly by his own
imperial ambitions—as has been argued in the literature—then it is clear that these
interests were not limited to either the eastern Mediterranean or Syria and Anatolia.
Rather, we see a demonstrable effort by the Egyptian governor to pull western
neighbors, and their resources, into his broader sphere of influence. Citing Douin,
Fahmy underscored the importance of territorial expansion in the strategies of Egyptian
vali during the lead up to the Morea campaign. As a French military adviser recorded,
the vali, in a moment of candor during their conversation in 1825, said:
I am now the most important man [I'homme du jour] in the entire Ottoman
Empire. I have returned the Holy Cities [of Mecca and Medina] to the true
believers; I have carried my victorious armies to places where the power of the
Grand Signor [i.e. the Ottoman Sultan] was not known, and to places whose
people had still not heard of gunpowder. My right arm, my son Ibrahim, will
conquer Morea and the moment his mission is crowned with success, I shall
call him back and return these lands to their legitimate master. I will call back
my forces, raise [new] conscripts, complete my regiments and then grab the
pashalıks of Damascus and Acre . . . I will organize une grande armee and I
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shall not stop except at the Tigris and Euphrates. 617
Fahmy mostly used the record of this conversation as the foreshadowing of the
vali’s eventual expansion into Syria and Anatolia, two expansions that took place over
the course of the next decade. While he was correct to argue that the governor’s desire
to carve out his own empire was a salient– if not the most salient- factor in the
governor’s decision making, I argue that it is also important to look at this quote in
regards to the events of the mid-1820s.
Tactically speaking, if a provincial governor such as Mehmed Ali wanted to
control the swath of territory from the Aegean islands south to the Greater Syria
coastline and beyond, then he would need maritime expertise of the Maghrebis to
secure the commercial and naval routes of the eastern Mediterranean Sea— a stretch of
water that constituted some of the most important trade routes for the Ottoman Empire.
In order to do so, said governor would need quick and ready access to commercial and
naval vessels, as well as to men who could operate the vessels and were familiar with
the trade routes and ports. Therefore, if we are to take the above quote at face value and
believe the vali when he spoke of his great Syrian ambitions, then we cannot limit our
attentions to the territories east of Alexandria in the framework of the governor’s
strategies for administering his potentially massive Syrian empire. After all, the Porte
had already begun to see the vali as an interlocutor in their dealings with his western
neighbors, while the provinces themselves began to fall under the Egyptian Pasha’s
influence and engage his requests for assistance. Besides, it would have been out of
character for an ambitious governor like Mehmed Ali to not want to make full use of
the recently under-employed corsairs of the North African coast, particularly when he
617
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was after so much coastline for his empire.
From the Ottoman sources, we see that Mehmed Ali was beginning to shape
himself into a new powerbroker in the Maghreb. From 1822, there was a significant
increase in Egypt’s maritime interest—both in regards to the expansion of the small
preexisting Egyptian fleet as well as to the construction and purchasing of new
vessels.618 At the same time, from Egyptian sources we also see a significant increase in
the attention that was paid to the Cypriot coastlines.619 As Mehmed Ali’s interest in the
maritime world of the Mediterranean became increasingly obvious, so too did the
records of his correspondence with North African governors about their fleets and
mariners. The more Mehmed Ali focused on the sea, the more his attentions turned
westward, and in turn, manifested into requests for support from the governors of
Algiers, Tunis and Tripoli.
By the following winter, Egyptian governor’s growing involvement in the
Maghrebi and the Mediterranean worlds had grown in complexity. In two separate
letters, the vali reached out to Algiers and to Tripoli. On February 27, 1823, Mehmed
Ali wrote to the dey of Algiers expressing his gratitude for the dey’s support and for
generously providing the governor of Egypt with a laundry list of previously requested
supplies. The Egyptian governor wrote that the Porte’s best interests could only be
served if the two men continued to work together and that they had common goals and
desires for the broader region.620
Similarly, in a letter written to Yusuf Karamanlı of Tripoli, Mehmed Ali wrote
that he was equally appreciative of the positive exchanges and the ‘sense of trust and
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loyalty between the two parties’ In acknowledgment to the Tripolitan governor’s
graciousness, Mehmed Ali sent a gift of ten horses with saddles, ten swords of gold,
250 kilos of sugar, 250 kilos of coffee, 800 kilos of gunpowder, 200 ardeb measures of
rice, and ten shilen length of cashmere to demonstrate Egypt’s continued goodwill and
friendship towards its Tripolitan neighbor.621 Over the course of the next year, the
Egyptian governor’s maritime expansion became increasingly successful and his forces
effectively put down the last of the Cretan rebels, clearing Sfakia in 1824.
However, the Peloponnesian expansion was not enough to abate the territorial
avarice of the Egyptian vali. Fahmy was correct to argue that Mehmed Ali had more
ambitious plans for the region of the eastern Mediterranean, namely on the four paşalıks
of Syria. By the mid-1820s however, Mehmed Ali was nevertheless ready to assist the
Porte in its efforts in the Aegean Sea. Entrusting his son Ibrahim with the task of
subduing Morea, the vali soon began preparing an army of his new Egyptian conscripts
to sail from the shores of Alexandria. Ibrahim Pasha was placed in command of the
forces and named the vali of Morea. However, his appointment as the governor of the
region did little to secure Ibrahim’s direct command over his forces and his fleet.
Perhaps the most troublesome point of contention between Mehmed Ali and the
Porte was the assignment of Hüsrev Pasha to the post of the Kapudan Pasha of the fleet.
Despite his humbling failures as the deposed vali of Egypt, Hüsrev’s bureaucratic career
had advanced within the sultan’s domains. By the time of his appointment as Grand
Admiral in 1822, Hüsrev had served as the governor of several provinces including
Salonica, Bosnia, Silistre, a brief stint in Tunis as the military commander under
Hammuda Pasha, as well as the Admiral of the Black Sea fleet.622 In the years
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following his Alexandrine departure, Hüsrev had grown increasingly influential at the
Porte, and in doing so he became indispensable to Mahmud II’s reform attempts. Both
Philliou and Aksan note that the admiral was a lifelong supporter of the traditional
patronage systems within the Ottoman bureaucratic structures; “the hallmark of
Hüsrev’s long career was his adherence to the system of slavery and patronage in which
he had been brought up.”623 Walsh, an Irish physician and the clergyman to the British
embassy in Constantinople in the early nineteenth century wrote of Hüsrev’s practices:
Hussereff Mehmed Pasha who for thirty years was constantly engaged in
buying up children in Georgia and Circassia, to educate them for different
offices of the Turkish empire...The Greek insurrection had now
commenced...The efficacy of European discipline had at this time just begun
to conquer the prejudices of the Turks, and Hussereff also endeavored to
introduce it into his fleet, particularly among the marines. 624
From this quote, we can glean two important observations about the new
admiral of the fleet. First, throughout his successful career as an Ottoman bureaucrat,
Hüsrev remained explicitly committed to the devşirme practice of collecting young,
Christian male slaves funneled young men from the Caucasus into the heart of the
Ottoman Empire and from there, enabling the rise of a select few to some of the highest
offices within the empire—through the very same patronage networks that Gazi Hasan
Pasha, Küçuk Hussien Pasha, and Hüsrev had used, and the same that Mehmed Ali had
so brazenly circumvented in his rise to power in Egypt. Secondly, we learn that Hüsrev
was keenly interested in implementing a new set of naval reforms. Much like Gazi
Hasan before him, Hüsrev believed a new navy, based largely on western European
models, would enable the Ottoman flotilla to overcome the challenges that it faced in
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regards to the growing presence of Russian commerce in the Black Sea as well as with
the maritime excursions of the rebels off the shores of Morea. It is in these two points
that we find the foreshadowing for the admiral’s troubles with Ibrahim Pasha, their
constant conflicts, and tactical head-butting in Navarino and beyond, their incessant
quarreling over naval formations off the coast of Morea, as well as the lingering
resentment that Hüsrev Pasha towards the vali of Egypt, Mehmed Ali.
After all, Hüsrev Pasha was not originally granted the paşalık of either Salonica,
Bosnia or Silistre, but rather of Egypt. As the governor of one of the empire’s wealthiest
and most important provinces, the position of Mısır valisi carried with it a great deal of
prestige and wealth, both of which Hüsrev was denied after his embarrassing capture
during the ‘Fiasco of the Donkeys.’625 It was not surprising, therefore, that Hüsrev
maintained a longstanding resentment towards the Egyptian governor. This antipathy
would soon be projected on to the admiral’s ceaseless quarrels with none other than
Ibrahim Pasha during their efforts in the Morea campaign.626
North Africans in the Eastern Mediterranean
The question remains, what was the specific role of the North African fleets in
Mehmed Ali’s efforts against the rebels? Ottoman sources provide particularly useful
insights into the issue. From the Porte’s records, we can see that by November of 1823,
while Hussein Bey was fighting the insurrection in Crete, he received news from Tunis
that some Greek Orthodox rebels fell into captivity during a battle with Tunisian
ocaks.627 They commandeered an English ship, and took the rebels to Malta to be
interrogated. Similarly, in a report to the sultan from the spring of 1824, we learn that
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eight Tripolitan ships were equipped and attached to the sultan’s fleet, and that the
Tripolitan governor had promised the addition of more ships to be expected as soon as
they were completed the following months.628 While the North African fleets were
actively involved in the ongoing troubles, the Alexandrine shipyards were brimming
with activity.
By that summer, in July 1824, Ibrahim Pasha’s campaign in the Morea was
underway. The vali’s eldest son departed from Alexandria with an extensive force. The
commander was accompanied by 17,000 infantrymen, four artillery battalions and 700
cavalrymen.629 However, the rebels enjoyed the strategic advantage of a rugged
coastline and a familiarity with the local coastline and waterways; Ibrahim and his
forces were therefore unable to dock safely until February of 1825.630 The pasha’s slow
start was quickly offset by a rapid succession of victories in the field during the summer
of 1825. By early autumn of that year, news reached Mehmed Ali in Cairo, by way of a
letter from Ibrahim in Morea, that his men were regularly stopping shipments of British
aid intended for the Greek rebels. However, this early support from European allies did
little to shift the tide towards the rebel’s favor. By April of the following year, the
military reforms of the Egyptian vali’s new army were proving to be largely successful.
Having put down the insurrections within the Morean peninsula, Ibrahim Pasha united
with Reşid Mehmed Pasha, the Rumeli Governor and Serasker of the Ottoman army in
northern Greece in Third Siege of Missolonghi and Ottoman forces captured the
mainland city.631
As the combined Ottoman-Egyptian forces were focusing their efforts on
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capturing Missolonghi that we start to see the vali’s most ardent attacks on the Ottoman
Grand Admiral, Hüsrev Pasha in the Egyptian records. In his letter sent to the Porte on
April 13, 1826 —three short days after the city had fallen – the Egyptian governor
wrote to the Grand Vizier complaining about Hüsrev Pasha’s tactical incompetence.
According to him, the latter lacked experience in both naval and ground formations and
even the official’s mandubs [deputies] were unable to mediate between the admiral and
the Egyptian vali or his son. Nevertheless, the ongoing struggle for power between the
two was just beginning to unfold.632
Tensions worsened— by winter of the following year, the Egyptian governor
forced the hand of the sultan. In February 1827, Hüsrev Pasha was removed from the
command of the admiralty and the Ottoman fleet was put under the de facto control of
Ibrahim Pasha. However, the Ottoman conquest of Missolonghi had consequences that
went far beyond the personal career prospects of Hüsrev Pasha. The Ottoman conquest
of the mainland city attracted a great deal of European attention and sympathy for the
rebels’ cause. Paintings by the French romantic artist Eugène Delacroix and operas
composed by Gioachino Rossini helped to solidify both popular opinion and official
European supports for the Greek Orthodox insurgency. Philhellenism was à la mode.633
As the combined Ottoman-Egyptian efforts were making headway against the
Greek revolts, the engagement of North African ships with both the official Ottoman
fleet as well as Mehmed Ali’s forces, both of which were being equipped in the
Alexandrian shipyards, became increasingly prevalent during 1824 and into 1825. The
vali, had done everything in his power throughout the early 1820s to develop the
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Alexandrine shipyards, and had commissioned North African, as well as French sailors
and engineers into the construction of his new fleet. In a particularly vivid report sent to
Mehmed II on August 14, 1825, we learn that the Kaptan-ı Derya Hüsrev Pasha had
sent a report to Dersaadet recommending a Tripolitan corsair, the Kaptain Küçük
Mehmed for an award of bravery.634 Using his own brig, the Tripoltan ocak organized
an attack on Greek rebels in the strait off the island of Sisam [Samos]. After heavy
fighting, the Greek fire ship, the Kontra Mizata, lit fire to his mast, leaving only 13 of
the 105-man crew alive. Subsequently, Küçük Mehmed Kaptan left a trail of
gunpowder from the head of the ship to the ammunition depot and then lit it. He and
his remaining crew members jumped in the water as the ship exploded, destroying
several enemy ships in the vicinity.635
From Ottoman and Egyptian sources alike, we further learn of the involvement
and requisitioning of North African vessels by Mehmed Ali for the Morea. An
October 17, 1825 notice informed Mahmud II that the ships in the imperial fleet, as
well as vessels from Tunis, Tripoli and Egypt were repaired, equipped, and sailing for
Missolonghi to support Ottoman efforts after the capture the mainland city.636 From
Egyptian records we find corresponding reports of these maritime preparations. In a
letter to the Grand Vizier, Mehmed Ali outlined his response the sultanic edict he
received and informed the Vizier that he had readied a supporting fleeting to provide
reinforcement for Ibrahim Pasha. The vali equipped a significant flotilla comprising
of thirty-one ships belonging to the sultan’s imperial fleet, four ships that had been
sent to him by the dey of Algiers, twenty-three other ships of war that were purchased
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on the vali’s order, another two ships specifically kitted for the Emirü’l-mü’minîn,
along with ten other bukhairas, and an additional twelve corsair ships which the letter
identified as Egyptian, but which were most likely were either manned and operated
or purchased from the corso provinces. Further adding to the already substantial
force, Mehmed Ali rented the vessels of thirteen Egyptian traders as well as those of
twenty-three foreign traders in Alexandria. In sum, the total number of vessels that
were to leave Alexandria’s harbor was one hundred and eighteen.
This was a massive fleet. The vali had effectively transformed the maritime
status of Egypt. By recruiting most of North African sailors that had effectively been
unemployed in the post-corso years of the 1820s, as well as the same French and
Maltese firms that previously had contracts with the ports of Benghazi and Tripoli, the
governor of Egypt had successfully channeled the market for maritime labor from the
regencies to Egypt. From the governor’s records, we learn that Mehmed Ali was
looking to build his fleet along European lines and used several smaller corvettes to
match the sailing schooners used by the rebels.637 This compelling fact, not only
underscores Egypt’s broader ties to both the Ottoman Maghreb but also to the world
of the Mediterranean. Not only was governor looking to make the most of his naval
ambitions, the languishing dockyard labor of his western neighbors, as well as the
growing attention of the Porte on the behaviors of his Greek Orthodox adversaries.
Mehmed Ali informed the Grand Vizier that to amass this significant force he
had spent 1,336,000 and had provided the sum of 705,000 monies to be given to
Hüsrev, the Kapudan Pasha.638 The following day, the governor wrote a similar letter
to the sultan in Constantinople. From it we learn that in addition to the significant
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flotilla waiting in the docks of Alexandria, Mehmed Ali had also readied ground troop
reinforcements, whose mission was to first dock in Crete, deliver supplies to Egyptian
forces on island then continue north to meet Ibrahim Pasha in Morea. North African
vessels continued to aid the Ottoman war efforts throughout the length of the
campaign in Morea.639 In the autumn of 1826, Tripolitan vessels under the charge of
Tayyer Bey set sail to provide maritime and ground reinforcement directly to Hüsrev
Pasha. In fact, the only lull in North African vessels participation corresponded with
the October 20, 1827 destruction of the Ottoman fleet in the Battle of Navarino.
Tripoli Undone, Tunis Redone
Yusuf’s problems extended beyond the realm of growing European influence.
As the provincial economy gradually declined post-1818, the Tripolitan governor
found himself facing a resurgence of the internal threats that had threatened his hold
on power a few years back. While the sociopolitical conditions within the province
continued to deteriorate, support for Mohammed, the governor’s exiled son in Egypt,
continued to grow among the Tripolitan people and the Bedouin clans to the east.640
However, his eldest son was not the only threat that the Pasha faced from within his
immediate family.
The Pasha’s youngest, and most ambitious son, Ali Bey was also proving to be
an increasingly viable danger. Tensions escalated further when Mehmed Ali of Egypt
had tried to mediate between the estranged Mohammed and the Tripolitan governor.
Because of the Egyptian vali’s influence, Mohammed was eventually able to return to
the province as the bey of Derna for a short time. However, this was by no means the
end of the conflict between the father and son. During a subsequent outbreak of
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plague in the city of Derna, the Tripolitan governor explicitly forbade his son, or his
family, from entering the city of Tripoli. Their relations soon deteriorated and
Mohamed soon found himself exiled in Egypt once again, while Ali Bey took his
family hostage, locking them in the Tripolitan castle.641 With little choice,
Mohammed once again took flight to Egypt where he eventually died in 1828. The
records of the Egyptian National Archives do not hold documents specifically relating
to the Egyptian governor’s mediation between the two Tripolitan officials. What we
find instead is a very curiously worded letter sent from Tripoli to Cairo right before
the death of Mohammed in Egypt.
The circumstances surrounding the death of the Tripolitan governor’s son
remain unclear. However, in the months before his death Mehmed Ali received a
letter from the British Consul to Tripoli, Warrington. In his letter, the British official
informed the pasha that he would be traveling to Egypt on unofficial business and
requested that he have an audience with the vali and be accorded the proper
permissions for his travels.642 What was particularly striking about this seemingly
innocuous letter was that foreign officials and diplomats typically received the
according letters of introduction and permissions from the Foreign Office in London
or from the respective governor that their consulate served in, not the one of the
territory they look to visit. It remains unknown whether the Tripolitan governor, or his
youngest son, Ali, were in anyway involved in the death of the exiled bey apparent.
Speculation aside, what we do know was that six months later the eldest of the three
brothers, Mohammed was found dead. Tensions between the two surviving sons of
Yusuf Pasha, Ahmed and Ali came to a head, to the point where Warrington
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expressed his concern about the outbreak of war between the brothers upon Yusuf
Pasha’s death.643 In a grim twist of fate, Warrington reported that while still a young
boy Ali had apparently expressed his desire to do as Yusuf had done before him:
eliminate both his older brothers and his aging father, and assume the governorship of
Tripolitania for himself.644 The pasha confided in Consul Warrington of his dismay
with the infighting between his two surviving heirs. Nevertheless, Yusuf attempted to
remove himself directly from the quarrel.645 The infighting between the two surviving
brothers foreshadowed the dynastic rivalry in Tripoli a decade later, the same one that
eventually brought down the House of Karamanlı and reintroduced direct Ottoman
administration of the province.
Political one-upmanship was by no means limited to the direct line of
Karamanlı men. In the late 1820s, we learn of the final act between the Pasha and his
former chief of the Marine, Murad Ra’is, the Scottish renegade born Peter Lysle.
Murad, who was also Yusuf’s son-in-law, had fallen out with the Tripolitan
governor.646 With little choice but to seek haven first in the British consulate and then
arrange his escape to Egypt, it seemed that the aging governor was eliminating all
viable opposition to his rule.647 Despite eliminating Murad however, the feud between
Ahmed and his younger brother Ali raged on, and would eventually cost Yusuf the
paşalık in 1832.
From British diplomatic records we see that in the mid-to-late 1820s, the
governor of Tripoli had introduced a “new mode of drilling”648 among his men his
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men that was very much along the same lines as the military reforms of Mehmed Ali
in Egypt. In fact, in what the French Consul of Tripoli explicitly referred to as
Yusuf’s ‘nizam djedide,’649 the similarities between the Egyptian governor’s new
military organizations and the overhaul introduced in Tripoli were explicit. Folayan
argued that European consuls saw the actions of the Tripolitan pasha as conducted
“probably in imitation of Muhammed Ali of Egypt.”650 Moreover, European consular
records indicating a connection between the military reforms of Egypt and Tripoli
suggested that the military administration systems of the North African provinces
were far more interwoven than previously imagined.
From British records we are able to glean further insights into the efforts of the
Tripolitan pasha and his military reforms of the age. Yusuf had reached out, through
the French consul, to recruit French assistance in the training of his new officers.651
While his attempt was ultimately unsuccessful, we are able to contextualize it in the
Pasha’s efforts at reforms, which simultaneously included the regular purchase of
British made firearms and ammunition through the British firm of H. Fatham, which
were coordinated through the offices of the British Consul to Tripoli, Warrington.652
The outbreak of the Morean revolt led Tripoli, much like Tunis and Egypt, to
revive its maritime forces. Immediately after the Congress of Vienna, The Tripolitan
governor had all but abandoned his pre-existing naval fleet, to the point where the
governor was officially rebuked for the insignificant size of his fleets buy an official
Ottoman convoy from Constantinople in 1823.653 Over the next year however,
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Tripolitan maritime capacity was about to grow, exponentially. From 1823-4, Yusuf
Karamanlı began reinforcing his navy and the fortifications of the city. He refortified
the city walls and increased its munitions to 170 guns. Much like his neighbor to the
east, Yusuf shifted his attentions to the ship builders of Malta to reinforce his fleet.
Specifically, the Tripolitan governor turned to the firms of Hunter and Ross in Malta,
which alongside the vessels that Giuseppe Muscat, produced for the naval fleet in
Benghazi under contract.654
These commissions, which mirrored the contracts the Mehmed Ali had with
the French engineer, M. de Cerisy, significantly increased the size of the Tripolitan
fleet in record time. By 1828, the Tripolitan navy had twenty-eight vessels, and was
regularly engaging in the ongoing efforts against the Greek rebellion.655
These findings are also consistent with the records of the Porte. In the summer
of 1825, Tripolitan vessels became increasingly active in the Ottoman efforts for
Morea. In July of that year, the tersane-i amire [imperial arsenal] contacted the three
corso provinces requesting that each territory provide oarsmen for the naval
engagements off Morea.656 Tayyar Bey was appointed commander of the Tripolitan
faction and worked with Hüsrev and Ibrahim Pasha in coordinating the tactical
preparation of the North African seamen.657 This pattern continued before and after
the Battle of Navarino.
It was only after the extensive losses off Navarino Bay, which decimated the
fleets of all the North African provinces, as well as those of the Sultan, that the
Tripolitan governor diverged from his Egyptian counterpart in the Porte’s efforts
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against Russia. In that, while Mehmed Ali refused to support further the Sublime
Porte in the war of 1828,658 Yusuf Karamanlı outfitted and sent five ships to meet
with sultan’s imperial fleet in April of 1829.659 Moreover, by July of that year, the
Tripolitan shipyard had prepared additional vessels, manned by corsairs, to offer
further logistical support in the war effort.660
In Tunis
As Tripoli was facing an era of mounting internal pressures, the situation
within Tunis was brought a renewed period of relative stabilization under the new
administration of Hussein Bey and his government. However, there was no denying
that the troubles of the previous decade, combined with the end of the corso, had
hindered the Tunisian economy. In the 1820s, the Tunisian currency underwent
devaluation and the growing competition from European merchants had taken its
toll.661 Nevertheless, despite mounting socio-economic pressure, the new pasha was
eager to demonstrate his continued alliance and fealty to the Porte.
From Ottoman records we can trace that the coronation of Hussein
corresponded with a rapid expansion of the Tunisian naval fleet. The governor
provided regular reports and updates to the Ottoman center about the activities of new
Tunisian ships or additional mariners in their effort against the Greek Orthodox
rebels. And, as in the case of Tripoli, Tunisian support for the Porte’s efforts in Morea
continued after the losses at Navarino, and the subsequent outbreak of war with
Russia in 1828.
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Interestingly, the expenses for these maritime improvements, which were
extensive in their own right, were far costlier for the financially insolvent Tripoli and
Tunis. Both Tripoli and Tunis’s pashas poured massive amounts of their already
limited reserves into expensive maritime expansions. Surviving North African and
Ottoman sources do not point to the logic behind the governors’ strategy in their
unwavering support for the Porte at a time of financial instability. We are left to
wonder if Hussein Bey and Yusuf Karamanlı believed that by supporting the Porte
and Egypt in the Morean efforts they would be able to secure their respective hold on
power, or if they believed that somehow, their participation against their European
powers that had effectively cut off their corso revenues a few years before would
eventually allow them to resume the practice. Records only indicate the consequences
and sadly not the causes of the policy.
Regardless, it was clear that both governors were eager to pour massive
amounts of money into the expansion of their fleets and, by extension, the naval
capacities of both the Egyptian governor and the Ottoman sultan. This, naturally, had
massive consequences on the economic health of the provinces. We know from
Tunisian sources that by 1829, Hussein Bey had accrued a deficit surmounting two
million piasters and that the province was experiencing a devastating drought.662
Ottoman sources also provide rich insights into the tumultuous political
relationship between Tunis and Algiers in the late 1820s. While Hussein Bey was
eager to cooperate with Mahmud II, he was far more reticent to offer any support to
Algiers in its ongoing crisis with the French. In fact, after his extensive naval losses
in the Battle of Navarino, Hussein Bey reportedly have said that he would not offer
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support or assistance to his western neighbors even if Mahmud II were to order him
with a “hundred firmans”663 to do that. Rathethe Tunisian government sent the
congratulatory delegation to the French Marshal de Bournmont upon his conquest of
Algiers.664
The Warning Signs
Reading Egyptian sources we learn that the Battle of Navarino was not an
unexpected event. Ibrahim’s assessment of British interests in Morea and the detailed
correspondence he maintained with his father throughout the campaign point to the
growing concern about European involvement and their role in the Morea. In what
Fahmy referred to as the Morean “last straw,”665 the growing frustration between the
Porte and Cairo is increasing present in the text. Ibrahim informed the vali of the
growing European support that the rebels were accruing in Morea. In turn, the vali
notified the Ottoman Porte about the grave need of the Porte to open negotiations with
the insurgents. However, the Porte did not act.
In a wonderful letter from Mehmed Ali to Nacib Effendi, his agent in
Constantinople, the Egyptian vali wrote heavy-heartedly of his failure to convince the
Porte of an impending disaster and his inability to confront European forces head on.
He wrote:
Regarding the present situation there are two issues worth thinking of. The
first is that the moves of the Europeans are merely a bluff; the second is that
the fleets will, in fact, try to intercept our navies. If they are only bluffing then
this is exactly what we want…If, therefore, the Europeans are not
bluffing…then we have to realize that we cannot stand up against them, and
the only possible outcome [if we do so] will be sinking the entire fleet and
causing the death of up to 30 or 40 thousand men…Then it will be said that
Mehmed Ali Pasha was the cause of this disaster and my name will always be
stained with such a disgrace…Taking the responsibility of wasting thirty or
663
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forty thousand lives is no easy task. I have, therefore, stopped sending letters
to my son encouraging him to fight on…Unfortunately, my dear friend,
although we are men of war (ehlli harbdan), yet we are still in [the
rudimentary level] of that art[.] [W]hereas the Europeans are way ahead of us
and have put their theories (about war) into practice…(Contemplating all of
this) one thinks of accepting the lesser of two evils, namely, the principle of
independence (for the Greeks) and (conducting it through) Austrian mediation.
This will mean unfortunately that… all the effort and money that I have put
into this affair will have been wasted together with my soldiers and
officers…Here I am at a loss: shall I be grieved at the calamity of the Sublime
State (devlet-i aliyye) or at my lost effort? I am, therefore, most sorrowful and
anguished. 666
Growing European support for the rebels took a toll on the pasha; the events of
the autumn further justified the pasha’s sense of dread. On 20 October, 1827 both the
Ottoman and the Egyptian fleet were destroyed within the span of an afternoon. The
collective efforts that Mehmed Ali, and the North African provinces had allocated to
fighting on behalf of the sultan, had gone to waste. Mehmed Ali was furious. And he
knew where to assign blame. Fahmy succinctly wrote, “[Mehmed Ali] was convinced
that this heavy loss was not caused by any oversight on his part, nor was it the result
of any negligence by his son, Ibrahim. Rather, he was adamant that the disaster at
Navarino was a direct result of the Porte’s intransigence and, specifically, of Hüsrev’s
incompetent interference – an opinion shared by many in the Ottoman capital.”667
Fahmy was right—Ibrahim Pasha was likely a more skilled military commander than
the recently retired Grand Admiral of the Ottoman fleet. But there is also a significant
distinction in the nature of sources available.
While the Egyptian National Archives contain the intimate as well as official
exchanges between Ibrahim Pasha and his father in Cairo and the letters between the
vali and his representatives across the empire, the records available from of the
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Ottoman Porte lack the corresponding subjectivity. Sultan Mahmud II and Hüsrev’s
private mulling about the secret ambitions of the Egyptian governor and his son were
simply not preserved within the official paperwork of the Ottoman Empire or the
reports about the military campaigns in the Morea.
Source imbalance aside, the losses of Navarino were disastrous for both the
vali of Egypt and for the Porte. Ottoman mismanagement of the day-to-day
administration of the battalions and supplies had, much like the Egyptian governor
predicted, led to the loss over 40,000 of the pasha’s troops.668 The ones that did
survive were now facing a new set of challenges. Ibrahim’s four-month grain supply
stored off the bay of Navarino was set on fire. His collective forces had less than a
thirty day supply of rations remaining and little likelihood of replenishing their
provisions and supplies, as European ships had quickly prevented the vali’s supply
from reaching the ports.669
The Dust Settles After Navarino
From Egyptian and British records alike, we know that Ibrahim Pasha’s return
to Alexandria on October 14, 1828, seven days shy of the one-year anniversary of the
destruction of the sultan and his father’s treasured fleet off the Bay of Navarino.670 It is
from the extensive correspondence that Ibrahim had with his father, as well as the
exchanges that the governor had with Constantinople that we learn of the extreme
difficulties Egyptian forces based in the peninsula as well as the continued activity of
Tunisian and Tripolitan mariners against the rebels.
Fahmy made clear that Mehmed Ali foresaw and warned the Porte about the

668

Mehmed Ali to Nagib Effendi 13 Rabia Akhar, 1243. DWQ, Khedival Folios.
ibid.
670
Mehmed Ali to Katkhoda of Egypt 4 Rabia Akhar 1244. DWQ, Khedival Folios.
289
669

Msdfasd

dangers of directly confronting European powers. However, after the disastrous losses
of Navarino, the historian wrote, “Mehmed Ali refused to listen to these stubborn and
unrealistic demands of the Porte [for Ibrahim Pasha to continue on in Morea] and
proceeded to sign a treaty with the European powers guaranteeing the safety of his
son's withdrawal from the Greek mainland.”671 What Fahmy did not discuss however,
was that Ibrahim Pasha evacuation from Morea did not take place for another full year
after the defeat of Navarino. It is only in the context of that year and the extreme
hardship faced by both his son and his troops that we can fully understand Mehmed
Ali’s later confrontation with the Porte in Syria. Moreover, it is from the records of
that year that we can examine the extent to which the Egyptian vali’s and his North
African counterparts remained committed to their efforts in the Morea even after the
losses of Navarino.
This leads to the question of why Fahmy, who so carefully analyzed and
narrated the details of the Morea expedition up until the naval losses, would entirely
omit the narrative of last year of the campaign—which arguably included some of the
more dramatic correspondence between Ibrahim Pasha and his father. Returning to
Fahmy’s source, Rene Cattaui’s Le Regne de Mohamed Aly d'apres les archives
russes en Egypte did not further elucidate the historical silence, as the source that
Fahmy cited was a letter dated from the following summer: on 11 August 1828.672
Further examination of this historiographical discrepancy leads to an interesting, and
similarly mistaken finding within a published primary sources from the time.
In the British Annual Register of 1828, published in London for Baldwin and
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Cradock by C. and J. Rivington in 1829, we can uncover more context for the
historiographical question mark regarding this last year of Egyptian presence in
Morea. Within the Register, the events of Ibrahim Pasha’s time on the peninsula as
well as his evacuation under the auspices of his father’s accord with Admiral
Codrington were described as follows:
Ibrahim found himself condemned to inactivity, and condemned moreover to
starvation if he remained in the Morea. The exhausted country itself could not
supply his army; the sultan, combating for existence in the north, had no aid to
spare for his friends in the south; and all communication with Egypt was
prevented by the presence of the allied fleets... His scruples regarding the
honestly of giving up his post without the authority of the [G]rand [S]ignor
were overcome by the authority of his father, the Pacha of Egypt, with whom
[A]dmiral Codrington arranged the evacuation of the Morea dated the 6th of
August, 1827…673
It is correct that the treaty between Mehmed Ali Pasha and Admiral
Codrington was signed on a 6th of August. However, it was signed on the 6th of
August the following year, in 1828 rather than 1827 as described above. Simply put, it
would have been unnecessary for the governor of Egypt to have signed any treaty
with a British admiral in the summer of 1827. Ibrahim was still relishing in the recent
victory of at Missolonghi and philhellenism had just begun to gain popular support in
Europe. The Treaty of London which secured the support and assistance of the Greek
rebels by Britain, France and Russia was not signed and ratified until July 1827 and
the naval catastrophe that Mehmed Ali so dreaded in the Battle of Navarino would not
take place until that autumn, in October 20th, 1827. It is likely that this typographical
error on the part of the Baldwin and Cradock is what has led to some of the
historiographical confusion. Reading the chronology as presented in 1829 provides
the reader with a sense of the relatively immediate evacuation of Egyptian forces after
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the Battle of Navarino. Adding to the confusion still was that the dates of the naval
battle were not explicitly mentioned in the description within the Annual Register.
Rather, it is only by reading the conditions of the treaty, that one can discern
the post-Navarino scenario that the Register was discussing. For example, “Article
1.—‘His highness Mehemet Ali Pacha engages to give up all persons under his
control made slaves after the battle of Navarin, who will be sent to Egypt, and will
immediately place them at the disposal of admiral Codrington.”674 However, one
needs to be explicitly mindful of the date of the Battle of Navario, and moreover,
familiar with Ibrahim Pasha’s surviving correspondence in the Cairene Dar al
Wathai’q to be able to pinpoint this historiographical error and to know for certain
that the timeline, as presented above, was simply wrong.
This historiographical oversight was not limited to the influential monograph
or printed primary sources mentioned above. Rather, it is representative of and our
broader understanding and scholarship of Ibrahim’s Morea campaign. Dodwell, who
focused heavily on the role of the Greek insurrection in shaping the Egyptian policy,
similarly glossed over the final year of Ibrahim’s Morea campaign. He wrote
“Ibrahim’s army returned starved, crippled and miserable. Many where so worn by
privations that they could not march.”675 Similarly, in her study of Mehmed Ali, Afaf
Marsot’s discussion of the affair was similarly brief, and limited to the hunger and
lack of resources. She wrote:
Ibrahim's reports from the Morea revealed that the troops were sick and
starving; consequently, some regiments had revolted, some had deserted and
tried to make their way to Rumelia by land, killing and stealing on their way.
The rest were reduced to eating animals which had died, and even to eating
pigs. … supplies never reached Ibrahim and daily reports of starvation reached
the wait, as well as news of mutiny, for if the men were ready to die in battle
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they were not willing to die of starvation. 676
These examples are the closest we have to a full analysis of Ibrahim’s time in
Morea post-Navarino. A few sparing lines in full-length monographs, neither of
which mention the Pasha’s military efforts after losses on the peninsula nor the extent
of time Egyptian troops remained in the Morea after the naval losses. Working from
Ottoman and Egyptian records sources however, we are able to piece together a very
different picture than the one presented in the current historiography.
The Hunger and Resentment Grow
By the winter of 1827, the vali of Egypt would receive near-daily reports
regarding the hunger and frustrations of his men.677 After their victory, European
powers worked quickly to prevent any supplies from reaching Ottoman garrisons.
Much as Ibrahim Pasha had predicted, the conditions and morale were so bleak in the
winter that the remaining Egyptian force had effectively fallen to shambles. However,
the growing desperation of his son and his men were by no means the only
communication that the Egyptian governor sent, or was sent, regarding the condition
of Ibrahim’s troops in the Morea.
One month after the Battle of Navarino, in November 1827, before their
supplies ran out and the hunger set in, we learn that Mehmed Ali had written to the
Porte urging for his son’s continued stay in Morea. News had reached Cairo that
Constantinople was considering the possible withdrawal of Ibrahim Pasha and the
remaining vessels to Anatolia, where the fleet was to be repaired and sent back, while
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Ibrahim was to update the Porte’s officials on the events post Navarino.678 As per his
letter, Mehmed Ali argued firmly against such a measure. The Pasha believed that the
evacuation of the commander would send an explicit message to the Greek rebels that
the Ottoman sultan was ready to acquiesce to their demands for independence, and in
doing so further instigate the Greek uprising. Instead, the governor suggested sending
the ships back to Alexandria where they would be repaired and returned to his son’s
command, and that Ibrahim remain in his post in Morea.679
That same day, the Pasha sent another letter to his agent in Constantinople
complaining that news had reached him regarding the scandal-mongering in the
center. The newest gossip circulating amongst various Ottoman officials was that the
Egyptian governor was secretly planning his imminent resignation as the Sultan’s
official representative in Egypt. Rumor had it that Mehmed Ali was in clandestine
negotiations with the British and was about his loyalty to the Sublime Porte. In
response, the vali denied the allegations, and went so far as to complain to Necib
Pasha that Hüsrev Pasha was personally responsible for spreading the hearsay in an
effort to stir trouble.680 True or not, it is worth mentioning that the governor did not
write a corresponding letter to the Porte or to the Grand Vizier claiming his innocence
and denouncing the reports as misinformation—a measure that he had taken in an
effort to clear his name on many occasions in the past.
From the tone and the information presented in the documents and letters
dated from immediately after the naval defeat, I speculate that Mehmed Ali was still
attempting to make the most strategic and least costly tactical decisions he could after
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Navarino. In the immediate weeks following the sinking of his cherished fleet, the
governor was still willing to risk the life of his son and best commander, as well as his
army, in an effort to minimize the overall losses incurred in the Morea.
These two points frame the Egyptian vali’s position as one that was much
more pragmatic and less reactionary than previously imagined. Rather, Mehmed Ali’s
position regarding his continued efforts in the Morea was far more nuanced and
complicated after Navarino than is currently represented in the historiography.
The issue of supply shortages first appeared in the historical record during
December of that 1827. In a letter Mehmed Ali Pasha wrote to his agent in
Constantinople the vali mentioned sea routes had been cut off and Ibrahim and his
men were growing increasingly concerned about the dwindling supplies. Further, the
situation deteriorated further because of the ongoing drought in Crete.681 However,
that was not the only concern of Ibrahim or the remaining troops in the region.
In one particularly graphic letter Mehmed Ali wrote to his agent, Nacib
Effendi about Suleiman Pasha’s disregard for the island’s administration we learn that
Crete, which was officially under Egyptian control, was attacked by rebel forces. The
insurgents, emboldened by the allies’ victory, killed the men on Crete, raped and cut
off the breasts of the younger women, eviscerated the pregnant ones, and destroyed or
stole whatever provisions they could find. We are told in the letter that Suleiman
Pasha did little to intervene and that only Egyptian forces remaining tried to defend
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the surviving villagers.682 However, the troubles were only just beginning.
By January 1828, we saw just how quickly the situation deteriorated, at least
for the army. Marsot was correct in her assessment that the Pasha received near daily
updates about the lack of grain and supplies available for his son and his men. What
she did not mention however, was the extensive correspondence from the governor of
Egypt correspondingly sent near daily letters of his own to Constantinople asking for
the Porte’s help in providing supplies and foodstuffs for the remainder of the Egyptian
army.683 Support was promised early on by the Porte, however Ottoman assistance
materialized for Ibrahim and his men.
Reading through the materials, one is given a detailed insight into the pasha’s
growing angst about the condition of his military. As the letters from Morea were
becoming increasingly distressed, the pasha in Cairo was increasingly disgruntled
about the administrative mismanagement on the part of the Ottoman Porte. Matters
became further complicated for Ibrahim the following spring, after the Russians
declared war on the Porte on April 26, 1828. Reading Ibrahim’s letters in Dar al
Wathai’q, which openly discussed food shortages and the lack of grain supplies,
became increasing strained during the winter months of 1827-8. Countless attempts
on part of Mehmed Ali, his agent in Constantinople, Nacib Effendi, and his Foreign
Minister, Boghos Bey Yusufian, Ibrahim Pasha and others were made to secure the
appropriate grain shipments from the Asitane during these difficult months.684
However, the grain shipments never arrived. Rather, Ibrahim’s supply lines
were cut off by the rebels. Vivid accounts of illness and famine increasingly trickled
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into his letters to Mehmed Ali. So much so, that by the summer of 1828, the latter had
grown fed up with the Porte and was ready to evacuate Ibrahim and his troops from the
Morea. By July, Mehmed Ali was in negotiations with the English to secure the return
of Ibrahim Pasha and his men to Alexandria. However, still then, Ibrahim refused to
surrender his position in the Morea. In his historical volume published half a century
after the events of Morea, the Hellenist George Finley wrote:
The army of Ibrahim Pasha suffered great privations during the winter of 182728. Though no regular blockade of the ports in his possession was maintained
by either the Greeks for the Allies, his army would have starved, or he would
have evacuated the Morea, had he not succeeded in attaining large supplies
provisions rum the Ionian Islands, And particularly from Zante. About fifty
Ionian boats entirely manned by Greeks, where almost constantly employed for
several months in carrying provisions to Ibrahim’s troops in Greece. But even
with all the assistance supplied by the Ionians, the price of provisions was high,
and the suffering of the soldiers work great in the fortresses of Navarin, Modon,
and Coron. At last the sufferings became intolerable.
In June 1828 about two thousand Albanians in garrison at Coron broke out
into open mutiny [against Ibrahim,] and after plundering the place marched out
to return home…The French government undertook to send an army to expel
Ibrahim... On 19 July 1828 a protocol was signed, accepting the offer of France;
and on 30 August an army of 14,000 man, under the command of General
Maison landed at Petalidi in the Gulf of Coron. The convention concluded by
Codrington at Alexandria had been ineffectual [ in persuading Ibrahim to
abandon his post]. It required the imposing force of the French General to
compel Ibrahim to sign a new convention for the immediate evacuation of the
Morea. This convention was signed on 7 September 1828, and the first division
of the Egyptian army, consisting of five thousand-five hundred men, Sailed
from Navarin on the 16th. Abraham Pasha followed with the remainder on 5
October; but he refused to deliver up the Fortress to the French alleging that he
had found them occupied buy Turkish garrisons on his arrival in Greece, and
that it was his duty to leave them in the hands of the sultans officers. 685
Finley’s assessment of the conditions overwhelmingly corresponds with the
records of Mehmed Ali in the Egyptian National Archives. The one point of debate
between the two sources is the issue of European blockade. We know from the vali’s
letters to Constantinople and from Ibrahim’s letters to his father that the three allied
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powers were actively preventing the arrival and the distribution of grain ships from both
Egypt and from Anatolia—however the conditions of their cordon were not clear.686
Even Finley references the European cordons in his analysis of Ibrahim’s continued
survival in Morea and his reliance on Ionian support. While Ottoman records do not
discuss the matter, the issue of the European blockade and Mehmed Ali’s increasing
frantic efforts to supply his son and men indicate that at a covert attempt to provide
Ibrahim and his men with at least some limited rations would have taken place.687
We know from letter the Egyptian governor to his kethüda that Finley’s overall
timeline was accurate. Ibrahim and the remainder of his men docked in Alexandria on
October 14, 1828.688 Upon his return, the commander was too weak to walk.689 The
damage done to the governor’s relationship with Constantinople was arguably
irreparable by this point. However, tensions worsened when Mahmud II responded
furiously to Ibrahim’s abandoned post. The vali was subsequently forced to defend the
evacuation of his understandable, but nevertheless serious, insubordination. After
receiving a condemning rebuke, written in the hand of Sultan himself, Mehmed Ali
responded to the High Porte on October 19, 1828. While a copy of the Sultan’s original
letter was not available at the Prime Ministerial Ottoman Archives, we learn, by way of
Mehmed Ali’s response to Mahmud II, that the sultan had strongly censured the
Egyptian vali, and admonished the governor’s impertinent disregard for the Porte’s
wishes during the post-Navarino phase of the campaign.
In a contrite response, Mehmed Ali attempted to further explain his reasons for
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the decision to negotiate with Admiral Codrington. He wrote, again, and in great detail
of the gravity of the conditions in the Morea, the starvation of his troops, the constant
illness, the subsequent poisoning of his men from consuming the last of their rancid
supplies, and the pleas of the five hundred Cretans inhabitants that begged Ibrahim to
return to Egypt. Despite the contrition the vali was obligated to demonstrate any
cooperative regard the vali felt towards the Sublime Porte had long since soured.
Mehmed Ali held the Porte responsible for his financial and military losses in Morea
and for his lost windfalls from the eastern Mediterranean maritime trade. As Dodwell
wrote, the Egyptian governor “unluckily had sufficient insight to lay these misfortunes
at the door of the ‘pig-headed Sultan’ and the ‘ass-like Vaziers’ [sic] who had rejected
his advice.”690
The Importance of Russia
Again, by the winter of 1828, the Ottoman records inform us that Yusuf, the
Tripolitan governor, was rebuilding his fleet and had sent five vessels to assist in the
sultan’s fleet’s efforts against the Russians. Similarly, we have corresponding records
of both Tunisian, as well as Algerian involvement in the maritime hostilities of the
age, with the deployments of galleons, frigates, corvettes and other ships under the
Tunisian Patrona Ahmed and Piyale Osman Bey to the Mediterranean.691
Interestingly however, it was at this point that Hussein II dissented. In the
summer of 1829, the governor of Tunis wrote an official, sealed report to the Porte,
informing the Asitane that it would not be possible for the regency to provide the
Ottoman navy with additional tactical support or ships for the war with Russia.
Hussein Bey wrote that he had taken defensive measures to refortify the walls, and to
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increase the coast’s defenses, but that he was unable to provide the sultan with more
ships.692 This was the first recorded incidence of the Tunisian governor actively
refusing to engage in the broader Ottoman efforts of Morea. Moreover, this report
corresponded with the strengthening relations between Tunis and France in the face of
the upcoming invasion of Algiers. The focus of the governor of Tunis had shifted, and
that his alliance had gone from the Porte to his continued viability in the province.
Hussein Bey was not alone. The vali of Egypt had also refused to provide the
Ottoman admiralty with additional vessels and support during the ongoing war with
the Russian Empire.693 By the summer of 1829, Mehmed Ali was fully preoccupied
with rebuilding both his army and establishing his upcoming plans for a Syrian
invasion. Mehmed Ali was thus, fully aware that his interests no longer aligned with
those of the sultan. The Treaty of Adrianople, that ended the Russo-Ottoman War of
1828-1829, was signed on September 14 in what is modern-day Edirne, and swung
the pendulum towards Russia’s advantage. The Ottoman Empire allowed full access
to Russian commercial vessels through the Danube and Dardanelle Straights,
effectively expanding Russian commercial efforts from the Black Sea into the
Mediterranean. Moreover, the treaty recognized Russian sovereignty in the Caucasus,
from Georgia to the Khanates of Yerevan and Nakhichevan, which make up modernday Armenia and western Azerbaijan, forced the Porte to guarantee the autonomy of
Greece, allow for Serbian independence and gave the Russians effective control of
Moldavia and Wallachia. The topography of the Sultan’s well-protected domains in
Southeastern Europe had entirely transformed.
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It is beyond the scope of this dissertation to include Mehmed Ali’s Syrian
Campaign of 1831-1833. For our purposes here however, it is from Russophone
records written during Mehmed Ali’s Syrian campaign that we learn the full extent of
Ibrahim Pasha’s position in both Morea the consequences that it had for both him and
his father, and for Ottoman-Egyptian relations after 1830. In his published memoirs,
Avtobiografiia A.O. Diugamelia, Aleksandr Osipovich Diugamel, the Russian Consul
to Egypt from between 1833 and 1837, traveled on behalf of his government to meet
with Ibrahim Pasha while in Konya during his Syrian campaign. Translated into
English for the first time, we learn the impressions of the consul as recorded in the
Russian language journal, Russian Archive, which focused on history and literature
and about his impressions of Ibrahim Pasha from January 1833, and Mehmed Ali’s
imperial designs. Further, we can use this text to contrast it with the impression given
to readers by the Anglophone records of previously discussed Reverend Swan in
1825. The future Russian consul to Egypt wrote:
Moreover, due to his concern with legality, the emperor Nicholas considered it
his duty to support Turkey and curtail the ambitions of the Egyptian pasha. In
this situation, it was necessary to encourage the sultan and intimidate Mehmed
Ali. The General Lieutenant Murav'ev was entrusted with this double task. He
was supposed to go to Constantinople first, and subsequently to Alexandria. I
was assigned to him as a plenipotentiary of the Ministry of War[…]
For a couple of years, the Pasha of Egypt, Mehmet Ali, had made constant
effort to improve his troops and fleet. On the orders of the Porte, and in order
to assist her to quash the Greek rebellion, his son Ibrahim Pasha landed with
the troops in Morea. Such a recourse of the sultan to his vassal increased the
political standing of the latter. The growing power of Mehmed Ali was a
concern of the Porte; when, as a result of alleged two-decade-long insults from
Abdullah Pasha of St-Jean d’Acre, the Egyptian Pasha invaded Syria and took
Acre, making the confrontation between the sultan and his vassal inevitable,
and both parties started to prepare for war. The Turkish army under Husseyin
Pasha was defeated by Ibrahim Pasha in the valley near the Syrian town of
Homs and following this victory the Egyptian army crossed the Taurus and
entered Asia Minor.
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[Of his time with Ibrahim:]
On January the 5th, 1833 I arrived to Konya and at the very moment I crossed
the city gate I saw the courier of the French embassy, who had left
Constantinople a couple of days ahead of me. It is possible that the French
messenger rushed to Konya in order to warn Ibrahim Pasha about my arrival
and to set his mind against the proposal I was going to make. Generally, the
policy of [France’s] Talleyrand's cabinet at this time was characterized by
suspiciousness and duplicity, which was in stark contrast with the
straightforward and open actions of Emperor Nicholas. The behavior of
French representatives in Constantinople and Alexandria bore the mark of
outrageous partiality towards the Egyptian Pasha and I saw that they wanted
Mehmed Pasha to be girded with the sabre of Osman and become the sultan in
Mahmud [II]'s place. Later, in 1840, this favor of the French towards Egypt
was even more open and was one of the reasons of this country's estrangement
from the rest of Europe.
I was granted the audience with Ibrahim Pasha just after arrival to Konya [in
1833.] It was my first encounter with this extraordinary man, with whom
subsequently I conversed quite often. Ibrahim Pasha was of average height,
with his thin beard that already became somewhat gray, even if he was only
around 40 years old. His face was marked with smallpox, and he was
definitely not a handsome man. At the same time, his eyes showed particular
energy, and his moves were energetic. Ibrahim Pasha had nothing in him of a
coarse savage, as he had been described to me; instead, he was immersed in
the European ideas and views. He was well versed in the matters the newest
developments of military art and knew well the international relations. He was
fascinated with France more than with any other country, which is
understandable considering that it was the Frenchmen who brought the
achievements of enlightenment to Egypt. The most important individual in this
respect is the Suleyman Bey, the renegade ‘Selve,’ [who was of French
extraction] who was the head of the Egyptian general staff and who exerts
great influence on Ibrahim Pasha.
When I entered Ibrahim Pasha's quarters, he was sitting cross-legged on the
sofa and he was incessantly swinging his body from one side to another. In his
lifestyle, he was like the majority of the Turkish dignitaries. He didn't smoke
and had only one servant to attend to him. In Morea, he had been accompanied
by scores of servants, which constitute a necessary entourage of any highranking individual in Turkey. However, after noticing the uselessness of such
indulgences, Ibrahim Pasha changed his lifestyle. He had only one carpet to lie
on, and only one fur robe. There is no doubt that Ibrahim Pasha tried to set the
personal example in order to rid the Egyptian army of anything excessive,
which could cause logistical problems during the movement of the army.
After customary introductions, I informed Ibrahim Pasha about the mission of
Gen. Muravev to his father and passed what I was instructed to do.
Subsequently, I made a strong demand that Ibrahim Pasha halt the march of
302

Msdfasd

his army [in Anatolia] at least until he received new orders from his father.
However, I have to say that my rhetorical efforts were in vain: Ibrahim Pasha
continued to claim that he is removed from political affairs and as a
commander he is no position to make [political] judgments, but only to follow
the instructions of his father. Thus, declining my propositions, he continued:
'Where did this particular friendship on the part of the Russian emperor
towards the sultan originate from, if, only four years before, [the Russian
emperor] had conducted a war against [the sultan]?'
I replied: 'As long as Turkey declined to respect the law, which had been
conferred to us by previous treaties, we remained in open war with them.
However, as soon as the sultan requested peace, it was granted to him on
sound and generous foundations.''
Ibrahim: 'It wasn't worth to make such expenses only because of the excessive
sense of honor.'
Me: 'The war was not conducted because of the excessive sense of honor, but
also in our commercial interests, which required safeguards. We never
considered taking away any Turkish possessions. When I was in Adrianople,
we were closer to Constantinople than [you are now] from Konya. Moreover,
between us and the Ottoman capital there was no Bosphorus... And all this
considered, didn't we restore all the possessions we had conquered to Turkey?'
Ibrahim: "But tell me, finally, why the Russian emperor is so much interested
in the fate of the sultan?'
Me: 'Because, as I've already told you, His Majesty the Emperor is a faithful
ally and a friend of His Majesty the Sultan, and he also considers the war you
wage against the sultan, a most unjust one.'
Ibrahim: 'And what do you call an unjust war?'
Me: 'We call the war, in which an administrator of the country leads against
his ruler, an unjust war."
Ibrahim: "Do not confuse, please, the Misir valisi, with a mere Pasha of some
Konya or Kutahya."
Me: 'I know that the Egyptian pasha is without comparison in terms of wealth
and power to any other pasha, but nonetheless he is the subject of his ruler."
Ibrahim: "I can see that you have no idea about the real cause of the war..."
And he started his account of all the grievances of Mehmed Ali against
Abdullah Pasha. He told me that the Porte did not pay any heed to the
complaints of his father, that after taking Acre, Mehmed Ali was content with
punishing Abdullah Pasha, and he offered the Porte to give [Abdullah] his post
back. But the sultan wanted to see in [Mehmed Ali] only a maverick vassal.
Then, the subject of the conversation moved to different topics. Ibrahim Pasha
talked a lot about India, about the fear of the English that the Russian would
eventually take their conquest from them. [He also told me] that Admiral
Malcolm told him about all those fears. Then he turned to discuss the
revolutionary spirit spreading across Europe and told me that it spreads like
wildfire.694
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Clearly, the Russian consul’s vivid and detailed account of his time with the
Egyptian commander offers Anglophone scholars a compelling perspective into the
character of the future vali of Egypt. First, reading Diugamel’s text one is given a
vastly different perspective on the character and the way of being of Ibrahim Pasha,
particularly when compared with the physical description offered by Reverend
Charles Swan from a few years before. The Reverend Charles Swan accompanied a
detachment of British officers aboard the Cambrian that were sent to Morea to
negotiate a prisoner exchange with Ibrahim Pasha in December 1824. After meeting
with the Egyptian military commander, the reverend spoke of his impressions of
Ibrahim:
The Pasha is a stout, broad, brown-faced, vulgar looking man, thirty-five or
forty years of age, strongly marked with the small-pox; his countenance
possesses little to engage, but when he speaks, which he does with
considerable ease and fluency, it becomes animated and rather striking. He
frequently accompanies his words with a long drawling cry, which to
European ears, sounds ridiculously enough. His manner carries with it that sort
of decision which the common appendage of despotism. Deprived of this, he
would resemble an uneducated, hard-favored seaman of our own country. He
was plainly clothed for a Turk; and his camp establishment altogether had
none of that parade and luxury which we are accustomed to attach to eastern
warfare...” [He continued] “Speaking of Morea...although he regretted the
necessity of his present proceedings, yet it was his intention to pursue them to
the utmost. He would burn and destroy the whole Morea; so that it should
neither be profitable to the Greeks, nor to him, nor to any one. Would would
these infatuated men, the dupes of their own imbecile Government, do for
provisions in the winter? He knew that his own soldiers would suffer--that
they two must perish. But his father, Mehemet Ali was training forty thousand
men, and he was in daily expectation of a reinforcement of twelve thousand. If
these were cut off, he would have more, and he would preserve till the Greeks
returned to their former state... He repeated, 'I will not cease till the Morea be
in ruin.' The sultan has already conferred upon him the title and insignia of
Pasha of this unhappy land; and said his highness, “If the good people of
England, who are so fond of sending money to the Greeks, would send it
directly to [Ibrahim] it would save them considerable trouble; eventually, it all
comes to [the pasha’s] treasury.” 695
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The text was first published in in 1828, after both the Ottoman capture of
Missolonghi and the European powers’ successes off Navarino bay, it is easy to surmise
several important points. First, British diplomats were explicit in their attempts to
portray Ibrahim Pasha as a repulsive, barbaric despot, who would not “cease ‘till the
Morea be in ruin”696 and in doing so justify their government’s support of the Greek
Orthodox rebels. Secondly, it is obvious that British, and indeed European support of
the Greek rebels became increasingly common knowledge by the fall of 1825—to the
point where Ibrahim Pasha had become explicitly flippant about it in his conversations
with an Anglican clergyman. Lastly, Swan’s characterization of Ibrahim Pasha’s
behaviors and comportment during his time on the frontlines of the Morean field is
useful countermeasure to the Russophone description of the pasha.
Rather than portray Ibrahim Pasha as a despotic “stout, broad, brown-faced,
vulgar looking man [with] a long drawling cry, which to European ears, sounds
ridiculously enough,”697 Diugamel wrote of Ibrahim’s compellingly energetic eyes, in
a manner inherently similar to the one found in the western traveler reports of
Mehmed Ali, that Fahmy analyzed so carefully. Diugamel claimed to have found
“nothing in him of the coarse savage, as he had been described to [Diugamel,]” but
rather found a man “immersed in the European ideas and views. He was well versed
in the matters the newest developments of military art and knew well the international
relations.”698 The claim leads readers to wonder where Diugamel had originally heard
the above-mentioned descriptions of the Pasha, and more generally how much weight
to place on diplomats’ perspectives within the broader historical record.
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Diugamel had an explicit admiration for the young commandant's
comportment and the minimalist subdued airs that Ibrahim attempted to model to his
men and commanders under his charge. If anything, one could argue that Diugamel
expressed a fondness for Ibrahim Pasha, who the consul explicitly described as
“extraordinary,”699 and charismatic in his rhetorical abilities. This leads one to wonder
how can two descriptions written only eight years apart could convey the same man in
such radically different depictions, and more importantly, what interests did the
respective authors have while depicting Ibrahim the way that they did?
Conclusion
From Ottoman, North African and western sources, one can easily see that the
1820s proved to be a watershed moment in the broader Maghreb. It was a time when
the region experienced a pull towards the gravitational center of Cairo. With the
burgeoning empire of Mehmed Ali and its increased sway over first Tunis and Tripoli,
and later in the French attempt to recruit him into their capture of Algiers, we can trace
how imperial powers, Ottoman and European alike, began to consider the Egyptian vali
in their Maghrebi diplomatic efforts and considerations.
Throughout this chapter, we analyzed the regional, maritime, military, and
tactical connections among the provinces of Ottoman in Egypt, Tunis and Tripoli. This
chapter elucidated how, in his efforts to build an Egyptian navy, the vali of Egypt turned
to the North African regencies for their maritime expertise. We examined the underlying
ties between the province of Egypt and the broader Mediterranean space in which it
operated, looked to both Western and Eastern European sources to gain insights into
how Ottoman Egypt and North Africa operated during the Peloponnesian struggles.
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These events provided the context for Ibrahim Pasha’s efforts in Morea, and led to a reevaluation of the Egyptian governor’s ‘benevolent detachment’ towards the Porte, and
the conflict to the north both before his involvement in Crete as well as after his losses
in the Bay of Navarino. Further, this chapters made clear that the Tripolitan governor
looked to incorporate the strategies of his Egyptian counterpart first into his planned
Bornu expansion and then in his efforts to reorganize his military. This chapter
completed the regional framework for how the North African provinces of the Ottoman
Empire operated independently as well as collaboratively in their efforts to resist
European encroachment and maintain their regional connections during the time of
shifting power politics.
Next, in the epilogue, we will examine how France and the Porte would invade
and (re)capture the spaces of Algiers and Tripoli, respectively; in doing so we will focus
on the local response to the corresponding structural upheaval.
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HISTORICAL AFTERWORD
THE LEAD UP TO INVASION
By the late 1820s, Mehmed Ali’s penchant for territorial expansion had
established Cairo as a new political center and the Egyptian vali as an important—if
not critical—player in the Ottoman Maghreb. When we last left the vali and his son
Ibrahim Pasha, we were able to compare the gradual rise of an Egyptian center in the
Maghreb as seen by different western and Russian representatives, the administrative
ethos of the governor’s son, as well as the diplomats’ early efforts to ingratiate
themselves in the good will of the vali in order to win his support in their expansionist
endeavors. In effect, we set the stage for the historical postscript, which addresses
Mehmed Ali’s extended influence and authority in North Africa. By examining how
Europeans saw the vali’s growing power we established a foundation for the analysis
of imperial schemes of the age that pushed forward territorial land-grabs and
eventually brought about a new era of North African colonialism.
This afterword serves a double scope. On the one hand, it aims to summarize
the developments analyzed throughout the dissertation, by tracing the course of events
that had been set in motion in the period under discussion. At the same time, and more
importantly, my aim in this section is to broaden the scope of the study and identify
future directions of research. Therefore, the present epilogue examines the emergent
role of an Egyptian center of power in North Africa during the years immediately
after Navarino, building off Chapter Five’s analysis of the contrasting European
perceptions of Ibrahim Pasha and the role of Mehmed Ali in Egypt, and examines the
lead up to two central invasions of the Maghreb by competing imperial powers.
Throughout this section, we analyze how through the failed attempts for economic
reform in the aftermath of the Congress of Vienna, and growing European influence
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and competition in the region subsequently paved the way for political instability
within the provinces of Tripolitania and Algiers. Conversely, I also examine how,
through the strengthening of its relations with France, the Husainid dynasty of Tunis
was able to remain in power after first its neighbors to the west Algiers, and then five
years later, its neighbors to the east, Tripoli, both fell the victims of direct imperial
military occupation. Lastly, it also touches upon the subsequent Maghrebi resistance
efforts against the occupying powers, in both Algiers and Cyrenaica.
During the period under discussion, significant overlaps in the Sufi intellectual
and theological networks that historically connected Algiers, Timbuktu, Ghademes,
Benghazi and al-Azhar in Cairo gradually took root. These same predominantly Islamic,
anti-imperialist networks bound the resistance movements of Abdul Qadir al-Jaza’iri in
Algiers with those of Mohammed Sannusi in Cyrenaica. This work will juxtapose the
intellectual networks and pedagogical styles of North African scholarly institutions such
as al-Azhar University in Cairo, with the minimalism of the Sannunsi movement,
alongside the Sufi tenants of the Algerian sheriff, who while a scholar by training, took up
arms and led the fight against the French invasion of Algiers.
Doing so allows us to further examine the inland ties of the North African
provinces and their connections with the Sahel, while also allowing the present study to
move from the imperialist ties of the region, to the anti-imperialist ones that emerged in
the first half of the nineteenth century— simultaneously and along similar theological
tenets. Interestingly, mystical communities whose members incorporated both the Islamic
pedagogical doctrine of ijtihad, adjusting it into the rich North African tradition of
maraboutism, established themselves through a network of lodges along the desert
caravan routes. These communities looked to transform the spaces that had been serving
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for the transport of slaves, ivory and gold dust into a network of religious and intellectual
exchange where Maliki scholars from Cairo would engage with disciples and students of
Amazigh saints and holy men.
The main goal of this afterward is to transform our understanding of how
knowledge flowed across the topographical reality of the broader North African region.
This section will eventually look to examine the network of cities and oases across this
border region, the same ones that served as the backbone for trans-Saharan caravan trade
and in addition to the transportation of slaves, gold dust, and henna, also disseminated
systems of knowledge. Books bought in Timbuktu were sold in Cairo and the religious
tefseer writing of uluma in Cairo was sold and read in Ghadames.
These desert networks were critical in the Islamic intellectual exchange and
theological ties that connected North Africa to the larger African continent, and that tied
political movements like that of the Sannussiya movement to a community of religious
scholars, and students of fiqh and in doing so, blurred the lines between religious doctrine
and political mobilization. This afterword, as it is currently presented, offers critical
background to this forthcoming research.

Historical Background for 1830
France is engaged in a quarrel with the Dey of Algiers, which her dignity
requires that she terminate in a manner worth of her. Experience has
demonstrated that the means already employed are insufficient. The sending of
a military expedition to the coast of Barbary presents many difficulties and is
open to many dangers. The expedition, however successful it may be, would
be expensive and would perhaps arouse the jealousy of a rival nation… it
would be possible to have the robber dens of these Mohammedan barbarians
destroyed by coreligionists who have already known something of discipline
and who are in closer touch with civilization… Mohammad Ali would not be
unwilling to send an army to these parts, in conjunction with France, in order
to bring these countries into the orbit of civilization, etc.”700
700
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Algiers, as the regency with the largest navy and the highest socioeconomic
stake in the corso, was the province that most defiantly agitated against the forced
implementation of western laws that demanded the elimination of the practice. Under
the authority of the dey, the Algerian rais al-marsa continued the campaigns well past
the Congress of Vienna. Targeting mostly French and Austrian vessels, the dey
remained entirely defiant to the imposition of European norms, despite the increased
risk to the city’s both physical and economic security. Traders from Europe traders
grew increasingly frustrated with cost of their seized property, and, in turn, both the
French and British had responded by attempting repeated blockades and
bombardments of the city. Regardless, the Algerian maritime campaigns continued.
Tensions worsened throughout the 1820s and gradually frayed the few remaining
diplomatic ties between the governments of France and the regency.701
701

The distinction between dey and bey was an extremely important one. In that while the Husainid and
Karamanlı families overwhelming centralized and exercised control over Tunis and Tripoli while
cooperating, to varying degrees, with the sultan and the Porte, the dey of Algiers was actually elected
by the Algerian divan to rule the province. This distinction not only marked a more salient
gubernatorial tie between the province and the Porte, in that Constantinople remained a larger
stakeholder in the administration of the territory, but it also meant that as elected official the deys of
Algiers were historically easier to depose, and also allowed for different internal pressures and ruptures
to form.
Early on, the Algerian navy’s choice in successor held the greatest sway over the selection of new deys.
Over time however, this influence shifted to the military of the province, and the dey maintained in a
precarious position of an absolute ruler whose tenure was under constant question. In fact, nearly half
the deys elected from 1671-1818 were assassinated. Further adding to the governor’s troubles were the
hereditary customs that required he abandon his family, children and home and lead “a prisoner’s life
in the governmental palace.” See H. Z. Hirschberg, A History of the Jews in North Africa: From the
Ottoman Conquests to the Present Time / Edited by Eliezer Bashan and Robert Attal (Leiden: Brill,
1974), 5-6 for further information.
The parallels between the customary seclusion of the dey and the gilded kafis of the sultanic heirapparent were overwhelming evident. Hirschberg cited travelers’ chronicles to Algiers to surmise, “His
status has been tellingly defined: a rich man having no control of his riches; a father without children; a
husband without a wife; an autocrat deprived of his freedom; a king of slaves and the slave of his
subjects.” The divan of Algiers had ensured that the authority of the governor effectively served as his
own cage. Given the compendium of pressures on Algiers and the increasingly diminishing authority of
the dey, conditions were such that by 1829 French officials in Paris were openly discussing the viability
of various options for the removal of Dey Hussein II, from power and supplanting him with a more
favorable alternative.
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Ongoing troubles with France were not the only concern of Algiers.
Historically, the most powerful of the regencies, the new diminished status of the
province after 1815 proved to be a particularly bitter pill for the dey and his
administration to swallow. If a new rival contender on the far east of the North
African coastline was not troublesome enough for the dey, Tunis—Algiers’ old rival
and former vassal neighbor—soon found itself in a position to air old grievances and
undermine the rule of Hussein II. Abun Nasr wrote of the Tunisian reaction to the
French occupation:
Husayn Bey’s interest to remain on good terms with the French as well as his
vainglorious of annexing Algeria, or at least larger parts of it, to Tunisia
prompted him to respond positively to the proposals of General Clauzel, the
French commander in Algeria and to place the beylik of Constantine under the
authority of the Tunisian prince. The Tunisian delegation which traveled on a
French ship to Algiers concluded a convention with Clauzel on the 18th
December 1830, under which Husayn Bey’s brother Mustafa would become
the bey of Constantine under French sovereignty. Husayn Bey is reported as
having told his confidants that he entered into this agreement with the French
because he believed that they would not want to rule Algeria and consequently
they would hand it over to him. 702
Perhaps because of the historical tensions that dominated the relations between
Tunis and Algiers in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the potential for a
Tunisian ‘David’ to extend his authority over the Algerian ‘Goliath,’ or perhaps out of
sheer socio-economic interest of Hussein II to maintain himself and his dynasty on the
Tunisian beylicate, it was clear from the historical record that the Husainid
government attempted to benefit from their neighbor’s misfortunes. The bey was not
alone.
The French government also found the symbolic nature of an Algerian
conquest particularly appealing. The most geographically extensive of the regencies,
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the province already equipped with a strong military, the best-fortified harbor, and
booming agricultural production. Moreover, Algiers had come to symbolize the
source of long-held frustrations associated with the corso in western popular
imaginations. In short, to conquer Algiers meant not only to conquer North African
topographies for the restored monarchy of Charles X, but to eliminate the corso once
and for all, as well as the cornerstone of Ottoman power to the west.
Frustrations rose. Algiers refused to cede the regional authority it once
leveraged over Tunis and the broader region, while European moralistic antagonism
began to fixate on the provinces western shores and regard the dey, Hussein II, as a
cause of all of Europe’s maritime woes. However, the catalyst that led both parties to
an open conflict was, unexpectedly enough, an insect swatter. The event, which
became known as the Flywhisk Incident took place during a heated argument between
the dey and the French consul to the province, Pierre Deval.
The dey was furious. Officials in Paris kept ignoring his letters and refused to
negotiate the repayment of eight million francs, the outstanding sum that the French
government was due for several years of Algerian wheat shipments. The wheat had
been purchased by the since-defunct First Republic at the turn of the century to feed
Napoleonic troops stationed across the Mediterranean, with the terms of the
arrangement originally set by Algerian merchants from the local Bakri and Bushnaq
families and French officials. Despite the fact that nearly three decades had passed
since the purchase, the funds remained unpaid. In fact, it was only after the drop in the
province’s revenues in the 1820s, and the inability of the Bakis and Bushanqs to meet
increased tariff demands of Hussein II that the dey, as the merchant’s creditor, began
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to actively look for repayment.703
The French stalled, and Charles X’s officials remained overwhelmingly
dismissive of the governor’s demands. After repeated attempts to write directly to
Paris, the dey— frustrated with the lack of response—demanded to speak with the
French Consul. However, Pierre Deval was not diplomatic in his response. The
consul, rather than trying to intercede or ameliorate the dey’s concerns, brusquely
disregarded the demands, and proclaimed that “his government would not deign to
reply to the [dey’s] letters dealing with the debts.”704 Infuriated over the loss of nearly
eight million francs and the blatant disrespect demonstrated towards him, the
governor struck the Frenchman with the swatter he had in his hand and reportedly
called Deval a “wicked, faithless, idol-worshiping rascal.”705
France immediately demanded reparations; the dey, just as quickly, dismissed
them scornfully. This resulted in a swift deployment of the French naval fleet to
blockade Algerian ports in an effort to force the dey to back down from his demands.
However, the impediment did more disservice to French tradesmen in Marseilles than
to the Algerian fleet. French merchants against the measures and the government
found itself forced to reconsider its position. In August of 1829, the new Prime
Minister, Jules de Polignac, dispatched another fleet, this time under the Provence, in
order to renegotiate the terms of peace with Hussein Dey.
Neither the belated effort of French diplomats nor the reluctant offer of an
armistice managed to convince the Algerian governor. He tersely dismissed de
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Polignac’s men from his audience with the statement, “I have powder and cannons.
As it is not possible for us to agree, you are free to leave,”706 and ensured that the
Provence was fired upon by the city’s naval batteries as it sailed out of the port. As far
as Algiers was concerned, Parisian efforts at diplomacy failed as long as the sum of
eight million francs remained unpaid.707
The French fumed, and the dey’s breach of protocol and rejection of peace
offer quickly turned into rhetorical fuel that ignited both public opinion and official
tempers against Algiers. The incident provided the French authorities with a pretext to
reopen a decades-long debate regarding a possible French invasion of Algiers that, as
far as Paris was concerned, would oust the disdainful governor and simultaneously
free the French merchants of threat of the corso.
Despite the increasingly garish displays of popular chauvinism within the
salons of Paris, the French Foreign Ministry soon became engrossed in broader
continental concerns. The treaty of Adrianople, signed and ratified by both the Porte
and Nicholas I’s government in September 1829, granted considerable concessions to
the Russians, whet the appetite of expansionists within the French Foreign Ministry,
and brought a halt to any immediate plans regarding the invasion of Algiers among
the members of Polignac’s government.708 Effectively, the French Prime Minister,
along with his European diplomatic cohort, found himself consumed with the
territorial competition and scheming that accompanied the European powers’ careful
monitoring of the ‘Eastern Question’ and diplomatic scramble for influence within the
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sultan’s well-protected domains.709
It was in these early days of expansionist machinations that the French consul
to Egypt, Bernardino Drovetti would become extremely influential within his home
government in Paris. The Sardinian-born, nationalized French citizen who had served
in Bonaparte’s Grande Armée, had remained in Egypt, and – after a brief period of
service in the capacity of the Russian consul in the province – rose to the position of
Consul General for France under Mehmed Ali. Drovetti concocted a plan to eliminate
the defiant Algerian governor, while at the same time would provide the government
of Charles X with a convenient diplomatic bulwark.
According to the diplomat, French interests would be best served by striking
an alliance with the governor of Egypt and making use of Mehmed Ali’s freshly
rebuilt army and his expansionist proclivities towards his neighbors. The consul was
convinced that, with French assistance and the cooperation of the vali, the swath of
territory along the Southern Mediterranean between the Western Desert of Egypt and
the coastal town of Oran in Northwestern Algiers could, if planned correctly, fall
under the governorship of Mehmed Ali—but ultimately belong to France. This way,
Paris would eliminate any remaining threat from the dey, bring an end to the corso,
and avoid expenses that a direct invasion would demand. The Consul General to
Egypt quickly persuaded Polignac of the merits of his master plan.
Historians remain uncertain of the exact origin of Drovetti’s plans. However,
there are indications that the plan was the consul’s own idea, soon becoming his
favorite topic of conversation — both with Mehmed Ali Pasha and, perhaps not so
strategically, with Drovetti’s colleague and close ally, the British Consul General in
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Egypt, John Barker. 710 Barker f was a career diplomat and had served as the general
consul for the Levant Company in Aleppo for nearly thirty years. The Englishman
considered Drovetti’s plan laughable, and routinely expressed his disregard for the
Frenchman’s plan in his letters to London.711
Regardless, Drovetti increasingly became infatuated with his own stratagem
throughout the winter of 1829. The more he dwelled on the project, the more he
believed that involving Mehmed Ali would shield the French Foreign Ministry from
vehement protestations that a direct invasion would invoke across Europe while
simultaneously freeing the majority of French forces. In turn, this would allow Paris
to remain on the look for any potential land-grabs to be had in the ongoing Eastern
Question that consumed Polignac’s time and efforts.
Perhaps because of Drovetti’s explicit subjectivity towards his plan, the
consul’s enthusiasm for the project became contagious, at least in the short-term.
While in the company of Mehmed Ali, Drovetti convinced Cairo of the merits of his
plans for the North African coast.712 From French diplomatic sources we know that
the governor expressed an early interest in the idea.713 Mehmed Ali posed three
conditions to his upcoming cooperation with the French Foreign Ministry.
First, the vali requested a subsidy of 20 million francs, a demand that the
French government was willing to accommodate. Secondly, the governor wanted to
secure a guarantee of royal protection from Charles X, which the French deemed
acceptable. Thirdly, and most importantly for Mehmed Ali, the governor requested
that the French navy provide him with vessels for his own use, and specifically with
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four 80-gun line ships.
The point of contention between the two parties was the ships; the French
claimed that it was unclear why would he need them for the campaign and they had
none to spare; Mehmed Ali refused to move forward in the plan without a guarantee
of those vessels.
Paris resisted; Cairo forced the issue, arguing that Drovetti had personally
agreed to the terms. Eventually, after extensive back and forth between the two
parties, Mehmed Ali walked away from the idea of a western expansion. The
following summer Paris invaded Algiers lacking even tacit support of either the Porte
or the governor of Egypt, and certainly without the acquiescence or backing of the
actual inhabitants of the province. France spent the next seventeen years attempting to
subdue Algerian resistance, and the next 132 years forcing its authority on its colonial
possession.714 In doing so, the government of France created the environment for one
of the bloodiest and most violent examples of North African colonialism. Conditions
that would lead to the subsequent death of countless Algerians over the next half a
decade, during the age of initial political resistance and even more during the
subsequent political massacres and the eventual Algerian War for independence from
1954-1962.
French Ships, Algerian Ships, and Constantinople
One could argue that the most salient reason for the Egyptian governor’s
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political backpedaling was largely due to mishandling the negotiations by French
diplomats rather than a disinterest in western expansion—the position largerly
presented in the Francophone historiography. Drovetti, as per his letters to Paris, had
originally agreed to Mehmed Ali’s terms,715 and the vali was adamant in his demands
for the gunships. In a report from the French Captain Huder, who arrived to Toulon at
the end of December 1829 from Alexandria, Mehmed Ali considered the ships a
necessary condition and stated that he would not send his troops until the vessels
dropped anchor in Alexandria. Studies on the diplomatic exchange between Paris and
Cairo, as well as – to a lesser extent – scholarship on Mehmed Ali’s rule in Egypt,
present the situation in a totally different light.
The common thread of their arguments has been that the vali had in fact
considered a western expansion into the Tripoli, Tunis and Algiers, but had thought
against it and pursued his subsequent invasion of Syria and Anatolia.716 However, that
simply was not the case. Mehmed Ali had been exceedingly forthright with the French
consuls and emissaries in Egypt regarding his plans to invade Ottoman Syria. The
conditions for a potential invasion of Maghreb did not rule out the possibility of
Egyptian expansion both westward and northward. Rather, I argue that Mehmed Ali
was likely looking to gain as much maritime expertise as possible to facilitate his
invasion of the Levant of Greater Syria. After all, the maritime trade routes that
connected the port cities of Alexandria to Yaffa, Haifa, Sidon Beirut to Iskenderun,
Mersin and Antalya were some of the most commercially profitable in the entire
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Eastern Mediterranean.
However, when the vali’s unwavering stance regarding the conditions of the
alliance and a sentiment of French national hubris among officials of the French
Foreign Ministry proved too strong for Paris. Effectively, the officials considered the
notion of providing French military vessels to the vali of Egypt as too great of a
disservice to the honor of French Royal Navy. At least, that was what Paris argued. So
unyielding was the Foreign Ministry that by January 20th, 1830 the French prime
minister was considering another plan entirely.717
Polignac’s new position was that it would be preferable for the government of
Charles X to rely exclusively on French forces during the attack on Algiers. However,
in order to keep the political buffer in place, as Polignac argued, Paris should
encourage Mehmed Ali to enter Tunis and Tripoli, while the invasion of Algiers
would be entrusted exclusively to French forces. The revised plan saw the reduction
of the subsidies accorded to vali to 10 million francs. Moreover, while not providing
Mehmed Ali with any vessels of their own, the French would allow the governor to
construct his own ships in French shipyards, a move which the prime minister’s
cabinet considered useful, as it would allow Mehmed Ali to exercise control over the
newly conquered provinces.718 Again, however, Mehmed Ali refused.
Cairene Incentives for a French Alliance
The disdain that Mehmed Ali intimated towards the Porte was reflective of the
generally dismissive tone Cairo had for Mahmud II after the governor’s losses in
Navarino and the sultan’s subsequent refusal to allow Ibrahim Pasha to abandon his
post. In fact, after conversation with his old rival, and longtime antagonist, Hüsrev
717
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Pasha, the governor let his true sentiments regarding the Porte be known in a
conversation with Baron Emile de Langsdorff, a young French diplomat from Fumel
in Aquitaine who was assisting in the discussions. Mehmed Ali said:
[Hüsrev] complains of the Sultan and the ministers, of peace as well as of
war… [recently] The divan lacks the measures to collect the money it needs to
pay its war indemnities. It has alienated the provinces [asking for resources]
that only Egypt can supply [to the Porte.] Everywhere, however [popular
rebellion] is fermenting. While in all the provinces of the empire, the cannons
fire to announce the birth of the Sultan’s newborn son, the people are crying in
the streets of Constantinople “When will our woes end? The father is bad, the
son will [only] be worse!... The [Ottoman] Empire is great, without doubt…
and Egypt would be great if I had men, and [yet] Egypt is only one of its
provinces.
But this greatness is not real, all the parts of this vast body are dislocated.
Bosnia, Serbia, and all the neighboring districts are independent in
practice…before long Baghdad and all the provinces of Asia Minor …will
give neither men nor money [to the Porte.] The reforms have destroyed the old
body but have done nothing to replace it… [speaking of his desire for a navy
and the concern and envy that it aroused, the pasha continued…] They want
me, my commerce, my soldiers, my buildings… do they not want to be like
me? I want a navy and I want it for myself. A few more alliances and I will
become a great maritime power. Egypt is great, fruitful, every day sees
increase its resources; my army is excellent. I will conquer Syria at will.
Abdullah Pasha trembles behind its walls since we spread news that my son
Ibrahim was preparing an expedition against him. I have great things in my
head, but it still takes ten years to mature this! Meanwhile, I conquer each year
several thousand feddans of desert, I dig canals, I sell cotton, I plant mulberry
trees, olive trees; Egypt will have nothing to envy Europe [in] and I will give
you everything your climate refuses you.719
Working from this source, it was clear that the Egyptian governor felt free to
speak his mind.720 Not only was he not attempting to keep his plans for an upcoming
Syrian invasion a secret, but the extreme frankness of the vali in his conversation with
a still junior French diplomat is quite striking in the range of issues covered. Firstly,
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in the final twist of fate in the two Ottoman officials’ complicated relationship,
Hüsrev, the standard-bearer for the traditional practices of the empire’s patronage
systems, was looking to assuage his relationship with the governor, whose rule he had
vehemently opposed for so long. One could argue that this case explicitly
demonstrates the fact that even so prominent officials as Hüsrev Pasha had lost faith
in the Porte’s administrative choices and the reform attempts of Mahmud II. In effect,
Constantinople’s staunchest supporters were attempting to establish external safety
nets, beyond the imperial divan. Secondly, the personal disdain of the Egyptian
governor towards the sultan and the reforms he was attempting to introduce was
entirely palpable.
Moreover, Mehmed Ali’s choice of words to express his discontentment with
the reforms is particularly striking. The vali’s objection was not to the idea of reform,
but rather the lack of viable administrative alternatives presented. This point
demonstrated that Mehmed Ali was engaged in the political developments of both
Ottoman Iraq and the Balkans, and suggested that he was looking for alternative
alliances, both economic and military means to continue his rule.
There is a surprising dearth of documentation regarding Mehmed Ali and the
French expedition to Algiers in the Ottoman records. We know however, by way of
French and some British sources, that the Porte was entirely aware of Mehmed Ali’s
ongoing negotiations. In fact, Polignac’s consul to Constantinople, General Armand
Charles Guilleminot, had gone so far as to personally inform the Porte of a possible
collaboration between his government and the vali of Egypt. This decision to inform
the imperial divan was carried out against the explicit wishes of Mehmed Ali, and in
retrospect, poor planning on the part of the French diplomat, as it further undermined
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the idea of cooperating with the French for Mehmed Ali.
British intervention eventually discouraged the vali from the participation in
the campaign. By that time however, the likelihood of a French-Egyptian coalition
had dwindled, in part because of hostile stance of the Porte and the pasha’s gridlock in
the negotiations with the French.721
This is not to imply that the English had an easy go of convincing the
Egyptian governor. For example, on March 7, 1830, the British Consul Barker arrived
to Cairo with instructions from London. News regarding the protracted talks between
Paris and Cairo had reached both Istanbul and London. Upon being received by
Mehmed Ali, Barker argued that France’s plan was untenable—in part because the
governor had not received an order from the sultan— allowing for such an expedition.
In response, Mehmed Ali burst into laughter, not even trying to conceal his
contempt for Mahmud II. When the consul mentioned ‘other European powers,’
Mehmed Ali interrupted: “Stop, stop! You say that other European states, meaning at
least two, [would object.] Please, in all goodness name a single [European] power
whose interests would object to having the North African regencies fall under my
control. Is it Sardinia, Naples or perhaps Austria?”722 The governor had intentionally
enumerated three of the European countries most affected by the continuation of the
corsair campaigns. The efforts of the British diplomat had clearly been ineffective.
Ultimately, however, Barker’s efforts proved successful. Nonetheless, the root
cause of the breakdown of French-Egyptian negotiations had more to do with French
obduracy than British diplomatic savvy. The sticking point was, and remained, the
four gunships. Mehmed Ali wanted a navy after all, and four eighty-cannon vessels
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would be an important addition to his fleet. But Polignac refused any such concession.
The pasha stood firm demanding the ships; and in an effort to appease him, at the
further expense of the Algerian dey, the French offered two Algerian vessels that had
docked in Alexandria under blockade. Since it was the French navy that had set up the
blockade of Algiers, Polignac and Foreign Ministry argued, they were within their
maritime rights to retain the ships.723 Thus, in an interesting development, the
grandiose political project involving several political centers in the region and
beyond, fizzled out and concluded in a claim regarding two dilapidated Algerian
vessels that had just barely survived the Battle of Navarino.
Delay Tactics
The discussions surrounding these two Algerian ships, effectively stranded off
the waters of Alexandria, offer us an important insight into Mehmed Ali’s continued
interest in Algiers and the consequences it would have for his political ambitions in
the region. In his work on Russian seapower during the early nineteenth century, the
historian Daly wrote:
[Mehmed Ali] was aware that Sultan [Mehmed II] wanted the combined
[Ottoman]-Egyptian naval forces to winter in Constantinople, but he told the
British consul that his ships would accompany the Sultan's squadron only as
far as the Dardanelles. [Mehmed Ali] coyly explained the previous delay had
been due to the presence of two Algerian warships that had limped back from
Navarino and taken refuge in Alexandria from the French blockade of Algiers;
he was worried that the French might try to seize the two vessels.
In reply, [Mahmud II] simply expanded his demand to include the two refugee
vessels. The ships [Mahmud II] wanted returned were one 74-gun line ship,
six frigates, six corvettes and four brigs; during their two-years’ idleness in
Alexandria, [Mehmed Ali] had had no maintenance work done on them, as he
conserved his supplies for his own vessels. 724
However, Daly’s treatment of the events described above was based entirely
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on western— namely British—accounts. In as much, it failed to depict the full context
of the events or the French reluctance to provide the vali with gunships. After all,
even Anglophone scholarship on Mehmed Ali and his potential alliance with the
French explicitly state that Polignac’s government was trying to buy Egyptian support
with Algerian means.725
By turning to Egyptian fonds we gain a much broader perspective of these
events, and of the actual context of Mehmed Ali’s efforts to curb the Porte’s influence
post-Navarino. From Cairene records, we know that Mehmed Ali openly discussed
the matter of the Algerian ships from as early as spring 1829.726 Similarly, from
Ottoman records we learn that the Porte knew that Mehmed Ali was delaying the
departure of the vessels, technically still under French embargo, because of his
ongoing efforts to negotiate with Polignac’s government.727
In a letter to his kethüda, Nacib Efendi, the Egyptian governor wrote, much as
Daly had noted, that the two ships had been used in both the Battle of Navarino and
the vali’s own Morean campaigns, had sought safe haven in the Alexandrine docks
because of the ongoing French blockade of their home province. However, the ships’
seaworthiness, the general state of the dockyards, and the assessment that Mehmed
Ali shared with his lieutenant in the Asitane diverged significantly from Daly’s
account above.
A letter, sent to the Ottoman center on 30 April 1829, was actually the first of
several communications to discuss the condition of the two ships. From it, we learn
that Mehmed Ali received a directive to have the fleet in the Alexandrian shipyards
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rendezvous with the imperial flotilla off the coast of Morea. Within the chronology
presented in the document we learn that the Porte wrote to Mehmed Ali ordering that
he dispatch the ships of the western fleet docked in Alexandria. From there, the ships
were to meet with the vessels under the command of the Kapudan Pasha and were
likely to be deployed in the ongoing Ottoman war effort against the Russians.728
These two points, the pasha’s reference to the western fleet, rather than an
Egyptian one, and the ongoing war with the Russian Empire are of critical
significance. They portray the political situation between the vali, his western
neighbors, and the Porte as far more complicated and nuanced than Daly’s depiction
would suggest.
First, the Porte was not simply looking to winter the North African fleet in
Constantinople, nor was it communicating with Mehmed Ali regarding the future
deployment of just the Egyptian fleet. Rather, the sultan’s officials approached the
vali ordering him to deploy all the available ships, both from the regencies and
Egyptian ones. The vessels were to sail first to London, collect an agent, and then
return to the Anatolian coast, where they would ultimately rendezvous with the fleet
under the command of the Kapudan Pasha to engage in the ongoing Russo-Ottoman
war.
Cairo and Constantinople were discussing the dispatching the entire western
fleet from the Alexandrine shores to join the war effort. The distinction is an
important one, since Mehmed Ali applied the term himself in order to refer to the
compendium of ships belonging to the various North African provinces: Egypt,
Tripoli, Tunis, and Algiers. In as much, we can deduce that the Ottoman Porte was
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directing the Egyptian governor to deploy all ships available, including the ones not
directly under his authority, to meet the imperial navy. The use of this label not only
encapsulated the argument of North African naval cohesion in the lead up to the
governor’s invasion of Ottoman Syria but also contextualized, and perhaps - from the
point of view of Mehmed Ali - justified, the delay in the deployment of the
Alexandria-based fleet, as he was not only referring to Egyptian ships.
Further clarifying his position as a regional power broker, Mehmed Ali went
on to speak about the situation of a few Tunisian ships that had, under his son,
reached Navarino, and remained there since. In an effort to regroup the dispersed
remnants of the North African navy, post the naval losses, the vali sent Tunisian
mariners to retrieve what they could of the remaining vessels. However, their efforts
proved largely ineffective, as the end result of these efforts was the subsequent
collection of a solitary abandoned ship, off the waters of the bay, which the Tunisians
had returned to Alexandria. Further elaborating his position, Mehmed Ali informed
the Asitane that he purchased and rented several other ships from Tunisian and
Tripolitan merchants, and that they were being prepared and kitted for the upcoming
journey.729
On the same day that Mehmed Ali wrote his agent, the governor also
addressed the kaymakam of the grand vizier in the High Porte. From this second letter
we learn that the Egyptian vali received an imperial order where the Porte requested a
military inventory of Mehmed Ali’s reserve troops and naval holdings; the sultan and
the grand vizier insisted to have him dispatch the fleet from Alexandria, as well as to
dispatch several battalions of ground forces.
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Mahmud II also requested the Egyptian governor send four battalions of
troops aboard the vessels from Alexandria to Anatolia. However, their intended
voyage was not a direct sail to meet the Kapudan Pasha. Rather, Mehmed Ali was
ordered to dispatch the fleet, send it to Izmir, collect an agent of the Porte, and from
there sail to London, where it was to rendezvous with two warships that the Porte had
commissioned in for the ongoing war against Russia, and from there meet with the
with the sultan’s vessels.730
The Egyptian governor still had to respond to the sultanic amr nevertheless.
The vali claimed to have sent a few of his captains to Alexandria to prepare the
vessels. The captains in turn reported that the two Algerian ships had remained in
Egypt for fear of capture by French forces. According to them, the ships that had
dropped anchor in the coastal city’s waters were ill-equipped for the upcoming
journey that the Porte had ordered. In a similar vein, Mehmed Ali expressed his
concerns about an expected high death rate among the soldiers that would be sent to
Anatolia. The vali claimed that long journey, considerable foreign presence in both
Alexandria and Izmir compounded the high risk of disease and would heavy toll on
the troops, leading to the death of a quarter or even a third of the soldiers and
rendering the others unable to fight. In an effort to deflect the wrath of the Sultan,
Mehmed Ali offered to send money rather than troops.731
In this sense, Daly’s assessment of the Egyptian governor’s position is
correct. The Egyptian governor was indeed stalling, and had become largely
disinterested in providing support to the various military commitments of Mahmud II.
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This foot-dragging continued throughout the autumn of 1829. On October 17, 1829,
the governor wrote again to Nacib Efendi. At a convenient moment, after the
conclusion of the Russo-Ottoman War, Mehmed Ali informed his agent that he sent a
handful of vessels from Alexandria to the Asitane. However, again, the governor held
back the Algerian ships, as well as the Fayd Maragh, the imperial ship of the Porte.
Mehmed Ali argued that the delay stemmed from the necessity of more repairs, and
blamed the French blockade on his inability to send the Algerian ships.
However, arguably the most convincing pieces of information in support of the
hypothesis that the vali tried to extricate himself and his forces from serving Mahmud
II in the war against Russia were the letters sent by Mehmed Ali to the başbuğ of the
fleet and the Kapudan Pasha in first days of November 1829. The governor finally
sent the ships. However, their departure date conveniently coincided with a six-week
lag after the ratification of the Treaty of Adrianople. The governor, effectively, waited
for peace to be brokered between the two imperial parties before he sent orders to
have the vessels deployed the Porte.732
In the first letter, addressed to Ibrahim Pasha, the başbuğ of the Imperial Fleet,
the governor outlined in great detail the number of ships kitted and soldiers sent to the
Asitane. As per the letter, he informed the Porte that the galleon of Burgh Zafar had
been manned with a crew of 400 sailors, the Kaid Zafar, and the Fawwz Nasir each
were assigned 200 men; the Fayd Maragh, the imperial vessel which Mehmed Ali had
delayed since the spring, was also deployed with a crew of 240 sailors. Further, the
governor equipped the Kiwan Bahri with 230 hands, the Asar Nasrat with 90, the
corvette the Faid Bakhsa was manned with another 70, as was the Sammeret Fituh,
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Anwar Nasrat, Masrat Bahri, Sahieer Safar, and the Hamay Bahri. Another corvette,
the Anayet Haq had a party of 60 crewmembers, while the Broek Ali Kapudan
el’Ihambargi, the Kora Mostafa Kapaudan, the Nama Khada, Cilen Bahri, Nozdar
and Hasan Kapudan were each manned with 30 seamen apiece. After several months’
delay, Mehmed Ali had sent at least twenty vessels that were manned with 1,790
sailors in total to winter with the sultan’s flotilla.
In addition to the vessels and men, Mehmed Ali also sent nine-hundredthousand purses with Ahmed Bey Şukri to the Asitane.733 From the surviving records
in Cairo, we also learn that Tunisian, Tripolitan, and Egyptian vessels, as well as
shipments of grain and money continued to flow from Alexandria to Anatolia
throughout the winter months of 1829.734
Given the extent of the vessels and seamen sent to Anatolia, it was clear the
pasha was engaging in delay tactics with the Porte while expanding the scope of his
navy. By the time the vali’s fleet had departed from Alexandrine waters, the two
Algerian vessels that had been the point of so much contention had, as Daly noted,
accompanied the governor’s fleet in their departure for Anatolia. Nevertheless, while
the two ships remained in their post-Navarino state of dilapidation, however lack of
repairs was neither due to the greed of the governor nor his antagonism towards the
Porte.
Rather, as he was still in the heat of negotiations with the French about the
four vessels he had originally requested from Paris, the vali was looking to have the
French foot the bill for the ships’ overhaul. After all, if Polignac’s government was
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not going to provide him with the vessels from Paris, the very least they could do was
to pay to repair the ones that they had already offered to Mehmed Ali.
Political Upheaval in Tripoli
Algiers was not the only province to experience massive political upheavals
during the 1830s. The late 1820s brought a great deal of socio-political and economic
trouble for the province of Tripoli and for the other two regencies of Tunis and
Algiers. Troubles within the province were mounting for decades. The economic
crisis started in the mid-1810s, was exacerbated political tensions, and contributed to
the growing resentment towards the pasha’s increasing mismanagement in the 1820s.
These difficulties effectively whittled away the already hollowed confidence in the
bey’s capacity to govern, and in turn the ability of successor. Further undermining the
Karamanlı leadership was the souring of relations amoung British, and Maltese, and
the Tripolitan merchant class.
In 1828, one attack in particular aggravated relations between the
communities. A handful of Maltese bankers, in the middle of a heated argument,
attacked a young Tripolitan near the marina. The guards on duty rushed in to defend
the boy, who was entirely outnumbered and only a teenager himself, and in the
process proceeded beat the Maltese aggressors to a bloody pulp. In response, the
British consul Warrington demanded reparations on behalf of the agents, who were
under the protection of the British consulate. In turn, countless Tripolitans, including
several Yusuf’s ministers, fumed in anger.
The mistreatment of the boy at the hands of the grown men, and Warrington’s
subsequent demands, which were overwhelming perceived as European entitlement
and crystalized into an open antagonism against the foreign residents of the city.
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Yusuf attempted to intervene and cool tempers and granted the frustrated population
the safe release of Tripolitan soldiers from the castle prison.735
But the die was cast. Attacks on Maltese residents, as well as on members of
the British diplomatic corps only increased. By 1830, two years after the incident,
diplomats and their families had also fallen victim to harassment and abuse. For
example, Consul Warrington along with his son Frederick, and his daughter were
openly attacked while walking in the city walls. The British threatened to pull their
emissaries from the province. Anger festered and the pasha’s ministers refused British
demands for redress. Yusuf Pasha attempted to curtail the rampant social disorder, but
his efforts were mostly futile.
The Tipping Point
The conditions of public disorder soon spilled beyond the walls of Tripoli and
spread to the already disgruntled Bedouin communities of the western region of
Cyrenaica and the southern region of Fezzan. Soon, two of the most prominent figures
in Yusuf’s administration, Mohammed Beitul Mal and Hassuna D’Ghies began to
discuss alternative candidates to replace Yusuf Pasha, and to restructure the Tripolitan
government.736 Facing increased pressure from the members of the divan, the pasha
was nearing seventy and no longer possessed the wherewithal to withstand either the
growing rebellions within his province or the dogged ambition of his son Ali, whom
he had publicly repudiated after an earlier attempt to assassinate him. Still, the
abdication of Yusuf triggered yet another round of dynastic infighting between
Yusuf’s successor Ali, who was challenged by the rival claims of his nephew
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Mohammed.
Mohammed’s father and namesake was Yusuf’s eldest son and had died in
Egypt after a long period of exile. However, Mohammed claimed that his father was
the rightful heir and thus the stewardship of Tripoli should pass on to him rather than
to his uncle Ali. The fight for control of Tripoli continued among the Karamanlı men.
The Roots of Trouble: Egypt and Tripoli
Compounding the governor’s troubles, Yusuf Pasha’s relationship with the
Egyptian vali had also begun to sour. In 1822-3, difficulty between the two rules came
to a head when Yusuf Pasha offered refuge to six Mamluks who had survived the
Egyptian vali’s Citadel massacre and since fled to Kurdufan, in Central Sudan.
However, with Mehmed Ali’s Sudan campaign, the Mamluks soon found themselves
facing the same devastating political wrath of the governor that had let him to
massacre the cavalrymen a decade prior. Fleeing first to Darfur, and then to Wadai,
the remaining Mamluks ultimately were granted asylum by Yusuf, who gave them his
permission to travel north from Wadai to settle in Fezzan, where they remained under
Tripolitan protection.737 This frustrated Mehmed Ali, and he would soon adopt tactics,
in many ways similar to those of Hammuda Pasha, in an effort not only to undermine,
but entirely overthrow the Tripolitan regime.
The tradition of offering protection to Egyptian political dissidents began
under the short-lived administration of Yusuf’s older brother, Ahmed, in the late
eighteenth century. While Ahmed managed to retain power for only a couple of
months following the death of his father, the practice of granting asylum to Egyptian
political exiles continued throughout the turn of the century. Equally, the practice of
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granting safe haven to Tripolitan exiles was also maintained in Cairo.738
Ahmed Karamanlı himself had little choice but to seek refuge in Egypt.
Similarly, Yusuf’s eldest son, Mohammad fled Derna after his attempted uprising
with the Jawazi Bedouins was brutally crushed by his brother. In Cairo, Yusuf’s
exiled heir apparent sought the protection of Mehmed Ali and spent the majority of
his remaining days within the city’s walls.
The political asylum seekers who fled from Egypt to Tripoli however, were
typically much less powerful then those who fled to Egypt. In the 1810s, Mehmed
Ali’s attempts to expand his control to the outer reaches of Egyptian territory
instigated a great deal of political antagonism among the Bedouin communities of the
Western Desert. Depending on circumstances and the reach of the vali’s forces,
Bedouins found safe haven in Cyrenaica, where they could avoid both their forcible
conscription into the pasha’s army and the various tax levies issued from Cairo.739
The Awlad Suleiman, whose lands straddled the divide between western
Egypt and Cyrenaica made full use of this tactic. However, from Cairo’s perspective
it was one thing for the Karamanlı governor to turn a blind eye towards Bedouin
horsemen evading taxes, but something entirely different to offer political sanctuary
to the surviving members of the Mamluk households that had participated in the
administration of Egypt since the thirteenth century.
In response, Mehmed Ali turned to his army, as well as to his alliances with
the Hanadi and the Awlad Ali Bedouins. In 1826, Egyptian forces totaling 2,000
soldiers, with the likely involvement of the exiled Mohammed Bey, crossed the
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border in Cyrenaica and took the garrison outpost of Tobruk, but did not advance
further.740 Nevertheless, the annexation of this small outpost with a well-protected
natural harbor was enough to cause concern in the divan of Tripoli. Much like his
father before him, Yusuf found himself having to cope with a series of cross-border
incursions, this time from Egypt rather than Tunis which, while never actively
undermining his continued rule in the province, were able to generate a great deal of
insecurity within the walls of the Tripolitan castle and beyond.
Egyptian border incursions continued throughout the end of the decade. Each
time forces would capture exiles who had fled the government of Mehmed Ali, as
well as loot and cause a great deal of trouble in the western spaces of Tripolitania, but
never venture further into the regency. 741 These maneuvers served to intimidate the
Tripolitan bey rather than to expand the reach of Mehmed Ali’s imperial control.
After all, despite the weakened state of the Egyptian army in the post-Navarino late
1820s, the overthrow of the aging Yusuf Pasha would not have been of tremendous
military cost to Cairo. Rather, by mirroring the measures used by Hammuda Pasha
against the equally enfeebled Ali Karamanlı Pasha nearly half a century before, Cairo
was able to maintain a relatively constant level of political uncertainty and, in doing
so, tacitly undermine the Karamani governor. In effect, the Egyptian vali was looking
to curtail, but not entirely compromise, the political viability of Tripoli. These
measures were overwhelmingly successful. Each time the vali’s troops crossed the
border, panic resonated through broader Tripolitania.742
The Shocks of 1830
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In February 1830, the confidence in Yusuf Pasha’s continued rule plummeted.
Months prior to the landing of 34,000 French troops in Sidi Fredj, just west of the Bay
of Algiers in June that year, news reached Tripoli that Mehmed Ali was planning an
invasion of Tripoli and Tunis. The news, which had arrived via different diplomatic
and mercantile channels, shattered the remaining confidence in the aging governor.
First to divulge the information was the Sardinian ambassador to Tripoli, who
revealed that the news had reached him by way of the French ambassador in Florence.
According to him, Mehmed Ali in alliance with France was planning to seize Tripoli,
Tunis and Algiers. If this was not enough to ensure panic, later that month Jewish
Tripolitan merchants who conducted extensive commerce in the Grand Duchy of
Tuscany also returned to the harbor of the city. They quickly informed everyone that
they had been forced to abandon their purchases and belongings in Livorno.743
The city was in uproar. Yusuf mobilized seventy thousand men, under the
Georgian ra’is almarsa Mustafa Gurgi, and dispatched them to the Cyrenaica. Hajj
Muhammed Baid al Malk and Sidi Umar marched to Bomba and Sirte in order to
protect the territory from possible invasion. The governor’s divan met frequently in
secret meetings in an effort to strategize a response.744 Further undermining public
confidence, Yusuf immediately imposed a general tax on the population to raise the
two million Spanish dollars he needed to mobilize the Tripolitan navy and army.745
While the invasion never manifested, the breaking point for the continued
governorship of Yusuf Karamanlı Pasha came shortly after the June 1830 French
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invasion of neighboring Algiers. By then, tensions in the province were on a hairtrigger about the possibility, if not the eventuality, of invasion and even the
governor’s most powerful allies had lost faith in his continued ability to lead the
province.
Removing the Pasha
The broader population of Tripolitania had had enough and the unresolved
political revolts of the 1820s flared up again. By 1831, the Gharian Amazigh united
forces with the Saif an-Nasir clan under Abdul Jalil as well as the Awlad Suleiman,
demanding a sharp reduction in tribute rates. Under the leadership of Abdul Jalil, the
Saif an-Nasir Bedouins join forces with a compendium of Bedouins and Amazigh
horsemen.746 Collectively, under the organization of Abdul Jalil the prepared to face
Yusuf’s ground forces. Numbered between twenty-to-fifty thousand combined
forces, they were not only strong enough to push back Yusuf’s men, but to advance
the territory under their control from Ghademes south to Bornu and Hauasaland to the
northern frontier of Fezzan.747 By the summer of 1831, the Karamanlı pasha had lost
control of over a third of the Tripolitan province and access to the caravan routes of
the trans-Saharan networks.
Compounding Yusuf’s troubles, Abdul Jalil proved himself to be a skilled
negotiator. When British consul Warrington arrived in Ben Ulid to negotiate peace
terms on behalf of the pasha in December, Abdul Jalil offered the entire region of
Fezzan to the British in exchange for their support. The Bedouin leader’s argument
was that since the French had taken Algiers, the British would be able to use Fezzan
as a bulwark to limit the further spread of French expansion, and maintain their
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colonial interests in the Chad basin.748 Negotiations not only did not favor the
Tripolitan pasha but also represented a new chapter in European imperial competition.
By the following summer, the highest members of Yusuf’s divan met in secret
to force the abdication of the bey. After extensive deliberations, the ministers Hajj
Muhammed Baitul Mal, Yusuf’s brother in law and the former ra’is al marsa, Murad
Ra’is and Muhammed D’Ghies chose to replace Yusuf with his son Ali. On 16
August 1832, a tearful Yusuf lead his final divan, summoned his son and pronounced:
My dear son and successor, I now take off the heavy burden I carry on my
shoulders and throw it upon you, preferring to live tranquil and to see you on
my thrown. I recommend you to act strenuously to fulfill the laws of the
[Quran,] of our prophet and not to govern by caprice: the fall and sin of my
government are owing to this. 749
In one of his first decisions after ascending to power, Ali distanced himself from
Warrington, the British consul, who - many Tripolitan dignitaries believed - had for a
long time exerted adverse influence on the deposed Yusuf Karamanlı Pasha. One
consequence of this shift was the young governor’s newfound alliance with France,
which sparked the struggle between French and British diplomacies for influence in
the province. In this context, both great powers threw their support behind rival
claimants for power in Tripoli, Ali and his nephew Mohammed.
The British Warrington wrote in the autumn of 1832, “If Ali succeeds this place
will be no more than a colony of France as the advantages would be derived without
the odium of expenses.”750 A great deal of backstage maneuvering and manifestations
of rivalry between France and Britain took place over the next eighteen months, to the
point where, on 29 April 1834 addition of the London Times ran an article that wrote
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“… the British have a secret design—first to overturn and confuse, and then to occupy
the regency of Tripoli.”751 When the political conditions with the province had so
blatantly devolved to the point of a published discussion of a Tripolitan invasion by
British forces, Mahmud II and the Porte stepped in.
Ottoman Response
In September 1834, the Sublime Porte sent an envoy, Mehmed Çekir, the
Private Secretary of the Seraglio, as the private envoy from the Sultan dispatched to
resolve the dispute between Ali and Mohammed. After a series of meetings with
officials of the divan, the sultan’s representative gave a firman to Ali, in which the
Porte recognized his claim and his father’s abdication.752 The firman provided Ali
with the official recognition of the Ottoman sultan, and “the high honors and authority
of a representative of our brilliant royalty by conferring upon [him] with the royal
letter the rank of beylerbey and Prince Ruler of the said Regency of Tarabulsgarb.”753
However, as social unrest grew in intensity, by September 1834 not even an official
decree, written personally by Mahmud II, was enough to stop the infighting and
public disorder. Mohammed’s supporters refused to acknowledge the firman, and
while the presence of the sultan’s representative in the province sufficed to prevent an
open aggression, the fighting resumed immediately after Mehmed Çekir set sail to
return to the imperial capital, and continued throughout the winter.
Interestingly, while there is a pronounced absence of Ottoman documents on
the French invasion of Algiers in 1830, the Porte documented the Sultan’s re-conquest
of Tripoli. From the surviving records, we learn that the sultan received near weekly
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updates regarding on the ongoing infighting between Ali, Mohammed, and their
respective imperial backers. By winter 1834, the Porte turned to the bey of Tunis,
Hussein II, in an effort to intercede.754 Similarly, Ottoman ambassadors in Paris and in
London were both working to curtail the efforts of their European counterparts in the
proxy battle between Ali and his nephew.755
Moreover, it is from the Ottoman records that we know that during the
political crisis of 1834-1835, Tunis supplied Tripoli with the much needed grain
shipments to off-set the ongoing food-shortages.756 In a striking contrast to the role
the Tunisian bey and his support of the French invasion of Algiers, during the
Tripolitan dynastic struggle, the Husainid governance adopted a different stance.
After the French invasion of Algeria in 1830, Tunis found itself in a precarious
socio-economic position. Hussein II was forced rely on loans from European
merchants in order to sustain the province, and withstand the shockwaves that
accompanied the political shift from the rule of the Algerian dey to the French
imperial control and the restored monarchy’s subsequent attempts to curtail the
political resistance of Abdul Qadir within the entirety of the province. For Tunis, this
meant that the mounting European debt allowed for expanded European involvement
in both the political affairs of the province as well as its economy. It was during this
time that, Montana noted, a particularly salient resurgence in the, then clandestine,
slave trade through the Air-Kano route. However, this shift back towards the transSaharan slave trade did little to compensate the province for the lack of previous
maritime revenues as well as the agricultural reforms that effectively weakened both
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the provinces grain production.757
Consequently, by 1835, the Tunisian administration of Hussein the II was far
too preoccupied with its own internal troubles to involve itself in its eastern
neighbor’s dynastic succession crisis. The Porte’s response was hindered by its
preoccupation with the growing Russian influence in Moldavia and Wallachia, where
the Russian administration imposed new Organic Statutes, which restructured the
principalities’ institutions.758 While Istanbul recognized these reforms as early as
January 1834, the situation continued to be a matter of concern in the following year.
Thus, the Porte wanted a swift resolution to the matter of Tripoli. Mahmud II chose a
strategy very similar to the one implemented by Ali Burghol nearly fifty years before.
The sultan sent an emissary, armed with a firman and relatively small but
nevertheless substantial fleet, and reclaimed Tripoli for the Porte. In the narrative of
his travels in North Africa, Robert Greenhow offered his readers a detailed
description of the 1835, entirely peaceful, Ottoman recapture of Tripolitania.
Greenhow wrote:
In the spring of 1835 reports were circulating in Tripoli that a Turkish armament
was about to be sent to that place from Constantinople; some supposed it was
for the purpose of overthrowing all opposition to Ali; others hinted that this isn't
meant to take possession of the country... The letter opinion was confirmed by
all the European Journals; and indeed it could scarcely have been expected that
the Ottoman government, which at that moment seem to need all its forces and
funds for its own defense, could have been disposed to send a large and
expensive expedition for the mere purpose of settling a dispute with regard to
the sovereignty of a distant country.
On 20th of May [1835] Mohammed [Ç]ekir returned to Tripoli where he
announced the Turkish squadron as near, and assuring Ali that it was sent
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entirely for his benefit, advising him to show his gratitude to the Sultan, by the
liberal distribution of presents among its officers. The Ottoman ships appeared
on the evening of the 25th and in the course of that night the whole armament
consisting of one ship of the line, five frigates two sloops, two brigs, a schooner,
a cutter and ten transports anchored in the roads and harbor, without any
opposition either on the part of the Pasha or his rival. The next morning
presence of fresh provisions were sent to the ships from the [Mohammed’s
supporters] as well as from the town... On the 27th of more than four thousand
Turkish soldiers with nineteen cannons and four mortars had entered the city,
which was thus placed entirely at their discretion. On the morning of the 28th,
Ali again went on board the Admiral’s ship, in order as it was understood to
accompany the officers and the commander of the trips to the city; two hours
afterwards he guns of the ships announced that the high personages were on
their way to shore, and the barges supposed to contain them were discovered
approaching the water gate. The Turkish Admiral and General landed and
attended by their guards entered the castle; the Pasha however did not appear; it
was soon ascertained that he was a prisoner onboard the flagship. At four
o'clock the sultan’s firman was publicly read, by which the General Mustapha
Nedgib was appointed pasha of the Province of Tripoli...
The Arabs as soon they were certain of Ali's imprisonment, and of their own
freedom from danger, abandon their tents and batteries and flocked to the
town… With a few followers that two young [surviving] Princes then betook
themselves to flight. Hamet succeeded in reaching the frontiers of Egypt but
[Mohammed] overpowered by the sudden disappointment of all his hopes, blew
his own brains out with a blunderbuss on the day after he left Tripoli; at least
such with the account of his death given by his attendance.
Ali and his Minister Mohammed D’Ghies were sent to Constantinople…the old
Pasha Yusuf who appear to be sinking into idiocy remains in honorable durance
in the castle, where [Hajj Mohammed Beitul Mal] is allowed to attend. Thus has
the Caramanli family been the second time deprived of the sovereignty of
Tripoli, which will not probably be regained by one of their name.759
Unlike Burghol however, this time the Ottoman authority managed to retain
control over Tripoli. Ottoman fears of losing even more territory to European imperial
powers grew after 1830, leading the Porte to impose a new form of imperialism, this
time modeled rather closely on the European model of colonialism, to the territories
of broader Tripolitania. However, the ties between the North African provinces and
the Porte, and as well as the Ottoman territories ties with the Sahel not only remained
viable, but grew deeper as most of the Awlad Suleiman Bedouins were forced into
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either the Lake Chad Basin or into western Egypt.760
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EPILOGUE
The fifty years straddling the end of the eighteenth and the beginning of the
nineteenth centuries constituted a period of turmoil, change, and connectivity among
the Ottoman provinces of the North African coast. Across the southern seaboard of
the Mediterranean, regional elites faced new challenges, were forced to accommodate
new actors into their political networks, and carefully navigate across the stormy
waters of local, regional and imperial politics. Some – as in the case of Algerian
ta’ife, and the Karamanlıs – failed to retain their positions, others – as Mehmed Ali –
succeeded in their ambitions.
However, until now, these actors have remained largely on the sidelines of
most historical analysis, which presented them at the losing end and as the unadaptive
victims of the unravelling of the Ottoman Empire during the emergence of new
imperial idiom in the region. Spatial and temporal compartmentalization of North
African history led scholars to see the North African provinces as peripheral actors,
fighting a losing battle against European powers seeking to establish and expand their
hold on the southern coast of the basin.
However, as I have shown in the present study, North African actors did not
exist in a vacuum. Rather, they maintained and expanded the existing political
networks, which in turn bound Tunis, Tripoli, and Egypt to one another, the Ottoman
Empire, the broader Mediterranean, and the African Sahel. In spite of its position as
an imperial periphery, the Maghreb and – more broadly speaking, the Arab provinces
of the ‘well-protected domains’ – increasingly participated in the interconnected
world of the turn of the nineteenth century. The governors and elites of the region
demonstrated the adaptability of the North African province by refusing to remain
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locked in their traditional institutional and political frameworks.
Rather, these actors demonstrated socio-political innovation, adopted one
another’s tactics and actively sought the support and resources necessary for their
political survival. By expanding both their vertical and horizontal ties, these actors
adjusted their strategies, going far beyond the binary opposition of the center and the
periphery and in doing so thoroughly restructured the political map of North Africa
and the Ottoman Empire.
This disseratation has argued that this new framework evolved along two
major axes of socio-political engagement, which have been generally neglected in the
historiography of Maghreb at the brink of modernity: one vertical, one horizontal.
While the Maghreb remained a constitutive parts of the Ottoman sultans ‘wellprotected domains,’ the link between the imperial center and its westernmost
possessions has remained largely neglected by scholars, who perceived the Maghreb
as an imperial hinterland, beyond effective control of the Sublime Porte.
However, as I have shown in the present analysis, Ottoman authority loomed
large over Maghreb and the policies and strategies of North African political actors—
in their various machinations and tactics. Moreover, from the perspective of the Porte,
and the empire’s ongoing commitment of resources to ward off the Russian imperial
threat, Ottoman officials did not simply leave their African provinces to their own
devices. Rather, as this dissertation has demonstrated, authorities in Constantinople
frequently called on the support of Maghrebi fleets and interviened in the diplomatic
and military affairs of the North African provinces.
While this relationship was often far from smooth and involved constant
bargaining between central and peripheral actors, the Ottoman presence in the region
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was far from negligent, and constituted a force that western as well as regional,
diplomats penetrating the region had to account for.
In effect, this vertical axis was complemented by a horizontal one, with
networks of socio-political engagement crisscrossing the region itself. The analysis of
this research has shown a complex web of communication circuits, with patronage
and cooperation ties straddling the region’s boundaries. However, these networks
remained largely ignored by scholars, both western and North African alike. In the
face of various geopolitical and internal pressures, the governors of North African
provinces intensified communication with each other, trying to forge alliances, secure
their rule and expand their influence in the region. Moreover, this growth of a
“networking society”761 was by no means restricted to the powerholders, but included
a variety of actors, which rarely made their way into the political histories of the
region, be they Islamic scholars, corsairs or Bedouin leaders.
This complex geography of human agents challenges the established view,
which regarded the affairs of Ottoman North Africa in an insular manner, as selfcontained traditional communities helpless in the face of the reshuffling of global
political idioms. The shift of focus from the geopolitical understanding of provincial
politics towards more nuanced multiple geographies of human agents allows us not
only to reconnect the region and its shared history to the region and beyond during the
critical temporal juncture, but also to posit it within the wider narrative of the Age of
Revolutions.762
Sandwiched between the Mediterranean and the Sahel, the Maghrebi provinces

761

Barkey, Empire of Difference, passim.
For similar discussion on the Ottoman Balkans, see Frederick F Anscombe, “The Balkan
Revolutionary Age,” The Journal of Modern History 84, no. 3 (2012): 572–606.
762

346

Msdfasd

saw both the sea of water and the sea of the desert as opportunities rather than
obstacles. The ebb and flow of the corso, attempts at tightening control over the
hinterland and North African expansionist ventures into the Sahel, were all closely
connected and represented the North African provinces’s response to the changing
environment.
Apart from the north-south axis between the waves of Mediterranean and the
dunes of the Sahel, the analysis has brought to light the importance of east-west
connections that bound the Maghrebi provinces to the emergent political power of
Mehmed Ali. Scholars of North Africa and the Ottoman Empire have generally
approached Egyptian history in isolation from that of its western neighbors. In
contrast to the peripheral status of Algiers, Tunis, and Tripoli, Egypt constituted an
empire-wide center, second only to Istanbul. Under the dynamic leadership of
Mehmed Ali, the vali himself emerged as a powerful adversary to the Sublime Porte.
However, the narratives of his political ascendancy have generally underplayed
Egypt’s connections to the Maghreb, instead focusing on its Syrian and Hijazi policy.
As I have argued throughout the present study, the re-examination of sources
provides us with a different narrative: one of a complex and multilayered nexus of
political, economic and social ties between Egypt and Maghrebi provinces. With the
previously hegemonic Algiers in decline and the Sublime Porte locked in a series of
debilitating wars against the Russian Empire, the Egyptian vali became the dominant
presence along the Mediterranean southern seaboard. At the same time, the
relationship was far from one-sided, since Mehmed Ali was dependent on the
regencies’ fleets to project his power across the Eastern Mediterranean. Obviously,
the relationship between Egypt and its western neighbors was fraught with frequent
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conflict, but there is no doubt that the two parties remained dependent on each other
for resources and manpower.
This interdependency of North African provinces forces us to reconsider the
way modern historiography has framed the region’s history, namely the implicit
notion of Egyptian exceptionalism. While Mehmed Ali has emerged as a towering
figure in the historiography of the Middle East, a closer analysis of the regional
dynamics challenges the uniqueness of his policies throughout the period.
In fact, the interconnectedness of the North African seaboard contributed to
the spread of political ideas, strategies and tactics, with provincial powerholders
engaging in similar projects to crack down on internal opposition and expand their
control inland towards the Sahel. Albeit extraordinarily successful, Mehmed Ali’s
consolidation and expansion of his power constituted part of the wider set of North
African dynamics, and the difference between him and his Maghrebi counterparts was
quantitative rather than qualitative.
The existence of complex and tightly knit political networks in the region had
tremendous circumstances at the point, when upheavals in Europe spilled across
Mediterranean and the Middle East. Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars brought to
the region a new set of diplomatic actors, who tried to expand influence of their
respective governments in the region. While Eurocentric historiography has generally
assumed that European diplomatic agents changed the very framework of North
African policy, I argue that the dynamics played out in a different fashion.
While British, French, and even American officials had superior military
forces to back up their claims; however, on the ground, it was the local patterns of
connectivity and bargaining, to which these new actors had to adapt. Ottoman North
348

Msdfasd

Africa constituted a hotchpotch of crisscrossing alliances, conflicts and patterns of
engagement, to which European diplomats had to recourse to in order to further their
agendas.
At the same time, the growing involvement of European powers in North
Africa and the Mediterranean reshaped the regional political scene, as well as had a
profound impact on economic fortunes of the provinces. In this respect, the famous
1798 French invasion of Egypt constituted a crucial event in regional history. In a
similar manner, the crackdown on corso following the Congress of Vienna plunged
the economies of Tunis and Tripoli into crisis, forcing their governors to restructure
their respective economies.
However, the local response was not simply reactive, but constituted a blend
of traditional patterns and local innovation. For instance, Egyptian and Tripolitan turn
towards the Sahel and their expansion along slave trade routes was not a coincidence,
but rather a conscious drive to increase revenue and political control as old sources of
income dried up. Inspiration also came from the imperial center in Istanbul: the
overhaul of the military by Hammuda Pasha, Yusuf Karamanlı and Mehmed Ali
reflected the parallel efforts of sultan Selim III nizam-ı cedid reforms. Taken together,
these adjustments challenge the oft-repeated narrative of local, traditional institutional
framework failing to adapt to the changing conditions at the dawn of the nineteenth
century.
The impact of North Africa’s regional and cross-regional socio-political
networks went far beyond the immediate political conjectures, shaping post-1830s
period to a considerable degree. While the French invasion of Algiers in 1830 and the
Ottoman reassertion of control over Tunis five years later constituted a watershed in
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North African history, it did not mean that the regional networks of cooperation
withered away.
On the contrary, their evolution and transformation eventually left an indelible
mark on politics in the Maghreb under colonial rule. The most prominent example is
the Sanussiyyah movement, whose roots we can trace to the North African turn
towards the Sahel in the opening decades of the century. Obviously, the new idiom of
colonialism in the southern Mediterranean had not created a blank slate and local
actors used these networks in order to assert their agency vis-à-vis the authorities.
The survival and further evolution of those regional network forces us to
rethink the traditional divide between early modern and modern history of the
southern Mediterranean. Too often western and local have historiography alike
presented the Ottoman rule in the Maghreb as the source of the region’s weakness at
the break of the nineteenth century, and subsequent colonial expansion of European
powers as its outcome. In rendering the history of the region as shaped solely by
outside powers, this paradigm has effectively deprived local political actors of their
agency.
However, as I have shown throughout the dissertation, Ottoman North Africa
during the period enjoyed bustling political life of its own, and local powerholders,
corsairs, Bedouin traders, and itinerant scholars pursued their own agendas, under
both Ottoman and European rule. This forces us to rethink the periodization of North
African political history, with the processes set in motion in the late eighteenth
century continuing well into the colonial period.
At the same time, the actor-oriented approach I have adopted forces us to
revisit the emergence of a new colonial idiom that gradually came to dominate the
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nineteenth-century North Africa. While the discussion of the rise of colonialism has
generally put focus on western actors and political trends and rendered North African
political milieu as an object acted upon, the present study has shown that regional
actors were very much the subjects that influenced and shaped the western approach
to the region. Egyptian and Maghrebi interests played a considerable role in the ways
French, British, Russian, and Ottoman imperial centers formulated policy towards the
region, and, even more importantly, how diplomatic agents operating on the ground
applied these policies. Moreover, the framework presented in this study extended well
into the nineteenth century, when modes of imperialism transformed into colonial
projects and the networks of resistance, similarly, as before, transcending the divides
of the provinces and empires.
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